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Psychology
of
Industrial Conflict

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
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Psychology of Industrial Conflict







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Preface

The physical sciences have now achieved such success that it is possible for all men to die together. Relatively little is being done to make it possible for us to live together.

Wars begin in the minds of men. So do strikes and other forms of industrial conflict. Wars are conflicts between organized groups, as are the difficulties encountered in union-management relations. It seems to me, therefore, that an effort to apply modern psychological knowledge to industrial controversies may have value not only in its immediate focus but also in casting light upon international affairs and other social problem areas.

Industrial conflict, racial conflict, and international conflict pose grave threats to the future of civilization. I do not believe that the proper role of the social scientist, in this situation, is to take detailed notes regarding the developing crisis, for the potential benefit of some future archeologist. It seems to me that we should be collecting, organizing, and evaluating knowledge from all the social sciences in so far as it bears on the resolution of group conflicts.

One of the conspicuous gaps in this knowledge has been in the sector which is known as social psychology. Professional psychologists have tended to restrict their efforts to a more detailed understanding of the human being in isolation, disregarding to a regrettable extent both the determination of individual characteristics by group influences and the determination of group process by individual functions. Management decisions are made by individual human beings; strikes are called by specific persons. Psychology must have—and does have—important contributions to make in understanding these decisions. If we set as one aim the reduction of frequency and intensity of industrial conflicts, we can say that an adequate

comprehension of psychological principles is essential to the achievement of this goal.

This is not to suggest that psychology has the final answer, that it represents an approach somehow more fundamental than economics or sociology. Industrial conflict is a complex phenomenon to which valid approaches may be made on many levels. I have attempted to systematize and apply the principles of social psychology as they are relevant to this phenomenon. Frequent reference is made to the fact that the human person does not operate in a vacuum, and that, consequently, principles derived from economics, sociology, and other disciplines must be accorded a prominent place in our thinking. For obvious reasons I have not attempted a complete statement or integration of these other approaches.

The conflict between employer and employee has today a unique significance for western civilization. Even those among us who hold to the view that ours is a truly classless society must concede that economic struggles have become symbols in the world clash between communism and democracy. It is thus increasingly urgent that we broaden our understanding of the factors involved in industrial strife, and that we apply this knowledge to the resolution of conflicts without resort to violence or totalitarianism.

This book offers no formula solutions to industrial conflict. It represents the competition between unions and management as a complex set of interactions occurring simultaneously on the individual, group, and institutional levels. My effort has been to gather relevant material on the psychological factors involved, to formulate general principles, and to demonstrate by reference to specific union-management behavior that these principles are useful.

Company executives may feel that I have been excessively critical of some aspects of managerial behavior. Similarly, union officials may react negatively to some of my comments about the motivation of certain union policies. I anticipate that both sides will endorse my remarks in so far as they relate to the opposition. Let me emphasize, however, that I have tried to avoid either praise or criticism of either party to labor relations. My concern has been with the facts of human behavior; if describing these facts accurately constitutes either praise or criticism, that is incidental. Indeed, I have found it necessary to stress the surprising uniformity with respect to many psychological processes, whether the individual is functioning as a factory worker, a union leader, or a company executive.

I have not ventured into the recommendation of policy changes for management or unions. The psychological principles here de-

rived and illustrated can be of great practical importance to anyone in industry. However, they must be applied with due consideration for the concrete economic and social context of any given policy. Such questions go well beyond the scope I have set for this volume.

Because of the technical nature of my material, and the fact that in some instances I am proposing new formulations of old problems, I have not written primarily for practitioners in the field. The treatment will, however, provide a new approach, and a framework for thinking about situations, which practitioners may appreciate.

This book is addressed primarily to advanced students in psychology, in other social sciences, in management, and in labor relations, who look forward to roles as teachers, researchers, or practitioners in union-management relations. It is organized to provide a new frame of reference, sharply different from and yet essentially compatible with more familiar formulations in terms of economic issues and organizational structures. Secondly I have written this book for social scientists in other disciplines who may want to know, without digging through a scattered and extensive literature, what psychologists have to contribute. We are in urgent need of better interdisciplinary cooperation. My personal experiences as a member of a research team in the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations at the University of Illinois have convinced me that such cooperation is both feasible and rewarding. I hope that this book may have as one of its consequences the facilitation of such efforts in other research centers.

ROSS STAGNER

Rome, Italy
January, 1956



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Introduction

Strikes are headline news; peaceful settlements of union-management disputes are not. Trouble in the coal mines; trouble on the docks; trouble in the steel mills—these are the ways in which the problems of industrial relations are called to public attention at periodic intervals. But behind and aside from these dramatic flare-ups can be found a vastly greater number of establishments where employer and union deal peacefully together.

(From a purely practical point of view, both conflict and cooperation in industry are important—for directly opposite reasons, of course. From a scientific point of view they are also important. We need to know the sequence of events that leads to harmony or to violence. We need to understand the forces that lead to action and reaction. At the present time science and understanding seem extremely important. In a practical sense we can blunder along, and for the moment we can tolerate the social cost of conflict and strikes. But there are always people around who have panaceas for sale, solutions to all our troubles; they know what to do about unions and businessmen who disturb the peace with labor troubles. The solution may have a swastika, or a hammer-and-sickle stamped on it, but in time of hardship it may sound attractive. Unless we have achieved a deeper understanding of the causes of industrial conflict than we now have, these patent medicines may represent a real danger.)

(We need to understand, therefore, the factors behind employee "demands" for certain kinds of benefits and changes in working conditions. We need to analyze the conditions determining employer resistance to these demands. Perhaps even more important is an understanding of the circumstances under which suitable relationships are worked out smoothly without these dramatic occurrences of strikes and lockouts. We need, in short, more insight into the phenomena of industrial relations.)

The term "industrial relations" today points most often to group interactions: to events involving management, an organized group

functioning as employer, and involving union, an organized group representing the employees. It is true that the majority of employed persons in the United States are still not represented by unions, and yet it is also true that significant patterns of worker-employer relationships are determined by these organized groups.

Some employers, for example, keep the wage scale and employee benefits just a little above the union level. This is calculated to reduce the attractiveness of unionization for their employees. Others, because of turnover and loss of their best workers, meet the union scale. *Gains won by unionized employees* are often given to other groups in order to maintain established differentials. Thus, it happens that organized employees, even though a minority, do in fact determine patterns of benefits and conditions for a sizeable majority of American workers.

WHY PSYCHOLOGY?

Under these circumstances the question may well be asked: why psychology? If the phenomena of industrial relations are primarily group phenomena, is it not more appropriate to analyze them in terms of the concepts of sociology and economics? Certainly we must agree that such analyses have made substantial contributions to an understanding of these problems. There are, however, gaps in their formulations which call for clarification at the level of psychology. After all, groups are composed of individuals; evidence is evaluated, decisions reached, and policies implemented by specific identifiable persons. It is scarcely conceivable that psychological variables have no place in such a process.

This is not to say that a psychological explanation is *the* explanation of industrial events. The study of union-management relations is complex, and important aspects belong to the domains of economics, of sociology, of politics, and even of engineering. This book does not try to summarize the relevant facts from these fields, but from time to time connections are established with analyses from these other academic disciplines.

Economics and psychology. Let us note, first of all, the importance of economic analysis. Industry exists by virtue of an economic system, as do unions. The main goals of both managers and workers *appear* to be economic in character; we stress the word "appear" because closer study quickly reveals important non-economic goals. These can be comprehended better through a psychological analysis than by treating them as incidental to economic events.

Economics deals with problems of impersonal market forces; psychology deals with specific, identifiable persons. The economist speaks of "a change in the labor market"; the psychologist observes John Jones out of work and looking unsuccessfully for a job. Both sets of facts are "real"; but they exist on different levels. One way of characterizing the difference is that economics deals with a macroscopic analysis, psychology with microscopic techniques.

The economist has been far from successful with his efforts to comprehend the phenomena of industrial conflict. By and large, both sides lose in a strike. Workers often lose an amount in wages which will not be recouped for years, if ever. Employers lose in profits, sales, customers, and overhead costs. Most of these can never be regained. Surely, if people were the rational calculating individuals of classical economic theory, such things could not happen.

It is this very irrationality of so much of industrial behavior which makes the psychological approach so important. Psychologists have become, in effect, specialists in the irrational. And, interestingly enough, psychological research often reveals that superficially irrational events are logical enough—if we understand the mental processes involved in them.

Sociology and psychology. Sociologists also have important things to say about industrial relations. The firm is a social group as well as an economic event. Workers organize into unions and behave according to familiar principles of group action. We need more good studies of union-management relations from a sociological angle.

Again it is possible to suggest that sociology provides a macroscopic approach whereas psychology utilizes microscopic analysis. We shall be concerned not merely with events in the group but with specific persons—leaders and followers; with how the facts would look to this person, how his motives would affect his decision, and so on. For the most part this will be a "class" psychology which assumes that people of defined characteristics will respond in a certain way. It still gets down to smaller units than the typical sociological study.

This emphasis on getting at smaller units does not justify the assertion that psychology is "basic" in a sense that other social sciences are not. Each of these levels of analysis has its uses. An economic analysis in terms of market forces is just as valid as a psychological analysis in terms of motives, perceptions, and barriers. Each is necessary for a complete picture of the problem.

Consider this book. From the bookseller's point of view it is an item which he can sell, preferably at a profit. The printer sees it as paper of certain quality, printed in a given type face with some kind

of ink, and so on. A chemist would see it as a complex of organic molecules. A physicist would report that it is really a mass of electrons and protons in rapid vibration. Now what is the book *really*?² Obviously it is all these things. For certain purposes one level of description is best, but for other purposes another is required.

Engineering and psychology. The engineers have made important contributions to the organization of industrial work and to its technological setting. Yet they have not been conspicuously successful in solving industrial relations problems. Their extensive training in handling inanimate materials seems to give a poor background for understanding human behavior.

Actually, by a kind of paradox which is only apparent but none the less illuminating, it can be asserted that if we treated humans as we treat machines most of our troubles would be eliminated. No engineer, for example, would assign a job to a machine without considering carefully its maximum speed, its allowable load, its tolerance limits, and so on. Yet we assign jobs to humans with no consideration of the vital performance characteristics which may interfere with or prevent efficient job performance.

Realism vs. animism. Another way of saying this is to say that we have learned to treat machines realistically, not animistically. When an automobile engine breaks down, the driver may swear and impute malice to the engine—but he knows that magical incantations and punishments will not make the engine work. He must get at the cause and remedy it if he wants performance (Fig. 1.1).

When a human being “lets us down,” on the other hand, we swear at him, punish him, put him in jail—and expect him to work correctly as a result! But, realistically, he will perform efficiently only if we find the cause of his “breakdown” and correct it. Human behavior cannot be explained by “evil spirits” any more than automobiles can. Explaining human conduct as due to malice, to bad traits of character, or to inherent evil, is pure animism. Unfortunately, a great deal of public debate about labor unions is on a level with explaining an engine failure as due to evil spirits.

Industrial conflict is a complex phenomenon with many facets. The economist, the sociologist, and the engineer have dealt effectively with some aspects. More and deeper insight is needed. We believe that psychology can provide this.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE IRRATIONAL

If all human beings were entirely rational, we should undoubtedly be living in Utopia and psychologists would be permanently unem-

played. Most of us try to be rational, but with only moderate success. Employers and unionists are no exceptions.

Suppose we consider a few broad generalizations like the following:

1. Higher production of goods is beneficial to everybody.
2. Higher wages increase purchasing power.
3. Strikes are costly, wasteful, and inefficient for both sides.

It is likely that we could get unanimous agreement from employers and union leaders alike on these three platitudes. But employers cut down on production when inventories pile up; workers hold back on production above a certain rate. Unions press for higher wages; employers resist. Unions threaten to strike; employers stand firm, waste and inefficiency triumph. Such contradictions could be piled high on top of one another, but doing so would serve no useful purpose.

ALL IN A LIFETIME



Fig. 1.1. Animistic thinking. (By permission of Mr. Beck and the McNaught Syndicate, Inc.) We do not really expect to influence machines by these magical words, but we continue to expect them to change the behavior of people.

Now what about the question of rationality? The employer says higher production is good, but he must cut back or face the threat of bankruptcy. The worker says higher production is good, but he must hold back for fear of layoffs. Similarly with the other platitudes—each person finds that *the facts as he sees them* justify his behavior.

The paranoid patient who carries a gun because the Masons or the Rotarians are persecuting him is locked up as insane; but in terms of the facts as he sees them, he is simply taking a logical precaution. If the Russians build up their armies because the bad capitalist Americans are about to attack them, it is easy for us to see that they are being irrational; but do we feel that we are irrational in fearing that the Russians will attack us? Given the facts *as they look to us*, our behavior is logical.

The key to the understanding of irrational, illogical behavior is often simply the question: irrational by whose standards? How do the facts look to him? Maybe his actions are comprehensible if viewed from his angle.

Motives and perceptions. What we see often depends on what we want. The paranoid sees a world full of hostility because he himself is bitterly full of aggression. Some people see evidence of sexual misconduct on all sides because they are themselves driven by powerful unconscious sexual impulses.

A psychological analysis of union and employer behavior will therefore have to deal with questions of perception—how the facts appear to this person—and of motivation—what goals is he trying to achieve? Our understanding of industrial relations will be materially improved by this analysis.

Aggression. A major feature of industrial conflict is the amount of aggression manifest. Executives express hopes for the early demise of a union representative; workers throw bricks through factory windows and maul people trying to get through the picket line. The occurrence of the strike is usually—not always—an indication that hostility is high. Whence comes this hostility? Is it inherent in “human nature”? Can it be channeled into socially harmless channels? These are only a few of the urgent questions to which psychology may provide an answer.

Sources of psychological insight. (Psychologists have not, up to the present, devoted much energy to the analysis of social conflicts.) They have, however, accumulated an extensive body of knowledge on conflicts between persons. Clinical psychologists work daily with problems such as conflict between husband and wife, between parent and child, between teacher and pupil. These conflicts have to a

high degree the qualities of emotionality and irrationality. They provide us with both facts and theories regarding the circumstances which precipitate conflict between persons.

This knowledge cannot, unfortunately, be translated directly into social terms. If we tried to deal with employer-employee interactions in terms of the father-son relationship, we should almost certainly lapse into the group-mind fallacy described below. However, it is relevant to learn whether the union officers perceive the employer as treating them as children; and in some instances the response of the unionist to such a perception can be illuminated by knowing something of his relationship to his own father. In general, though, we must avoid analogies between group action and individual behavior. We must view our problems as involving a complex reciprocal relationship between individual and group, rather than a simple translation from the personal to the social level of events.

What psychology can contribute is a mode of analysis of problems which is based upon realism rather than animism. Consider the case of little Johnny, who is destructive, throws tantrums, fights and bullies other children, refuses to obey parental orders, and so on. Some adults may blame "original sin" for such behavior. Mother may hint darkly at heredity from father's side of the family. Observers say Johnny's actions are due to traits of aggressiveness and destructiveness. All such explanations are essentially animistic. They appeal to "spirits," little demons concealed somewhere inside Johnny, which account for his acts. By contrast, the child psychologist inquires into the child's frustrations, his feelings of insecurity, methods of parental discipline, the emotional problems of the parents themselves, the child's problems at school and play. This approach assumes that child behavior is an outcome of a definite sequence of events, and that changes in the treatment of the child can produce changes in his behavior. As in the case of the automobile engine, we must find what has happened, why it "let us down," and what concrete steps can be taken to restore it to condition for normal functioning.

The study of union-management relations is not advanced by blaming the bad, greedy capitalists or the malicious, irresponsible unionists for troubles. What is required is a technique for identifying the significant events that cause the employer to act in a manner that seems greedy, and the unionist to act in a manner that seems irresponsible. Some of these events can best be described in terms of psychology; others require consideration of economic, sociological, or technological conditions. In almost every case we shall be concerned with a reciprocal relationship between individual and group.

GROUP PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY

We are concerned with industrial relations as a process of interaction between groups. Management is always tightly organized, with policies guiding behavior, rewards, and punishments to keep members of management coordinated. Employees are rapidly becoming organized, and, although union membership is still only about 25% of the total of gainfully employed persons in the United States, unions include well over 50% of the manufacturing, railroad, and other heavy industry employees. Furthermore, union-management settlements have come to set patterns for many firms that do not have unions. It therefore seems not only justifiable, but also important, to examine intensively the psychological aspects of union-management relations. This calls for an approach somewhat different from that which is most appropriate for studying relationships of the employer with individual employees.¹

It is also important that we avoid falling into the "group mind" fallacy in dealing with events on the group level. Only individuals have motives, emotions, perceptions, habits, and memories. It is easy and convenient to speak of a "group goal," but, unless we have defined operationally what is meant by such a term, it can lead to serious misunderstanding. Goals exist first in the minds of individuals; by a process of acceptance (formal or implicit), they become adopted as goals of collective action. The individual does not conform to a group decision because of a "group mind"; he fits into the group pattern because of habits, motives, and perceptions within himself.

A picket-line example. A brief consideration of a specific incident will clarify our emphasis on the distinction between group and individual understanding, and our concern to reject the group-mind hypothesis. Suppose that a strike is in progress at a small manufacturing plant. The company has taken the position that it will try to operate; the union places a picket line across the gate. Some employees, not members of the union, try to drive in to go to work. The car is stopped, tipped over, and badly damaged; the non-strikers are mauled around, as are the police trying to protect them.

This kind of incident is often referred to as an example of a "group mind" or "mob hysteria." The point is made (correctly) that the

¹ More detailed discussions of the interactions of employer with individual employee will be found in the usual textbooks on industrial psychology and personnel management. In the Bibliography at the end of this volume will be found a number of such, listed alphabetically by author and date of publication, e.g., Blum (1949); Yoder (1952).

union members did things under the influence of the group situation that they as isolated individuals would never do. Joe Jones and Sam Smith are honest, quiet, law-abiding citizens. They would not damage a neighbor's car or beat up strangers whom they had never seen before. Yet as members of a picket line they may do just such things. How can we reconcile these two sets of observations without saying that the men were under the influence of a "mob spirit"?

Psychologists, while agreeing that Joe Jones acts differently in the group situation, reject the notion that any new principles are needed to understand his action. Here are the main points of an analysis adequate to understand his behavior as a picket:

1. *Intensity of motivation.* Although it is true that Joe would not *ordinarily* attack another man individually, it can happen under strong motivation—to protect his money, his family, or his life. To some extent the striker protecting his job sees all three of these involved. The strikebreakers are seen as snatching the bread from the mouths of his children.

2. *Mutual reinforcement.* The tension level is reinforced by the group situation. Other men are shouting angrily. Joe hears their voices, sees their facial expressions. Each encourages the other to act in a violent manner. People are pushing and shoving. The physical contact intensifies the emotional response.

3. *Distortion of perception.* Under the stress of excitement and strong motivation, the strikebreakers are perceived as alien, inhuman. They are criminals. It is not only permissible, it is actually righteous to attack them.

4. *Lifting of inhibitions.* The group situation acts in two different ways to relieve the normal inhibitions against violence. One is the neutralizing of "conscience" or superego restraints against antisocial actions. Conscience is a social product. Group pressure instills in us a reluctance to damage property or use force against other human beings. But in the mob situation there is an illusion of group approval of violence, just as in wartime people get medals for killing. Hence the normal internal inhibition against violence is diminished or neutralized in the group setting.

The fear of punishment for violence is also lessened. Guilt in our culture is an individual matter; but when many participate simultaneously in an act, it will be difficult to identify and punish individuals. The individual feels anonymous in the mob. He thinks (correctly) that his chances of being punished are rather small.

This skeletonized analysis of a typical group incident serves only to show that the concepts and methods of individual psychology are

adequate to give us a basis for the understanding of behavior in groups. The validity of the analysis has not been demonstrated. To validate the interpretation proposed, it is necessary to consider the phenomena of motivation, perception, aggression, and leadership. Approximately half of this book is devoted to establishing empirical and theoretical bases for applying these concepts to the behavior of persons responding to union-management situations of various kinds. The second half of the volume is devoted to the use of these concepts in an interpretation of group policies and actions in the industrial arena.

It will be noted that the interpretation of group incidents as individual phenomena offers a certain practical utility which cannot be found in "group mind" interpretations. If the behavior of employees, or of executives, is to be ascribed to some mysterious group spirit, practical efforts to manipulate such behaviors are severely handicapped. How do we contact a group spirit? How do we modify this spirit in order to improve union-management relations? The difficulty is evident.

On the other hand, when we evolve an analysis in terms of the motivations and perceptions of individuals, we have clearly available levers which we can grasp, operations which can be performed, to modify the components of the group. We may be able to redirect motivations, or to establish new perceptions, or to build new habits of response. The group is different from the sum of its parts; but differences in the parts make for very real differences in the group as a whole.

It must be emphasized that the individual is also modified by his group. Once a person has accepted membership in a group, he tends to conform to certain norms of the group regarding facts, proper ways of behaving, acceptable goals, etc. The business executive is modified by the corporate organization of which he is a member, just as the worker is modified by the opinions, attitudes, and values espoused in his union. The individual-group relationship is reciprocal; the group reflects individual needs, the person is influenced by group pressures.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE

Industrial conflict and industrial cooperation occur as immediate consequences of the action of individuals. These actions are guided by the *facts as they are seen by the individuals concerned*. A major portion of our analysis, therefore, is concerned with difference in perception between managers and employees and union officers. Agreement on certain facts provides a basis for cooperation; disagreement often leads to conflict.

Fundamental to an understanding of perception is the problem of

motivation.) As was noted in the picket-line example just cited, powerful motives can induce distortions of perception. "Wishful thinking" is a popular phrase identifying our tendency to accept as real those accounts of reality which fit our desires. It is thus important for us to examine the motivational characteristics of managers and employees and union officers.

(The general point of view proposed in this volume is that the phenomena of industrial conflict and industrial cooperation grow out of the needs of individual human beings.) The business man who starts an enterprise and goes into the production of a particular type of commodity is attempting to satisfy some of his own basic desires. His main motive may be a desire for money, as many economists believe it to be; it may be a desire for power, as can be demonstrated in a certain number of cases; it may be a question of prestige, status, security, or many other forms of human motivation. We shall return to this question of what people want in later chapters. We wish only to note at this point that the organization of a business enterprise and its successful maintenance are reflections of the motives of the individual entrepreneur or the group of business men who initiate this particular project.

In the same way, a labor union must be considered as a reflection of the needs, desires, and impulses of individuals. Completely satisfied workers do not organize unions, as can be demonstrated by so many case histories of particular establishments. It is true, of course, that, after a group of workers has organized a union, various forms of pressure may be brought to bear upon other individuals to join. In the first instance, however, the organization of the group reflects the needs and desires of the particular individuals who make it up. Here again, these desires may be primarily economic: the desire for wage increases, shorter work hours, and so forth; or they may be social: the desire to establish certain kinds of relationships among the group members; or they may be specifically psychological, in the sense that an individual desires prestige, power, or status and seeks this by becoming active in the union movement. Many individuals who have achieved high levels of prestige in the union movement would undoubtedly have made successful business men. However, within the framework of American corporate structure at the present time, it takes a long time for even an intelligent and aggressive young man to rise to the top. Within the union movement, his progress may be much faster. Thus, the highly motivated individual may go in for a career in union activities simply because it offers him a source of gratification which is more readily available than corresponding goals in the business world.

If an individual sets out upon a particular course of action to satisfy a given desire, it then becomes necessary for him to achieve a certain degree of control over the environment if he is to attain satisfaction for his motives. A manager who sets out to manufacture a commodity such as an automobile must have access to sources of supply of steel and other metals, of power, and of skilled workers. Any situation which threatens his access to these materials causes him to feel endangered and provokes energetic activity designed to remove this threat or to guarantee his needed supplies. Thus, it is more or less inevitable that, as business history shows, large corporations engaged in the production of particular items tend to purchase or to establish interlocking directorates with sources of supply and outlets for their products. They also devise various methods of protecting themselves against any factor which would threaten their economic security in the production process.

In the same way, the individual worker who has learned a particular skill, such as being an electrician or a machinist, has committed himself to a defined course of action for satisfying his motives. It becomes necessary, by the same logic as that affecting the business man, that he will attempt to control availability of such jobs, will attempt to prevent other individuals from coming into this job area and threatening his job security, reducing his wage level, and so forth. Thus, from the time of the Middle Ages (and no doubt, even farther back in human history) organizations of workers have attempted to limit access to their particular type of work and to maintain some degree of control over the job in opposition to the owner of the industry (who, of course, is concerned with protecting his own economic security). It thus happens inevitably, as a result of psychological processes, that divergences of interest and motivation will appear between workers and owners or executives in industry. That they need not lead to open conflict, or even to constant friction, is evident from the history of many industries. On the other hand, they provide a setting within which such conflicts are highly probable. It thus becomes incumbent upon us to study the circumstances under which these divergences of motivation will lead to open hostility or, conversely, the circumstances under which conflict is reduced in frequency and intensity.

CONFLICT OR COOPERATION?

Some readers will question the desirability of suggesting, by our title, an emphasis upon industrial conflict. Why not stress industrial cooperation, of which there is a great deal? Actually, of course, we discuss both. There are essentially two reasons for an apparent stress on conflict. One is that dramatic instances of industrial conflict receive

a great deal of attention in our news media; conflict threatens the welfare of many persons who are neither employers nor employees, and it is thus in a sense a focus of interest in the same way that disease is an object of scientific research more often than is health. The second reason is that important principles are often revealed more clearly by a breakdown of function than by a smoothly operating mechanism; thus, the automobile mechanic learns more by studying a defective engine than he might have by listening to and testing one which was perfect. Most of our knowledge of the human body originated in studies of disease and abnormality. These analogies are not precise, since industrial conflict should not be characterized as a diseased condition of the economic system. They suggest only that a study of one kind of event may reveal more than a corresponding study of another; the same persons, and the same basic principles, are involved in both conflict and cooperation.

It will be useful to think of industrial conflict and cooperation as simply two sides of the same coin, alternative expressions of the same forces. The conditions which make for conflict are in general those which impede cooperation; the conditions which lead to cooperation are, for the most part, the converse of those inducing conflict. Understanding of each will help with understanding the other.

Is conflict bad? Some popular writers on labor problems have fostered a convention that conflict is equal to "bad labor relations" and cooperation is good. We are unable to subscribe to this view. As a general rule, and particularly with regard to nation-wide strikes, the occurrence of overt conflict between employers and employees is a destructive affair which causes inconvenience if not outright suffering to other individuals not immediately involved in the conflict. On the other hand, it is obvious that in many cases industrial conflict has led to improvement of working conditions and to changes which are desirable from the point of view of broad social policy. Conversely, it should be noted that industrial cooperation has in some cases extended to the point of collusion between employers and employees for the purpose of defrauding the consumer. In this respect, at least, if not in others, cooperation can be carried to a point which is not socially beneficial. We shall therefore, avoid attempting to suggest at any time that we are equating conflict with bad and cooperation with good. We must always ask, "Bad—from what point of view?" and "Good—from what point of view?"

We assume that, as human beings, members of both sides will undoubtedly do some things which are socially good and others which are subject to social criticism. The point of view taken is that of a detached scientific analysis in which we attempt to ascertain the facts

in so far as they can be separated from the points of view of the observers involved, or, if this is impossible, to ascertain the facts as seen by members of each group. It seems fairly obvious that a chemist who became emotionally involved with what went on in his test tubes would have a great deal of difficulty in working out any kind of scientific problem. A physicist who became so disturbed about the destructive possibilities of the atomic bomb that he was no longer able to work in a detached manner in nuclear physics would obviously have to transfer to a different field. If the psychologist becomes emotionally involved with either labor or management, he loses his ability to make scientific contributions in this field. We therefore attempt to examine the characteristic ways of thinking and acting which can be observed in union members and company officials, without attempting to criticize or defend either side.

TOWARD INDUSTRIAL PEACE

It is implicit in the efforts of the scientist studying cancer that he hopes to contribute to a cure of cancer. However, his definition of a cure includes broad considerations of consequences. A "cure" which actually shortens the effective life expectancy of his patients is not acceptable. The real goal is a broadening of human life and human value, not simply the elimination of a specific malfunction.

In talking about industrial peace we shall be wise to keep this same caution in mind. Some people have offered paths to industrial peace: kill all the capitalists; put all union officers in jail, etc. The "cure" is worse than the disease. It is not industrial peace which is our sole goal, but a functioning economic system which maximizes human values in a broad frame of reference.

In the final chapter of this volume we apply some of our psychological principles to an analysis of some of the problems and proposals in this area. We anticipate that discussion at this point by saying that no blueprint for industrial Utopia is presented. Modifications at the level of economics, sociology, politics, and psychology merit consideration as ways of improving the situation. These approaches must be integrated. A change on one level without corresponding modifications elsewhere may increase friction rather than decrease it.

In the industrial as in the international sphere, the psychologist can make his best contribution by working closely with people from other disciplines. The urgency of doing so needs no demonstration. The physical scientists have already made it possible for all men to die together. The task of the social scientists is to seek ways by which we can live together.

Perception:

General Considerations

We have intimated, in the preceding chapter, that many industrial conflicts arise because of differences in the "facts" as seen by executives and workers. This suggestion runs counter to a deeply established belief that "facts are facts." Furthermore, most people implicitly believe that "the real facts" can somehow be uncovered, and that, when this is achieved, men of reasonable intelligence will accept these facts and act accordingly. A prominent labor mediator is fond of saying, "There cannot be disagreement about facts; there can only be ignorance of them." Hence, when disagreement about facts appears as an important element in a strike (and it is, in almost every case), a popular gesture is to appoint a "fact-finding commission." This commission is expected to "find the right answer."

Modern psychology parts company with this kind of thinking, and indeed cuts the ground from under it. Every fact is relative to some observer. When we talk about the "real facts," we are simply deceiving ourselves. There are some facts about which a high degree of social agreement exists; we can agree that a man is, or is not, on the job today. But there are other, more explosive instances in which sharp disagreement exists as to the facts. A company executive says, "It is a fact that Jones was not giving us a fair day's work." The union officer says, "It is a fact that Jones was giving a fair day's work." Is somebody lying? Not necessarily. Facts exist relative to an observer. The fact as seen by people on one side need not—indeed, often does not—correspond to the fact as seen on the other side.

This does not mean that we must remain bogged down helplessly in a muddle of subjectivism. It does indicate the need for a sharp critical analysis of the process of perception, before we can begin to consider possible solutions for industrial conflicts.

Perception of industrial situations can be broken down into perception of physical objects, perceptions of other personalities, and per-

ceptions of relationships.) Certain common principles run through all of these. There are two reasons for examining first the process of physical perception. All percepts of persons and social situations are built upon physical percepts; we must see Jones as an object before we can become aware of his characteristics as a personality. (This is not entirely true in adult life, where we accept descriptions second-hand, but, even here, some physical communication is indispensable.) Secondly, the demonstration of certain points is easier at the physical level than under more complex conditions. When we have examined the process of perceiving carefully, we shall then apply our findings to the differences in perception which are important aspects of industrial conflict.

PERCEPTION OF PHYSICAL OBJECTS

The problem of the perception of social situations can advantageously be approached by a consideration of how we perceive the objects in our physical environment. Although the naive view holds that we see what is "really" there in the external world, a more sophisticated approach indicates that much of what is seen is a product of the person observing. In some areas, this is a familiar phenomenon. It is a standard joke in our culture that women see details of dress (especially on other women) which simply do not exist for a male observer. Similarly, we are not surprised when an automobile mechanic detects sounds diagnostic of engine trouble which are unnoticed by the average driver. We simply have not applied this principle to the general understanding of how people know the environment in which they live.

We live in a tremendously complex world. At any moment I am assailed by a multitude of sights, sounds, smells, and other stimuli. It is not only absolutely essential that I reduce this complexity to something simple with which I can deal; it is also inevitable that unless I block out some of these stimuli I shall be confused and overwhelmed. Even a scene that I pass every day will have many details which remain unnoticed until something calls them to my attention. Thus it is clear that, in the realm of perception of physical objects, each of us gets only a limited knowledge and this can be expected to vary from one person to another. We sample the environment but do not know it completely.

(Objects are identified and their characteristics known on the basis of cues transmitted to the organism.) My knowledge of my automobile

is based on light waves reaching my eye, sound waves to the ear, contact with skin sense organs, odors, and even certain muscle sensations based on my motor movements in manipulating its parts.

The acquisition of knowledge, the "facts" of the physical world, is thus a process of learning. Consider the situation facing the infant; he is required to act on the basis of certain cues in identifying the presence of objects which have certain consequences for him. It is necessary for him to learn what is out there, what characteristics it has, and so forth. Observations of individuals who gain sight after having been blind from birth indicate that this learning process, in the case of vision, takes a definite and observable period of time and is not innately determined. There may be some inborn organization of the visual pattern in the field, but the designation of objects and attributes certainly is not.

When we speak of cues, we refer to the fact that the organism is constantly receiving light waves, sound waves, and other types of information which the organism interprets as sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, and so forth. When we speak of consequences, we are referring to the fact that acting on the basis of a cue leads to a certain result as far as the organism is concerned. Thus, the presence of a flickering red pattern in the field of vision may be reacted to by reaching forward and touching. When this results in a burn, the individual later perceives that particular cue as one that is not to be approached. To take a different illustration: when we perceive a certain pattern of cues we say, "This is a chair." When we approach the chair and attempt to sit upon it, the consequences determine whether the prediction about the nature of the real object was correct. The validity of a given perception then is a function of the consequences to which it leads.

Not all cues have equal predictive value. The child learns by experience that the form (outline) of an object is a more dependable guide to action than its apparent size or color. In predicting the behavior of other people toward himself, he learns that tone of voice, facial expression, and muscle tension are better guides than the words used by the other person. (This is the basis for the success of young children in penetrating the pseudo-affection of adults.) As a result of these experiences, the child learns to weight cues differentially; in determining the percept, one cue may be *magnified* and another ignored or *minimized*.

We have been writing of cues as if each were isolated and independent; actually they are experienced in combination and organiza-

tion. Look at Fig. 2.1. It is virtually impossible to keep from seeing this as a square, although it is actually composed of separate dots. The cues are *structured* or organized in the process of perceiving. Figure 2.2 shows how structure can make one cue quite distinctive. The one dot outside the circle is emphasized.




Fig. 2.1. Organization of Cues.




Fig. 2.2. Isolation from structure.

The term “assimilation” is used for the fact that similar cues tend to be perceived as identical, even though slight variations occur. Conversely, “contrast” occurs when one item in a series differs markedly from the others; it then receives emphasis by virtue of its deviation (Fig. 2.3). The term “leveling” has been employed as rather equiv-



Fig. 2.3. Contrast of cues.

alent to “assimilation”; it suggests that slight variations are ironed out. Similarly, “sharpening” is used to refer to cases where a small difference is exaggerated; for instance, a mole on the end of a man’s nose may look much larger than it really is. Processes such as assimilation and leveling account for our tendency to see things as alike when minor differences exist; contrast and sharpening account for the insistence upon difference when this deviation goes beyond a certain threshold value.

All perceptions of physical objects involve a *probability* function. When we receive a cue, such as a certain pattern of light waves from the external environment, we “have a hunch” or establish an hypothesis to the effect that this is a signal that such and such an object really is present out there in the external world, that it really is a certain distance away, that it really has certain characteristics. The importance of this probability function cannot be overestimated because, from

these cues, the individual must make a judgment as to the nature of the object. Errors in perception may be dangerous. For example, an automobile driver in a long line of cars may pull out a little, look down the left lane of the highway, and see in the distance a car which apparently is going away from him. If he pulls out into the left lane and attempts to pass some of the other cars, he may suddenly find that the apparently receding car was really approaching at a high rate of speed. In many instances this error of perception is fatal. We are at all times compelled to make our decisions as to the real state of affairs on the basis of the probabilities as we know them. Nevertheless, it behooves us to become conscious of the errors which are inherent in our perceptual mechanism and to make compensations for them wherever possible.

Perceptual constancies. The extent to which we rely upon one cue as opposed to another can be well illustrated by the phenomena called "perceptual constancies." The commonest forms of constancy are those for shape, color, and size.

If I hold up a silver half dollar, you may look at it from different angles and say that it still looks round. Physically, of course, the pattern projected on the retina varies through a series of ellipses as the object is rotated; but it is not perceived in that way. It is perceived as a constant object even though the external cues are constantly being modified. Size constancy can be illustrated by the fact that, as my friend walks away from me down the street, he does not seem to shrink in size as he goes away. The projected retinal image is, of course, shrinking; but the size constancy phenomenon involves an unconscious correction of the retinal image to maintain the perceived size with little decrease.

In each of these cases, we have learned to ignore some cues in favor of others. In the case of size constancy, for example, we emphasize form at the expense of apparent size. We also emphasize cues indicating the *relationship* of the focal object to nearby objects. (Size constancy breaks down when there are no objects such as trees and houses to provide a frame of reference for the perception. This explains why "flying saucers" seem to vary so inexplicably in size, speed, and distance. In a homogeneous environment with no relational cues, the same cue might indicate an object 1 mile away traveling at 200 miles an hour, or 10 miles away traveling 2000 miles an hour.) We shall refer to these supporting cues, which help us maintain constancy of perception, as the *context* of perception.

Object constancy has a very substantial survival value. If you were a cave man living under primitive conditions, the ability to recognize

objects at a considerable distance would have material advantage as far as the perpetuation of existence was concerned. The fact that the saber-tooth tiger at a distance of 500 yards looks like a kitten, would not be justification for approaching, or for failing to run away. Perhaps we may assume that those cave men who did not develop object constancy were long since eliminated and their hereditary strain has disappeared from the human germ plasm. At any rate it is obvious that the properties of object constancy, such as size, form, and color constancy, do have a survival value and they are important characteristics of the organism.

Nevertheless the constancy phenomenon has very serious disadvantages. In many cases, for example, the pattern of cues presented duplicates substantially that of a different object and we perceive something which is not "actually" (physically) there. Sometimes we get a perception of an object which is decidedly misleading. Furthermore we have to learn to differentiate between the same object or person under different conditions. The constancy phenomenon tends to lead us to the conclusion that this object or individual has not changed. If a change has, in fact, occurred (such as that a friend has now become an enemy or a harmless object has now become dangerous), survival is threatened. The constancy phenomenon therefore can under certain conditions be maladaptive. As we shall point out in later paragraphs, in the social field this is particularly true. There is a tendency to assume that people or groups continue to be the same when they do in fact change. Since people vary more than physical objects, this constancy phenomenon involves somewhat more danger in the social than in the physical field.

The private world of experience. It is commonplace to say that no two people see reality exactly alike. But this commonplace truism is ignored most of the time. In our daily behavior we assume that "facts are facts," that we see what is *really* out there in the environment, that people who claim the facts to be otherwise are knaves or fools.

The purpose of the foregoing analysis of cues has been to emphasize the idea that perception is *not* determined purely by the physical nature of reality. The information that comes to each person depends on the sample of cues he receives, how they are organized, and what "probable objects" they evoke for him. The nature of reality depends in marked degree upon the nature of the organism. Experience is not a function of physical reality alone; it is a function of physical cues acting upon an organism.

Let us consider in somewhat greater detail some of the many ways in which the organism does contribute to the nature of the external

object as perceived. In what respect is it true that each individual does create his own world? How is it that each of us lives in a reality that is somewhat different from that of every other person?

1. *Sensory modalities.* It is obvious, if we stop to think about it for a moment, that the possession of a certain limited variety of sense organs determines the kind of external reality we perceive. We are sensitive to certain light waves which we call the visible spectrum. We are not sensitive to ultraviolet, infrared, gamma rays, x-rays, and so on. If, like Superman, we had some sense organ which was sensitive to x-rays, we would undoubtedly perceive external reality in a very different fashion. Because of our present sensory modalities, such perceptions are impossible. We do not miss them, although it may be that we would survive much more effectively in the Atomic Age, if those other modalities were present.

2. *Sensory deficiencies.* A second rather obvious respect in which the organism determines the perceived quality of the external world is the phenomenon of sensory deficiency. Color blindness, for example, is a sensory deficiency which modifies very significantly the perceived quality of visual reality. If we say, "The grass is green," our color-blind friend may disagree. To him it may seem gray. Where is the quality of green? Is it "really" out there in the external world, or is it within the organism? A little reflection will indicate that the quality "green" must depend upon an interaction between the organism and the external world. It is not "really" out there at all.¹

Limitations imposed by our particular pattern of sensory modalities are, of course, common to all members of the human species so far as we know and consequently cannot contribute to conflicts in the way in which reality is perceived. Sensory deficiencies, on the other hand, differ materially from person to person and may under certain conditions give rise to conflict situations. One can imagine that a color-blind traffic policeman might create considerable trouble, and it is well known that sales clerks in department stores who have defective color vision may cause many problems for the store by virtue of their poor color matching. It is improbable, however, that sensory defi-

¹ Indeed, there is considerable disagreement as to just what is "out there." The physicist may say that the grass is really just a mass of electrons and protons in rapid vibration. The chemist may say that it is really a bunch of complex organic molecules, and so on. Each of these statements (plus the statement that the grass is really green) may be considered valid within a certain frame of reference; but none of them can be treated as the ultimate reality. The physicist points out that light waves are not colored; they are simply frequencies of vibration. When the waves impinge on certain sensitive surfaces, a reaction takes place which can give rise to the sensation of color.

ciencies make any contribution to social conflicts. This is not true with regard to the other organismic contributions to perception to which we now turn.

3. *Past experience.* The manner in which a physical object is perceived, the qualities attributed to it, and so on, are a function of past experience. Consider our illustration of the half dollar which is seen in different positions and from different angles; the fact that this object retains its constant size is a function of our particular experiences. If we showed the same object to primitive aborigines who had little experience with circular objects, the results might be quite different. Highways and traffic situations are not perceived in the same way by experienced drivers and by novices. Skilled craftsmen in a factory perceive a particular object, finished item, or raw material rather differently from the beginning worker. Thus object perception is definitely modified by the past experiences of the organism.

Experimentally this process has been demonstrated by having a person practice making certain kinds of sensory discriminations. Helson (1947) showed that, if a person judges lifted weights to be "heavy" or "light," his standards will change if he is given series of weights which differ in physical characteristics. For example, in one series, using a comparison weight of 90 grams, a 400-gram weight was judged "very heavy"; in another, using a comparison weight of 900 grams, the 400-gram weight was judged "medium."¹

The *frame of reference* in terms of which we make our judgments of physical objects, therefore, depends on a summation of our past experiences with a particular characteristic. A person who works often with objects having slight variations in color which he must observe tends to develop a very fine discrimination for color differences. Professional tasters develop a frame of reference for taste differences. All of us learn to discriminate differences in height, weight, distance, and other aspects of our environment which are important to our daily living. But this discrimination is accurate only within the range of customary experience. One of our students from Malaya was asked to rate himself on a scale from tall to short. He was confused, because, as he said, "In my country I am tall, but here I am short."

¹ An amusing sidelight on this experiment was the report, by numerous subjects, that they got much more tired in the first of the two series cited above, in which the comparison weight was 90 grams. In this series the variable weights were constantly being judged "heavy," whereas, in using 900 grams as a standard, they were giving many more judgments of "light." Physically, they did much more work using the 900-gram standard; but, psychologically, they perceived the weights as lighter, and hence reported less fatigue.

The effects of *primacy* are important here. After a frame of reference has been established and used for years, modification is slow and difficult. Tresselt (1948) used Helson's lifted-weights experiment with three groups: watchmakers, college students, and professional weight lifters. By the watchmakers, a "medium" judgment was given to relatively light weights; the professional strong men, on the other hand, gave a "medium" judgment only to rather heavy objects. The students were intermediate. After several hours of practice with the same series of weights, the three groups became more similar; but, at the end of the experiment, there were still significant differences in their judgments.

The accuracy of a frame of reference for physical objects could be checked by measuring devices, if necessary. But what about judgments of the trustworthiness of an employee, the quality of his performance, or his cooperativeness with management on the job? Such judgments are commonly made on industrial merit rating scales. They derive from perceptions of the worker which, consciously or not, are evaluated in a frame of reference based upon the observer's past experiences. In this case there is no measuring device which can be applied for checking; yet the possibility of error is obvious and important.



Fig. 2.4. Rabbit. (From Leeper, 1935.)



Fig. 2.5. Ambiguous figure.
(From Leeper, 1935.)

4. *Expectancies.* The way in which the organism is "set" for the stimulus has a great deal to do with the manner in which it is perceived. If we are expecting to see a particular person, we frequently react when an individual of rather similar build and coloring comes on the scene. We are embarrassed to find that we have greeted the wrong person because of this particular expectancy. An ingenious experiment to test this phenomenon was devised by Leeper (1935). Take a look at the illustration in Fig. 2.4. Now look from this to Fig. 2.5. Having once seen the rabbit in the first figure, it is easy to perceive him in the second. However, it is most unlikely that you will see any other prominent object in the ambiguous drawing of Fig. 2.5. The other object is clearly defined in Fig. 2.6.



Fig. 2.6. Pirate. (From Leeper, 1935.)

Leeper found that, if he showed either of the clearly structured figures to a class, they would find this object in the ambiguous drawing, but not the other.¹ Indeed, having once been "set" for one figure, it was difficult for them to accept the presence of the other. Data such as these have led to the following generalization: *In an ambiguous situation, expectancy determines what we shall perceive and what we shall ignore.* Since most industrial conflict situations are inherently ambiguous, the importance of this factor is obvious.

5. *Group influences.* Expectancy is profoundly affected by group influences. What the philosophers call "consensual validation" simply means that, if the group agrees about object X, that defines its "real" character. Persons who disagree about the real characteristics of physical objects are locked up in insane asylums. Those who disagree about social objects may be subject to ostracism, ridicule, jail, etc.

¹ Note that "clearly structured" in this case means that certain cues have been magnified (heavier lines) and others diminished. For obvious reasons, we do not know precisely what happens inside the organism when "clear structure" is imposed upon an ambiguous situation, but the use of indirect evidence suggests that something similar takes place. Certainly the subject's verbal report indicates that he has emphasized one set of cues and ignored others.

It is hardly surprising that, even for children, group agreement about an ambiguous occurrence has a heavy influence on the perception of this situation.

A striking experimental study of group influence on expectancy is that of Sherif (1935) on the so-called "autokinetic" phenomenon. When a person is placed in a dark room and looks at a fixed point of light, he will quickly see it as beginning to move. He can be asked to estimate the number of inches the light moved during its travels (objectively, of course, the light does not move at all). One person may tend to standardize on an apparent movement of about 3 inches for the pin point of light. Another person may standardize on a much larger estimate, say, 9 inches. Sherif showed the importance of group influence on perception, as follows: if one individual, with an estimate of rather short apparent motion, is placed now in a dark room with two persons whose previously established norms were for longer movements, the first person will tend to change his judgments to agree with the others. There is, in other words, a coercive effect in that two other individuals report much larger movements than he sees. Since he is uncertain about the basis for his judgment, he tends to modify it in the direction of the majority influence (see Fig. 2.7). Particularly interesting is the fact that, if he is now run through the individual experiment again, he tends to stick to the new norm established as result of the group influence. This norm will persist for as long as a year.

Such perceived qualities of objects as good and bad, acceptable and unacceptable, useful and useless, virtuous and evil, are largely a function of group judgments. The child grows up in an atmosphere in which certain attributes of objects are simply taken for granted. He actually comes to perceive the object as having those characteristics. It is not a matter of his seeing the object and thinking, "Now in my society this is considered harmful, therefore it must be harmful." The quality "harmful" actually becomes an essential part of the perception itself.

6. *Inner needs.* What the individual perceives in the external world will also be profoundly modified by the motives which are operating within him at any given time. If ambiguous figures are projected onto a screen, hungry subjects will report a large proportion of food objects, or objects which are useful in manipulating food, such as knives and forks (Sanford, 1937, McClelland and Atkinson, 1948). Well-fed subjects, on the other hand, will report a smaller percentage of these hunger-related items. It is apparent that the perceptual field is modified very substantially by the presence of this motive.

Because anxiety is an inner dynamic state which can be manipulated somewhat more easily than others, several experimenters have used it to test this hypothesis. Moffitt (1953) showed that, if subjects were placed under stress (anxiety-arousing), they “saw things” differently.




Fig. 2.7. Formation of group norms. (From Sherif, 1935.) People working together come to see things in the same way.

For example, they were first shown the design of Fig. 2.8 as a complete figure. Then, in very brief flashes, the experimenter exposed various incomplete figures (lines omitted, as in the dotted parts of the figure). The subject was asked to draw what he had just seen. More of the missing lines were added by the anxious subjects. Similarly Moffitt found more perceptual rigidity (clinging to a percept after the cues had changed) and more distortion of details to fit into a stable background among the anxious group.

It is not necessary, however, for us to deal with strong motives, such as hunger and anxiety, to apply this principle. Even the existence of a relatively mild intention, or purpose, will modify perceptions. If




Fig. 2.8. Closure test figure. (From Moffitt, 1953.) Subject was first shown the complete figure, then a series with one or more lines omitted (e.g., the two right diagonals in the figure shown above). Closure was indicated if subject drew a figure in which he added the missing lines.

you are looking for a container, objects made of glass will be perceived and considered with reference to their utility for this purpose. If, on the other hand, you are looking for something which can be used in driving a nail, glass objects will be ignored and not seen at all. The function of the intention or task set is to focus the organism on certain cues which are predictive of probabilities relevant to the inner need which is operating. Cues indicative of probabilities of objects which are not significant for this inner need are simply not observed at all.

Before going on to the consideration of perception of social situations, let us briefly recapitulate the major points which have been

developed up to this point. We may summarize them in the form of a series of statements, referring back to the points made in the preceding paragraphs.

1. The perception of physical objects is a function of a variety of physical cues: light waves, sound waves, gaseous molecules in the air, contact of mechanical substances with the skin, and so on. Naive psychology would have it that we are directly aware of the real physical object. Scientific psychology emphasizes that objects are not directly perceived but that these cues have an impact on a sense organ.

2. The physical disturbances (sound, light, etc.) affect a sense organ which in turn gives rise to nerve impulses. These impulses travel to the brain. The final process which gives us the experience of a perceived external object takes place only in the brain. It must be recognized, therefore, that the "real" physical properties of the external object may be radically changed in the brain. For example, the visual perception of three-dimensional objects must be entirely inferential, inasmuch as the retina of the eye is two-dimensional. The brain interprets objects as three-dimensional on the basis of a variety of cues, but there is no direct visual perception of this dimension.

3. It is obvious, therefore, that the quality of experience and the nature of the perceived object or situation are directly dependent upon the brain activity, which is set off by the outer stimulus cues. Each cue leads to a certain brain activity, and this brain activity becomes a basis for a prediction or hypothesis as to the nature of the external source.

4. The experience therefore can be modified by various inner conditions of the organism. As Ellis Freeman (1936) has pointed out, the correct equation for the relationship between stimulus and experience is $e = f(o, s)$. The experience of a given situation is a function of the organism and the stimulus, not of the stimulus alone. Thus we can have influences from inner motives, expectancies, tensions, purposes, and so forth, which will influence what we predict to be out there in the external world.

5. The process by which cues come to be interpreted as signifying particular objects or situations is a process of learning. As far as we can tell, the experiences of the infant have only very simple forms of organization. As a result of the consequences of reacting to cues, the infant learns rather rapidly what can be predicted with reasonable accuracy as to the external situation.

6. Since learning is never entirely perfect, and since there is always a certain possibility that a combination of external cues occurs which is not related to the object ordinarily indicated by these cues, every

perception must be considered as a probability. When I see a chair out there in the room, I have a very high level of confidence, better than 99 per cent, but I do not have absolute certainty that any chair is there. When we come to perception of automobiles in motion, of the qualities of a race horse, and of other complex physical stimuli, we frequently make errors. One should always think in terms of the *probability* that a given cue indicates the presence of a particular kind of real object, not an absolute certainty.

7. Both the learning process and the process of immediate perception depend profoundly upon the purposes and intentions of the organism. The way in which the child learns to perceive physical objects depends upon the needs and motives which impel him to act at a given time. It seems likely, in the final analysis, that every perception, even the simplest perceptions of objects, are purposive—in the sense that the manner in which we perceive them depends upon the way in which we could utilize these objects in executing purposive acts. We therefore adopt the position that *all perception is ultimately purposive in character*, even though the immediate perception (at least of physical situations) may not show this characteristic.

PERCEPTION OF SELF

So far we have paid no attention to one very important perceptual process. This is the individual's awareness of himself, of his own body, his physical abilities, his mental capacity, skills, and so on. This percept becomes an intensely important component of one's personality; it is also linked in very significant ways to one's perception of other persons.

Let us consider first the origin of the ego. There is reason to believe that the baby at birth has no self-awareness. His arms and legs, apparently, are simply objects in the environment. Gradually he learns that what happens to these objects is intimately bound up with his experiences of muscular movement, pain, and other sensations, whereas objects not so located may be bumped, fall, etc., with no such associated sensations. Since the physical body is always present, and since certain kinds of associations are invariant, a body image or self-percept evolves.

As the child grows older and more mobile, he finds that his bodily characteristics have much to do with motive satisfaction. He is too short to reach the table and get candy for himself. He lacks the muscular dexterity to handle certain objects. He cuts or hurts himself and associates these painful experiences with his perceived size and

strength. Thus he comes to see his body as a tool, an object which can be utilized to obtain satisfaction or avoid discomfort.

Adults accelerate this process by giving the child a name, and by associating this with descriptions of his abilities and shortcomings. They label him as handsome or ugly, as clever or stupid. Such personality traits as self-confidence apparently derive from experienced success and failure, and from these verbal definitions by adults, which mold the child's percept of himself.

Mental skills also become aspects of the perceived self. The boy who does schoolwork easily, solves problems quickly, and deals efficiently with "mental" tasks comes to perceive himself as having these qualities. Again, teachers and parents speed up the process by applying grades and labels. By the time one reaches maturity, he has an elaborate and complex *self-image*, which reflects the extent to which his physical and mental characteristics have aided him in satisfying his motives.

Associated objects. Not only does the child come to value his own body, as a means of achieving his goals, but he also values various associated objects—his clothes, his toys, etc. Because these are likewise important to his satisfactions, he attempts to hold onto and protect them. As most parents know, it is not unusual for a child to cry over a broken toy as if he himself had been injured.

We shall use the term "ego involvement" to refer to the fact that people perceive many associated objects, persons, groups, and organizations as parts of themselves. When the unionist turns red with anger because of police attacks on a picket line that he has never seen, his response is based on ego involvement. He perceives the other union as a kind of extension of himself, an object in which he is involved. Similarly, the manager of a plant may see his factory as in some degree an extension of his own ego. Because the ego is such a highly valued object, anything which becomes ego-involved tends to be perceived as more valuable than would realistically be justified.

SOCIAL PERCEPTION

The concept of purposiveness in perception provides us with a convenient way of discriminating between *physical* and *social* perception. Physical perceptions may be defined as those in which the purposes of only a single individual come into play. It is obvious, for example, that perceptions of a chair, a table, an automobile are significant only in terms of the individual perceiver. The object has no purposes (at least, of which we can be aware) which would interact with the pur-

poses of the individual. Social perception, on the other hand, is characterized by the fact that two or more sets of purposes come into interaction. When, for example, the industrial executive perceives the union official, he perceives him not only as a physical object or a biological organism but also as someone whose activities may have an impact upon the executive. There are, in short, two sets of purposes, those of the industrialist and those of the unionist, coming into play. In all instances in which we can properly speak of social perception, it would appear that at least two sets of purposes are involved. Sometimes these purposes are not immediately apparent (e.g., social perceptions involving the symbols and stereotypes of other countries) but, if we look into the significantly social aspect of these situations, we realize that the social context is contributed by the purposes of those individuals who are related in some way to these symbols.

This definition of social perception leaves ample room for the consideration of situations such as occurred in primitive society, in which trees, storms, rivers, and other natural phenomena were perceived as having life and purpose of their own. The phrase, *primitive animism*, refers to the fact that primitive man ascribed human-like characteristics, including purpose, to these objects. He considered that they had purposes and intentions which were significant for him, and furthermore that his behavior towards these objects would have significance; for example, when the storm was deified as a god, the proper worship of the god had significance in terms of possible protection in the individual's daily life. Thus it is correct to speak of an interaction of purposes in these situations.

Perception of persons. The most important aspect of social perception is that which we may designate perception of persons, although we shall also consider perception of groups and perception of social issues as relevant problems. Modern man has almost eliminated animistic thinking in so far as it relates to natural forces and objects. However, animism in interpersonal relations is still prevalent. We ascribe the behavior of others to malicious evil spirits, to good will, to will power, and so on. Such "explanations" do not explain; they only replace one mystery with another. The task of psychology is to find the "real" environmental factors, the determinants which cause persons to behave in defined ways. An increase in such information leads to more realistic and more efficient perception of other persons.

It is important to emphasize, in connection with the perception of other persons, that we know only through physical stimuli. The baby becomes aware of his mother through the senses of sight, hearing, taste, smell, contact, pressure, temperature, and the like. Differential cues

also become noticeable. Mother's voice when she is happy and relaxed is quite different from Mother's voice when she is harassed and irritable. Baby comes to associate pleasantness with one kind of sound, discomfort with the other. The father provides totally different visual, auditory, and other cues. These are likely to be associated with other consequences, and hence the father is perceived as having characteristics quite unlike those of the mother.

Many of our adult perceptions stem from these images of mother and father, established in our earliest years. Much has been made of the theory that all authority figures (e.g., employers) are perceived as father substitutes. Thus, if a boy was severely punished by his father, he may perceive severity in his boss even if no realistic basis is present for such a perception. We shall consider this view in later chapters; let us note here only that many authors have exaggerated the importance of these infantile images. Occasionally we find clear-cut evidence that they are important, but not often.

We have said that social perception involves not only the perception of another person as a physical object but also some awareness of this person's purposes. Thus, the executive faced by a union official is not merely aware of sound waves, light waves, etc., which evoke the percept of a human body before him; he also becomes aware of this man as having the potential for doing certain things, for striving toward goals, which may interfere with the goal seeking of the executive. The estimates he makes of the probable behavior of this man depend on how he is affected by cues emanating from the other person. He recognizes the union official's face, hears his voice, becomes aware of his gestures, facial expressions, and so on. The manner in which he perceives the unionist will involve interpretations of smiles, laughs, shouting, and various other cues as well as the actual words employed. Hence all the possible distorting factors which we have enumerated in the earlier paragraphs come into play to some extent. In addition, certain new complexities will enter. Before considering these, let us consider how some of the items mentioned in the preceding paragraphs will affect our perception of social phenomena.

1. *Past experience.* The kind of past experiences we have had with a given person will have a great deal to do with our perception of him. If his appearance raises a probability of pain and anxiety, he will be perceived as dangerous. Furthermore, our past experiences with *similar* individuals will have a considerable impact upon our perception. If, for example, you were painfully mistreated by a red-headed bully in childhood, it may be impossible for you to perceive a situation involving a red-headed person without reacting in terms of this emo-

tional predisposition. You will be likely to perceive him as untrustworthy, threatening, or cruel. Your perception is distorted by his resemblance to the bully in your past experience. This process accounts for our prejudiced feelings about some people at first meeting. Their appearance provides cues signaling danger in terms of past events.

2. *Expectancy.* Our perception of others is a function of what we expect to happen and how we expect them to behave. A young housewife may go to a tea with the expectation of being snubbed. In physical reality, nine women at the tea may speak pleasantly to her and one woman is cold and frigid. When she returns, she reports that she had a very unpleasant time because she was snubbed. The objective preponderance of pleasant experiences is not perceived, but rather that phase of the situation which fitted in with the expectation is the one which receives emphasis.

A common experiment in psychology classes (cf., Kelley, 1949) is to ask the students to judge a person who will come in and talk to them. By subtle devices some students are given the suggestion that this person is warm and friendly; others receive a suggestion that he is cold and distant. When ratings are collected, it is found that most students "saw" evidence to support the expectancy created by these suggestions.

3. *Inner needs.* The manner in which we perceive a given social situation is a function of the needs which are dominant at the time. Consider the example of an industrial executive meeting a union official who is presenting a demand for a union shop clause covering all the employees. The executive will perceive this not merely as a certain proposal with regard to the extent of union membership in his organization. He will perceive it also in terms of the motives which dominate his own activities. Thus, for example, he may be concerned primarily with making a profit, in which case the union shop clause may have little annoyance value for him, and may even be perceived in a favorable light as a possible device for decreasing labor unrest. On the other hand, if his primary motivation takes the form of dominance, or the desire to be free from interference and restraint, then he may perceive the union shop clause as a technique for restraining his freedom of action. Thus, his behavior with reference to this particular proposal will be a function of his perception, and this in turn is a function of his motivation.

Such dynamic tendencies as fear, aggression, love, and loyalty may have profound effects upon our perceptions of particular social stimuli. The individual who has grown up in the United States perceives the

American flag, the Statue of Liberty, and other national symbols in quite a different way from the foreigner who comes into the country and perceives the same physical objects. The object itself is the same, but the perception is different because of the dynamic significance which it possesses for the citizen of this country.

4. *Consequences.* We have noted in connection with physical perception, that the consequences encountered when an individual responds to a stimulus modify the way in which he perceives it. This is much more markedly true in the field of social perception. For example: when a union organizer first approaches a group of workers, his perception of them will be to a very considerable extent a function of his own preconceptions plus any information he has received from the workers who asked him to come to the plant. But after he has tried to persuade them to sign up, and succeeded (or failed), his perception of them will be modified. His behavior and the feedback from it will determine the characteristics that he will perceive them as possessing. Since his behavior will influence their responses, we must recognize that there is an intimate relationship between the behavior of the individual, his perception of others, and their response to his behavior.

This interaction is easily illustrated in the kind of psychoanalytic phenomenon which we call *projection*. An individual who is dominated by feelings of hostility toward others will act in an aggressive manner. This will tend to set off anticipations of attack in others, and they will react with counteraggression. To the first person this reaction will seem to justify his hostility, and thus he will be likely to start a fight. This has been called the "self-validating" aspect of social perceptions. By acting on a percept, one creates a situation which seems to prove the accuracy of the original percept.

5. *Structuring the field.* A field of physical stimuli does not remain a series of isolated points and independent items. It is structured and organized into a pattern. Generally speaking, we fit it into the simplest pattern conveniently available at the time, although this will depend to a certain extent upon the past experience of the individual. Let us consider some of the specific principles of field structure that have been developed for physical perception and see how they relate to the field of social perception.

(a) *Assimilation.* When a series of physically similar objects are presented together, they tend to be assimilated into a single pattern. If, on the other hand, objects of two different kinds are presented, a pattern is formed by assimilation among those which have a clear resemblance. In social situations we are constantly encountering cases

of assimilation on the bases of skin color, religion, language, national origin, and other factors: i.e., because one Negro is musical, we impute musical talent to all Negroes, and so on. Sometimes we get stereotypes based on political affiliation, as in the notion that all communists wear beards and carry knives. Upon learning that a man is Italian, we "see" him acting in an emotionally explosive manner. Unfortunately, in many cases the process of assimilation is based on exceedingly minor aspects of the situation. In the social percept the physical cues are likely to be of relatively little importance, but, because of our experiences in learning to deal with objects in which physical similarities are of great importance, we tend to exaggerate their importance in social situations as well.

If a union representative comes to deal with a personnel manager on a grievance, he brings an expectancy based on certain past experiences with personnel managers. He assumes that certain kinds of behavior, and certain attitudes, will be manifest in this situation. Because a new man has the role of personnel manager, the representative tends to assimilate this new experience into the preexisting pattern and to act as if this executive were like all the others. He finds it difficult to deal with the personnel manager as an individual, a new and fundamentally different person. He finds it difficult to deal with a new company as representing a different labor policy or one which may be unlike any which he has previously encountered. The assimilation process tends to unify all these experiences which have an element in common. Now it cannot be denied that there is some survival value in this process of assimilation. By and large, similar objects do have similar characteristics. Most corporations do tend to show rather similar policies, e.g., as regards labor unions. Thus assimilation has just enough objective basis to make it seem a plausible process. At the same time it involves a sufficient number of errors to make it dangerous from the point of view of the social welfare. It is plain that unionists perceiving company officials in a stereotyped way are less efficient than would be desirable. Similarly, company executives who see all labor unions as identical are not showing good judgment or discrimination.

(*b*) *Contrast.* A black dot looks even blacker when seen against a white background. The presence of a group of stimuli of one kind causes even a moderate difference to be perceived as very sharply different. The same phenomenon occurs in social perception. Thus, for example, in wartime it is almost impossible to be neutral. If you are not perceived as one of us, then you must be one of the enemy. It is very difficult to take any middle ground. People tend to be all black or all white. Anyone who has been in a fairly small community

during an important strike knows how difficult it is to avoid being aligned with one side or the other. The contrast effect militates against recognition of the fact that there are shadings and degrees of difference between social groups. The contrast phenomenon eliminates confusion and mental conflict, but it does so at the cost of




Fig. 2.9. Angle.

oversimplification and missing the fundamental significance of the variations among people and groups.

(c) *Context.* The interpretation of a concrete object such as a visual pattern will depend upon the context in which it is perceived. The angle represented in Fig. 2.9 is perceived differently in isolation from the way in which it is perceived when incorporated into the figure representing a cube (Fig. 2.10). In social psychology we find context phenomena constantly occurring to modify and distort the perceived characteristics of the object.




Fig. 2.10. Cube.

This is especially true with regard to public understanding of labor issues. A specific controversy is presented to the public without any of the historical background and interpretive material. The result is that we get widely different notions as to what is going on and what the situation "really" is, because the full context is not available, or perhaps more accurately because each individual in the public tends to put

the specific issue in a context of his own construction. The result is that we get a very decided split on issues which might very well be

matters of general agreement if the context were adequately presented.

The importance of context can be readily illustrated by reference to the task of interviewing people to find out how they perceive certain situations. Here the interviewer provides a significant context for the perception. If workers perceive the interviewer as a representative of management, they are likely to modify their report, if not their actual view of the issues being discussed. Two of our students tested this hypothesis with house-to-house interviews. Each presented himself as a student at the University, doing a survey on what people thought about unions. However, for half the interviews, he indicated that the study was sponsored by the Chamber of Commerce; for the other half, he said he was doing it for the CIO. Both students found that they got significantly more favorable attitudes toward unions when identifying themselves with the CIO.¹

Cues in social perception. How do the processes of magnification, suppression, and distortion of cues operate in the perception of social situations? A good device for examining this is the interview technique developed by Alfred W. Jones in his study of labor-management relations in Akron (1941). Jones presented to people thumbnail sketches of the facts in a given situation, and asked them to indicate approval or disapproval of action taken by someone on these facts. The following is an example:

"Anthracite coal mining in Eastern Pennsylvania was a "sick industry" even before the depression. In the 1930's still more mines shut down, the companies deciding to keep their coal in the ground until prices for it should go up. There was great unemployment and distress among the miners. In these years the unemployed miners began going into the idle mines and taking out the coal. They did this without the permission of the companies which own the mines, and without the interference of the local police, so that no violence resulted. They have both burned the coal themselves, and sold it.

What do you think of this sort of *action* on the part of the unemployed miners?"²

A student who approved strongly of the miners' behavior justified his answer by pointing to the hunger and suffering of the miners' families. One who answered, "Disapprove strongly," retorted that the miners were *stealing* the coal. To this the first student replied that since the mineowners knew of these actions and did nothing, this was not exactly stealing. He reiterated the importance of the human

¹ For more systematic studies, showing that the interviewer is a significant part of the situation, see Robinson and Rhode (1946), and Katz (1942).

² Jones (1941), p. 358. Reprinted by permission of Alfred W. Jones.

hardships involved. The second student reaffirmed his emphasis on the legal side, but agreed that "some other way should be found" to resolve the human problem present.

Clearly, what is going on here is substantially the same as in the case of physical perceptions. Each person tends to magnify these cues which have special value for him; he may ignore cues, either because they have negative value or because they conflict with the positive cues; and he may add, or change, details to fit into the total picture that he develops.

Fisher and Withey (1951) find that the public, in general, approves of "big business," in that 76% say, "The good things outweigh the bad things," whereas only 10% reverse this. What is particularly interesting from our present point of consideration is the manner in which these two groups of people emphasize different cues or aspects of the total picture. Thus, among the good things about big business, people mentioned providing jobs, producing consumption goods, and making things cheaper. Among the bad things they noted too much power, squeezing out the little man, causing strikes and labor unrest, and exorbitant prices. When we tabulate these aspects mentioned by those whose over-all evaluation was good, and those judging big business "bad," we get the following interesting differences (Table 2.1). From these data it appears that we have the same kind of phenomenon as in the perception of physical objects: the exaggeration of one set of cues leads to one total percept, whereas emphasis on other cues leads to a different picture.

THE PROBLEM OF UNIFORMITY IN PERCEPTION

In the foregoing pages we have demonstrated that the facts as experienced by a given person are, in part, a function of his point of view, his frame of reference, his way of perceiving. This analysis leads to the conclusion that each of us lives in his own private universe, that facts are not the same for any two persons. And, to some degree, this is true—each human being is unique, different from everyone else. Likewise, the facts of the world as he sees them are, to some extent, unique.

This view, however, must not be carried to an extreme. After all, most of us do see the same tables, chairs, trees, and automobiles. Uniformity in the perception of physical objects is very high. Those persons who insist that they see things or hear voices which are not perceptible to others are locked up in insane asylums. Uniformity in physical percepts derives from a very high probability that certain consequences will follow a given cue. Everyone learns to perceive

Table 2.1 Differing Perceptions of "Big Business"*

<i>Mention</i>	<i>People Whose Over-All Judgment of Big Business is</i>	
	<i>"Good"</i>	<i>"Bad"</i>
Big business creates jobs	49%	32%
Pays high wages	6	2
Improves products	11	7
Has too much power	24	36
Causes strikes, labor unrest	4	11
Kills craftsmanship	2	5
Makes exorbitant prices	4	9

* Fisher and Withey (1951), pp. 24-25, combined from Tables 8 and 9. Reprinted by permission of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.

these cues in the same way, and it is consequently possible for us to communicate and deal effectively with these cues and the objects which they signal to us.

The problem of uniformity in social perception is somewhat more complicated. However, even in this instance we find that social perception shows a substantial degree of uniformity. Most of us do learn to recognize when others are angry, friendly, frightened, etc. Similarly, we have some substantial degree of uniformity in our perceptions of organizations, laws, social policies, public leaders, and similar social objects. Some degree of agreement is, of course, essential to the maintenance of civilized society. Persons who fail to accept the social consensus as regards mortgages, contracts, bank checks, and similar items usually encounter penalties. We could not operate our complicated social system without substantial uniformity in perceptions of these social objects.

Such a degree of agreement is a logical necessity if we hope to understand such complicated events as union-management relations. If every union officer were indeed a totally unique person, we could make no general statements about union officers as a group. Similarly, we could make no general assertions about factory workers, company executives, foremen, etc. It is essential to any psychological study of such problems as industrial conflict that there be some degree of relative uniformity of perceptions within a social group and a significant difference in perceptions held by the contrasted groups who are involved in this kind of interaction.

Sources of uniformity. Such uniformities and differences in social perceptions do, in fact, occur. Persons growing up in the United States show a predictable tendency to perceive as favorable various aspects of American institutions and to perceive in an unfavorable

light those of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Persons growing up in Russia reverse these perceptions. There is a more or less automatic tendency for each of us to see certain aspects of an ambiguous situation as real in terms of our own group background and social conditioning. This process makes possible the kind of psychological analysis in the following pages.

Uniformities in perception are not limited to those characteristic of nations. Within the American population there are also substantial subcultures, groups of individuals who have their own characteristic ways of perceiving, which are uniform within the group and differ from other groups. These differences are important for our purposes. Let us turn, therefore, to a more detailed consideration of the kinds of uniformities and differences in social perceptions within the American population and to the psychological factors which appear to determine them.

1. *Cultural area.* It is common knowledge that different cultural areas within the United States do have differences in uniformities of perception. A familiar example is the difference between North and South with regard to race relations. The stereotyped perception of the Negro is substantially different north and south of the Mason-Dixon line. The perceptions of acceptable and proper situations involving contact between the races also differ sharply, with a fairly high degree of uniformity on each side of this imaginary cultural boundary. (It should be noted, of course, that to some degree this stereotype is unrealistic. For example, the work of Anikeeff (1952) indicates that the traditional patterns of perception in the South have changed by an important amount, but that the Northern perception of the South has not changed to keep pace with this development. Thus, the relatively liberal attitude of Southern college students as found in his study on race questions is not correctly predicted by the Northern students.)

Another familiar difference in terms of cultural area is the difference between the eastern United States and the midwest with regard to foreign policy. The traditional isolationism of the Middle West is reflected in greater support for various kinds of "go it alone" policies with regard to international relations. The eastern states, on the other hand, give greater support to foreign aid, cooperation with democratic powers in Europe, etc.

Work on the determinants of political behavior has indicated that it is possible to predict the behavior of people in presidential elections with a fairly high degree of accuracy simply by a knowledge of certain cultural factors affecting the individual. For example, Lazarsfeld and his collaborators (1944) found, in the 1940 election, that it was

possible to predict approximately 85% of the votes in their sample by a knowledge of whether the individual lived in an urban or rural environment, whether he was Protestant or Catholic, and whether he was of upper or lower economic status.¹ The importance of these cultural factors in determining individual psychological variables should not be underestimated. We must recognize that, in the majority of cases, the way in which the individual perceives specific social situations will be determined by the kind of cultural background from which he has come. When we imagine that we are considering issues




Fig. 2.11. Typical public opinion differences among upper, middle, and lower income groups. (Data are from Kornhauser, 1940, Table IX, pp. 235-236.)

and making rational decisions, our judgment often enough is predetermined by our earlier experiences.

2. *Economic status.* Of the cultural factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the one which is most directly related to our area of concern, namely, industrial relations, is, of course, the factor of economic status. We now have ample data indicating that the perception of many social objects and issues varies according to the economic status of the observer (Fig. 2.11). These differences are, of course, not peculiar to the United States. The public opinion data

¹ Lazarsfeld *et al.* (1944). It must be noted that this index did not hold up in the 1948 and 1952 elections very well. The generalization is still true that social status has a powerful effect on perceptions and attitudes.

presented by Cantril (1951) in his tabulation of public opinion polls covering the period 1935-1946 indicates that exactly parallel differences in group-determined perceptions according to economic level can be identified in the Western European countries. In the Eastern European area, of course, free public-opinion polls are not permitted.

The psychological basis for such differences could be identified in motive satisfaction if they occurred only in adults. It is no mystery that the well-to-do favor sales taxes as opposed to income taxes, since the latter tax hits them personally much harder. We should note, however, that children of such families generally adopt the same attitudes before they are likely to appreciate the personal implications. In other words, the processes of identification and imitation, learning to say those things which Father and Mother will approve, or learning a way of evaluating social policies are very important here. Most young people follow in the footsteps of their parents on religious, political, and economic attitudes. This is important for industrial relations because persons going into executive jobs are more and more being recruited from among college graduates, who are relatively more often from upper economic backgrounds.

The existence of these differences indicates that we must expect the same social stimuli to be perceived in radically different ways by people of varying economic levels. A proposal to eliminate federal taxation of dividends may seem just and relatively valuable from a social point of view to an upper income man who has extensive investments. To the worker, who owns no shares of stock, this same proposal looks like a device to shift the tax burden from the rich to the poor.

As we shall note in later connections, the perception of picket lines, strike issues, legislative proposals for controlling unions, etc., differ significantly from one economic group to another. Such differences have extensive implications for the occurrence or non-occurrence of conflicts in specific situations.

3. *Educational level.* The United States has gone in for mass education on an unparalleled scale, but a wide range of educational levels within the adult population still exists. In some respects the differences in social perception associated with education duplicate those differences based on economics. This occurs for two reasons: first, upper economic families send their children to college much more often than lower level families; and secondly, college-trained people earn higher incomes and therefore move into the upper economic category if they did not originate at that level.

When we eliminate statistically the effects of economic status, we

find that some slight differences in social perception remain. These differences may perhaps be ascribed to a broadened context within which specific issues are perceived, as a result of the facts learned in the higher educational institutions, or to the greater acuity in discrimination which probably goes with higher intelligence. (Intelligence is not perfectly correlated with education but there is, of course, a significant tendency for them to vary together.)

4. *Group identification.* Membership in religious organizations, political parties, labor unions, and other voluntary associations brings with it some degree of uniformity in social perception. There is a higher degree of agreement within the group with regard to specific issues, and a higher degree of divergence in comparisons made of cross-groups. One need think only, for example, of the divergence with regard to birth control between Catholic and non-Catholic groups to illustrate this point. (It should be noted, of course, that the differences found from actual surveys of individuals are smaller than the differences that are popularly believed to exist. For example, a random sampling of Catholics does not score as unfavorably on attitude toward birth control as would be predicted by a group of non-Catholics. Similarly, other types of hypothetical religious differences, although they are confirmed, prove to be much smaller than the stereotyped predictions would indicate.)

The importance of group identification in determining perceptions of social situations depends upon the function of the group as a frame of reference, providing a standard of values by which certain objects shall be evaluated. The concept of reference group has such extensive implications for our later discussions that it is necessary at this point to take it up in somewhat greater detail.

THE REFERENCE GROUP AND PERCEPTUAL UNIFORMITIES

As we have seen in the foregoing analysis of perception of physical objects, the cues which are presented by the environment are often ambiguous. The young child, therefore, frequently has to rely on definitions provided by his parents and other adults in order to achieve some feeling of security in his knowledge of his surroundings. For instance, he may see an old-fashioned rocker and a modern "functional" chair. Without adult advice he might never perceive them as serving the same purpose or being classified in the same category. The need for adult guidance is felt even more keenly when a child is faced with the task of getting a clear structure of social situations. For example, a high school youth may hear of a proposal to increase

unemployment compensation benefits. This sounds good until his father says, "No, this would encourage laziness." The particular aspects emphasized by different parents lead to the divergent perceptions noted in the preceding pages.

However, parents are not always present. Also, adults have to resolve the ambiguity of new and complex situations when the parent is no longer available for guidance. Typically, these perceptions are also group-determined. We shall use the term "reference group" to identify the group to which a person characteristically looks for guidance in his perceptions.

Experimental studies. Before taking up some of the studies in reference groups in everyday social perceptions, let us consider some experiments on this problem. We have already cited the study by Sherif (1935) which indicated that the apparent movement of a point of light could be modified by a group experience. Upon hearing others give reports as to the amount of movement perceived, the typical subject shifted to agree with the majority (see Fig. 2.7). Even where subjects experienced clearly structured physical cues, as in the experiment by Asch (1952), they changed many judgments to conform to a majority when this majority had been coached to give a deliberately incorrect answer. Some of the subjects reported that they actually began to doubt their own judgment and to rely upon the group figures rather than upon the physical cues provided by the environment. This, of course, is precisely what we mean by a "reference group." The individual looks to the group as a guide whenever his personal percepts are not clear, and sometimes even when they are.

Let us consider an experiment using social materials. Lawson (1954) chose college students who were quite nationalistic or internationalistic in their political attitudes, as measured by two attitude scales. Each nationalist was put into a discussion group which had been loaded with people who held international views or who were coached to give international views and judgments. The issues to be discussed were also loaded in such a way as to favor internationalism. Conversely, each internationalist used in the experiment was placed in a group loaded in favor of nationalistic opinions. Forty such groups were run, twenty with each set-up. Virtually every experimental subject showed a change in his way of looking at questions in the field of international relations after the experiment. It is also true that almost all of them reported that they were *not aware* of changing their opinions and only two or three suspected that an attempt had been made in the discussion group to change their point of view.

Such experiments are analyzed as follows: The subject has a certain

way of looking at social objects. When he is placed in the discussion situation, he faces a physically present group of his peers. By loading the situation, the experimenter shakes the subject's convictions as to the accuracy of his own percepts. The present group provides a new frame of reference, a guide for judgment. Thus, the subject tends to adopt a new reference group and to emphasize those cues which lead to percepts matching those of the reference group.

Studies of existing reference groups. A fertile source of data on the importance of reference groups as determinants of social perception is *The American Soldier* (Stouffer *et al.*, 1949, 1950), a report on studies in social psychology by the armed forces during World War II. We can mention here only a few of these data.

1. *Combat veterans and replacements.* Interviews with combat veterans indicated that they felt considerable reluctance to return to the battle lines (only 15% said that they were "ready to get into an actual battle zone"). Green troops, by contrast, showed 45% saying that they were ready and willing to move up into battle. What about the situation when new replacements were assigned to experienced combat units? Since they would have a new reference group to look up to, the combat veterans, it was hypothesized that they would rapidly begin to change toward the veterans' view of things. Actually, they reported 28% "ready and willing," a decided shift from the position of the groups from which they had just been drawn. This seems to indicate a kind of compromise between the point of view of the new troops and the point of view of the experienced combat units.

2. *Attitudes of married draftees.* A reference group may be one with which to compare yourself favorably or unfavorably; that is, it need not be one in which you desire membership. Thus, *The American Soldier* reports that married men over twenty, not graduated from high school, most often felt injustice at being drafted (41% as compared with 10% of unmarried high school graduates under twenty). This is analyzed as follows: The married draftee compares his situation with that of unmarried draftees and feels that they did not sacrifice as much as he did; and, looking at the married civilians, he feels that his sacrifices were much greater than theirs. Hence, *multiple reference groups* may reinforce a way of looking at situations. Such multiple reference groups undoubtedly function in many day-to-day situations. For example, a man may be influenced by his work group, his union, his political party, his church group, etc. If these multiple groups support similar perceptions, this man will have a clear, consistent view of social objects and issues; if they disagree, he is likely to feel confused and to see the same issue differently at different times.

Also, he may look at contrasted groups of differing wealth, religion, and politics and may reinforce his own perceptions by emphasizing his differences from them.

The importance of reference groups. How a given individual perceives any social object, policy, or issue depends upon all the factors we have enumerated in this chapter. However, there can be little doubt that a major role in the perception of issues important in union-management relations is played by reference groups. Workers are influenced significantly by their personal associates, family, work




Fig. 2.12. General attitudes toward unions. (Data are from *Labor-Management Relations in Illini City*, vol. 1, p. 117.)

group, union, etc. Executives, likewise, see things in terms of standards provided by their families, friends, fellow executives, clubs, and manufacturers' associations. The importance of a national union or trade association lies not so much in the fact that such groups are representative of their members; rather their chief significance is that the positions officially adopted by such bodies provide reference points for members, many of whom uncritically adopt the views of their organizations.

The importance of such reference group membership is indicated by such differences as are revealed in Fig. 2.12. The data here show that perception of labor unions by the general public in Illini City varied from strongly pro-labor to strongly pro-management (based on ten specific opinion statements, Table 3.5, p. 71). Persons who were

members of unions, however, saw only the favorable aspects of these organizations, with very few exceptions. Managers and executives gave predominantly neutral answers, with some favorable to unions and a smaller proportion pro-management (unfavorable to unions). Since these differences between groups are large and cannot be ascribed to chance, we infer that group membership has induced a higher level of uniformity within the group and consequently larger differences between groups that would otherwise be expected.

PRESTIGE FIGURES AND ATTITUDES

We have noted that parents provide the earliest reference groups. They can structure experience for children, and the child usually comes to rely upon the interpretations of cues as set up by adults because he is unable to estimate accurately the probable consequences of dealing with certain objects. Many children never develop any confidence in their own judgments and wish to go through life leaning on parent-figures who will tell them what is good and what is bad. Even the wisest of us cannot learn to evaluate judiciously all kinds of situations: esthetics, economics, politics, religion, and science. Each of us, therefore, is likely to accept suggestions from prestige figures, leaders in certain areas, on how to look at social situations. In this sense it is correct to say that a prestige figure constitutes an effective reference point.

Prestige figures undoubtedly play major roles in determining how we see union-management issues. Such prestige persons may be parents, school teachers, political leaders, prominent businessmen. Studies of the relative effectiveness of different prestige figures indicate that college students (at least) are more likely to respond favorably to figures who are usually pro-management. For example, Stagner (1941) presented ten attitude statements to college men for endorsement. Several weeks later the identical statements were submitted again, but on this occasion they were ascribed to "a prominent utilities magnate," a "CIO president," "a Brigadier-General, U.S. Army," etc. Change scores from the first administration were computed by determining the extent to which people shifted to agree with the source imputed to the statement in the second administration. It was found that these students were affected positively by (agreed more with) business and political leaders, but responded negatively to statements when they were imputed to union, military, and religious leaders (Table 2.2).

**Table 2.2 Shifts in Approval of Attitude Statements with
Prestige Suggestion***

<i>Type of Prestige Figure</i>	<i>Mean Shift†</i>
Business	+.113
Political	+.006
Religious	-.014
Military	-.026
Union	-.127

* Stagner (1941) p. 409. Reprinted by permission.

† Each item was answered on a 5-step scale. The shift score indicates the amount of change in answer steps when prestige figures were attached to the statements. Only the business-union difference is statistically significant.

Such studies emphasize the process of *organizing the perceptual field*. When certain attitudes toward leaders or issues have been established, they in turn shape new perceptions to form a consistent view of life. This is why attitude tests regularly find most people to be generalized in their liberalism or conservatism. The need for a consistent set of frames of reference is an important factor in the psychology of the individual and therefore in his way of viewing social situations.

SELECTIVE IGNORANCE

Once a certain way of perceiving reality has become established, it is protected by a variety of techniques. As the preceding paragraphs have indicated, favorable attitudes toward one person or object carry over to others. Another device which merits our attention is the process of refusing to learn new material which conflicts with previously established points of view. By refusing to observe those "facts" which would upset my beliefs, I can maintain my equilibrium, keep a feeling of comfortable stability. I can also avoid the mental effort of trying to think through a complicated situation.

We have already presented the process of acquiring information about the environment as a kind of sampling of the various cues present. No one can possibly attend to every facet of life about him. Each of us is likely to take many samples from a limited area. Thus, the botanist approaches and has dealings with a wide variety of plant life, and his frame of reference for evaluating and discriminating among plants becomes increasingly refined. The automobile mechanic has dealings with a variety of defective engines, and becomes more

acute in discriminating the various kinds of ills found in these machines. Generally speaking, persons who have chosen an occupation tend to acquire more and more skill in identifying and evaluating the objects and situations significant for that occupation.

Suppose, however, that the individual has a painful experience with an object of a certain class, say, insects. He is likely, in the future, to avoid any chance to sample the characteristics of new insects. If he can, he will avoid situations involving their presence. If he is forced into a situation involving them, he is likely to keep his attention focused on his dislike of them and how disturbed he feels because of their presence, so that the new information he might have acquired does not in fact register. Thus divergent perceptions, once established, tend to resist modification by new knowledge.

People expose themselves to political speeches, campaign documents, and other propaganda items emanating from the side they favor, but avoid contact with the material published by the opposition. Thus Lazarsfeld *et al.* (1944) found, in the 1940 presidential campaign, that Republicans who were interviewed had heard Republican speeches and read pro-Republican newspapers, whereas the Democrats had not exposed themselves to such materials. Obviously what develops here is a focusing of ignorance. The Republicans remain in ignorance of the Democratic policies and programs, the characteristics of the Democratic candidates, and the arguments used by that party. Conversely, the Democrats refuse to sample, and therefore to learn about, Republican programs, candidates, and arguments.

The processes by which we defend ourselves against seeing things in a new fashion are even more complex. In an experimental laboratory we can insist that our subjects learn material which contradicts their established beliefs. But if they do, they learn with difficulty and forget rapidly. Figure 2.13 shows the results of requiring pro-communist and anti-communist students to memorize a passage sharply critical of communism. Those who disagree with the message resist it and forget it as soon as possible.

These processes have deplorable results in politics. But they also extend widely into other fields. Religious groups, for example, tend to stick together and learn little of other religions. Racial segregation, formal or informal, prevents acquisition of information about the characteristics of other races. On the other hand, if people work together for common ends, these barriers are broken down. Numerous studies during World War II showed that white prejudice against Negroes declined rapidly when service in mixed units made it necessary for




Fig. 2.13. Learning and forgetting of controversial material. (From Levine and Murphy, 1943, by permission of American Psychological Association.) People learn more rapidly and forget more slowly material that agrees with their prejudices. The material here was an anti-communist paragraph; the subjects were two groups of college students, selected for fairly strong attitudes for or against communism.

prejudiced white soldiers to work with Negroes. Similarly in the Merchant Marine it was found (Brophy, 1946) that prejudice declined proportionately to the number of voyages made in mixed crews.

In industry, a variety of factors combine to make less likely the acquisition of information by one party about the other. Few factory workers have an opportunity to mix with executives, either socially or in a business context. Certainly the typical worker has no conception of the daily problems faced by the executive, the factors he must consider in making decisions, and the threats to his continued success which he must evaluate and counter. But conversely, the typical executive nowadays has far too little information about the characteristic problems of the worker. And certainly he does not expose himself to information regarding the internal workings of the unions, the problems facing the union officer, and the consequences for the union head of some policies blithely proposed by business men. Some industries have experimented with running foreman training classes in which union stewards were included; the general impression is that such stewards become more understanding and less prejudiced against the foreman. Is it possible that some company officials also could profit by attending training sessions for stewards?

Pluralistic ignorance. Another way of protecting established beliefs should be mentioned. Often we encounter, in social conflict

situations, a condition which has aptly been called "pluralistic ignorance." If we ask workers in a factory, for example, whether they approve of hiring Negroes, we are likely to get responses like "I wouldn't care, but most of the workers would walk out if it happened." Often a sizeable majority of the group individually profess tolerance but perceive their fellows as intolerant. This has been interpreted as indicating that if this misconception regarding the group were cleared up, intergroup relations would be improved.

The situation, of course, is not quite so simple as this optimistic interpretation. First of all, we must recognize that people who are prejudiced may prefer not to accept personal responsibility for an attitude they feel is somewhat anti-social; hence the assumed group hostility may be only a rationalization.¹ Secondly, each person may consciously think of himself as tolerant, but unconsciously carry a great deal of prejudice; he may sense this in others even though he does not recognize its presence in himself. The evidence to date seems to indicate that "pluralistic ignorance" or blaming others for failure to change one's behavior is most often functioning as a device for protecting established prejudices against the demand for change.

SUMMARY

This chapter has analyzed the process by which we get information about our physical and social environments. Specific cues—light, sound, odors, contacts—provide information about objects, but these cues are emphasized, ignored, or fitted into patterns to construct perceptions of physical objects. Characteristics even in the physical world are thus determined to some extent within the organism.

Individuals develop frames of reference, consistent ways of evaluating the size, color, usefulness, beauty, and desirability of objects. These frames of reference derive from repeated experiences with similar objects, from satisfactions of needs, and from definitions provided by parents and other reference groups.

Perception of social events, issues, and objects also depends upon information received through the senses, especially sight and sound.

¹ It is interesting to note that the consumer research divisions of the automobile companies reject the concept of pluralistic ignorance. They report that, if the average man is asked what characteristics he prefers in a car, he answers in terms of efficiency, economy, etc.; but, if asked what his neighbors prefer, he answers in terms of flashy chromium. Experience, they claim, supports the latter answer as the best predictor of sales success. Perhaps, therefore, the "sensible" answer is superficial, the answer in terms of other people revealing his "true" feelings.

In this case, however, group definitions of social objects become far more important determiners of what is perceived than in the case of the physical. Family, school, work group, and other reference groups can and do provide us with definitions. Persons who find themselves in conflict with a physically present reference group usually change their way of looking at things to conform to the group norm.

We should not overemphasize the extent to which these perceptions are peculiar to the individual. Although it is true, in a certain sense, that each individual lives in his own private universe and that the world is not the same for any two of us, it is also true that there is a high degree of uniformity in the perception of both physical and social objects. Sources of uniformity in the perception of social situations derive particularly from such factors as similarity in economic and educational level, similarity in reference groups, and similarities in past experience. As individuals develop similar frames of reference, they come to look at new issues in the same way. This fact of uniformity in the manner of perception of different factory workers, different corporation executives, or different union officials makes it possible for us to have a social psychology of union-management relations. If each of these persons were totally and completely different from all the others, no generalizations could be made with regard to the psychological determinants of his behavior. Precisely because of uniformities of perception within each of these groups, but decided differences between groups, psychology has something significant to say with regard to union-management relations. This point is further developed in the following chapter.

Perception: Applied Aspects

The problem of industrial conflict is the problem of the perceptions of company executives, union officers, and rank-and-file workers, the ways in which they see themselves, and the prospects of achieving satisfaction for their motives within the framework of reality as they perceive it. In the foregoing chapter we have outlined some of the basic principles of the psychology of perception as they determine attitudes, values, and frames of reference for people in general. Let us now turn to a specific analysis of the situation as it relates to the three groups which we have identified as crucial for an understanding of the realities of industrial conflict and industrial cooperation.

At least three kinds of perceptions can be of decisive significance in union-management relations. One of them is *perception of persons*—what people on one side look like to people on the other side. Second, *perception of situations* is important. We can show how the same kinds of distortions identified in the generalized discussion already given can be found in a union-management context. (And third, *perception of issues* is a significant part of the interaction. How the various groups perceive managerial policies, union activities, etc., can be very important in determining not only company-union relations but also public policy regarding this problem.)

PERCEPTION OF PERSONS

From a psychological point of view, industrial conflict is first and foremost a matter of conflict between people. And the extent to which we fight with others depends to a substantial degree on how we perceive them. (Conversely, of course, we perceive persons differently if they frustrate us or satisfy us. This point will be developed in subsequent chapters.) Thus, it becomes important to ascertain whether executives and unionists perceive each other realistically. Do distortions in interpersonal perceptions affect the course of industrial relations? And if differences exist, how do they arise?

Perceptual abstraction and differentiation. Every percept is a complex experience involving a variety of elements and possessing characteristics enabling it to be differentiated from others. Thus the young child learns to *differentiate* objects on the basis of color, form, and size; and at a somewhat later age can *abstract* these qualities (e.g., classify all red objects together, all round objects together, etc.).

Perception of persons illustrates clearly these same processes. At a fairly early age children become aware of differences in dress (the policeman, the doctor, the waiter, etc.) Somewhat later we get evidence of recognition of differences in social role regardless of clothing. Conscious abstraction of categories of people probably is a fairly late (adolescent) development. Perceptual distortions occur when these differences in perceived traits are arbitrarily "loaded" in one direction, without regard to the "real" situation.

The evidence indicates that the earliest differentiations involve polarized, all-or-none judgments. For example, southern white children have been shown at first to have no prejudice as regards Negro children (perceive no difference); then they begin to develop a complete avoidance response (all perceived qualities "bad"). Only in later childhood and early adolescence does the white adult stereotype, with its inclusion of some desirable and some undesirable features, develop.

This process may be a necessary one in any kind of social perception. The typical executive seems to go through a developmental sequence in his perception of labor union officials. At first all are bad (frustrating, threatening figures). Later the executive begins to differentiate between individuals (some are better than others), and perhaps, even later, to differentiate within the individual (he has some features I don't like, but he has his good points too).

Children's perceptions of labor and management figures. We can verify the accuracy of the foregoing analysis, as regards children, by reference to a study by Haire and Morrison (1954). These investigators presented pictorial and verbal stimuli to 755 school children, ages 12-16. They were interested first in differences related to the income status of the child's family. A few sample items are shown in Table 3.1.

Inspection of this table indicates that children of upper economic background are more likely to see strikers as "bad," "dirty," etc. Of 57 items in the test, 38 gave differences significant at the 1% level or better. All of these indicate that lower economic status goes with more favorable perception of labor and union figures.

Particularly important for our purposes is the analysis of age dif-

Table 3.1 Socioeconomic Differences among Children's Perceptions of Labor and Management Figures*

<i>Item</i>	<i>Percentage of "Yes" Responses</i>	
	<i>High Economic Status</i>	<i>Low Economic Status</i>
Photograph of people unloading a truck		
Caption reads: "These strikers are receiving food and clothing."		
1. Do they deserve help?	48	76
6. Do you think they are bad people?	22	7
Photograph of a picket line—Telephone strike		
No caption.		
9. Are they good people?	64	89
10. Would they be nice to talk with?	43	71
12. Are they clean?	39	54
13. Are these people smart?	31	55

* From Haire and Morrison (1954).

ferentials. We have already noted that perception of persons develops before perception of issues, and that discrimination of "good" and "bad" precedes awareness of other differential features. The Haire-Morrison data confirm these observations for union-management material. The younger children—roughly, 12 and 13 years old—are differentiated chiefly on items about the personal characteristics of workers and bosses. The older subjects—ages 14 to 16—give fewer distinctive responses to these purely personal items, although some differences persist; but they show differences on questions regarding issues, which do not appear at the earlier levels. This trend makes perfectly good sense in terms of the fact that an understanding of abstract issues by the age of 12 is rare, particularly if such issues have not been topics of specific indoctrination.

Thus, by the time the child is 12, he has already been slanted toward a pro-union or pro-management bias. From that point on, by selective learning and selective forgetting, he will as a rule become more and more disposed to see only those "facts" in a situation which fit in with his established attitudes.

This kind of perception influences the individual's evaluation of job opportunities. Table 3.2 shows how high school boys feel about jobs in relation to union membership. Active hostility to unions is clearly not large, but it does reflect the economic status of the family.

Perceptions of college students. These observations suggest that

Table 3.2 Attitudes of Boys toward Unions, by Occupation of Father

<i>Father's Occupation</i>	<i>Attitude of Sons</i>	
	<i>Accept Unions*</i>	<i>Reject Unions†</i>
Unskilled workers	76%	11%
Semiskilled workers	77	11
Skilled workers and foremen	74	14
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	63	28
Farmers	60	27
Proprietors, managers, and officials	61	30
Professionals	68	26

Source: *Youth and the World of Work*, Social Research Service, Michigan State College, 1949.

* Adds together those preferring a job where one must join a union and those preferring a job where one can join a union if he wishes.

† Indicates those preferring a job where there is no labor union.

persons friendly to unions perceive workers as having pleasant, desirable characteristics, whereas those disliking unions perceive workers as bad and threatening. Stagner (1950 *b*) reported on 50 college men who were consistently pro-union, and 50 who were consistently anti-union. These men checked a list of adjectives, first to show which they thought characteristic of factory workers, then for characteristics of business executives. A portion of the list is reproduced in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3 Descriptions of Workers and of Executives by College Men*

<i>Adjective Checked</i>	<i>By Pro-Union</i>		<i>By Anti-Union</i>	
	<i>Men</i>		<i>Men</i>	
	<i>For Exec.</i>	<i>For Worker</i>	<i>For Exec.</i>	<i>For Worker</i>
Lazy	10	10	3	20
Aggressive	46	23	49	23
Ignorant	6	6	3	25
Violent	8	7	3	13
Kind	26	37	36	34
Sarcastic	27	11	15	15
Happy	28	35	35	29
Grasping	39	15	29	16

* From Stagner (1950), by permission of the American Psychological Association.

N = 50 for each group.

Table 3.3 shows consistent differences in the mental picture that the pro-union students and the anti-union students have of business executives. The pro-labor group tends to perceive the executives as grasp-

ing, sarcastic, and lacking in kindness, whereas the anti-labor students perceive the executive as having favorable characteristics. Conversely, the pro-labor students are prone to see the good side of the worker's personality, whereas the anti-labor students are likely, relatively at least, to characterize the worker as ignorant, violent, and lazy. We can hardly doubt that these mental pictures of the kinds of persons with whom they will be dealing in future years will have a profound influence on the policies and activities of these two groups of young men.

A study of executives and unionists. The crucial question with regard to these perceptual differences, of course, is how they actually function in union-management relations. Let us consider first whether labeling a neutral person as an executive or as a union officer changes his perceived qualities. Haire (1955) tested 76 members of a Central Labor Council¹ and 108 representatives of management—mostly personnel managers and industrial relations men. The test materials consisted of two pictures and four descriptions. Each picture was that of an ordinary, middle-aged man. All four descriptions were virtually identical, though in slightly different words and arrangements. Two descriptions identified the picture as that of a "local manager of a small plant which is a branch of a large manufacturing concern." Two identified him as "Secretary-Treasurer of his union." Each description was paired with each picture for equal numbers of respondents. The men in the Central Labor Council were asked to look over a photograph and description, then check an adjective list to describe this person. The same was done by the group of executives. Since the photographs and descriptions were labeled half the time "manager" and half the time "union," we can ignore the specific pictures and see what adjectives were applied by each group. Some of the results are shown in Table 3.4. Haire offers the following generalizations regarding his study:

"The general impression of a person is radically different when he is seen as a member of management than when he is seen as a representative of labor.

"Management and labor each see the other as less dependable than himself.

"Management and labor each see the other as less appreciative of the other's position than he himself is.

"Management and labor each see the other as deficient in thinking, emotional characteristics and interpersonal relations in comparison with himself."

¹ The Central Labor Council is composed of delegates from local unions within a community. These men can therefore be assumed to be active unionists.

Table 3.4 Traits Perceived As Applying to Photographs when Labeled Manager or Unionist*

	By Executives		By Unionists		p
	Labeled Manager	Labeled Unionist	Labeled Manager	Labeled Unionist	
Dependability (conscientious, honest, responsible, etc.)	252	176	200	231	.01
Seeing others' problems (considerate, cooperative, fairminded, etc.)	123	47	93	137	.01

* From Haire (1955), p. 210. Reprinted by permission of *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*.

Perception and the quality of union-management relations. It seems plausible that the existence of these divergent perceptions would aggravate the real conflicts of interest which arise in union-management bargaining. A corollary of this idea is that, when the union-management relationship is full of conflict, each party will perceive "bad" traits in the other; whereas "good" labor-management conditions should be associated with perceptions of the opposing party as "good."

An early observational investigation into this question is that reported by Stagner (1948 *b*). In this study personal interviews were conducted with union officers and company officials to get some notion of the way in which they perceived each other. Marked agreement was observed between the general level of labor-management relationships and the kinds of reports obtained. For example, interviews at a company in which the general relationship was reported to be poor led to the following observations: "At one time he (the executive) claims that his rank and file workers are all right, only the officers being bad. On other points, however, he says of the workers that 'They seem to lose sight of everyone else but themselves. No matter how you slice it, they still think they should have more.' He believes that 'workers are forced into the union, and once in it, a small group dominates the meetings so that only the desired few are allowed to speak.'"

An executive in another company, whose union officers had commented that he was "too stuck up" and they could not trust him, gave the following comments about the union: "I really don't see what good the union has done these fellows; they are just contributing money to the union." Under the Taft-Hartley Act he will have a chance to show the workers "where they have been led astray by some of the labor organizers." Regarding an annual wage, this executive says: "Of

course, you have an awful lot of workers who are lazy. If you gave them an annual wage, it would take away the incentive to work." He then commented rather naively: "Why they should believe everything the union tells them and nothing management tells them is beyond me. *We pay them their wages.*" The perception of the worker as being lazy and likely to be corrupted by an annual wage, although the executive is not corrupted by an annual salary, is, of course, suggestive of some of the important elements in this man's frame of reference. Likewise, his notion that labor organizers are those who lead the workers astray is significant of the way in which he looks at certain kinds of situations.

In contrast to these descriptions of unfavorable perceptions by both union and company officials are reports from companies where relations were commonly said to be "good." In these establishments, executives saw their workers as "people like myself," and unionists described the boss as "a square shooter." We need no crystal ball to see the significance of such interpersonal perceptions for smooth-functioning contract negotiations and grievance settlements.

The Illini City study.¹ Finally, we can report on a comparison which makes use of quantitative estimates of the quality of the union-management situation. In the Illini City research, eight companies were ranked according to "attitudinal climate,"² using reports of proportions of conflict and cooperation in interviews with production workers. They were then ranked again by taking the proportion of favorable remarks that top managers made when interviewed about their union. The correlation of these rankings was $+0.74$, a highly significant degree of agreement.

Since it seems unlikely that the views of hourly workers affected top executives, we incline to the following interpretation of these data: in some establishments top executives perceive the union and its officers as unreasonable, hot-headed, demanding, and irresponsible.³

¹ Frequent reference will be made in this book to *Labor-Management Relations in Illini City: Vol. 1. The Case Studies. Vol. 2. Explorations in Comparative Analysis*. Champaign, Illinois: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Illinois, 1953, 1954. These volumes present extensive data of a comparative nature on eight union-management relationships, including considerable material of psychological character, along with economic, sociological and historical data on the companies and unions involved.

² For a more detailed treatment of this concept, see Chapter 12, pp. 398-403.

³ It is probable that these perceptions were in part realistic, but not wholly so. For example, the same union officers were perceived more favorably by executives in one company than by those in another; and the attitudinal climate of workers was more favorable in the former.

Their behavior toward the union is guided by these perceptions. This behavior sets off defensive and counterattacking responses by the union leaders. Thus workers (in plants where this sequence occurs) are correct in reporting more conflict between management and union. The reverse of this occurs where executives have favorable perceptions of the union.

Cues, roles, and percepts. Let us now relate these observations to the systematic view of perception outlined in Chapter 2. Figure 3.1




Fig. 3.1. Abstracting different features of a perceived person.

diagrams a way of thinking about the perception of persons. The "real" individual has a number of social roles. In each of these he "emits" cues which reach the observer. However, the observer may be influenced by role A even though that role has been replaced by role B. The potency of specific cues in determining a percept depends on how they are "loaded" for a given observer. In Fig. 3.1¹ we suggest that Joe Jones has differentiable characteristics, such as being a worker, a bowler, a homeowner, and a union member. Which of these will play the major part in determining how Jones is perceived by Smith?

¹ This method of representing successive degrees of abstraction from a perceived "real" object has much in common with what Korzybski (1933) called the *structural differential*, later called the *abstraction ladder* by Hayakawa (1941). We have omitted any suggestion of the "real" object of physics, which Korzybski considered essential.

Obviously, the outcome depends substantially on characteristics within Smith. If he has been slanted by family background, college training, or prior experience to perceive unions as threatening, the cues from this role may overbalance everything and determine the perceived personality.

(It is worth while, at this point, to note that many psychological errors derive from ill-founded generalizations based on these perceived characteristics.¹ In human relations we must deal with specific individuals, not consumers, or citizens, or unionists, as abstractions.) Much of this book seems to lead to the opposite conclusion. We are engaged in locating those psychological traits that are reasonably common to executives, others that characterize unionists, and so on. But if we want to work successfully with Joe Jones, we need to perceive accurately his individual traits. To some extent what we have identified in the foregoing pages is indeed perceptual distortion. The manager's stereotyped picture of a unionist may have little in common with Jones's personality as observed by others. A knowledge of perception, then, warns us of a source of error that makes a sizable contribution to industrial conflict.

Resistance to change of perceptions. The extent to which one resists any attempt to modify his perceptions of another person is sometimes surprising. Psychologists, in their work with children, have often noted cases in which the child has a decidedly "unrealistic" picture of his father and, even when factual evidence is pointed out, refuses to change this perception. Thus, a boy who describes his father as stingy and denying pleasures to the son will, in the next breath, mention expensive gifts of objects or cash from the father. When this is pointed out, the son typically argues that this was just an attempt to bribe him into being friendly, or that the gift was tiny compared to what should have been given, and so on.

(We are concerned, in our present context, with more generalized perceptions. Executives get pictures of what the average worker is like—as the worker gets a picture of the typical executive. These perceptions likewise tend to resist change, and they get in the way of improvements in union-management relations; for example, if one side does objectively change its tactics, this change may be denied or distorted by those on the other side.)

An interesting experiment by Haire and Grunes (1950) illustrates this point in an ingenious way. Students were given the following

¹ For a more detailed analysis of the misunderstandings which derive from stereotypes and other errors in perception, see Ichheiser (1949).

instructions: "The object of the test is to determine the extent to which people are capable of sizing up a person from just a few facts about him. Below is a brief description of a certain working-man. Describe in a paragraph what sort of person you think he is. Indicate where possible which item gave you your impression of him."

Form I

works in a factory
reads a newspaper
goes to movies
average height
cracks jokes
intelligent
strong
active

Form III

works in a factory
reads a newspaper
goes to movies
average height
cracks jokes
strong
active

It will be noted that the lists of items are identical except that Form I includes the item "intelligent." The descriptions based on Form III were quite uniform. The worker was seen as "A typical American joe, likeable and well-liked, mildly sociable, healthy, happy, uncomplicated, and well-adjusted in a sort of earthy way." The addition of "intelligent," however, complicates the task of the subjects; they must fit this item into a picture which is not congruous with the idea of an intelligent man.¹ Haire and Grunes identify four kinds of responses made by their subjects in dealing with this incongruous element: (1) denial of the existence of the elements; "he's intelligent, but not too much so." (2) Reinterpreting the attributes so that the conflict vanishes; "he is intelligent, but doesn't possess enough initiative to rise above his group" or "probably never had a college education, or he would do a bigger and better job than the work in a factory." (3) Allowing the new element to make a real change in the perception, sometimes with reference to his personality, sometimes about his job. "Because of his intelligence I think he is a little more interesting than the average;" or "this person is perhaps a foreman at the factory where he works, because for this position he would have to be intelligent." (4) Recognition of the incongruity but failure to resolve it; "the traits seem to be conflicting . . . most factory workers I have heard about aren't too intelligent." Of the four types of response, 5 used the first, 14 the second, 22 the third, and 3 the fourth. Thus it is clear that about half the group either refused to accept the

¹ Actually, different subjects responded to Form I and Form III. However, it seems reasonably certain that the subjects receiving Form I developed the picture sketched by those subjects using Form III, and then had to modify their responses to take account of the item "intelligent."

information provided or twisted it so that it fitted into their stereotyped picture of the factory worker.

As Ichheiser (1949) has stated, "Once the image of another person . . . is fixed in our minds, we tend either to overlook all factors in the other person which do not fit in with our preconceived scheme; or else, we misinterpret all unexpectedly emerging factors in order to preserve our preformed misconceptions." Perceptual constancy is a powerful tendency in human thinking. Apparently we resist, in a variety of ingenious ways, "real facts" which would compel us to change our ways of perceiving the people immediately around us.

Is this fact important? Obviously it is. It means that executives are not inclined to notice when union officers change from hostility to a cooperative attitude, and unionists fail to see that management has shifted to efforts to get along with the union. A new union officer looks just like his predecessor to the director of industrial relations; a new company man looks just the same as the old one to the union committee.

PERCEPTION OF SITUATIONS

The point has been developed that people, faced with a concrete situation, magnify certain cues, suppress others, and distort some aspects of the situation to fit their personal prejudices and attitudes. This phenomenon as regards executives and unionists can be well-illustrated by another example from the study of Akron by Alfred W. Jones (1941). The following story, which was used as a basis for eliciting responses from the persons interviewed, relates to an actual situation which had developed just prior to Jones's investigation:

The B. F. Goodrich Co. in early 1938 asked the workers in its plant in Akron, Ohio, to accept a wage cut and a longer working week. The company maintained that if the workers refused, some departments would have to be moved away from Akron, involving the removal of some four or five thousand jobs. They held that only in this way would they compete with the other rubber companies which already had a smaller proportion of their operations in Akron, where a strong union exists and maintains high wages. Assume that the Goodrich Co. can stay in business and continue to pay the old wages. They will not be able to make much money, if any, and they will not be able to pay much in dividends, but they will at least not be driven into bankruptcy. Assume also that if they move out of Akron they will be able to hire workers cheaper, make more money and pay more dividends, at least at first.

The workers at a meeting held by the union refused to accept the wage cut.

The company has the next move. What would you think of its *action* if the *company* should move these jobs away from Akron?¹

It will at once be observed that the story offers numerous cues which can be interpreted by the respondent in a manner to fit his point of view. One set of cues relates to the welfare of the company as an organization, competitive advantage, wage cuts, higher dividends, absence of a strong union, etc. On the other hand, there are also certain cues which can be built up into an opposite perception, particularly the loss of four or five thousand jobs as far as residents of Akron are concerned, the fact that the company will not go bankrupt, etc. Each story was scored on a basis from 0 to 4, according to how emphatically the person answered against the company proposal or in favor of it. In this particular case 18 top executives in Akron companies received an average score of 3.7; only 2 out of the 18 gave answers deviating in any way from an emphatic assertion of the company's right to move under the conditions stated. In contrast to this, a group of 167 members of the United Rubber Workers, CIO, received an average score of 0.4. Only 9% of this group gave any support to the proposal that the company move, and 89% vigorously rejected the proposal.

(The differences in perception of the situation can be suggested by the following quotations, the first from a company executive: "This is not a moral question, but a matter of sheer business. The company owes nothing to the worker or to the town; *its only obligation* is to make money for the stockholders. If the management considers morals in this case, the stockholders ought to vote for a change in management." In contrast to this view which focuses completely on one set of elements in the story, we have the following quotations from members of the CIO: "The company in any town should be compelled to stay *if a lot of their workers have given it their very best years of faithful service.*" And again: "I know they can't make this cheaper elsewhere.) The efficiency of Akron labor can overcome lower wages in other places by putting out a better product and more production per hour." Note that the persons who disapprove of the proposal are actually adding information which was not given in the story. They are so strongly involved in the situation that they are failing to distinguish between their own personal involvement in the problem and the specific facts which they were asked to respond to by the investigator. (This, of course, is a very common process in the perception of conflict situations. People do not limit themselves to

¹ Jones (1941), p. 359. Reprinted by permission of the author.

the known facts but add to the perception elements of their own needs, pressures, and emotions. The conflict between the two ways of viewing the situation was aptly characterized by an average citizen in his comment, "Of course, they have a right to move, but what they owe their workers and the community is *more important*."¹ Each of us weights the various cues to produce a perception that fits our own point of view.

Perceptions of employer rules. Since there are so many other differences in perception of social objects, it is not surprising that employees differ in the way in which they perceive rules established by the employer. Oman and Tomasson (1952) demonstrate that supervisors differ from salesclerks in their beliefs as to what store rules exist, as to the frequency of violations of these rules, and as to punishments which would be meted out if violations occurred. Salesclerks also varied among themselves; it was found that many were carefully obeying requirements which were not store rules at all. Some of these differences were found to be due to variations at the executive level, some supervisors being more strict than others. Punishments also varied considerably. The personality of the supervisor contributed to differences at the salesclerk level.

(The counterpart of this problem on the executive side, one which is especially painful for foremen, is clear knowledge of the union contract.) The number of grievances based upon contract violations by foremen, which arise from pure ignorance of contract provisions, is incredibly large. Many companies have resorted to conferences, quiz games, prizes, and other methods to induce their foremen to read the contract carefully. Even so, it is likely that men will misperceive provisions of which they disapprove, just as workers and stewards often "drop out" of the contract limitations which they do not like. Selective observation, selective learning, and selective forgetting all join in producing a distorted notion of contract requirements which contributes materially to industrial conflict.

Perceptual differences in a crisis situation. The foregoing considerations with regard to differences in the perceived facts in particular situations may be clarified and amplified by a consideration of a concrete example. The quotations given below are from the operating superintendent of a small textile factory and the organizer of the union which set up a local in this particular mill in the late 1930's. [The quotations are from much longer passages, Hartmann and New-

¹ The quotations are from Jones (1941), pp. 359, 176, 256, and 46. (Italics are ours.) Reprinted by permission of the author.

comb (1940).] The descriptions were written at the request of a psychologist who was personally acquainted with both these individuals and were prepared very shortly after the events in question. It will be instructive to note how very differently the two individuals perceive the same conflict situation.

For the sake of brevity we have eliminated rather long introductory statements from each of these accounts. For concrete context it should be understood that the mill had been non-union until quite recently, that the workers in the mill had submitted a petition for a pay increase which had been rejected and had then joined the union in a body. The union promptly demanded a pay increase, and the incident reflected in the following passages was the showdown on whether a strike would be called to enforce this union demand. Let us now consider first the comments of the superintendent with regard to this particular situation.

The one thing that we seemed not to agree on was the method of *protecting ourselves from excessive union demands*. Some of the executives thought that we should bargain. It was reasoned that the phrase "collective bargaining" determined our course of action. It had never been my policy to bargain. *This seemed weak*. It is always wiser to know what you want to pay and then stand pat even though you lose the object of discussion. The next time either the buyer or the seller will change his price, and the purchaser has not paid too much nor has the seller lost on the sale. The same with help and jobs. *Every job has its correct value*. No job is worth more than it can earn for an employer when the best workman in the world is doing it at his best. *So often workers will be doing work that has no stabilized worth*. One man may get too much and others may get too little. When this is true, from experience I have found that the man who will be persuaded to pay too much for a job will always compensate by browbeating others to work for less than they are worth. If a man is worth more money his employer should be proud to raise him before he expects it. On the other hand, it is shameful to raise an employee beyond his worth in order to keep him from getting a better job somewhere else. Because of this background, it seemed childish to fight for something lower than we were willing to pay and lower than we knew would be acceptable.

The union did extract a 5% increase. While we were doubtful about our ability to pay an increase, we were not brave enough to withstand a demonstration. When our help started one, we agreed to the 5% raise *just as the small school boy, when threatened with abuse, passes over his apple to the playground bully*.¹

The superintendent has in many ways indicated his way of perceiving the industrial situation. First, we may note that he auto-

¹ Hartmann and Newcomb (1940), pp. 170-172. Reprinted by permission of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. Italics are ours.

matically assumes that any union demands are going to be "excessive." A 5 per cent wage increase plus one week's vacation with pay hardly seems to be an excessive demand, although, of course, this particular controversy arose at a time when American industry had not fully recovered from the depression. Secondly, we note the characterization of the union as if it were comparable to a "playground bully." This likewise reflects a particular way of perceiving the union. Third, we observe contradictions within the superintendent's account as he attempts to rationalize his policy. First he says, "It has never been my policy to bargain." Then he says, "The next time either the buyer or the seller will change his price," which obviously is a matter of bargaining. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how wages could be set by a process of give and take unless either the employer or the union were willing to change demands. Presumably the superintendent means that he wants all the changing to be done by the union. Similarly, the employer says, "Every job has its correct value," and then again he says, "So often workers will be doing work that has no stabilized worth." This contradiction suggests that the superintendent does not want to accept any criterion of the value of a job except his own personal judgment. Finally we observe the superintendent saying, "It seemed childish to fight for something lower than we were willing to pay and lower than we knew would be acceptable," and yet this is exactly what the superintendent did. He put up a rather lengthy struggle against granting the 5 per cent wage increase but eventually he did so. By his own criterion, therefore, he had behaved in a childish way.

The importance of these ways of perceiving the union, the proposed pay increase, the bargaining relationship between union and company, and the nature of the tactics to be employed lies, of course, in the implications they have for industrial relations policy. As long as a company executive has these particular ways of perceiving conflict situations involving the workers and the union, a certain amount of difficulty is almost inevitable. However, it is pleasant to be able to record that over a period of time this particular superintendent did modify his way of looking at the situation and came to perceive the union and the workers in a more favorable manner.

Union officials likewise perceive industrial conflict situations in terms of their own attitudes and values. The following passage is a description of this same crisis situation as written by the union organizer:

Another conference, at which this proposal (5% wage increase plus one week's vacation with pay) was made to the management, proved futile.

The management's statement that further discussion of the question was useless was reported back to another union meeting. Their answer was brief: "We demand our terms within 48 hours; otherwise we give you authority to call a strike." The management's reply to this report was that they had given their last word. One of the officials, *shaky and white-faced*, was already busying himself *going through the motions* of preparing for a shut-down. But there was something *almost mystical in the way the workers saw through this bluff*. All the gestures which the management intended to impress us with their uncompromising readiness for war only had the effect of *intensifying the strike fever*. "We know the old man; he can't bluff us," they said.

I asked for an hour in which to contact my regional office before taking final action. Actually, I did not consult the regional director, because *I felt perfectly sure of my ground*. . . . At the end of the hour I returned, met the negotiating committee and told them that we had no choice but to use the authority given us by the workers to call a strike. They left to lead out the workers in their several departments. Before their footsteps had died away, the official with whom we had conferred that morning rushed in, demanding to know what was going on. *I told him, as briefly and as calmly as I could*. In a high state of emotion, he rushed out, returning with another official, who also demanded what had happened. "Mr. Nelson, you are not being fair. Why didn't you notify me of this?" I replied that I had sat there for some time that morning, conferring with the only available representative of the management, and did not know that the management did not consider itself adequately represented. The second official then told me that the first one had taken an unauthorized position, and asked me if I would give him a few more minutes. . . . One of the officials rushed into the mill with the news that we were to confer again, and the workers agreed to return to their posts for a brief period, though it was too late to catch up with the workers of one of the skilled departments. When the news reached them, outside, they announced that they would not return until the management agreed to their terms.

In the half-hour that followed the management made an attempt to restrict the 5% increase to certain classes of employees, but this offer was refused. Finally the vice-president said, "We agree to your terms."¹

If we look at the italicized items in this quotation, we find many indications of perceptual distortions on the part of the organizer. For example, he says, "The official, *shaky and white-faced*, was already busying himself, *going through the motions* of preparing for a shut-down." Obviously the organizer had no way of knowing that the official was just "going through the motions." This is a way of protecting his own point of view against the possibility of a strike which might have been disastrous to this newly organized union. It is also relatively unlikely that the official was shaky and white-faced. These are perceptual devices in which people commonly indulge to reassure

¹ *Ibid.* Reprinted by permission of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. Italics are ours.

themselves as to the correctness of their position and the fact that they are not making a mistake in strategy. Had the company actually closed down operations and broken the union, it is likely that the organizer would have remembered this official as looking red-faced and aggressive, rather than white-faced and shaky.

Similarly, we note the gross exaggeration of the value of the union side of the case. "There was something *almost mystical* in the way the workers saw through this bluff." The attribution of superiority to one's own side and the denial of such perceptual acuity to the opponent is a widely used device for maintaining group solidarity and confidence in the rightness of one's position. The organizer asserts his own calmness and confidence, while representing management as confused and emotional. Such observations as these make it possible to underline our previous assertion that aspects of a situation which seem particularly important to one person are not even observed by another.

The foregoing examples help us to understand the common difficulty in resolving various kinds of grievances involving foreman-worker interactions. The account of what happened (as given by the worker) may seem to have little or no relationship to the account given by the foreman. Under these circumstances it may require a trained investigator to dig into the situation and find out, in a reasonably impartial way, what did occur. Many grievances, of course, are not significant enough to justify such detailed analysis. What is clear, however, is that we must avoid the tendency to jump to conclusions on the basis of a report given by one side of a particular controversy.

This observation has particular implications, furthermore, for evaluating newspaper reports, radio accounts, and similar communications with regard to controversial issues, strike incidents, etc. The kind of situation perceived (or at least described) by a reporter for the Chicago Tribune, for example, may have little in common with that observed by a reporter for the New York Times. In these cases crucial effects on public opinion result from particular kinds of distorted perceptions which are communicated through sources of public information.

PERCEPTION OF ISSUES

(In a sense, perceptions of persons and of situations make up the real total of information available to workers, executives, and union leaders in their day-to-day relationships. However, there is another way of approaching this problem of perception which has proved useful, and which should be given some consideration here. We have

1944, however, is slight; about half of the public and three-fourths of union members still believe that management has to be forced to pay higher wages.

The second chart reveals an even more clear-cut decline in perception of management hostility to unions. Only about 60% of unionists now see the companies as trying to break unions, and, for the general




Fig. 3.2. Trends of opinion regarding management's willingness to raise wages. (Data are from *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, used by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.)




Fig. 3.3 Trends of opinion regarding management's intention to break unions. (Data are from *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, used by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.)

public, the figure is consistently below 50%. These trends seem to augur favorably for future union-management relations.

Worker effort. Perhaps a more touchy issue at present is that of worker productivity, or more precisely, of worker effort. In a 1947 survey¹ the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* reported on top executives' views of worker productivity, and also gave facts regarding the views of factory workers. The executives were heavily inclined toward the view that worker productivity had declined since the war, 66% agreeing with this view, and most of them blamed bad worker attitude for this drop. By contrast, only 28% of factory workers agreed that people had worked harder before the war (24% said they work harder now, and 40% thought the pace was about the same as before the war).

This issue is likely to become an important bone of contention as economic pressures on management increase. If competition and price resistance become important, executives will undoubtedly try to raise productivity levels. Both improved technology and increased output of effort by workers will be sought. Each of these is likely to evoke opposition from the employees (cf. Chapter 10 for a more extended discussion of this problem).

Under these conditions management raises the slogan, "a fair day's work"; and the union spokesman replies, "We'll give a fair day's work for a fair day's pay." Both of these clichés sound fine, but neither has operational meaning. The various kinds of perceptual distortions we have enumerated will cause the executive to perceive "a fair day's work" as a larger amount than will be perceived by workers and union leaders. The "facts" are not the same to the two sides of this controversy.

It is the failure to recognize this essential disagreement as to the "facts" which gives rise to such naive remarks as, "Determination of a 'fair day's work' is a problem of measurement through engineering and biometrics."² Technical procedures have long since been developed for measuring the physical work done, or the energy expended by the worker. But there is nothing in these devices which says that 1000 foot-pounds of work, or 2000 calories of energy, or any other physical measure, is a *fair* day's work. The judgment of what is fair inevitably implies a personal frame of reference. The frame of reference differs from person to person and from time to time. What workers

¹ Productivity and the Factory Worker, May, 1947.

² Joseph M. Juran. Management techniques for stimulating productivity. (p. 77, footnote) In: L. R. Tripp, Ed., *Industrial Productivity*. Industrial Relations Research Association, 1951.

would have considered "a fair day's work" in the early Lancashire textile mills would now be rejected on all sides as outrageous.

FACTORS RELATED TO PERCEIVED DIFFERENCES

We have sketchily reviewed, in this and the preceding chapter, some of the more important facts regarding differences in social perception. The data prove beyond any doubt that people differ in the way in which they perceive other persons, concrete situations, and abstract aspects of situations in the form of issues. Furthermore, these differences are systematic in the sense that executives and union members consistently show discrepancies in their way of looking at objects which are significantly related to the work situation.

These perceptual differences can characteristically be reduced to three patterns: (1) the magnification of certain cues—stressing one aspect of a situation; (2) ignoring other cues—denying the presence, relevance, or importance of cues leading to disliked interpretations; and (3) distorting the significance of cues—asserting that this cue does not in fact have the meaning commonly attached to it. These three processes generally operate at the same time, and it is only by special techniques or by selected observations that we can separate them. Such a separation is not especially important for our purposes, and it will therefore be ignored. We are concerned with the over-all perception, which is usually based on a mixture of realistic evaluation of cues and distortions of the kinds suggested. The problem we must now consider is this: how do these differences arise?

A preliminary answer has, of course, been given early in this chapter. Haire and Morrison (1954) found that children of upper and lower income families show sharp differences in their perceptions of persons pictured in roles as strikers, workers, etc. We infer, then, that these children learned their percepts from their parents. But this is only a postponement of the answer. How did this divergence according to income arise in the first place?

The evidence indicates that differences in perception of social objects are related to a variety of factors. To what extent these correlated variables are casual influences cannot always be stated confidently. In some cases it is quite clear that the external condition is an independent variable which has influenced the person to develop a certain way of perceiving. In other cases people may join together, in groups, for example, because they see things similarly. A decision on this question is not necessary at this time, but in Chapter 15 we raise some questions about the task of changing social percep-

tions in order to improve union-management relations. At that time some of these points are again considered.

For the present we are concerned with identifying some apparently important factors which are associated with differences in perception relevant to union-management problems. On the basis of the evidence to date, the following merit consideration: occupation and income status; group memberships; education and mass communications influences; personal experiences; and personal motives.

Occupation and Income. In Chapter 2 we developed an analysis of perception based on the principle of probability. The generalization was offered that cues are received from the external environment, and that each cue comes to be evaluated in terms of the probability that it will be accompanied by other cues. Thus the visual outline of a chair carries a high probability of certain contact and pressure cues, muscular relaxation, and so on. In social perception, emphasis was laid upon the extent to which the person observed has cue value




Fig. 3.4. Attitudes of various groups toward corporate property rights. (Data are from Jones, 1941, p. 378, used by permission of Alfred W. Jones.)

for satisfaction or deprivation, goal achievement or frustration.¹ If we wish to understand the differences in perception of members of unions and of management, we must search for differences at this basic level.

Occupational differences in the perception of issues relevant to union-management problems can readily be demonstrated. Figure 3.4



Fig. 3.5 Opinions of various groups on management's willingness to raise wages. (Data are from *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, used by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.)

shows how various occupational groups in the city of Akron differed in their responses to Jones's interview situations. The chart confirms the fairly obvious expectation that top executives see most of these situations in a manner favorable to corporate property rights, whereas AFL and CIO members find little to value on the side of corporate property.

Similar differences, based upon the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* data (February 1954) are shown in Figs. 3.5 and 3.6. Figure 3.5 indicates the proportion of each occupational category holding that "companies have to be forced" to pay higher wages. Similarly,

¹ A more rigorous analysis of these processes is offered in Chapters 4-6.




Fig. 3.6. Opinions of various groups on management's intention to break unions. (Data are from *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, used by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.)

Figure 3.6 shows the proportions taking the position that "most companies would like to break the unions." In both charts, the proprietor-manager group is lowest, i.e., they see the company in a favorable light, whereas workers as a group, and especially union members, have the least favorable perception of the average company.

How does perceptual theory help us to understand the occurrence of these consistent and highly significant differences between groups? It seems likely that each occupation involves certain regularities in contacts with situations, and in consequences following from contact with a specific object, person, or organization. For example, it is in the nature of the institution that top executives act in the name of the corporation whereas the rank-and-file production worker never takes action in the name of the corporation. The idea that a corporation has certain "rights" therefore has little reality for the worker, whereas it evokes all kinds of associated experiences full of meaning for the executive. On the other hand, the worker has frequently experienced incidents such as layoffs, being evicted from a house, and protesting company actions—the very kinds of situations which Jones presented to elicit responses opposing corporate property rights.

We can thus confidently say that the cues relating to one set of percepts had high reality value and would be heavily weighted by one group, whereas the other cues presented would be more realistic and more heavily weighted for the other group.

Similarly, the executive knows that corporations often give pay increases without union pressure (at least to white-collar workers and managers, and no doubt in many cases to production workers). Thus, to him, the situation is loaded in one direction. The production worker, who has probably been told many times by foremen, "That's all we pay for this job; you can take it or leave it," sees the situation as one in which the overwhelming preponderance of probabilities favors the view that management gives raises only when forced.

The needs of executives and workers in these situations also tend to load the probabilities in favor of divergent percepts. The executive sees in the situations presented by Jones a variety of frustrations and threats to his freedom of action (sit-down strikes, interference with corporate decisions, and the like). The probable consequences of such events are personal losses (in self-expression, and perhaps even in income.) To the worker, the situations posed offer greater freedom of action and greater need satisfaction in the solutions which limit corporate property rights.

We have concentrated on occupational differences at the extremes. The charts show that professionals (lawyers, doctors, chemists) and white-collar workers tend to fall between executives and production workers in their views of industrial issues. The professional man, of course, is likely to have more contacts with the managerial group than with workers. He may therefore be inclined to adopt their views on such problems. The white-collar worker is, as a rule, in much closer contact with executives than is the production worker. However, the work situation of the white-collar employee is not so different as these results would seem to imply. Many students of white-collar employees hold that these differences in attitude reflect differences in status striving: the white-collar group not only are closer to "the boss" but they are more actively trying to rise in the socioeconomic scale. By accepting and repeating the views of top management, the clerical worker may unconsciously be trying both to be perceived as a member of the management group and to be accepted into this group.

Direct economic effects. How one perceives unions will presumably be in part a consequence of their immediate economic benefits or injury to oneself. Union members generally believe that the

union has gained certain advantages for them which would not otherwise have been forthcoming (cf. Figure 3.5). Executives assert that they oppose the union because it will injure the company (and, implicitly, themselves) economically.

In a public opinion survey conducted as part of the Illini City study, we inserted a question designed to indicate whether a perception of such benefits or injuries was related to attitude toward unions. Table 3.6 shows a consistent and meaningful relationship between answers to the question and the average attitude score (based on the ten items shown in Table 3.5). Those who say that the coming of unions has raised their standard of living are most favorable to unions (38.8), and those who believe the unions have lowered their living standard are most opposed (25.5). Among union members, 67 per cent believe that unions have helped them, whereas among managers only 30 per cent give this response (a very small proportion, it should be noted, say that unions injured them).

There is nothing surprising about these findings. They do, nevertheless, lend substance to the point already made, that uniformities in the perception of social objects arise as people perceive that a given object has beneficial or harmful effects. This is an elementary point which sometimes seems to be lost in the argument that most union members belong only because they are forced into joining. A man may be "forced" to take a job in a particular company (e.g., in a one-industry town) but, if he gets adequate benefits from this relationship, he will come to perceive the company favorably. The same is true, apparently, with regard to unions.

Importance of group membership. The foregoing kinds of explanation are decidedly incomplete and inadequate to the data. It

Table 3.6 Attitudes to Unions As Related to Effect on Standard of Living

"Have you found that the coming of unions to Illini City has affected your standard of living? If so, in what way?"

<i>Public only: Average Attitude to Unions*</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Percentage Responding</i>		
		<i>Public</i>	<i>Union</i>	<i>Management</i>
33.8	Hasn't affected it	41	20	53
38.8	Raised it	42	67	30
29.0	Divided answer (helped some, hurt some)	4	5	3
25.5	Lowered it	9	3	6

* For the attitude data, $p < .01$.

will be noted, for example, in Fig. 3.4 that the "Red Apple" rubber workers (members of a company union) score 17.6 on favoring corporate property rights, whereas unaffiliated rubber workers score 12.6 and CIO rubber workers score 6.2. (Needless to say, these differences are statistically highly significant.) (Clearly, then, any explanation of such generalized perceptual patterns which relies exclusively on objective experiences related to job and income status cannot be acceptable. Since there was a relatively high degree of homogeneity within each of these groups of rubber workers, and marked differences between groups, the evidence indicates that membership in certain groups influences one's way of perceiving relevant situations.)

(To some extent group membership operates through defining situations.) As we note in Chapter 2, many stimuli are ambiguous; adults must define for a child whether worms are edible or inedible, whether a swastika flag is to be hated or revered, and so on. Our standards of beauty in women, tastefulness in food, acceptability of economic and political institutions, all derive from the group in which we grow up.

(Groups also modify the perceptions of new members.) Numerous experiments on group discussion (cf. Festinger, 1950a; Lawson, 1954) show that minority members will shift their views of issues to agree with a majority. It may be assumed that longer-enduring group membership, in which friendship and approval are more important to the individual, could modify attitudes even more. For example, a young man may join the executive staff of a large corporation. At that time he may feel that unions have their good points, that an FEPC law would be socially desirable, and that an excess-profits tax is both economically and politically sound. All around him, however, he will hear contrary views expressed. If he states his opinions, he will encounter signs of disbelief or disapproval. He will probably be told that such views are contrary to company policy. Implicitly if not explicitly, he will be told that promotion within the company is unlikely if he clings to these heresies. Soon he will change his verbalizations, and before long he will change his perceptions. He will explain apologetically that in the past he had not seen all the complexities of these problems.

The same process occurs when a new member joins a labor union. He will find a "universal" opinion about the company, the boss, working conditions, and so on, expressed by his companions—the phenomenon we have called "attitudinal climate." To the extent that he knows nothing of these conditions, he will tend to accept the

definitions offered him; and, if he disagrees, he will be subjected to the social pressures described above, until he conforms or is ejected from the group. Thus, in some instances group membership will only strengthen and sharpen the influences normally to be expected in a given occupation. In other cases, especially where the occupational group is heterogeneous, people will cluster around leaders and will develop a shared frame of reference, a common way of viewing critical situations. This is true in the case of the rubber workers mentioned above; it would also apply to splits such as those between liberal and conservative Republicans and many other factional groupings not based on economic conditions.

(*Reference groups.* Uniformities in social perception are not developed solely by membership in a group. A man may aspire to membership in a group (usually, of higher status than his present situation) and may adopt their views as a device for becoming more acceptable to them.) Graduate students in psychology take on the views of the professors, and medical school students quickly learn not to endorse socialized medical plans. White-collar workers, aspiring to membership in the executive group, sometimes lean over backwards to see only the company's side of any controversy.

Since the United States is a country in which upward social and economic mobility is highly valued and believed to be fairly easy of attainment, conflict between a person's membership group and his reference group is not uncommon. In European cultures, where the average worker perceives no reasonable probability that he will ever move into a different socioeconomic stratum, this conflict seems to be less common. Such differences have a great deal to do with the failure of "labor party" proposals in this country.

(Unions do not represent groups of high socioeconomic status, whereas management does.) Thus it is not surprising to find that on many issues, "public" opinion resembles the views of management, though the economic status of the "public" is closer to the level of the union member. In Table 3.5, for example, the "public" sample is closer to management than to union opinion on 7 of the ten issues presented.¹ In two cases (outlawing strikes, firing an employee who joins a union) the public goes to a "management" position more extreme than the actual management sample. In no case does this occur for a pro-union statement.

¹ It is not implied that this is the sole cause of such opinion trends. Control of the mass media of communication by management may be more important. However, the higher status of management is unquestionably a significant variable here.

Ego-involvement. We have already noted (Chapter 2) that the individual's self or ego becomes a highly valued object of perception, and that associated groups may become ego-involved (part of the perceived ego). It can readily be deduced that any reference group with which the individual becomes ego-involved will have a powerful effect upon the perception of issues relevant to that group.

This is interestingly demonstrated in the study of pro-union and anti-union students and their perceptions of executives and workers (Table 3.3). These college men checked adjectives to describe the "typical" executive and factory worker; later, they checked from the same list of adjectives to describe themselves. In the anti-union group, self-description correlated with description of the executive quite well (.63) but, in the pro-union group, the corresponding figure was only .35. When self-description was correlated with that for factory worker, the figure for the pro-union group was .87, whereas it was only .68 in the anti-union group. Thus it appears that these students are already ego-involved, to some extent at least, with their respective reference groups, executives and factory workers.¹

The stubborn resistance of social attitudes to change with experience depends in part upon perceptual constancy and in part upon ego involvement. Few of us willingly admit our own defects; similarly, we resist any admission that our views on social issues are erroneous. Thus it seems likely that any attitude will be protected to the extent that it has become ego-involved.

Education and mass communications. Uniformities of perception are also significantly increased by similarity in educational level. The various public opinion agencies have consistently revealed differences between persons of grade school, high school, and college training. Obviously these are contaminated to some extent by the occupational and income influences already described; thus, men of higher education tend to adopt a pro-business point of view, in part because they are more likely to be in managerial or professional positions than in production worker roles. (By comparing groups of differing educational level within an occupation or income group, however, it has been possible to show that education is an independent determinant of opinion.

¹ An important question is raised by these data because of the population studied. Why would any sizeable group of men from well-to-do families, students at an expensive college, adopt the worker reference group? Evidence of a somewhat impressionistic character indicated that it occurred because of conflict with the father, usually a successful executive; hence, rejection of executives as a reference group.

The public schools, as well as the colleges, have been partial in the union-management controversy particularly by omission. Even after 1950, few mentions of labor unions occurred in the typical high school curriculum, whereas courses in how to be a good business man have been common for a long time. Courses in how to suppress your individuality so that you will be more acceptable to an employer (this is often known as "improving" your personality!) have also been introduced into the schools.

The public school policies have, of course, been controlled mainly through school boards. These have normally been dominated by business and professional people. It is only since 1935 that unions have been successful in placing any of their members on such boards in significant numbers. With this increase in union-oriented board membership has come an increase in discussion of labor unions as a legitimate part of the high school program.

Boards of trustees of colleges and universities are still composed almost exclusively of business and professional people, high in the income scale. It is noteworthy that during the hectic period of union organization, 1935-1939, many college professors were discharged for pro-union sympathies and activities, whereas there is no evidence to indicate that any such pressure was ever exercised against a man with anti-union views. Thus college students tended to be exposed to influences somewhat loaded in the anti-union direction. This situation, fortunately, has been improved, although there are still occasional indications of its persistence.¹

Mass communications. Pictures of unions and companies, of the corporation executive and the union leader, are communicated by newspaper stores, radio commentators, magazines, television, and so on. Since each of these enterprises is itself a business, often involving large amounts of capital, it is not surprising that the top executives see things as do top executives in most other corporations. And, since newspaper reporters, radio commentators, and others wish to receive salary increases and promotions, it is not surprising that some pro-management or anti-union bias creeps into their communications. Thus, for example, Sussman (1945) tallied 212 items on radio news programs between September and November, 1944. Of these, 21 per cent were simple factual items, 39 per cent were quoted

¹ For example, there have been allegations that professors were attacked as communists or "fellow travelers" when they were in fact only sympathetic to organized labor. Because "communist" is such an ambiguous term today, it is fairly easy for any anti-union person to perceive a pro-union professor as a communist.

opinions, and 40 per cent were the commentator's own opinions. As to favorableness of these items to unions, the tally was as follows:

Favorable	13.2%
Neutral	8.4%
Balanced (both sides)	15.0%
Unfavorable	63.2%

As Sussman remarks, "The presentation of labor in such an unfavorable way in the radio news can have two effects. It can foster an anti-labor psychology in the listening audience; and it can create a feeling in the ranks of labor that they simply do not have a chance for a fair hearing in the channels of mass communication."¹

Stereotypes in reporting. Every act of reporting, like every act of perceiving, is a selective process. No reporter, no matter how conscientious, can report all the details of a controversial situation. What he will select and report will be a function, first of all, of his own frame of reference, and secondly, of official editorial policy. He will report chiefly those aspects which will please his superiors; and, if he reports material of which the editor disapproves, it will be censored before publication.

Some mass media even have detectable patterns of loading the communication with words evocative of stereotyped pictures in the minds of the readers. A widely quoted example of this is a study by Sargent (1939). He examined stories reporting presumably identical events, in the *New York Times* and the *Chicago Tribune*. Some of the terms used in the *Times*, and the parallel terms from the *Tribune*, are shown in Table 3.7. For each word, its "emotional value" (composite judgments by 60 college students, who were not informed as to the source of the words) is also given. It is fairly clear that any reader of the *Tribune* got a picture of union labor and of the Roosevelt administration which would only remotely resemble the picture communicated by the *Times*; and certainly the attitudes evoked by the *Tribune* would be decidedly anti-union. As a private organization the *Tribune* certainly has the right to do this; it must be presumed, nevertheless, that this policy has contributed its share to the misunderstandings between unions and companies in the Middle West.

To attempt to build a shared frame of reference among their members, labor leaders have started newspapers and even bought radio time. Within the period since World War II, attempts have begun to use the mass media to reach the public and build up more favorable

¹ Sussman (1945), p. 214.

Table 3.7 Terms Used by the *Chicago Tribune* and by the *New York Times* in Reference to the Same Event*

	<i>Emotional Value</i>		
<i>New York Times</i>	<i>Times</i>	<i>Tribune</i>	<i>Chicago Tribune</i>
Progressive	+92	-53	Radical
Senate investigation	+57	-38	Government witch hunting†
Regulation	+32	-53	Regimentation
Maritime leader	+10	-68	Communist CIO leader
Labor organizer	+12	-63	Labor agitator
Home relief	+27	-35	The dole
Crop control	-02	-55	Farm dictatorship
Non-strikers	+08	+60	Loyal workers
Investigator	+23	-22	Inquisitor†
CIO chieftain	-33	-72	CIO dictator
Picketing	-50	-55	Mass picketing

* Modified from Sargent (1939).

† These terms are not employed in stories relating to Senate investigations of which *Tribune* policy approves, such as those of Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin.

pictures of unions. We have at present little indication as to the effectiveness of these efforts.

It is for the sake of building and maintaining a shared frame of reference that union leaders keep alive the stories of mistreatment of workers by employers. The Homestead strike, the Ludlow massacre, Memorial Day, 1937, and other incidents are reviewed in mass meetings and in union communications material so that new union members will be able to see things as the "old-timers" in the movement see them. Management has not followed such tactics for a considerable time, but the hostility and suspicion generated will not be allowed to die out for years to come. Similarly, of course, executives judge unions more by what they used to be than by what they are today.

Personal experiences. Our discussion to this point has aimed at bringing explicitly into focus some of the factors which have made for group uniformities in perception. We have been concerned with the fact that large groups of people, who may be classified by occupation, or income, or education, or group affiliation, show relatively high agreement within the group, and marked disagreement with other groups, as regards important issues in union-management relations. Such influences as common work experiences, common environmental stimulation, common satisfactions and frustrations, similar educational experiences, and comparable mass communication ex-

postures were identified as contributing to these intragroup uniformities and intergroup divergences.

But no group is completely homogeneous, and unanimous group decisions, whether in Russia or in the United States, are likely to be looked upon with suspicion. Each person encounters a variety of personal experiences which make his perception unique and different from others in his group. This means that occasionally a business man perceives unions as a help rather than a barrier; and some union leaders express opinions which would sound perfectly at home in an N.A.M. convention. In other words, we must not stress group uniformity to the point of losing sight of the unique individual. Our modern society tends to exalt the status of the group, and we often feel that individuals are too small to have social significance; but group policies are made by individuals, and new groups organize around leaders who offer new solutions for old frustrations (see pp. 195, 259).

Individual variations in perception of industrial issues may arise in many ways; indeed, the fact that they are unique makes it difficult to classify them. However, we wish to call attention here to accidents of the individual biography—occurrences which do not fit into any of the group categories already indicated.

A young man, for example, may be building a home for his family. It is already costing more than he expected, and now he runs into an AFL building trades rule which costs him \$20 for no reason at all that he can see (such as hiring an ironworker to lay the strip of iron over the opening of a fireplace.) This may lead to hostility to unions in general (perceptual generalization). Or he may, on his first job, encounter a very severe and arbitrary foreman who is constantly scolding him for inefficient work but who gives him no training. This may generalize to all employers, even though such behavior is relatively unusual.

Personal motives. Every perception is potentially related to the satisfaction of motives. Physical objects are evaluated in terms of their value as food, sources of comfort or injury, etc. Other persons are perceived as threats, competitors, persons to be helped or to help us, to be loved or hated, approached or avoided.

(Many of these perceptions are subject to motivational distortion (cf. Chapter 2.) Wishful thinking often causes us to "see" things as we would like them to be.) The traveler lost in the desert sees water in the mirage; the lovesick youth sees evidence that his inamorata loves him, even though she is calmly indifferent to his

presence. Paranoid individuals find evidence on all sides that they are persecuted.

(Most of the uniformities in perception which are relevant to union-management conflicts are due to the broader causes sketched in the preceding pages: work situations, mass communications, and so on.) However, it is fairly clear that some leaders of both unions and companies have a personal involvement in the controversy which goes beyond the kinds of influences described. Since these are both complex and relatively rare, we need not spend too much time on them. The following are examples:

(1) A high school youth studied by Mandel Sherman (1935) was violently anti-communist. He perceived the communists as an immediate danger to the safety of the United States and to him personally. Detailed psychological study revealed that an unwise aunt had given the boy the impression that his birth had been the cause of his father's desertion. He felt that he had "broken up his mother's home." When he learned about "communists breaking up the home," he apparently solved his tremendous guilt feeling by projecting it onto the communists. Although labor unions are not specifically mentioned in Sherman's account, it is quite likely that this youth would also vigorously oppose unions, especially if he were in a role where this was appropriate.

(2) A college man who took one of our tests for attitudes toward unions made an extremely favorable score. Upon closer check it was learned that he was also active in a student socialist group on campus. Detailed interviews revealed that his father was a wealthy man, president of a company manufacturing household appliances. The boy expressed violent hostility to his father, on the grounds—very possibly unrealistic—that his father was arbitrary and domineering. It became evident that his enthusiasm for labor and radical causes was an expression of this resentment. He rebelled against all authority—at the college, in government, and in industry. (Had he been in a union, he would probably have rebelled against union discipline too.)

Such instances, as we have stated, are relatively rare. It seems likely that they may account for certain instances of leadership, as in the case of a factory where management is vigorously anti-union. Only someone who is driven by these irrational inner needs may be willing to take the punishment involved in organizing a union. Later, such leaders may cause trouble for the union, and excuses must be devised for easing them out of important positions (see pp. 365-366).

Management, too, has in some instances found it necessary to remove executives who were so irrationally hostile to unions that they could not accept normal collective bargaining relationships.

SUMMARY

Behavior is governed, not by "objective" facts, but by facts as perceived by individuals. In some respects it is true that each of us lives in his own private universe—each of us sees the world in a manner slightly different from anyone else. These differences give rise to the unique individual personality.

Social psychology, however, is interested in the behavior of groups. This depends upon uniformities in perception: members of one group see the facts in one way, members of an opposing group see them differently. The data show that executives and workers differ sharply as to the "facts" regarding many industrial situations and issues. Executives and union officers likewise differ; and it may be that in some instances there will be differences between workers and union officers.

Uniformities in perception arise from a variety of influences common to members of a group. These may include a common objective situation (tasks, problems, tools) with which the individual must come to terms; common education and communications, company and union newspapers, stories handed down by word of mouth, and the like; and common personal environments, in the form of other persons who accept a certain view of the facts and punish members of the group who do not accept this common frame of reference. In addition, unique personal experiences and personal motives may cause an individual to adopt a certain view of industry, even though he is not a member of the group concerned.

As we have progressed with this analysis, it has become clear that motivation is inextricably linked with perception. A variety of motives are involved in group membership, for example, as well as in the unique personal experiences mentioned. It is therefore important that we turn now to a consideration of the psychology of motivation, and find what light it throws upon these problems of group conflict.

Motivation: Principles

We have spent considerable time in analyzing factors influencing the perception of industrial situations. We have pointed out the significance of personal experiences, group associations, leadership, and various other considerations in determining how the facts are perceived by particular individuals.

But it must be obvious that differences in perception of facts are not alone responsible for social conflicts. Two people may differ, for example, on their interpretation of Buddhist philosophy, but—in this country at least—they are not likely to get into a fight about it. The average person who is not particularly interested in art may differ with his friend in regard to whether Picasso is an artist or merely a caricaturist; but again, there is not likely to be any vigorous conflict.

On the other hand, disagreements about what constitutes a fair day's pay, what constitutes unfair and dictatorial supervision, or what constitutes decent working conditions may, and do, lead to violent social conflict. This leads us to the generalization that motivation is an important factor in the determination of social conflict. Where differences in the perception of fact are not keyed to the satisfaction of individual motives, they are likely to be regarded as relatively unimportant. On the other hand, differences in perception which are closely related to strong desires are likely to lead to vigorous conflict.

Motivation refers to the process of energy mobilization. This process occurs within each human being. This means that the dynamic force which motivates such vigorous human actions as strikes, lock-outs, sabotage, and other forms of industrial conflict must come from within the individual human being. Although we recognize the great importance of broad economic forces, institutional factors, and similar large scale influences in the determination of industrial conflict, we must nevertheless insist that in the last analysis the driving energies for these forms of social behavior come from within the individual person. The psychology of motivation is concerned with

the problems of energy mobilization and the focusing of energy on a specific goal. If we are to achieve a deep understanding of industrial cooperation and industrial conflict, we must analyze the phenomena of motivation.

(The psychology of motivation attempts to answer the question "why?") An answer to this question is usually couched in terms of needs, impulses, or purposes. Why does a man organize a corporation? Why does he build up a large business enterprise? Why does he resist unionization of his employees? And why do workers strike and undergo considerable hardship merely to win recognition for their union? These questions get at the very essence of industrial conflict. They lead us straight to the analysis of motives.

We can start with the broad generalization that all human behavior is motivated. Every organized act in which one engages is directed to the satisfaction of some need. Obviously, the activity is guided by perception. We could not obtain food if we did not have sensations and memories, if we did not perceive certain objects as edible and others as useless or poisonous. But the urgent need to obtain food exists independent of perception; it is a biological necessity for survival.

However, it would be unwise to limit ourselves to a purely biological approach to motivation. Employers do not hand out food, clothing, or other useful objects to their employees. Few people, in the United States, at least, work because they will be hungry tomorrow if they do not. The fear of hunger and suffering is more remote; it is a threat in the background rather than an immediate drive to work harder.

The goals men strive for in a modern industrial society are in the main symbolic. Money is not edible, but it has exchange value; earning it is acquiring a symbol, something which means satisfaction for future physical needs. Job security, insurance, and guaranteed income plans have symbolic value in terms of possible hazards. Even praise, prestige, and promotion have symbolic value as they promise more security and more gratification in the future.

Psychologists have amassed a great deal of information about man's biological needs and their effects on behavior. These forms of motivation are innate; they are rooted in our biological structure. Symbolic goals acquire motivating potency only as a result of experience; young children will work for candy, but not for money. Our analysis must first deal with the problem, how do we move from strictly biological needs to social goals and symbolic motives?

THE CONCEPT OF HOMEOSTASIS

The human body is so constructed that there are certain "steady states" which must be maintained if life is to continue. An easy example is temperature. A deviation of even a few degrees from 98.6° F is fatal. Another is the oxygen-carbon dioxide equilibrium. An excess of CO₂ can be disastrous, and even an excess of oxygen can have unfortunate consequences. Food intake is necessary to maintain a certain blood-sugar level in the body, and so on.

A disturbance of equilibrium, as regards any of these steady states, leads to mobilization of energy for vigorous action. Shut off a man's supply of air, and he will struggle violently. Shut off his supply of food or water, and he will also react vigorously to restore these supplies before it is too late. The concept of *homeostasis* has been taken over from physiology to identify the general principle that *the organism mobilizes energy to restore any of these essential steady states*.

The term homeostasis, of course, does not explain anything. It simply identifies a general principle, as does gravitation. The law of gravity says that a smaller mass moves toward a larger neighboring mass. To determine how much energy will be developed, we must know the relative sizes of the masses, the friction interfering with free movement, and so forth. Similarly, if we want to predict how much effort will be released in a given example of homeostasis, we must know what steady state has been disturbed, how much environmental opportunity is available for restoring it, and what habits the person has available for securing the needed substance (Stagner, 1951.)

We shall use the term *biogenic needs* to refer to the impulses that derive from the disturbance of tissue equilibrium, as in the cases of blood sugar, temperature, water balance, and the like. This term simply denotes the fact that these needs have their origin in the nature of living tissue and are not dependent on experience. Let us consider briefly what we know about biogenic needs which will be relevant to our purposes in this book.

Equilibrium and threshold. Each of these steady states normally varies within very narrow limits. For practical purposes we can say that they are in equilibrium. Minor variations produce no energy mobilization. For example, body temperature may go up to 99° or down to 98.2° with no apparent effect. But a somewhat more extreme change will have a marked influence upon behavior. The size of the disturbance at which energy begins to be mobilized for corrective action is known as the *threshold*.

Certain changes occur automatically when a threshold change occurs. For example, if a man's temperature goes above 99° , he will begin to perspire, the blood vessels in his skin will dilate, and other automatic processes will operate to cool off the body. Metabolism is slowed down, energy expenditure is decreased, and so forth. Conversely if the body temperature goes down to about 97° , a series of automatic mechanisms is brought into play to restore the normal temperature. These include an increase of metabolism, contraction of skin blood vessels to keep the blood deeper inside the body so that the heat loss will be restrained, and finally shivering, which releases heat from muscular activity. These automatic mechanisms illustrate the principle of homeostasis.

The concept of homeostasis asserts that the human organism attempts to maintain a certain set of constant inner conditions. We need a certain balance of food supply against expenditure, the balance of water intake against water loss, temperature balance, mineral and vitamin balances, and the like. These are the simplest of the "steady states" which energize man's behavior, but they are important because they are essential to survival.

Deprivation and satiation. These simple physiological steady states are disturbed chiefly by continued metabolism. The body burns up food at a rate varying with activity, but, in any event, the blood-sugar equilibrium is disturbed if the individual goes without food for a substantial period of time. The longer the period without food intake, the more energetic the resulting activity (up to the point of bodily weakness). Thus *the intensity of motivation is proportional to the amount of deprivation.*

Different steady states can tolerate different amounts of deprivation. Shutting off the flow of air provokes immediate violent response. Thirst does not become acute for several hours. Deprived of food, a man will feel hungry at his usual mealtime, but will show increasing intensity of motivation for two or three days without food. The sex drive grows more potent with continued deprivation, although even indefinite denial of gratification does not lead to any tissue damage.

Satiation tends to weaken a need. When equilibrium has been restored in one essential, another need comes to dominate behavior. A very thirsty man forgets food in the search for water. After he has drunk, he begins to search for food. Since there are many possible needs which could be operative at any time, that which has been relatively deprived for the longest time dominates behavior. When the need is satiated, it disappears until the normal course of life (or renewed deprivation) brings it to the foreground again.

Tension and pain. Deprivation of needed substances disturbs the essential steady states and arouses tension. The hungry child squirms, frets, and cries. School children get very restless just before lunch. Any motive sets up an increase in tension.

Pain and discomfort evoke tension and behavior which may remove the painful stimulus, even though no metabolic steady state has been disturbed. In this case we can say that the biological basis is in the tissues themselves. Painful stimuli such as heat, cold, electric shock, cutting, and heavy pressure lead to tissue damage. Our sensory system is connected in such a way that these threatening stimuli instantly evoke tension, without regard to the other steady states. Furthermore, tensions based on pain normally dominate behavior even when the person is quite hungry, thirsty, or sexually aroused.

Motivational tensions based on pain do not show the deprivation-satiation relationships noted above for drives like hunger and thirst. There is no increasing and decreasing of drive state simply as a result of bodily activity. Pain (and signals perceived as threatening pain) can elicit tension and motivate vigorous effort at any time.

All the biogenic needs—hunger, thirst, oxygen, temperature, escape from pain, and various others—evoke prompt and vigorous action. The person becomes restless, he scans his environment for an object which will relieve his need, and he continues moving and exploring until his problem has been solved. Homeostatic action persists until the steady state has been restored to its normal value.

Focusing. One of the most marked effects of drive states is the change in perception. Phenomenally we can describe this by saying that the drive results in a change in the attention-getting value of objects. These objects which offer a reasonable probability of satisfying the urgent need will be perceived much more readily than when the need is not pressing.

The mechanism which is assumed to account for this is called *focusing*. It will be remembered that under normal conditions the person is assailed by a tremendous variety of stimuli. The perceptual process selects and organizes cues to produce perceptions of "real" objects. Under the pressure of a strong need, the perceptual mechanism focuses on those objects which have a high probability of satisfying that need. The traveler lost in the desert sees mirages in which lakes are a prominent feature. On a hot summer day a refrigerated drinking fountain has an attention value it loses in the winter.

Focusing also operates to exaggerate the need-satisfying qualities of objects which are perceived. To a very hungry man, a cheap ham-

burger may taste like the most delicious meal; when well-fed, he would find the same object distasteful. Young men on military duty far from western civilization at first perceive the women of primitive tribes as repulsive, but, as sexual deprivation increases, the women are seen as far more attractive.

Focusing undoubtedly accounts for the fact that some people "see" evidence that some event is probable when others do not observe it. The man who suffers from acute economic insecurity will see facts which indicate approaching depression and layoffs, while others find this hard to believe. The man with a strong sex drive exaggerates the tendency of women to flirt with him, and so on. In the latter case, minor cues which promise need satisfaction are magnified, while more important aspects of the woman's behavior may be ignored completely. In the case of anxiety, it would not be correct to say that the man wants a depression; but it is plausible that he feels an especial urgency to identify the approach of trouble, so that he can take some protective action. It is in this respect that focusing is a homeostatic mechanism, even as regards fear of injury or deprivation.

Levels of protective action. The principle of homeostasis asserts that the organism is motivated to restore certain essential steady states when they are disturbed. So energy is mobilized to locate food when one is hungry, water when thirsty, and so on. But one of man's distinctive features as a psychological mechanism is that he does not wait for hardships to catch up with him. Having once experienced deprivation and tension, he can in the future anticipate them and take protective action.

The principle of homeostasis is just as appropriate to such self-protection (forestalling action against serious threat or deprivation) as to action after the deprivation has occurred. Whatever prevents a crisis from occurring is aiding in the maintenance of those steady states which are essential for survival. All animals, but man especially, can anticipate limited segments of the future. Once an association is learned that *A* is followed by *B*, the appearance of *A* sets off perceptions of *B*, and it becomes possible to respond in such a way as to prevent contact with *B*. For example, if a rat is placed in a box where the sound of a buzzer is followed by an electric shock, he learns this signaling relationship. Now, if a window is opened so that he can jump out, the sound of the buzzer will immediately set off this escape reaction.

Human beings develop very elaborate forms for forestalling the effects of deprivation. Once a man has, let us say, experienced food deprivation and severe hunger, he will anticipate the possibility that

such an incident could occur again. Active measures will be instituted to prevent such emergencies by creating a constant external physical environment to provide the necessary foodstuffs. Thus we find the human race developing a system of agriculture which provides year-round food supplies. The construction of granaries, cold storage systems, elaborate methods for transportation and distribution of food, in short, the whole economic system of production and distribution of edible commodities, may be considered to be a gigantic form of homeostatic endeavor. It is calculated in its entirety to prevent most of us from encountering an emergency deficit of food and other necessary commodities.




Fig. 4.1. Levels of equilibrium.

We might diagram this kind of relationship as shown in Fig. 4.1. The small circle in the center of this figure represents the essential biological constancies which are maintained by automatic action of the organism. These include the steady states related to hunger, thirst, and other biogenic needs. Under practically all circumstances, disturbance of any such equilibrium will set off vigorous activity motivated to obtain the necessary substance and restore the previously existing balance. The next larger circle represents the external physical environment. As a result of the anticipation of biological disequilibrium the organism develops techniques for maintaining a constant physical milieu so that the necessary substances will be available at all times. Thus we build houses which will maintain a constant temperature; in cold climates we provide them with central heating systems and in

warmer areas we may include air conditioning. We construct enormous water supply systems so that the danger of water deficit will be relatively unknown, and so on. This larger circle therefore represents the constant physical environment which man erects around himself in an attempt to protect his essential biological constancies—the conditions essential to the maintenance of his organism as a biological living being.

The expansion of the homeostatic tendency does not stop at this point. The organism seeks to maintain not only a constant physical environment but also a constant social environment. We have therefore in Fig. 4.1 indicated a still larger circle surrounding that representing the constant physical environment. This represents the social constancies which the organism attempts to maintain as a protective device. Let us consider a very simple illustration of how this process arises and why it is important. Take the case of the young child. He is very dependent upon his mother for food, water, escape from pain, and restoration of comfort when he is ill or otherwise disturbed. The presence of the mother is characteristically associated with satisfaction of these fundamental biogenic needs, whereas the absence of the mother is likely to be associated with pain, hunger, and discomfort. Thus after only a relatively short time the child reacts to the absence of the mother as if it were an actual deficit or threat to his continued existence. The presence of the mother, on the other hand, represents a form of reassurance and security.

The development of a constant social environment therefore may be conceived as a further extension of the homeostatic principle. As long as the child is able to maintain his secure relationship to his mother, he feels protected with regard to his biological needs. "Mother" has become a symbolic goal. The concept of security in relationship to other persons arises out of a conception of security in a more fundamental biological sense. Furthermore, the child indulges in vigorous effort to maintain this social constancy. He demands the presence of his mother, puts up bitter protest if she departs, and exerts a great deal of energy to get back to her if for any reason he is separated from her.

Other social goals. We may of course extend this concept of a constant social environment to include a wide variety of other instances. As the child grows older, he develops gang associations; and he feels secure with the members of his group, but decidedly insecure if the familiar group situation is taken away. As in the case of security with the mother, we can best interpret this need as a product of experience. Need satisfactions of various kinds are associated with the

presence of the group; deprivations and frustrations are perceived as more probable when the child is separated from the group.

Sociologists and clinical psychologists agree that it is "normal" for American children to develop some degree of group dependence. This desire for security in the group, once established, persists and becomes a powerful motive in the adult. For example, if he becomes an employee in a factory, he feels secure with his familiar fellow workers and insecure if he is changed to a different department or is compelled to leave one place of employment and look for a job elsewhere. Experienced industrial relations men know that it is frequently worth while to keep a work crew together and transfer it as a unit from one job to another. The transfer of the individual from one group situation to another sometimes arouses deep feelings of insecurity which may set off vigorous behavior, directed not toward goals of the company but towards individual goals which may or may not be acceptable from the management point of view. In a large number of cases the insecurity which the individual feels causes him to engage in activities which interfere with the normally efficient operations of the enterprise.

The ideological environment. On still a fourth level we may point out the operation of this principle of the maintenance of a constant environment. Even beyond the level of group membership and secure relationships with other human beings, we can identify the development of an ideological environment, or a set of beliefs and values which the individual attempts to maintain in a constant pattern. If the person grows up in a certain family, he will develop beliefs in the value of capitalism, protestantism, a certain kind of family structure, a certain kind of government, and so on. These beliefs will exist on a more or less abstract level; that is, they are somewhat different from the tendency to maintain a certain face-to-face relationship with other people. In the majority of instances the person does not develop such a strong need for the maintenance of these beliefs that he will put out a great deal of effort in their behalf. It is relatively easy to get the average person to give up some of these beliefs if in so doing he can maintain his security as a social being, his security in an environmental sense, that is, his property and possessions, or his biological security, that is, his freedom from pain and satisfaction of his basic needs.

Generally speaking, the four layers of constancy which have been indicated here develop from the center outwards and deteriorate in the same way. If an individual is placed under severe pressure, he will probably be willing to give up some of his beliefs and ideas before he will accept an injury in other respects. The threat of social ostracism, for example, or the loss of his security in relationships with people

will cause a great many individuals to modify their beliefs and values substantially. Likewise, the threat of loss of property and security in a certain familiar environment will motivate the individual not only to give up ideological values but in some cases even cause him to betray his friends and abandon members of his family. Finally we know that to avoid physical pain, torture, or perhaps extinction, most human beings will abandon property as well as friends and ideational systems.

All these statements, of course, have validity in only a statistical sense. Some individuals are so devoted to their ideological beliefs that they suffer not only loss of social security and loss of property but even physical destruction. This was true of the early Christian martyrs, and it has been equally true of political martyrs down to the time of Hitler and Stalin. In the same way, some people become so attached to their friends that they will suffer physical discomfort in order to protect these friends. And, curiously enough, some people are so attached to bits of personal property that they will undergo even biological frustration and discomfort to protect these physical possessions. In this category, for example, we have the miser whose case is occasionally reported in the newspapers: the individual who starves to death while he has fifty thousand dollars stored away under his mattress. For these persons the symbolic value of physical property and economic possessions has grown to such intensity that they lose sight of the basic purpose of such accumulations, namely, to maintain the basic biological constancies. In other words, for specific individuals the order of importance of these "steady states" may be different from that which is represented in the diagram. In the majority of cases, however, this seems to be a reasonably accurate representation of the order of importance which can be expected.

CULTURAL DEFINITION OF GOALS

Let us return now to a consideration of the biogenic needs as represented by, for example, the need for food. Although this is a universal type of pattern—that is, all human beings throughout the world are energetically motivated whenever such a deficit develops—the *goal objects* which are perceived as potentially satisfying differ sharply from one culture to another. If I suggest to a hungry American that I might provide him with a tenderloin steak broiled over a charcoal fire and smothered in mushrooms, he will probably put out a good deal of energy to achieve that particular goal object.

If I made the same suggestion to an orthodox Hindu, he not only would not be motivated, but he would be positively repelled by the suggestion. To him the idea of eating beef would be indecent. To the American the idea of a dish of earthworms fried in palm oil would not be motivating; in fact, he would probably not make any effort at all to achieve that goal object. The same dish offered to members of certain African tribes would elicit a great deal of effort. We must recognize, therefore, that how the individual perceives potential sources of satisfaction for his biological needs will depend upon his personal experiences and particularly upon the kind of culture in which he has developed. Thus, children born into working class families will grow up with unconscious expectations that there are certain ways of obtaining basic satisfactions. Children born into wealthy upper class managerial and industrial families are likely to develop unconscious assumptions of quite a different sort. The goals for which they will strive will be different. *The biogenic needs will be identical but not the perception of the ways in which they are to be satisfied.*

This difference is important in practical situations. In the short run the individual is striving to achieve a particular goal object (cf. Fig. 4.2); and, if he perceives a particular goal as being one that




Fig. 4.2. Positive goal orientation. The individual mobilizes energy to approach a goal perceived as attractive (positive valence).

does not have any relevance to satisfying his needs, he will put forth no effort to achieve it. One of the reasons for inadequacies in industrial relations programs and efforts by managerial personnel to motivate factory employees is the failure to understand what kinds of goal objects will be perceived as attractive and potentially satisfying by the persons toward whom the program is directed.

Not only do we find marked differences from one culture to another, and from one social class to another, with regard to the types of goal objects which are acceptable as satisfying needs; we also find decided differences with regard to the technique or form of activity which is socially acceptable. We find wide differences, of course, with regard to the various kinds of physiological deficits, in the extent to which society attempts to regulate these particular forms of satisfaction. The need for oxygen, for example, is not subject to any form of social regulation. Oxygen is widespread over the entire planet and is available to everyone without charge. Water is somewhat more restricted. In many areas of the world the supply becomes an object of private monopoly control, and a fee is charged the individual who needs water. Food is almost universally subject to certain restrictions, as regards what is edible, when one may eat, what utensils must be employed, and so on. Sex, of course, has the most extensive restrictions as to manner of gratification, rituals to be performed, and persons available as potential objects of the sex impulse.

Another important difference in the type of goal-seeking activity permitted is that between competitive and cooperative forms of behavior. We are inclined, in western civilization, to assume that individualistic striving and competitive effort to do better than others is an inherited pattern. Many other cultures demonstrate that this is not so. Stanley Porteus (1937), for example, tells of his attempts to give individual intelligence tests to the Australian aborigines on a competitive individualistic basis. When the test situations were presented to one individual, he immediately expected all his tribal brothers to help him out. In their culture it is considered obviously ridiculous for one person to attempt to do alone something that could be done much more easily and efficiently through cooperative effort. The technique of achieving goal satisfaction consequently is seen quite differently in such a society from the perception to which we are accustomed.

In many primitive cultures the supply of food is owned by the entire community and is available to any member of the community as needed. In the Samoan Islands, for example, the entire catch of fish is dumped into a community pile and divided up according to size of family, not according to the contribution of the individual fisherman. A great many cultures scattered throughout the world accept this cooperative joint activity technique as obvious and appropriate; the idea of adjusting the rewards to the efforts of different individuals is considered quite improper.

Prestige and power. In western civilization, two very important culturally defined goals are *prestige* and *power*. They cannot always be sharply separated in practice, since positions of power almost invariably are looked up to as prestige roles, and prestige frequently implies some power to influence others. We may say, however, that the goal of prestige is that of being looked up to and respected by members of one's group, whereas power involves the ability to obtain satisfaction for one's own impulses by controlling the behavior of others. Clearly, then, both prestige and power are *symbolic goals*, since they do not directly gratify biogenic needs, though they do put the person in a favorable situation to get such satisfactions.

Culturally, cravings for prestige and power derive from a society which emphasizes competitiveness as a mode of goal seeking. Children are urged from their earliest years to try to run faster, fight better, earn higher grades in school, and in general to excel their playmates. These parental pressures are supported by tangible rewards and punishments. Thus the child quickly learns to perceive a higher probability of need gratification if he competes and seeks such preferred status.

As noted above, there is no need to assume that this is instinctive. Many cultures frown on competitive behavior; among the Zuñi, for example, a young man who wins the foot race two years in a row is disqualified from further competition, since it is deemed "bad" for one person to win many such contests. Since most people adapt successfully to such non-competitive cultures, the least we can conclude is that, if a competitive instinct exists, it is readily modifiable under social pressure.

Another important factor in the development of the motive toward prestige and power is the nature of the relationship between child and parent. The boy normally looks up to his father¹ as a person of great strength and wisdom. He has power over the boy, and also a prestige status. If the son identifies himself with his father, as is normal in our culture, he wishes to achieve power and prestige for himself. The specific goals of giving orders, making decisions, exercising influence and dominating others may thus seem very at-

¹ In the typical American family the father is the chief power figure, the source of authority and of final decision. What is said above refers to this kind of family structure. The process gets considerably more complicated if the mother is the authority figure, since the boy cannot identify with his mother and still have a clear conception of himself in a male role. Even a daughter has problems in this kind of family because she will not develop the "usual" sex role for a female in our culture.

tractive. Furthermore, the father has many privileges and prerogatives (e.g., with regard to the beloved mother) which promise many additional need gratifications.

Conscience and the superego. Out of this identification of the child with his parent develops the *superego*, the Freudian conception of motivational demands made upon the person by himself in the direction of conformity to demands of society.

Freud demonstrated that the commands and prohibitions of the environment as imposed by the parents also are worked into and become a part of the personality. The environment is the source of various kinds of frustrations, threats, punishments, and so on. These frustrating stimuli deny gratification to basic impulses under various conditions. However, the environment at first is necessary to reinforce and maintain these threats. Otherwise the intensity of the need would compel behavior calculated to achieve immediate gratification. Thus, at a stage of personality development in which the ego has just begun to develop, the child may forgo selfish gratifications if there is an immediate danger of punishment. But he will not forgo pleasures merely because he has a "conscience" or a sense of right or wrong. It is obvious that the Freudian theory had to account for the development of conscience if it was to be a realistic picture of motivation. Freud handled this concept as follows: when the parents impose certain prohibitions and restrictions on the child, they speak to him in a certain tone of voice, disapprovingly when he fails to conform to their requirements; they give him praise and approval when he does conform. They provide him with rewards of various kinds when he behaves himself, that is to say, when he lives up to their expectancies; and they impose various kinds of punishments, which may be physical or which may be merely the deprivation of expected rewards and privileges. The result is that the child comes to recognize what things he must do and what things he must not do, if he is to gain their approval.

Now in some cases we find that the child begins to talk to himself in the absence of his parents and to say to himself, "If I do that, mamma spank," or "if I do that, mamma will like it." We find, in other words, that he begins to introject the demands of his parents and make them a part of his own personality. As this process continues, he takes in and uses as forms of self-control the positive and negative values of his culture as presented to him by his parents. When his mother says, "Boys don't cry," he learns that this is a kind of behavior which will be disapproved and which will not lead to

the advancement of his personal motivations. When his father says, "You must not do that, that would be stealing," he understands that the word *stealing* represents something strongly disapproved and likely to lead to punishment (cf. Fig. 4.3). Because of the symbolic capacity of human beings and their ability to represent situations which are not physically present, the child can talk to himself when his parents are not around, reinstate his memories of these instructions with the threat of punishment or the promise of reward which was either directly stated or implied by the parent. As this process continues, the child develops a set of standards or guides to conduct which are over and above the purely selfish demands of the ego. It is thus rather appropriate that Freud characterized this phase of personality development as the *superego*.

The superego corresponds to the religious concept of conscience. It is the collective term for the demands and requirements, the im-




Fig. 4.3. Negative goal orientation. Energy is mobilized to escape from a threatening object (negative valence).

peratives and prohibitions which his parents have imposed upon him. These standards constitute guides for the ego in its quest for satisfaction. On the other hand, the superego may also come to be a new form of id-frustration. For example, the purely selfish ego might take advantage of the absence of the parents to snatch forbidden gratifications under conditions where discovery was unlikely and punishment therefore improbable. The superego, however, interferes with this purely selfish form of behavior. The child becomes capable of punishing himself. He becomes aware of the fact that certain kinds of behavior are "wrong." He may, therefore, fear or become anxious about engaging in such activities and may avoid

them even when no physical punishment is possible because he would not be found out.

We may anticipate future discussions of norms and standards of value by noting, for example, that the executive's conception of managerial rights and his notion of certain principles for which he ought to fight belong in the superego category. Similarly, the idealistic unionist may have taken in and made a part of his personality certain conceptions of what is right and proper in terms of union activity and the demands of the union for recognition, for protection of individual workers, and so forth. The existence of a superego standard which says it is right to fight in behalf of this principle means that aggressive policies will be pursued much more vigorously and persistently than might otherwise be true. As the wars of religious persecution and ideological conflict show only too clearly, nothing is so dangerous as an individual who is convinced that it is his righteous duty to be aggressive in pursuit of the enemy—to root out the elements in the population that he considers wrong. So, only too often, when moral values and conceptions of right and wrong become involved in industrial conflict situations, the fight is much more bitter and the achievement of a rational solution much more difficult than it might otherwise be.

This is not to suggest that we can get along without moral values; far from it. In the industrial situation some conceptions of moral value are urgently needed. However, industrial conflict arises in many instances because the superego patterns which are characteristic of executives and managerial personnel differ sharply from those which are characteristic of union officials and rank-and-file workers. In this respect, therefore, we see that we are back at a point which was developed at some length in earlier chapters, namely, the importance of how the individual looks at reality. We have shown that the typical industrial executive has a way of looking at things which is likely to be quite different from that of workers in his employ. Such differences, it was noted, might or might not lead to conflict. Differences in perception which are associated with differences in motivation are particularly likely to result in serious difficulties. We may say then that differences in superego patterns are almost certain to lead to conflict because by definition the superego is a pattern of motivational impulses. If the individual has a conception of what is right or what is wrong in the field of industrial relations, he is likely to act much more vigorously, to fight harder in pursuit of his principles, much more aggressively than he might otherwise. This often has unfortunate consequences for industrial peace.

LEVEL OF ASPIRATION

Since we are concerned with behavior of man in western culture, and specifically in industry in the United States, we must accept competitive impulses toward prestige and power as major considerations. We live in a society in which approximately 85 per cent of fathers say that they expect their sons to outdo their own achievements. The so-called "American dream" is that of the poor boy who rises to be a big business man, a famous inventor, or a great political leader. Children are urged to set goals above their present performance, and then work energetically to reach these goals. Such a projected or hoped-for future performance is known as the individual's *level of aspiration*.

The importance of aspirations is to be found chiefly in relation to social goals such as prestige and power.) However, we can observe somewhat analogous phenomena at the simple biogenic level. Adolph (1941), for example, demonstrated that dogs when thirsty have a kind of quantitative notion of just how much water is needed to restore this particular equilibrium. Dogs were prepared with an esophageal fistula, so that water drunk fell out into a container and did not reach the stomach. (Needed water was later supplied through this same fistula.) The animals were then kept without water for specified numbers of hours, and the amount drunk was measured. Each animal took in almost exactly the amount required to restore his water balance, even though the liquid was not reaching his stomach and he therefore could not have any sensory feedback to inform him that he "had enough."

This kind of very simple, quantitative estimate of "how much I want" is quickly replaced by a socially determined craving for "something better" or higher in the scale of social values. Any house which provides shelter, warmth, and privacy might be said to satisfy biogenic needs. But people want houses which are attractive, in the right neighborhoods, and so on. We have already noted (Chapter 3) that housing type is a fairly good predictor of attitude toward labor unions. The significant determinant, of course, is income; as people get more money, they acquire more expensive housing, and also take on more conservative views on economic affairs.

Goal setting in an industrial society characteristically takes the form of an orientation toward a certain status or position just a short distance "up" from the individual's present achievement. Just as the private must become a corporal before he can become a sergeant, so there is a ladder to success in the business world. Even in terms

of income, the typical American sets his sights just a short distance from his present earnings (cf. Table 4.1) rather than "hitching his wagon to a star."

Table 4.1 Economic Level of Aspiration as a Function of Current Status*

<i>Present Income Level</i>	<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Average Estimate†</i>
Negroes	Farm labor	\$1,000-1,499
Poor	Miscellaneous labor	1,500-1,999
	Unemployed	
Lower middle	Factory labor	2,000-2,499
	Retired	
	Farm owners	
	White collar	2,500-2,999
	Housekeepers	
	Students	
	Miscellaneous	
	Proprietors	3,000-3,499
		3,500-4,499
Upper middle		4,500-4,999
	Professional	5,000-5,499
	Executives	
		5,500-5,999
Prosperous		10,000-14,999

* *Fortune*, February, 1940. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. See also Centers and Cantril (1946).

† The lowest income that would satisfy a majority of persons in each group named.

We can take this process into the laboratory and study it experimentally. The basic technique is to have the subject attempt some task (dart throwing, card sorting, solving anagrams, etc.). After he is given his score on the first trial, he is asked to estimate "how well you will do next time." It is assumed that the person setting a goal is revealing a generalized characteristic of his personality; that he gives some indication of how he sets goals in everyday life.

The results of a large number of investigations (cf. Gould, 1939) indicate that the typical American youth's response to the instructions given is to set a goal just a little in advance of his performance on the first trial. This is considered to indicate a realistic kind of motivation, in that the goal is reasonably probable of achievement. However, in any group there will be some who will set absurdly high aspirations—perhaps indicative of motivation so strong that it overpowers perception, distorting the situation so that it seems possible to attain so

distant a goal. Conversely, there will generally be some youngsters who will actually estimate performance on the next trial *below* past performance; this is thought to reflect a need to avoid failure as being more powerful than the need to increase status (see, e.g., Gruen, 1945).

Effect of success and failure. One of the main reasons for taking a problem like this into the laboratory is to make possible manipulations of determining factors which cannot be controlled in everyday life. It was hypothesized that a series of successes would build up an expectancy of continued success, leading to higher aspirations; whereas a series of failures would lead to expectancy of failure, and hence to lowered aspiration. This has been confirmed by many investigators (cf. Gebhard, 1948). Since it is easy to manipulate scores on the performance task, the subject can be given successes and failures in any predetermined manner.

The results are in high agreement for almost all such studies. Success, with very few exceptions, leads to a rise in the reported aspiration. Failure, by contrast, leads to lowered aspirations, although these rarely become negative (predicting poorer performance than last time) except with maladjusted personalities. Failing individuals reduce their effort and attempt to get away from the experimental situation.

Group norms. The level of aspiration experiment provides an excellent opportunity for studying the role of perception in the process of energy mobilization. Suppose we introduce a reference group into the above design by telling our subject that he has just made a score higher than the average college senior. If the subject looks up to and respects college seniors, he gets a vigorous boost from such a report, and his level of aspiration increases. On the other hand, if the group is one upon which the subject looks with contempt, he does not perceive surpassing their record as anything important, and his level of aspiration does not change. By contrast, the report that he is below the norm of some "inferior" group usually releases a burst of energy and higher aspiration.

Another interesting problem arises where a dominance-submission relationship exists between the reference group utilized and the person being tested. Preston and Bayton (1941) presented Negro college students with an experiment of the type described. As a reference group, they introduced alleged Negro college norms, and found their subjects trying harder in order to surpass these figures. But when they introduced alleged White college norms, the effect was much less. They interpreted this as reluctance to set up, even in fantasy,

a situation involving direct competition with the dominant White group. This may have some connection with the reluctance of workers to admit that they have any desire for managerial status. To be "aiming at" the boss's job might make him hostile, and he might retaliate in some unpleasant way. It may seem much safer to set only a low level of aspiration and say nothing of higher ambitions. Public opinion polls repeatedly indicate that about 20 per cent of manual workers think they have a chance to become a foreman. When the question is put in terms of wish to achieve this status, the percentage goes up to about 30, whereas, if the American competitive pattern were effective, the per cent aspiring to foreman's jobs ought to be at least 50, if not more. (However, Lipset and Bendix (1952) report that about 67 per cent of manual workers express a desire for a small business of their own. In this case, aspiring to the boss's job is not involved.)

Income Aspirations. Because the dollar provides a convenient unit, comparisons of present income with aspiration level are fairly easy to make. However, if a person were asked, "how large an income would you like to have?" he might be tempted to use the sky as the limit. If asked how much he expects next year, he will be cramped by immediate realistic possibilities. A *Fortune* poll in 1940 seems to have struck a happy compromise between these two unsatisfactory approaches by asking, "What do you really think would be a perfectly satisfactory income for you?" Under these circumstances people gave an aspiration level which apparently reflected both motivation and present achievement. As Table 4.1 shows, aspiration rises steadily with present economic status—almost everyone tested felt that he could be content with "just a little more." The discrepancy between present status and aspiration ranges from a few hundred dollars at the bottom of the economic scale to a few thousand at the top. One might readily suspect that this is the familiar Weber law in perception, that the amount of increase in a stimulus which will be necessary for it to "look bigger" is a constant fraction of the starting stimulus.

Importance. The implications of these studies on aspiration level, as regards industrial motivation, are no doubt obvious. Let us note just a few. First of all, children and adolescents who have had an accumulation of "success" experiences have higher aspirations than those who have more "failure" experiences. Thus, children from upper class families, with advantages in home background, intelligence, education, etc., characteristically have higher aspirations than those from poorer homes. Even during school years some youngsters learn "not to hope for too much," whereas others are encouraged to try for higher accomplishments.

Stubbins (1950) has shown that a similar relationship holds for returning veterans. Those with higher vocational aspirations were more intelligent and better-educated. They had reached higher pay levels in the service, held postwar jobs of higher status, and had better jobs than their brothers. In other words, their higher aspirations could be considered as reflecting the successes that they have already experienced.

If we keep these observations in mind, we shall not be surprised at some of the dynamic differences observed in everyday industrial situations. The executive, with higher present attainment and a history of successes, will set his sights higher and strive for increasingly more income, power, and status. The worker, with a low income and probably some failures to look back upon, tends to hold his aspirations down and to strive for only fairly short-run, reasonably attainable goals. Such differences play an important part in producing the lack of mutual understanding between these groups, especially, the inability of many executives to understand the cautious, security-seeking behavior of the typical worker or union group.

CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS MOTIVATION

Although the discussion of motivation in these pages has seemed to emphasize conscious motivation, we must recognize that in many instances the individual is not clearly aware of his own motivational impulses. Even such a simple biological need as hunger is not always recognized by young children; experienced mothers will note that their children are becoming restless, fretful, and irritable before the children themselves are aware of any change in their behavior. The mother infers the presence of hunger, thirst, fatigue, or some other biological disequilibrium, and, if she is skillful at handling the child, may get him to relax and satisfy this need before he becomes too irritable and unpleasant. In the same way when we observe boys and girls of high school age, we find clear evidence that the sex impulse is beginning to influence their behavior, even though they are not yet conscious of it. The girl who suddenly stops climbing trees and begins painting her fingernails, and the boy who suddenly becomes concerned about shaving, combing his hair, and wearing a necktie, illustrate the fact that the sex impulse can begin to modify behavior long before the person himself is consciously aware that this reflects an interest in the opposite sex.

At the adult level, unconscious motivation is even more potent and likely to have more far-reaching significance. Most of us are aware, in our observations of other people, of the fact that a person may

be striving for a certain goal even though he has not admitted even to himself that this is what he really wants. A person may very readily, for example, become focused on a position of power in an organization. He perhaps daydreams of reaching this position of power but does not admit to himself that he is deliberately trying to achieve it. Nevertheless the observer can frequently detect the fact that this goal has become so important to the individual that unconsciously he shapes all his efforts in an attempt to obtain that particular form of satisfaction.

Evidence has already been cited (pp. 16-29) that unconscious factors can influence our conscious perceptions. One of these is unconscious motivation. A person who is unconsciously impelled to try to dominate other people will perceive and act on opportunities to dominate, but will ignore or actively evade situations which would prevent such tactics. The committee chairman who is so fond of griping that "nobody on the committee does anything, they leave it all to me" is the first to protest any plan to distribute responsibilities. Many executives deny that they see any chances to delegate responsibility and authority; the denial is often truthful, in the sense that the person carefully avoids seeing such opportunities.

We shall have much to say in later chapters about the extent to which union demands and company opposition reflect unconscious needs on both sides. This is the kind of phenomenon about which it is easy to let the imagination run unfettered; there are not as many tangible facts as we should like. None the less, the evidence from clinical psychology regarding the effects of unconscious motivation on perception and behavior is very impressive. It is clearly a factor which may be of considerable importance.

Another, equally significant question is whether we can reasonably expect differences in the pattern of unconscious motivation between company and union representatives. On this point we do have some data which indicate a selective trend. These facts are elaborated in Chapter 8; we have at least some ground for expecting different patterns of unconscious motivation among these economic groups.

MULTIPLE MOTIVATION

A man may—and often does—take a job for purely economic reasons. He has to have an income in order to avoid hunger, cold, and discomfort. But once he has taken a job, he is impelled to try to use it as a vehicle for the satisfaction of other motives as well. We cannot expect him to spend 50 per cent of his waking hours in a given

situation without revealing there the motives which also determine much of his behavior off the job. We can distinguish between a man's role as an automobile assembler and his role as a head of a family, but he is still the same individual; many of his needs and desires are going to carry over from one situation to the other. The worker therefore will desire acceptance into his work group, praise and recognition from his immediate superior, opportunities for self-expression and ego expansion. The same observations hold for the executive. Regardless of how much he talks about the profit motive, his behavior is going to be determined by many of the other goals and needs which have already been described.

The worker responds not only to positive goals and incentives in the work situation but also to various kinds of negative goals. Such obvious factors as physical fatigue and the strain of high-speed, high alertness behavior of a continuing character tend to reduce effort on the job. More important, in the usual case, is the anxiety the worker may feel about possible layoffs or rate cuts if production gets ahead of consumer demand. Another significant negative influence is the degree of social disapproval that the worker may encounter (or anticipate) if he speeds up production. His fellow-workers are likely to have anxieties about layoffs and rate cuts, even if he does not, and they may put pressure on him not to produce at a high rate.

Behavior in any given situation can be considered the resultant of the various positive and negative motives operating (see Fig. 4.4).




Fig. 4.4. Summation of forces toward and from goal.

If the positive factors clearly predominate, the individual puts vigorous effort into his work. If, as he sees it, the negative influences are stronger, he will move away from the work. If motives and goals are nearly equal on the positive and negative sides, he will probably

work, but at an inefficient level. Energy is not being channeled into the specific task, but is used up in conflicting response tendencies.

It is possible to increase the effective energy level of the individual executive or worker by modifying this balance. At the executive level, counseling by psychiatrists and clinical psychologists has been found effective in relieving hostilities and anxieties, making it possible for men to cooperate with each other, and so on.¹ Many companies also have counseling programs for workers. However, it has been more common practice to attempt to affect the workers through an increase in motivation either by offering additional rewards or by warning of punishments to come if effort is not increased.

As Lewin (1947) has pointed out, certain detrimental results must be anticipated if we attempt to evoke more energy by increasing motivation. The total amount of tension will be increased, and the person may try to escape from the field (more absenteeism and turnover). This is especially true if the new incentives take the form of threats and anxiety-arousing stimuli. On the other hand, if we can reduce the amount of motivation directed against efficiency, a net increase can be achieved without raising the total tension level. Such devices include guarantees against layoffs, and the use of group decision to reduce social pressures (cf. pp. 313-315).

Man is a complex animal. Any theory of motivation which tries to offer one explanation, whether it is money, as in capitalist and Marxist theory, or sex, as in Freudian theory, or power, as proposed by Alfred Adler, is doomed to failure. Multiple motivation is a basic principle of behavior. It must be kept in mind in assessing the motives of executives, workers, and union officials, to a more detailed analysis of which we turn in the following chapter.

A GENERALIZED STATEMENT OF MOTIVATION

It will be helpful to us, in dealing with a wide diversity of motivational demands in later chapters, to have a simplified and generalized way of expressing them. We are therefore adapting the topological mode of representation developed by Kurt Lewin (1948, 1951) to this purpose.

We have already developed the idea that human motivation is best conceived as an active seeking after some goal, rather than blind reaction to inner tensions and "instincts." Thus we start with the representation (Fig. 4.2) of the individual as striving to achieve a

¹ Cf. Meltzer (1942).

positive goal object. The + sign is used to indicate that the object is perceived as attractive, something to be approached. The line separating the person from the goal is called a barrier; it is interpreted to mean that work must be done, resistance overcome, to reach the goal. Obviously barriers differ in density and resistance. We shall have more to say of this later. A very resistant barrier would indicate that the person perceived his chances of attaining the goal as very slight. If he gives up entirely, he perceives the barrier as impenetrable.

Obviously the inner state of the organism is to some degree important in determining intensity of motivation. The length of the arrow in Fig. 4.2 is a way of representing differences in inner tension. Thus a person with a 24-hour food deprivation will have a stronger drive toward a food object than one with only a 4-hour deprivation. A person who had little security as a child may strive for security far more vigorously than one who had a great deal and hence is relatively satiated as regards this need.

Goals may be negative as well as positive (Fig. 4.3). So, if a child perceives a situation as leading to pain or punishment, he will be motivated to avoid it. Deprivation and satiation have much less effect on negative than on positive goals. We continue to react by avoiding electric shocks and by perceiving them as threatening, even after a number have been experienced. However, the reports of Nazi concentration camp inmates indicate that, if the probability of escaping the pain is perceived as zero, many individuals can develop defenses such as numbness (failure to perceive the painful stimuli).

In trying to approach a positive goal or escape a negative one, we characteristically perceive a situation in terms of possible paths of action (Fig. 4.5). So, for example, a worker may have a strong desire to achieve higher class status, to "rise in the world." He may see two possible courses of action open to him: trying to become a foreman, or trying to become a union official (*A* and *B* in the diagram). Perhaps he works hard and tries to get a foremanship but is blocked (by a requirement such as a college degree). In this event he may turn to pathway *B* and attempt to achieve his goal through union activity.

What if the individual perceives his goal as absolutely unattainable? In that event, if the goal is essential to life, the person dies and is no longer of interest to psychologists. But there are many goals, particularly those in the social area (status, prestige, power, security, recognition) which are not vital; failure to achieve them wounds the ego but does not damage the body. If this kind of




Fig. 4.5. Alternative paths to goal. The individual chooses one course of action or another, depending on which is seen as offering the best chance of attaining the goal.

goal is involved, the person can usually find some substitute goal *B* to replace the unattainable goal *A*. The college boy who cannot make the football team may instead strive for high grades; or a business man who is rejected by his fellows because of nationality or religion may strive for competitive success as a substitute gratification. In some cases, by processes about which we do not yet know very much, the person may come to perceive goal *B* as very large and attractive, and the amount of energy channeled into its pursuit may become very great. This depends in some way on the kind of equilibrium that the person is trying to protect and the kinds of defenses that he perceives as essential. When we say that a dictator becomes power-mad (Napoleon, Hitler), we suggest that he exaggerates the importance of a certain goal, cannot be content with smaller achievement levels, and finally by his own desperate pursuit of power threatens the security of so many others that they combine to destroy him. Here again we have the problem of "realistic" perception. If a given level of goal attainment is *perceived* as inadequate, the person is driven to strive for more, even though it seems to others that he has an ample store of success.

Obviously, since perception is so important here, it is worth noting that our perceptions of alternative courses of action often determine our behavior. An effective leader, for example, may induce his followers to perceive one alternative as positive, the other as negative (Fig. 4.6). If superego motivation comes into the picture, e.g., when one path of action is perceived as morally "bad," a man may categorically refuse to follow this path even if it is the only one avail-

able. This occurs if, and only if, the superego motive is more powerful than the motive against which it is pitted.

Conflicts, such as that just suggested between a selfish motive and a socially oriented, superego motive, can be represented as in Fig. 4.7. Here the goal is pictured as having both positive and negative valences. (The negative value in some cases applies more to the manner of




Fig. 4.6. Positive and negative perceptions of pathways.




Fig. 4.7. Conflict regarding a goal. Some goals are perceived as having both positive and negative valences.

achieving some goal than to the goal itself. This makes no difference if only the one path is perceived as available.) In such instances the person is pushed and pulled by contradictory motives, and vacillating behavior is probable. A worker, for example, may feel attracted by a foremanship because of its financial and ego rewards. But he fears the responsibility, loss of security in his work group, and other negative valences. What he does, of course, depends on how he

perceives these various goals—the relative intensity of his positive and negative impulses. But while he is “making up his mind,” he may exasperate his superiors by oscillating frequently between accepting and rejecting the promotion.

Finally, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the most valued goal of all is the individual's self—his own ego status. We have noted in Chapter 2 that the ego becomes an object of perception and that one gets a perception of the self as a tool, which facilitates goal achievement. Thus the self is a highly valued percept. Life itself is dearer than property. Money is of no use after we are dead. What is less noticed about this relationship is that money also is of no use if we are shut off from human companionship. Property, prestige, and professional status have meaning only in terms of social relationships. Thus, whether we say that Mr. Jones is mostly striving for wealth, or for power, or for security, we are focusing on only one aspect of his motivation. In a broader sense, he is striving for that which will enhance his ego status at this time. This year he may be more concerned about security; attainment (satiation) may weaken this need, and it is replaced by a need for prestige or power. To achieve this, he may strive for money, and so on. In short, our view of motivation is that each man demands *more* of what is needed to improve his ego status.

The foregoing is a highly schematic statement of a way of conceptualizing motivation. The key terms are goal objects, perceived probabilities of achieving these objects, intensity of tensions impelling the person toward the goal, and paths of action perceived as leading to the goal. In succeeding chapters we apply this formulation to an analysis and comparison of the motivations of business executives, workers, and union officers.

Motivation: Some Application

In the preceding chapter we outlined a general theory of motivation, built around the concept of homeostasis. We noted that people not only mobilize energy to restore an essential steady state when it has been disturbed but also exert effort in the form of protective measures to prevent the disturbance of a favorable equilibrium. Any goal which is perceived as satisfying one of these basic needs, or as protecting existing satisfactions, will be eagerly sought. Any negative goal (threatening equilibrium) will also release energy, channeled into efforts to get away from, or to destroy, the threat.

Let us remember also that protective action can take place on any of several levels. A man may hoard food (physical level) or money (which can be exchanged for food as long as the economic system functions), or he may lean on some powerful individual who seems able to provide him with his needs; or he may form a protective group, hoping that collective action will lead to greater need satisfaction. The pathway he chooses will determine what subsidiary goals he will seek, and what steady states he will attempt to maintain.

Approaching the problem of motivation of company executives, factory workers, and union officers in the light of this theoretical formulation, we can readily see that specific goals differ among the three groups. Goals also differ to some extent within each group, especially as conditions change over time. Our immediate task, therefore, is to consider the evidence regarding similarities and differences in goal-seeking activities of the three major economic groups listed.

BIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC MOTIVES

The foregoing analysis suggests that economic motives may be closely identified with basic biogenic needs: that the striving for financial rewards, at least when the individual is on a fairly low

level of existence, is directly identifiable with the maintenance of a stable physical environment which will satisfy these needs.

This is not a particularly novel view. Among the psychoanalysts, Erich Fromm (1941) has been particularly clear in asserting the intimate relation of economic striving and biological necessity; for example, he says: "Thus the mode of life, as it is determined for the individual by the peculiarity of an economic system, becomes the primary factor in determining his whole character structure, because the imperative need for self-preservation forces him to accept the conditions under which he has to live."¹

This view—that economic motivation is fundamental—is shared by the Marxists and by American industrialists and union leaders. The Communists have long emphasized their views on economic determinism. Spokesmen for American business constantly assert that "what is in the pay envelope is what counts." Union leaders, too, have emphasized economic to the exclusion of other goals.

In terms of the theoretical formulation that we have proposed, this view is too restricted. Economic motives are primary; but they are far from the total dynamic pattern of the individual. Men also strive to help groups with which they are affiliated; they sacrifice personal goals to follow a leader; they may even die in behalf of ideals. The motivations of workers, executives, and unionists are complex; an economic or biological formulation is too simple. Fraser (1946) has attempted to picture this complexity in the following way:

"Each individual reacts at the same time to the physical conditions of work and to the social environment in which he finds himself. These pressures, both internal and external, make themselves felt upon him; some may be steady and constant, while some may vary from day to day; some may tend in one direction while some may compete and push him in opposite ways; some may be of great urgency while others may be relatively unimportant. Somewhere in this pattern of forces the individual must find an adjustment or point of temporary equilibrium."²

This sounds very much like our assertion that the person tends always to preserve his ego status. He chooses between conflicting goals in terms of which will enhance his ego, including the groups with which he has identified himself. Urgency is determined by the threats to the ego. In the long run, of course, biological danger is the greatest of all threats, since death puts an end to all ego strivings. However, under ordinary conditions there are many instances in which ego motivation is stronger than economic or biological motiva-

¹ Fromm (1941), p. 18. Reprinted by permission of Rinehart and Company.

² Fraser (1946), p. 133. Reprinted by permission of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology, London.

tion. We shall offer tangible evidence on this point as we proceed with our analysis.

Motivation: an individual phenomenon. Whether the major goals be identified as biological necessities such as food and water, or the economic counters which can be exchanged for these, or the ego status which is derived from them, all motivation is essentially a phenomenon within the individual. This point needs emphasis precisely because in earlier pages we defined industrial conflict in terms of organized groups. Groups set goals; but they do so as a consequence of motivational and perceptual processes within individuals.

Throughout our discussion of human energy mobilization we meticulously confine ourselves to what happens inside the single individual. The essential steady states which people try to protect are essential to the individual himself. If I do not get enough food, it is I who will die. If I am rejected and alone, it is I who suffer. And this is no less uniquely true regardless of how many persons a condition may affect. Physical pain and hunger are not communicated directly to others, irrespective of feelings such as sympathy.

The importance of this fairly obvious statement is that *there is no group mind*. Groups cannot feel, see, desire, fear, or hate any object. Perception and motivation are purely individual functions. Nevertheless, it is true that people can be influenced by group pressure, that motivation does change in group situations. How shall we harmonize these two facts?

In discussing the phenomena of perception, we noted that each individual must learn for himself to identify certain cues, to perceive objects as having size, shape, qualities, and values for satisfying his motives. We also pointed out that these perceptions are readily modified when the person is operating within a group. Lines are seen as shorter or longer, controversial issues are redefined, qualities are imputed to people which had not been observed when the individual was functioning in isolation. Members of groups adopt common frames of reference; they develop a common vocabulary which makes possible communication and effective cooperation among group members.

This same kind of analysis will be helpful to us in connection with the problem of motivation. Who defines the goals for which a person shall strive? In large part goals are determined by group influences. Even the kind of food an individual will accept to satisfy his hunger is a function of group determination. In the area of achievement and social aspiration, the group determination of goals is even more apparent. In the days of chivalry a boy's abiding ambition may

well have been to achieve knighthood, but such an ambition would be most rare today. Few American boys today would ask for a horse and buggy of their own. This goal has disappeared in terms of group values. The desire for a "hotrod" is a strong motive in certain groups where such a goal is prestigious and satisfying in terms of group-established standards of value.

Group values may be set by large cultural units (the American nation, or what we loosely call western civilization). They may, on the other hand, be functions of subcultures (middle class, factory workers, white-collar workers), or even of a face-to-face group (the family, juvenile gangs, businessmen's clubs, etc.) These subcultures and groups, both organized and informal, determine the values immediately relevant to union-management conflict. The specific goals of union recognition, of seniority clauses, etc., are determined for the workers by group pressures. Conversely, the goal of management prerogatives for the executive is in very substantial degree a product of the groups with which he associates. Certain goals in our society which are basic to industrial conflict are determined by the total culture. All capitalistic civilization stresses the goal of material gain, and in this respect conflict over economic rewards may be said to be inherent in our economic institutions. Businessmen compete with each other for gain, and unions compete with employers. This has no necessary implication of class warfare.

Could these group differences be biologically determined? Perhaps in a rigid society of hereditary castes, such a question would merit discussion; in a relatively mobile society such as that of the United States it does not. Gilbert and Sullivan once wrote

I often think it's comical . . .
 How nature always does contrive . . .
 That every boy and every gal
 That's born into the world alive
 Is either a little Liberal
 Or else a little Conservative.
Iolanthe, Act 2.

But they were talking about social heredity, not biological. The family as a reference group determines how the child will perceive unionists and economic issues (Chapter 3); it can also determine the perceived attractiveness and urgency of goal objects.

Our first problem then is to ascertain the goals which attract people, which arouse energy, and motivate industrial behavior. What are the values toward which men strive? Are these systematically dif-

ferent for workers and managers? Is a conflict of goals inevitable? These are basic questions for a psychology of modern industry.

MOTIVATIONS OF EMPLOYEES

The rank-and-file workers make up the largest single group of persons within industry. As such, it is not surprising that more research has been done on their motives than on those of any other group with which we are concerned. It is helpful, therefore, to consider what facts have been developed regarding the goals toward which they are striving, and later to make comparisons with similar observations of executives and other special groups.

Approaches to employee motivation have been of varied kinds. Many studies have utilized purely verbal reports of goals; others have attempted to make use of reported or observed behavior. In certain respects the most convincing evidence would be that based on production records but, as we shall see, the evidence here is both scanty and ambiguous. Different kinds of data must be examined and cross-checked to see what conclusions are justified by agreement among the facts reported.

Studies of verbal behavior. One easy and obvious way to find out "what the worker wants" is to ask him. One study, for example, presented 19 items to a large number of production workers, who were asked to indicate the first five in importance to them. Table 5.1 shows the items ranked by the percentage listing each of these among the first five in importance. Figures are also given for first choices alone. It will be noted that the two methods agree in general on rankings with minor exceptions (e.g., the pension item may have ranked first for a number of older employees).

These data do not indicate that pay is the most important goal for the average worker. Pay is third in terms of first choices, and second if the ranking is based on five choices. *Security*, as defined here by a steady job, seems to be a more potent motive than money as such. Other important desires include *prestige* (a chance to get ahead) and *security* in the sense of having a "square" boss, *recognition* (credit for the job you do), and so on. It must be noted, of course, that multiple motivations may be involved in these answers. For example, a steady job may mean more money in the long run than a high-paying job which is less secure. Prestige and recognition may be desired because they imply more pay, and so on. Probably the most that we can conclude from such direct questions is that, consciously, a worker does not think of the size of his paycheck as his main goal in industry.

General Motors' My Job Contest. (Another way of inferring motives

doubtedly obtained from company magazines and bulletins. Thus the authors comment that "If, through poor communication, management had failed to tell a story about some of its constructive actions, the employees did not talk about them" (p. 53). This statement, if literally true, undercuts the whole use of the contest as a source of information about job satisfaction. The statement means that employees wrote, in their contest entries, about those job aspects which management led them to believe were important to management. "There were a few instances," they say, "of *over-selling* on the part of the local Division that caused the employees to mention a theme more than actual conditions warranted" (p. 53). Since it would be almost impossible to determine what "actual conditions warranted," there is a sizeable possibility that most of the items mentioned were mentioned precisely because they had been stressed in GM employee publications. It is of course, true that the employee still had considerable freedom in selecting the particular theme from those presented by the company for his entry, but whether this selection shows anything about job satisfaction is uncertain.

The essential dilemma created by the technique can well be illustrated by references to the union. "Five items had been introduced experimentally into the coding structure to reflect any comments the entrants may have made about the Union. These items came through with less than 1 per cent mention, thus establishing the point clearly that a management-sponsored survey should not be expected to elicit comments about the Union" (p. 44). It could just as well be argued that a management-sponsored survey which involved the employee's name, and his effort to win a prize by saying nice things about his job, should not be expected to reveal anything about job satisfaction. It probably reveals more clearly what the worker thinks will please management.

Similarity of production and white-collar workers. A relatively larger amount of attention has been paid to production workers than to white-collar employees, partly because they are so much more numerous, partly because they organize unions and strike more often. It is a matter of concern to the psychologists if the major goals of these two employee groups are alike or different. Few investigations have focused on this question, but a poll of a national sample of workers by the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* gives us verbal reports which can be compared.

In Table 5.3 are shown comparative proportions of manual and white-collar workers desiring various goals. Here, as in Table 5.1, higher pay is not in first place (tied for third among manual workers,

fifth for white-collar employees). Security is most often mentioned by the manual group, interesting work by the white-collar workers.

Despite substantial differences in their work situations, it is interesting to note the degree of agreement on goals by the manual and white-collar groups. The rank correlation of the items in Table 5.3 is $+0.82$ —indicative of closely similar rankings of the 10 items listed. It would appear, therefore, that these goals were important to almost all employees as of the time the survey was made, noting, of course, that the fear of layoffs was more acute among the manual workers.

Table 5.3 Goals Listed As Important by Manual and White-Collar Employees*

"Which of these is most important to you in your job?"†	Manual	White Collar
Keeping a steady job, avoiding a layoff	46%	21%
Having good working conditions	28	28
Having good people to work with	19	27
Getting higher pay	19	20
Having interesting work	15	34
Having a good immediate boss	13	16
Having the company take a personal interest	10	15
Getting a job promotion	7	15
Having a good vacation plan	7	7
Getting more overtime work	4	‡

* From *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, August, 1953. Reprinted by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.

† Response of a national sample of employees. Figures add to more than 100 because some respondents gave more than one answer.

‡ Less than 1%.

In both groups, getting higher pay is well down the list of important goals.

A study of high school students. This point about the conflict between economic and ego goals is important. Our civilization is commonly referred to as a capitalistic culture, and to some this means that only economic rewards are important. But we also live in a democratic culture, in which the rights of the individual are important, too. And we are a little inclined to feel ashamed or contemptuous of the man who abases his own ego in order to get more money (Fig. 5.1). The high cultural valuation placed on certain kinds of ego values can well be illustrated by reference to a poll conducted by *Fortune Magazine* among high school students (Table 5.4). The students assert that they value ego goals highly in the field of self-expression and freedom from arbitrary control, whereas they are re-

latively less concerned about certain economic goals such as freedom to achieve a high income. It is easy enough to be cynical and say that, for enough money, people will keep their mouths shut and play yes-man to the boss; it is none the less important that these students at least verbally indicated higher valuation for the non-economic goals.

Awareness of employee goals among employers. The executive may well be, in consequence of his environment and the tasks imposed by his social role, exceptionally sensitive to cues relating to money. (Cf. pp. 139-145 below.) At any rate, when we ask employers what they judge to be major employee goals, we get an over-estimation of economic rewards which is in sharp contrast to the data cited earlier in this chapter. It should be apparent that, in dealing with other people, some awareness of their major goals is important.

OUT OUR WAY

By J. R. Williams



Fig. 5.1. Ego motives and success. By making the boss feel important, the worker may increase his chances of promotion. (By permission of NEA Service, Inc.)

Table 5.4 Valuations of Goals by High School Students*

"If you had to give up one of these things, which would you be *least* willing to give up?"

Which one would you be *most* willing to give up?"

	<i>Most</i>	<i>Least</i>
Freedom of speech	0.9%	46.0%
Freedom of religion	1.8	36.5
Right to vote	6.4	5.2
Trial by jury	3.9	3.8
Right to change jobs if you want to	20.8	3.0
Right to earn more than \$3000 a year if you can	59.8	2.3

* From *Fortune Magazine* (November, 1942), 30, p. 8. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

We are certainly safe in assuming that, if the employer perceives his workers as wanting money when they really want other goals more (or vice versa), the situation will not be productive of maximum effort on the part of the employees. Thus, even though we recognize the limitations of the verbal method, it will be valuable to see whether employers can in fact predict their employees' preferences in relation to rewards.

A relevant investigation was reported in 1939 by the Employee Relations Bureau of the National Retail Dry Goods Association. In this study some 3000 retail store employees were asked to rank the eight items of Table 5.5 in order of importance. The employers were asked at the same time to rank the items as they thought the typical employee would.

It is obvious from a glance at the table that the employers did not understand how their employees felt about these topics. Getting proper credit for work done was rated highest by employees, only seventh by executives. Job security, rated first by executives, was at the bottom of the list for workers. These happen to be the extremes, and there is surprisingly little agreement throughout the list. The correlation of the two rankings is $-.21$. Evidently the average executive does not have a very accurate idea of what his employees want.¹

¹ In part, the trouble of the executives may have arisen from the requirement that they make these judgments for *all* employees. In separate data from the same persons, judgments were obtained regarding the importance of the eight items for male and female employees separately. When these are correlated against rankings by male and female employees, the executives do somewhat better on the men, getting a rank correlation of $+.40$; however, they did a little worse on the women workers, the correlation being $-.28$. None of these correlations differ significantly from zero.

Table 5.5 Rankings of Importance of Various Items to Retail Store Employees by Employers and by Employees*

	Employees†	Employers†
Proper evaluation of all phases of one's work when judged	1	7
A job that interests the employee	2	3
Fair pay for type of work done	3	2
Understanding and appreciation from bosses of the difficulties of one's job	4	5
An available executive with whom to discuss one's personal problems	5	8
A system of promotion based on merit alone	6	4
Good physical working conditions	7	6
A secure job as long as employee does good work	8	1

* Data from *Personnel Journal*, 1939. Reprinted by permission of *Personnel Journal*.

† Based on several hundred employers and 3000 employees.

Stereotypes regarding worker motivation. Part of the difficulty in obtaining accurate predictions of employee goals resides, of course, in the fact that the most important motive for a worker changes from time to time. As one need is satisfied, another takes its place; when a certain threat to equilibrium is perceived, it may displace other objects of striving until the threat is countered. This criticism does not apply to the dry goods study just cited, inasmuch as the employers made their judgments at the same time as the employees and certainly should have known what goals and threats were relevant at that time.

A more important cause of the discrepancy seems to be the stereotyped perceptions of employee motivation held by executives. The *Public Opinion Index for Industry* asked 50 top manufacturing executives what they considered the most potent employee motivation¹ for greater productive effort. The responses were classified into three groups, as follows: "Money alone is the answer," 22 cases "Money is by far the chief thing but *some* importance is to be attached to less tangible things," 14 cases; "Money is important but beyond a certain point it will not produce results," 14 cases.

This heavy emphasis on money as a goal seems to have the quality of a stereotype. It derives from a picture of the average worker which magnifies certain cues and ignores others, and is applied mechanically to many situations in which it is not relevant. We can

¹ May, 1947.

hardly doubt that the typical employee takes a job because he must have an income in order to survive. But, once on the job, many other motives demand satisfaction. And certainly the evidence of actual wage rate changes is significant. Since 1939 the hourly wage in manufacturing has more than doubled. But there has not been a corresponding change in effort or productivity. This should show that money, in and of itself, is not the major goal as claimed by the employers.¹

A pungent criticism of management's way of thinking about worker motivation has been voiced by one of the more articulate and intelligent spokesmen for management, J. D. Houser. In his book, *What People Want from Business*, Houser charges the typical executive with acting to confirm the criticisms leveled against American business: "Radical critics blame most of the ills in industry, or even in society, on what they assert is the basic motive of industrial management, the 'profit motive.' Likewise, management seems to be controlled by a similar idea regarding employee's motives. In its industrial relations philosophy and activity, particularly in connection with the present union movement, management has been dominated obviously by the conviction that *the only important desires of workers are those which money will satisfy.*"²

Labor leaders share in this stereotype of the worker as economically determined. A strong emphasis on economic motivation was also revealed in a study of union officials conducted by the National Industrial Conference Board in 1947.³ Table 5.6 indicates that both company executives and union officers overestimated the compensation factor and underestimated such psychological goals as praise and recognition. Neither "leadership" group did a very good job of identifying the goals stated by the employees as most important to them.

The studies mentioned so far have been concerned mostly with the manipulation of words; i.e., with asking workers what they want, or with asking others what they believe the workers want. Perhaps a more realistic way of studying the problem would be to see what the people do. Unfortunately, this is not so simple as it sounds. In the

¹ The increases in wages, of course, have been canceled by price increases. As soon as this point is made, we recognize that emphasis on money alone is misplaced. An increase in income *which is greater than others get*, or which carries additional status and prestige, may have strong motivational value. More money, without these accompaniments in the form of increased satisfactions of other motives, has little significance.

² Houser (1938), p. 9, by permission of McGraw-Hill Book Co.

³ *Studies in Personnel Policy*, 85, 1947.

following section we present some of the studies on worker behavior in relation to assumed motives.

Table 5.6 Worker Goals As Reported by Employees and As Judged by Executives and Union Officers*

	<i>Employees</i>	<i>Executives</i>	<i>Union Officers</i>
Job security—employment stabilization†	1	2	2
Opportunities in the company for advancement	2	4	18
Compensation—base pay	3	1	1
Employee financial benefits (pensions, etc.)	4	8	19
Practice of informing you of your job status (successes and failures)	5	‡	‡
Type of work	6	7	39
Vacation and holiday practices	7	3	8
Profit-sharing plans	8	13	‡
Physical working conditions (on the job)	9	5	4
Company's attitude toward employees (liberal or conservative interpretation of policies)	10	6	6

* By permission of National Industrial Conference Board. Data from "Factors affecting employee morale," *Studies in Personnel Policy*, 85, 1947.

† Workers were asked to choose the first five items in importance to them personally, from a list of 71. Only the ten most often chosen are shown here. The rankings given to these same ten are shown for 50 top executives of the companies involved, and for 42 union officers representing these same employees.

‡ Not even within the first 40 items; i.e., items so marked were very far down on the list.

Experimental studies of production. The laboratory scientist's approach to the problem of effect of motivation is to change a specific motive while keeping other aspects of the situation constant. We can study the effect of hunger in the white rat by observing behavior in a given task when the reward is 1 gram, 2 grams, or 5 grams of food. Or the animal can be deprived of food for varying lengths of time, and the effort to find food can be measured quantitatively. In these experiments we can be reasonably sure that the specific food goal was the only change from one animal to another, or for the same animal at different times.

Human beings are not like that. Changes in the size of the paycheck involve also changes in social status, the individual's feeling of security, and other variables. These cannot be restricted by control of the experimental situation. The best we can do is to incor-

porate certain kinds of comparisons which make possible an estimate of the relative effect of some of these variables.

The Hawthorne studies. The first, and still one of the best, experimental studies on the relation of motivation to work performance was done at the Hawthorne, Illinois, works of the Western Electric Company over a period from 1927 to 1932. The entire program is much too elaborate to be described here; a detailed account is offered by Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939).

The experiment with which we are particularly concerned is known as the First Relay Assembly Test Room. Five girls assembling telephone relays were placed in a small room where they could be closely observed, and where accurate records of production, of physical working conditions, and of the girls' attitudes could be kept. The wage change was a group bonus system which geared earnings to group productivity rather than to production in the large department from which they had been selected. However, many other conditions also changed. They were allowed to talk freely; they were, in fact, encouraged to make suggestions in regard to how the work situation should be arranged. Their supervisor was a friendly observer, not an enforcer of norms. They developed a group feeling, a willingness to help one another on the job and to socialize outside the job. As a result of all these changes, production increased roughly 30 per cent by the end of the experiment.

How much of this was attributable to the wage incentive and how much to the social factors? To check this, two smaller comparisons were made. In the Mica Splitting Test Room, five girls were chosen who were already on an individual incentive rate. Their rate of pay was not changed, but they were given the special room, a friendly observer as supervisor, freedom to talk, and so on. Over a period of 14 months, their production increased by an average of 15 per cent.

A Second Relay Assembly group was set up without the special test room. They were given a change in method of payment (as for the First Relay Assembly group) but none of the other conditions of the first group. For the girls receiving the wage incentive but none of the social changes of the Test Room,¹ the increase in production was about 12 per cent.

Obviously it would be somewhat arbitrary to say that these two experimental variations account for all the results in the First Relay Assembly group. For one thing, these girls worked together for

¹ However, interviews indicated that social factors crept in here. One of these was *rivalry* with the group working in the Test Room!

years, whereas the check experiments lasted a much shorter time. On the other hand, we cannot avoid being impressed by the fact that a wage incentive alone increased production 12 per cent, a change in the social situation raised output 15 per cent, and a combination of the two gave an increase of 30 per cent. This looks surprisingly like an additive effect, with the social rewards being somewhat more potent in influencing behavior than the monetary reward.

Wyatt's study of candy wrappers. Another realistic experiment, relevant to our problem, was done under the auspices of the British Industrial Health Research Board. Wyatt (1934) reports on this investigation, in which girls working in a chocolate factory served as subjects. Although most girls were taught only one routine task, which they continued to perform daily, these girls were taught five jobs: unwrapping, wrapping, weighing, packing, and weighing and wrapping. Each worked 1 day per week on each job.

During the first 9 weeks of the experiment, each girl was paid a fixed weekly wage (*Time Rate*). This was followed by a competitive bonus system which lasted for 15 weeks (*Bonus Rate*). The bonus was computed by ranking the girls according to output; the slowest girl got no increase, but each girl got an additional sixpence weekly (Americans wonder if this constituted a bonus) up to a maximum of 4s 6d above the prior weekly rate. The last period of the experiment lasted 12 weeks, during which time each worker was paid a *Piece Rate* based on production. Thus the main change in the successive stages was in method of payment.

The results showed a marked jump in production when the bonus rate was introduced, and a second increase when the piece rate became effective. The first rise was estimated at 46 per cent, and the second at roughly 30 per cent of production just preceding the change. So far the results look like a very potent consequence of a financial incentive. However, if the different jobs are analyzed separately (Fig. 5.2), it becomes clear that here, as in the Hawthorne experiments, a wage change may get complicated by other considerations.

From comments the girls made during weekly interviews, it was possible to rank the tasks according to preference. They showed the following order of preference: (1) wrapping; (2) packing; (3) weighing and wrapping; (4) weighing; and (5) unwrapping. When we examine Fig. 5.2, we see that, except for one reversal, this is the order of effectiveness of the incentive rates. Unwrapping, which the girls looked upon as essentially a wasteful and useless procedure, never benefited materially (except during the first week of bonus

rate), from any incentive. Output after 8 months was substantially where it began. Wrapping, the most popular job, trebled in output over the experimental period. The intrinsic satisfactions of the job itself obviously have a great deal to do with the "will to work" and the effectiveness of the wage incentives.

Wyatt reports an interesting sidelight on this point which is worth mentioning. After 19 weeks of his experiment, reduced sales of a certain item prevented shipping out the tins which the girls had been filling and weighing. Instead, the tins were simply emptied out in




Fig. 5.2. Wage incentives and performance. Special wage incentives (bonus, piece rate) effectively increase performance on some jobs. But on disliked jobs (e.g., unwrapping), incentives may have no effect. (From Wyatt, 1934, by permission of H. M. Stationery Office.)

the factory and returned to the experimental room. When the girls learned of this, they lost interest in the work, even though they were still paid the same rate; they complained about the foolishness of such a procedure.

This experiment indicates again that wage rates are only part of a total perceived situation. The behavior of the employee is determined not only by what he is paid but by his liking for his job, by his feeling that the task is socially useful, and so on. Wyatt's study confirms the Hawthorne experiments in showing that output can be increased by incentive payments, and also by emphasizing that other

factors may outweigh or even completely neutralize the effects of such payments.

The man on the assembly line. The conflict between economic goals and the intrinsic satisfactions of the job itself (interesting, socially meaningful work) is well-illustrated by Walker and Guest (1952) in their study of workers on an automobile assembly line. Each man was asked how he felt about his pay and other economic benefits on his present job and on his previous job. The results are shown in Table 5.7. The economic goals were obviously quite potent on the assembly line—most workers admitted that they had taken the work because of the pay rate. But dislike of the nature of the task to be performed was widespread. The job was not only highly repetitive; it was also at a mechanical rhythm set by the conveyor belt, and it was usually difficult for the worker to see the significance or importance of his contribution.

Even without the assembly line, modern technology has tended to divide jobs into simplified segments, so that no one worker can feel that he can be personally proud of the quality of the finished product. The worker does not produce a complete chair, or shoe, or automobile; if anyone is praised for the quality of the product, it is likely to be an executive who never laid a hand on the physical materials involved. Management has attempted to compensate for the loss of intrinsic satisfactions in work by providing extrinsic satisfactions: higher pay, pensions and health benefits, recreation centers, long-service pins, and so on. The essential inadequacy of these devices can be readily demonstrated by a return to theoretical analysis.

Table 5.7 Economic vs. Job Content on Assembly Line Jobs*

<i>Factors</i>	<i>Likes</i>		<i>Dislikes</i>	
	<i>Previous</i>	<i>Present</i>	<i>Previous</i>	<i>Present</i>
Economic	54	147	81	1
Immediate job content	53	7	18	96

* From Walker and Guest (1952), p. 143. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.

Suppose that we represent, as in Fig. 5.3, the situation in which satisfaction is intrinsic in the work situation. This means that the reward is experienced in the process of working; it is immediate, not delayed, and it is not perceived as dependent upon other arbitrary, external conditions. Now in Fig. 5.4 we diagram the more recent situation, with work as a neutral or negative region which one must pass through to reach the goal. Here the reward is delayed, is not




Fig. 5.3. Perceived situation when job is satisfying in itself.




Fig. 5.4. Perceived situation when work is negative and reward separate from work.




Fig. 5.5. Perceived situation when worker finds way to avoid negative features of job.

associated immediately with work, and is perceived as dependent upon various external circumstances. Furthermore, the individual may perceive the situation as in Fig. 5.5; that is, he may attempt to reach the goal without doing the work, or doing the minimum possible, since his real goal is the extrinsic reward and not the completion of the task itself. So he will jam the machine, kill time, take a day off, come late to work, and loaf when he can.

This analysis shows that extrinsic rewards, provided by an outside agency at the completion of a task, can never motivate efficient and attentive effort in a manner comparable with intrinsic satisfactions. The mobilization of energy directly as a result of the presentation of the task will not, and indeed cannot, occur unless reward value is perceived as being implicit in the completion of the task itself.¹

Results of incentive installations. Unfortunately, few managements are willing to allow experimental manipulations of methods of payment, methods of supervision, work teams, and other changes such as those made in the Hawthorne studies and in Wyatt's research—manipulations which are essential to a definitive solution of the motivational problem. It is therefore necessary to try to piece together dependable knowledge from incidental observations of actual changes in wage payment and other working conditions.

It is known that the installation of piece rates and bonus rates does often result in increased employee output. Viteles (1953) comments that a government survey in 1945, covering 514 such plans, reported production increases averaging 38.99 per cent; unit labor costs decreased by 11.58 per cent; and average take-home pay increased by 17.56 per cent. These results are affected to an unknown degree by the fact that most of this experience accumulated during World War II, when patriotism served as a motive both to increase production and to eliminate restrictive tactics which are common on incentive jobs in peacetime.

Negative valences. There is no question that employees desire the increased earnings possible through these payment plans. But incentive systems have other unpleasant consequences as seen by the workers. In the study by Wyatt (1934) of the employees in a candy

¹ This does not mean that extrinsic rewards are ineffective, but only that on a relative basis they are inefficient. For example, premedical school students, motivated by professional ambition, will learn quantitative chemical analysis, a subject of no value to them as practitioners. Here the reward is extrinsic. But the amount of learning is substantially less than that in physiology, which students typically perceive as intimately related to their career activities.

factory, records were kept of various kinds of complaints and quarrels among the girls. Table 5.8 shows the relation of these incidents to payment practices. Since the bonus rate was a strictly competitive proposition, with the slowest girl getting no bonus at all and the others getting increases based on their comparative standings, it is not surprising that personal quarrels were at a maximum under this system. Complaints about the machine, paper, condition of work materials, etc., were commonest under the piece rate; under pressure for production, the worker perceives every little interference as much

Table 5.8 Relation of Payment Plan to Quarrels and Complaints*

	Quarrels	Complaints
Time rate	1.4	2.9
Bonus rate	6.9	7.1
Piece rate	4.2	10.8

* Modified from Wyatt (1934), p. 20. Reprinted by permission of H. M. Stationery Office.

larger than he would otherwise. It seems, then, that the incentive systems bring out unpleasant feelings in the workers, which are not characteristic under time rates. This may be an additional factor involved in accounting for union opposition to incentive plans.

The question of perceived probabilities. Another negative factor of great importance derives from the way in which the worker perceives these incentive plans. A goal will effectively influence behavior only when the perceived probability of attaining it is moderately high. Many workers see the increased earnings under incentive payments as transient or unattainable. The girls in the Hawthorne study commented that they probably would never receive bonus payments for increased output; they expected the company to cut the rates instead. Similarly, the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* has reported workers' opinions indicating that they fear layoffs if they really "produce" on incentive jobs. Mathewson (1931) and Roy (1952) further document these fears that rates will be cut and workers will be laid off.

If the perceived probability of getting (and continuing to get) the increased monetary reward is low, and the immediate costs in terms of energy and fatigue are inescapable, it is not surprising that many workers show only limited economic motivation. If they were freed from this feeling of uncertainty, the energy released by economic incentives might be much larger.

The underprivileged worker. An interesting confirmation of this

point regarding perceived probabilities has been developed by Davis (1946) from observations of the underprivileged workers, particularly those in minority groups, who are the last to be hired and the first to be fired. These workers are often condemned by employers for being uninterested in special training, in improving their job skills, in saving money, and so on. Davis describes instances of minority workers who did in fact attempt to save their money and adopt middle class values (upward mobility, higher education, etc.). Always, just as they were approaching the goal, layoff or discharge prevented this achievement. Ultimately the worker falls back on food, liquor, and sex as the only dependable goals. These are gratifications which cannot be snatched away from him; whereas promotions, better housing, higher education, and improved status may be dangled before him and then withdrawn after he has worked hard to attain them. Soon he becomes disillusioned and perceives these middle class goals as having zero probability for him. At this point they cease to have any motivating value as far as he is concerned.

Davis has this to say regarding our prospects of increasing the effort put forth by such workers: "Our society must offer the underprivileged worker a fair prospect, a better chance than he now has, of improving his status. It must convince him that he can secure a better life by hard work, and he can be convinced only when he sees a fair number of underprivileged *people like himself* getting reasonably secure jobs, a place to live, and a chance for promotion."¹

Economic vs. non-economic motives. Pitted against the economic incentives which management has considered the primary approach to employee effort are a variety of other motives. One of these obviously is fatigue; workers tend to keep rates of work low as a protective device against physiological discomfort. When we compare hours of work and physical effort today with that of 1890, however, we are inclined to suspect that this may be used more often as a rationalization than as a real reason for failure to respond to economic motivation.

A more important consideration is social acceptance. We develop in Chapter 7 the importance of groups and group norms in industrial relations. Let us simply note here that each of us needs to maintain a stable social environment, and that in so doing he must not produce enough to cause his fellow-workers to perceive him as a threat. Many incentive plans fail because this social acceptance is a relatively

¹ Davis (p. 105), in Whyte, W. F. *Industry and Society* (1946.) Reprinted by permission of McGraw-Hill Book Co. Italics are in original.

more potent goal than the extra cash. Incentive plans which elicit quarreling and personal conflicts among workers are likewise going to conflict with ego motives of this type.

Finally, we note that the *intrinsic qualities* of the job itself affect the operation of economic incentives. Wyatt's study showed that, on a job which the workers found meaningless and wasteful, incentives failed to raise output. On the other hand, output went up on preferred jobs even during the period of time payments.

We cannot, from these findings, conclude that workers will not put out more effort for increased monetary rewards; but we must at least conclude that an overemphasis on money as the primary incentive can lead only to misunderstanding and conflict. Viteles (1953), who has attempted to rescue the financial side of motivation from its neglect by psychologists, marshals a considerable amount of evidence to show that economic goals are important to workers. But, in a section of his book entitled "The Decline of Economic Man," he concedes that we must at all times keep the non-economic factors in mind. "It has become increasingly evident," he writes, "that the effectiveness of the financial incentive, as embodied in piece-rate and similar systems, can be reduced to nil if wants and needs not gratified by the monetary reward are thwarted in the formulation or administration of the plan."¹

MOTIVATIONS OF EXECUTIVES

As the foregoing pages suggest, there have been many attempts to identify the goals that are important to employees (we have cited only a small proportion of them). Most of the studies have used a method of limited value—the direct questionnaire. This method has, nevertheless, the value of being objective, so that few arguments arise about what the workers said, although disagreements often develop about what they meant.

The situation as regards studies of executive motivation is even less satisfactory. Much of our judgment of executive motivation is based upon the analysis of published statements, responses to projective tests, and similar indirect data which call for interpretation by the observer. It is striking, therefore, to find the number of points on which agreement seems fairly widespread.

It will also be interesting to compare observations on executives with the findings on workers. We have already taken the position that biological differences cannot be invoked here, since many em-

¹ Viteles (1953), p. 59. Reprinted by permission of W. W. Norton & Co.

ployers have been workers in their earlier careers. Does this lead to the conclusion that workers and employers have the same goals? Or does the change in social role lead to changes in goals perceived as important? And, if the latter is true, what implications can be derived for an understanding of industrial conflicts?

Verbal behavior of executives. Spokesmen for business have generally been vigorous in their assertions that the "profit motive," the desire for economic gain, is the mainspring of managerial behavior. Under the circumstances, it is a little surprising to find that so few business executives, when talking of their own motivations, impute their behavior to simple selfish profit seeking. The executive tends to explain his efforts as motivated by a desire to build a successful enterprise, to turn out a socially useful product, to provide employment, and so on.

We are not being particularly cynical in suggesting that these remarks have the status of rationalizations rather than accurate statements of motives. We can well be skeptical of the validity of such verbal reports, as we were in the case of the workers.

This does not mean that we should go to the other extreme and assume that the stereotyped expressions about the profit motive reveal true underlying dynamics. Rather it means that we have to try to ascertain the goals toward which the executive is really striving, even when he gives verbal reports of a different kind.

Houser's study of executives. One of the earliest systematic attempts to explore executive motivation is that reported by Houser (1927). He interviewed top executives in a number of large corporations across the country (the exact number is not stated), asking questions primarily about company policy as regards relations with employees. From these he attempted to distill an impression of the important motives governing executive behavior.

(a) *Power.* Houser stresses particularly the ego motives, the craving for power and authority, as important determinants of executive policy. He has the following to say regarding its expression in his interviews:

The sheer love for power so typical of autocratic attitudes everywhere is undoubtedly one of the greatest forces producing individual and group frictions. There may be a general unwillingness to admit it as an ideal, since social sanctions may not uphold its exercise. But with a great many executives, this love of power is a blind but strong impulse. The degree of its expression is the measure of their most vital satisfaction. This was revealed time and again in the interviews. Sometimes this motive was conscious; more often it was not. Many illustrations brought home the

fact that frequently the craving of executives for the exercise of power was actually greater than the desire for financial results.¹

(b) *Self-expression.* A second form of ego motivation which Houser estimated to be stronger than the financial for many of his executives was self-expression. He differentiated this from power by relating the latter primarily to dominance over people, self-expression to "doing things my own way" irrespective of other people. Thus he says,

In many cases workers might be automata for all the recognition given their essential human nature. Such an attitude on the part of an executive does not necessarily imply antagonism or ill will towards his subordinates, or any conscious endeavor to suppress them. It does, however, reveal his blindness. It does represent his own craving for expression, his immersion in his own activities and sometimes his complacency and self-gratification as well.²

Houser's evaluation of executive behavior and his estimates of motives are shot through with a moralistic vein of scolding and disapproval. This is as unrealistic as scolding workers because they do not produce at maximum under any and all circumstances. The goals which the executive is striving to achieve are related to the situation as he perceives it, and to his need to protect favorable constancies. We return to this point in more detail in a later section.

Fortune's management poll. A source of interesting information about the perceptions and goals of top executives is the Management Poll which was for many years a continuing feature in *Fortune Magazine*. One of their questions emphasizes the desire for self-expression: "Do you think you might be able to do a better, more creative job if you could work just the way you wanted to?" The answers were: yes, 60 per cent; no, 36 per cent; already do so, 4 per cent.³

Another question, asked of a public sample in 1947, brings out an important difference between the executive and the worker. As Table 5.9 shows, this question poses the issue of security vs. income in a fairly clear form. The responses indicate that security is a much more potent goal for workers, whether in unions or not, whereas a higher income even on a risky basis is more attractive to the executives. The sure but low-paying job has little appeal to them.)

This observation at once focuses one of the sources of misunderstanding between the employer and his employees. The worker

¹ Houser (1927), p. 93. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press. Italics are in original.

² Houser (1927), p. 99. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.

³ *Fortune* (1946), 34 (4), p. 5.

perceives few chances that he could ever achieve this high-income position; his experience, and that of his fellows, tells him that he would be sure to lose. The executive, on the other hand, has reached the high-income job, and knows others who have; so, from his experience, the risk is worth taking. So the worker stubbornly strives after security, and the executive accuses him of clogging the wheels of progress.

We have noted that workers often respond to incentive pay plans by earning up to a certain amount, then refusing to produce beyond this point. Do executives show similar behavior? Some evidence indicates that they do. In 1946 *Fortune Magazine* polled a large number of high-level executives with this question: "If you could double your income by working 2 or 3 more hours per day, would you?" Only 29 per cent said they would do so.

Table 5.9 Security vs. Income as Goals for Occupational Groups*

Question: (asked of men only) "Here are three different kinds of jobs. If you had your choice, which would you pick?"

	<i>Professionals and Executives</i>					<i>Salaried Employees</i>		<i>Factory Workers</i>		<i>Union Members</i>	
	<i>Total</i>										
A job which pays quite a low income but which you are sure of keeping	48.2%	25.5%†	42.3%	59.9%	56.0%						
A job which pays a good income but which you have a fifty-fifty chance of losing	22.8	32.0	27.3	20.9	23.7						
A job which pays an extremely high income if you make the grade but in which you lose almost everything if you don't make it	23.8	35.5	26.8	16.9	17.8						
Don't know	5.2	7.0	3.6	2.3	2.5						

* From *Fortune* (January, 1947), 35, p. 10. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

† This figure probably represents professionals more than executives. On a somewhat similar question, in February, 1940, the figure for executives was only 8.1%.

It may be argued that the question refers to overtime work, not to working harder during the regular day. In either case it reveals a lack of economic motivation remarkably paralleling the observations on workers. Indeed, no incentive plan has ever tried offering the worker a chance to double his income.¹

These findings suggest that the \$15,000 executive differs little from the \$3000 factory worker. Both apparently avoid exerting more energy and effort unless suitable rewards *in the immediate future* are perceived as reasonably certain.

Henry's study of successful executives. Projective tests can also be used to obtain information regarding the personal goals of an individual or a group. Henry (1949) has reported on a study of two groups of middle-level executives, one group rated by their superiors as successful men having potential for further promotion, the others rated as having reached their ceiling and relatively unsuccessful. The motivational differences between these groups give us some insight into the dynamics of the top executive, since it seems reasonably certain that these successful middle-level managers are similar to the men at the top of the industrial hierarchy.

(According to Henry's analysis, the main features of the successful executive are these:

(a) *Achievement desires.* "They conceive of themselves as hard-working and achieving persons who must accomplish in order to be happy." Henry explicitly differentiates this from a desire for glory, which he found more commonly in the unsuccessful group.

(b) *Mobility drive.* "They feel the necessity of moving continually upward and of accumulating the rewards of increased accomplishment." Some are satisfied simply to sense that they have improved; others want status in the community or in the company.

(c) *Acceptance of authority figures.* A crucial point in all social psychology is the relation between the individual and authority. Henry finds that the successful executive is one who is positively motivated toward authority figures, desires to please them, and accepts their goals. He may look forward to taking over the boss's job, but this does not imply hostility or rebelliousness.

Pricing decisions. We have found little reliable data on the de-

¹ A possible exception is that of the Lincoln Electric Co. Although this is a year-end bonus not directly geared to productivity, it seems to function as such. Worker morale and effort are reported as very high. The year-end bonus averaged over \$4000 per employee in 1953, almost doubling his yearly income. In this case the workers seem to respond better to the economic incentive than the above answers indicate would happen with executives.

cision-making process as it affects industrial relations. Katona (1951) has, however, compiled some excellent observations on pricing decisions by top executives. His analysis, like that presented in the preceding chapters, emphasizes the character of the perceived situation and the goals which appear important to the individual operating within this situation. A major consideration, he believes, is the executive's perception of the enterprise as a "going concern."

Usually the corporation or business enterprise has psychological reality for at least the executives. It is perceived by them as acting, as having objectives of its own, and as persisting beyond their association with it. The psychological reality of the firm appears to be especially pronounced in the minds of executives when management responsibilities are divided among several persons, as is frequent with many of the large corporations that are not managed by an autocratic president and his subordinates.

It follows that the corporation manager, as a rule, does not think separately of the interests of the owners, the employees, and the customers. On the contrary, he may think of the interests of *his* corporation without regard to the special interests of owners, employees, or customers. He thinks and acts as if it were his corporation, even if he has no ownership share in it. Improvement in the situation of the business enterprise brings him genuine satisfaction, and deterioration in its situation causes genuine worry, without regard to whether the improvement or deterioration affects his own position.¹

We would be inclined to disagree only with the last clause of this quotation. The kind of situation that Katona is describing is one in which the businessman has identified himself with his enterprise. Furthermore, his success, his prestige and status, are intimately tied to the success of the corporation. For these reasons a business gain or loss does directly affect the executive's position, if not financially, at least in respect to ego status. Since the evidence indicates that ego motivation is at least as strong as, and may be stronger than economic motivation, it is to be expected that the executive will make decisions calculated to make the company stronger.

Katona comments that: "There are indications that the prevailing institutional setup has greatly enhanced the desire for power among American businessmen. This desire is closely connected with the striving for profits and the striving for regular and secure profits. A business firm which rules and dominates its market is usually more profitable and has less to fear from sudden adverse developments than a firm which is in a weak position" (pp. 204-205).

¹ Pp. 196-197. This and the following quotations from Katona (1951) are reprinted by permission of the McGraw-Hill Book Co.

This statement is, of course, completely in harmony with the homeostatic view of motivation. The executive, in protecting his own favorable situation, must extend the power of the enterprise, make it more profitable and more secure. Some economists have even charged that many executives have begun to imitate the worker, playing it "safe and sure" in matters of corporate policy, because this tends to maximize the power of the executive within his area of influence.

On the basis of his observations, Katona is disposed to the view that the opposition between ego motivation and profit motivation which we have suggested in the foregoing pages does not exist. He says, "The current widespread split between ownership and management functions does not provide valid arguments against the role assigned to the profit motive in our economy. As a rule, a salaried executive will strive for profits for his firm" (p. 197). But he seems to contradict this when he points out, "Personal motivation of the executives—to satisfy their ego, to have power, security, and larger and larger income—may be and often is satisfied through identification with their firms. Rivalry between executives of the same firm exists. But usually it seems to take the form of striving for a larger share for one's own department" (p. 197).

Katona also comments that the desire to avoid a decrease in profits seems from some lines of evidence to be stronger than the desire to increase profits. This is interestingly parallel to an observation by Knowles (1952) to the effect that the British trade unions have shown more vigorous action to defend against wage cuts than to obtain wage increases. This finding is again harmonious with the homeostatic point of view. Although the gaining of new benefits and new gratifications is always attractive to us, the threat of losing those already achieved has more energizing effect in the immediate short-run sense. Protecting a comfortable steady state which has already been achieved is more important to us than struggling to achieve some remote future goal.

Motivations of executives and of workers. In our analysis of worker motivation, we stress the fact that both economic and ego goals are important determinants of behavior. A job, after all, takes about 8 hours of the employee's typical day. Since he is probably awake only 16 hours, this means that half of his waking life is spent at the job. It would be most surprising if this half of his existence was dominated only by desire for money, regardless of the fact that this motive impelled him to take the position. The worker's desires for security, for recognition, for power, and for self-expression are not checked at the time clock. However, the usual job allows him little gratification

of these motives, a point which is expanded in the following chapter.

Executives likewise show evidence of striving for both financial and ego goals. To some extent, as Katona suggests, these two may merge for the executive, since he is getting ego satisfaction from his activities in planning, designing, directing, and controlling the behavior of large numbers of subordinates, and he likewise receives economic returns far above those of the production worker. In some cases, however, the two sets of impulses may conflict, and in these instances it is not unusual to find the ego goals more attractive than mere money.

The similarity of worker and executive motivation can perhaps be well-illustrated by the following incident, one of many such in the literature. This is from p. 27 of the volume by Mathewson (1931):

A Slav electrician and a helper were installing complicated electrical signal apparatus in a car shop in New York State. The electrician was very proud of his technical skill and guarded it jealously. He was reticent even with his own helper about the details of the work, although he talked freely enough about how much he knew. The helper eventually attained considerable proficiency in the work. One day another electrician asked the helper's assistance on a technical point and readily received the desired information. After the questioner had gone the Slav said sharply, "You must never do that. Don't give up anything you learn or that I tell you. When you help him he gets the credit for what we know. If you don't help him he will have to go to the foreman for the information and then the foreman can tell who his good men are."

This kind of behavior has commonly been noted among junior executives and especially staff men, who want to be sure that they receive credit for their technical knowledge. It is, of course, basically related to the "professional secrets" of many kinds of experts, and to the secret process information which businessmen like to withhold from their competitors.

The motivation of the worker, in this case, or of the staff man, is chiefly one of prestige and recognition. The opinion of his superior is important to him. He wants to be praised for his skill and knowledge. In the long run, he may also hope for promotions and salary increases, but it seems clear that these are not essential to the occurrence of the phenomenon.

The evidence, therefore, supports the view that motivations of executives and workers are more similar than different. The chief differences are in the courses of action perceived as offering the highest probability of gratification. The worker's circumstances and experience bias his view in favor of security, whereas the executive is drawn to courses offering upward mobility, prestige, and status. But, as we examine these bits of information, we are inevitably reminded of an

anecdote widely told regarding Samuel Gompers, long-time president of the American Federation of Labor. The story alleges that on one occasion he was asked by a newspaper reporter, "Mr. Gompers, what does labor *really* want?" Gompers is reported to have thought for a moment and then replied, "More."

Whether or not the anecdote is true, the answer is accurate. As we have already indicated, American culture indoctrinates a desire for and an expectancy of upward mobility. Businessmen want more. Workers want more. This "more" can apply to money, prestige, security, recognition, self-expression, or any other form of ego expansion. While the level of aspiration typically set by the worker is far below that of the executive, the desire to move upward is important to him.

In homeostatic terms, we can say that each person wants to protect himself, his biogenic needs, and his social goals. By increasing power over his environment, he reduces the probability that he will suffer deprivation, threat, or injury. He protects his valued ego as well as his physical body. The particular form of striving which this ego motivation takes varies from time to time. When a man feels threatened by rising prices, it may take the form of demands for pay increases. At other times, such as the imminence of layoffs, it takes the direction of job security. Again, it may be a guaranteed annual wage. If the union plays the role of agent for any such gains, the protection of the union also becomes a valuable goal.

Because power for the executive necessarily means power to injure the worker in some way, worker and union strivings will inevitably move toward restrictions on executive freedom of decision and action. Such restrictions take the form of seniority clauses limiting layoffs, the right to enter grievances against supervisory procedure, controls on speed of production, and so on. Controversies about management rights and union obligations to the members will always become struggles over power. The following quotation illustrates this point:

In the 1946 General Motors strike the union bolstered its plea for wage boosts without price increases by challenging management's right to keep information concealed, with the slogan 'A look at the books.' General Motors countered with the apt phrase, 'a finger in the pie' to show what was implicit in the union demand. Psychologists will suspect that General Motors was right. The basic conflict is over self-assertion, over the right of the executive to independent decision versus the right of workers to challenge that decision or change it. 'A finger in the pie' is an inevitable goal of union policy, however much union spokesmen may disclaim any such idea.¹

¹ Stagner (1950), p. 14, by permission of *Personnel Psychology*.

Executives, it should be noted, already have several fingers in the pie. Traditionally, management had absolute freedom of decision; this has successively been limited by legal action, public disapproval, and union contract. Necessarily, each increase in union power means some decrease in management power. To quote a union organizer on the "real problem" in a strike in a small Illinois factory, "The real issue wasn't the 15¢ an hour we asked for or the 5¢ we got. The real cause of the strike was that we had to convince that guy he couldn't be a little dictator any longer."

MOTIVATION OF THE UNION OFFICER

We have now examined the perceived goals of executives and workers, and have seen how some of these perceptions must necessarily be expected to lead to conflicts. One more group of persons must be included here if we are to get a rounded picture of our problem. These are the paid union officials, the men and women who have left the role of worker for the role of formal representative of the workers. Although they undoubtedly maintain, to a large extent, the worker's frame of reference, certain new forces operate on them which must be recognized if we are to understand their behavior.

There is a great deal of anecdotal material on the personalities of union leaders, but not much scientific material. We shall therefore have less to say on this point than its importance would justify. Furthermore, the data that are available deal mostly with local union leaders, whereas the national officials play a more significant role in the determination of policy. Most national leaders, however, have in the past been local officers, and so this may not be too serious a handicap.

Interview studies. Most of the systematic information available regarding psychological characteristics of union officials has been gathered by interview. One comparative study (see p. 151) has used structured projective devices in comparing union and management leaders. The interview is, of course, a useful tool for this purpose, although it is somewhat more subjective than we would like.

(*Sayles and Strauss on the local union leader.* Sayles and Strauss (1953) have reported on a thorough study of 7 local unions, with casual observations on 13 more. They quote extensively from interviews with the officers and attempt to derive some generalizations about goals that the officers seem to attain through their union roles.

(a) *Economic.* The local union officers studied received little or

nothing in the way of financial return from their long hours of union activity. They were, of course, paid by the union at their regular hourly rate for wages lost because of union work, and they received some expense money for gasoline, meals away from home, etc. It seemed clear, none the less, that most of them lost money on these items. There was a chance that one of them would be offered a job on the payroll of the International, but the pay for an organizer was so little above that of the average skilled worker as to be no inducement.

(b) *Security*. The union officials did, of course, get increased economic security in the form of "superseniority." This refers to the fact that during his term of office the union steward (or elective official) has a higher seniority ranking than anyone else in his department. This protection against layoffs is especially valued by men in times of economic insecurity.

(c) *Prestige*. It seemed clear that one of the major returns to the union leader was in terms of higher prestige. He is looked up to both by his members and by some members of management; at the very least, the boss has to listen to him! As one man said of his local president, "He is really an important man in the plant as a union officer. People have to come to you with things and you make decisions" (p. 118).

We have noted evidence supporting the view that, like the executive, the average worker also desires prestige, an opportunity to express his ideas and to make decisions. The typical industrial set-up offers him no chance to satisfy such desires. But when he joins a union, he has a new pathway for attaining this kind of goal. There is a modest amount of evidence to suggest that this motive is a strong one in many top leaders of the union movement.

(d) *Achievement*. We noted in Henry's study of successful executives a strong need for achievement, a need to solve problems and to be creative. Sayles and Strauss observe the same phenomenon in the local officers. One man said, "We're building quite a union. I never thought it would be this interesting, but it's fascinating" (p. 112).

Observations of officer behavior. Rather than listen to what the union officer says, we can watch what he does. The problem of policy we shall postpone until Chapter 11; the fact that a specific policy is adopted by a local or national union does not necessarily reflect leader motives. It may derive from leader judgment that this is a popular demand among the members; this would indicate a desire to be re-elected, a desire to conform to group patterns, or a desire to act the role as the leader understands it. A policy may also be adopted

because it is the most practical goal to be working for at the time, although it may be far down the list in preference. "Fringe benefits" blossomed during the war partly because wage stabilization policy seriously hampered requests for wage increases. Thus union policies, though important, do not bear directly on officer motivation.

The efforts of the officer are directed to driving a successful bargain with management, increasing his local's membership, tying the members more closely to the union. We can say, then, as we did regarding executives, that the union has a high degree of psychological reality for the officer, and that he will get a great deal of satisfaction simply from seeing it strengthened. This corresponds to the phenomenon we have labeled *ego involvement*. The official has become so closely involved with the organization that he feels rewarded when an organizational goal is attained. Even if the policy is one of which he did not approve, he shows obvious elation at its achievement; and, when the union suffers a defeat, perhaps in a local a thousand miles away, he shows distress and disappointment.

The amount of energy that goes into "raiding" and defense against raids is relevant here. The union leader usually has no economic gain in sight when he tries to take members away from another union and add them to his own. It does, however, strengthen the group which he sees as an extension of his own ego; in homeostatic terms, he is protecting himself against possible disturbance of equilibrium by strengthening the organization. Peterson (1953) has laid particular emphasis on this as an important motive of union leaders.

The amount of time spent in socializing was mentioned by Sayles and Strauss as one of the characteristic features of the union official's life. This does not necessarily indicate that the officer enjoys being with people (socializing as a goal in itself), but this and other evidence indicate that the need for group acceptance, the need to be one of the gang, is an important dynamic factor. We shall present some projective test data on this point shortly.

Comparison of executives and union leaders. The foregoing passages suggest that the union officer resembles both worker and executive in certain respects. As a person who has been a worker, and who has never achieved a high income, we can predict that he will prefer security to a larger reward with substantial risk attached. As a person who has been cast in a decision-making, power-exercising role, he will be more positively oriented toward power than the worker. Because of the difference in institutions, however, his power goals will not be identical with those of the company official. In the typical American

industry, power is explicitly concentrated in one man at the top, and delegated downward.¹ Furthermore, within a specified area, each executive is supposed to have freedom to make his own decisions. The union is an institution in which power, theoretically at least, is concentrated at the bottom, in the members, who delegate it upward. This means that negotiated settlements, for example, must be referred to the membership for ratification. Even in those unions where democracy is honored more in the breach than in the observance, verbal homage is constantly paid to the principle that the membership has the last word. A man who is a leader in such a context cannot be focused on a goal of individual power; he must see his goal as power through the group. And he would be expected to show a great deal more concern with being accepted by the group than would the company executive, to whom it is theoretically unimportant whether his subordinates accept him as a person or not.

This kind of logic suggested a comparative study of company and union leaders in terms of two motives: the desire for individual power and the desire for group acceptance and security. Because it was assumed that direct questioning would lead to evasive answers from either group, pictorial material was prepared to test the hypotheses.² For example, one picture showed a large hand over a man's head. The captions were: "held down" and "protected." It was predicted that the managers would perceive this as interference with the man's freedom, whereas unionists would see it in terms of security. Another picture showed a man climbing on a rope. The captions were "up" and "down." Here it was predicted that executives would see him as climbing up, the unionists would see him as climbing down. Both predictions, along with a number of others of similar types, were borne out by the actual responses of union officers and labor relations executives.

Since no rank-and-file workers were included in this study, our conclusions must be limited to comparisons between the union and management leaders. The labor relations executives chose more answers indicative of a desire for individual power and freedom of action. Union officials chose more answers suggesting a concern for acceptance into a group, for security. Other differences in the data

¹ The power may be concentrated in an operating committee or an active Board of Directors. In any event, it is at the top of the hierarchy.

² This study was supported by a grant from the Graduate Research Board, University of Illinois. A technical report will be published elsewhere.

were not consistent enough to justify any generalizations. It did appear, however, that the results of this investigation confirmed the trends suggested by the opinion poll data, by interviews, and by direct observation of these men at work.

MOTIVATION AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT

The foregoing pages provide evidence that the basic motivations of employees, executives, and union officials are substantially similar. Economic rewards, power, self-expression, praise, recognition, and security, to name the main desires we have considered, are shown to be potent in mobilizing energy at all levels of the industrial organization. The individual's quest for one of these goals may put him into a conflict with other goals which are perceived as lying in the opposite direction (cf. Chapter 4, p. 111). So the worker may find himself in a conflict between his desire for more money and his desire for social acceptance. The executive perceives the fatigue of extra work and the loss of social pleasures as too much to justify additional duties (p. 142). The staff man may find the goal of recognition more attractive than the goal of helping out another man with a problem. These conflicts within individuals are important, and from time to time in later chapters we refer to them as essential to an understanding of specific behavior.

The occurrence of industrial conflict, in the usual sense of the term, is a function of the way in which individuals perceive an opposing group in relation to their desired goals. For example, an executive may perceive his employees as helping him achieve his goal, or as hindering him. The worker striving for security may perceive his employer as helping, as indifferent, or as interfering with this goal. If we attempt to classify these possible goal-seeking conflicts between the participants in industry, we find the three following combinations. (In this analysis we have treated the company and the union as entities for the sake of simplicity. It should be understood that each is composed of individuals.)

1. *Conflicts over the same goal which is desired by both.* This relates first of all to the question of economic return, the distribution of disposable income between workers and manager-owners. However, it speedily becomes involved in the question of power, which, if not a positive goal at the beginning of the relationship, quickly becomes one. As each side sees it, an increase for one is a loss for the other.

2. *Conflict resulting from seeking different goals which are perceived as incompatible.* An important goal of unions is job security (including Perlman's concept of job control). But managers are likely to perceive this as conflicting with their efforts to attain efficiency and higher profits. (Cf. Fig. 5.6.)




Fig. 5.6. Situation when worker goals are perceived as blocking management goals.

3. *Conflict over the pathways by which goals are to be approached.* Thus managers may perceive higher productivity to be desirable. The workers have no objection in principle to higher productivity, but the union operates to bar certain paths to this goal (e.g., speed-up and stretch-out) as suggested in Fig. 5.7.

It will be noted that all three of these conflict sources are completely saturated with the subjectivity of perception. How much is a fair share of company income for profits? We can get a wide variety of




Fig. 5.7. Situation when union tactics are perceived as blocking certain paths to goals.

answers, none of them having much objective foundation.¹ Both job security and efficiency of operations will be conceded by almost everyone to be desirable goals. But, if there is a choice between them, which is to dominate? What evidence justifies a decision in one or the other direction? Does the union really bar certain activities by management? Does management really bar certain activities by the union? How much perceptual distortion enters into the complaints which spokesmen for each side so regularly utter regarding the other?

It is precisely because these perceptual processes are so important in determining the decisions reached in industrial relations situations that we spent so much time analyzing and clarifying the problem of perception. The tendency to blame "bad" union leaders or "bad" capitalists is easily evoked. If we assume that these conflict issues derive primarily from "real facts," we shall almost inevitably wind up blaming some villain for industrial conflict. But, if we keep carefully in mind that each person behaves in terms of the facts *as he sees them*, we can concentrate on the fundamental problem: why do the facts look that way to him; and is there another way of looking at the situation which will be equally satisfactory without leading to conflict?

¹ In a free capital market, an answer of some objectivity could be derived from the rate at which new capital will flow in. But how long has it been since we had such a free market in capital?

Frustration and Aggression

In the two preceding chapters we have proposed a conception of the dynamics of industrial conflict in terms of perceived goals, the establishment of favorable equilibria, and actions designed to protect these favorable states once they are established. The emphasis has been on such questions as: what goals are important to the typical worker? What incentives are likely to mobilize more worker effort? Toward what goals is the executive striving? In what respects does the union officer have his own special motivational pattern?

An alternative way of posing the same problem is to ask: what are the *frustrations* encountered by the typical worker or executive? What are the sources of *dissatisfaction* in industry? This is a relevant approach, because it is safe to assume that the blocking of unimportant motives will lead to very slight consequences in behavior, whereas frustration of powerful impulses will lead to marked disturbances. The study of job satisfaction and dissatisfaction, therefore, can be considered as a way of verifying the conception of industrial dynamics developed in the preceding pages.

AGGRESSION IN INDUSTRY

There is, however, another, and a vitally important, reason for giving special attention to the problems of frustration and dissatisfaction with the work situation. This reason centers around the role of aggression in industrial relations. No one will deny the importance of aggression in this connection; it is, indeed, the aggressive manifestations with which most people are familiar, whereas the day-to-day working out of union-management relations is given little publicity.

Industrial conflict in the United States is relatively peaceful today; we have had no incidents, like the Ludlow massacre or the pitched gun battle between unionists and Pinkertons in the Homestead steel strike, for a long time. Even the Memorial Day shooting in 1937 at the Re-

public Steel plant seems somewhat tame by comparison with these bloodier events of earlier times; only 10 persons were killed.¹

It is, on the other hand, clear that most strikes involve a strong component of hostility toward the employer; and, as a matter of fact, the mere act of joining a union is, in some communities, still perceived on both sides as an expression of belligerence. It is thus important for us to explore the psychological problems involved in aggression.

The instinct theory of aggression. Traditionally there have been two views of the origin of aggressive impulses: the first, that man is born with an instinct for aggression, known variously as the instinct of pugnacity, the "death instinct," and the need for aggression. According to this view man will always experience aggressive, destructive impulses, just as he will always experience hunger. The practical problem simply becomes one of domesticating the pugnacious instinct in the same way that we socialize and control food-seeking activities.

Today the chief group holding to the instinct theory of aggression is composed of the orthodox Freudians. Briefly put, the arguments that they advance for the instinct hypothesis are these:

1. *Universality.* Not only all human groups but also all human individuals who have been studied intensively by psychoanalytic methods reveal evidences of hostility. The great majority of human cultures have organized patterns for channeling aggression into attacks on out-groups. Individuals have characteristic ways of venting pugnacity, and even those rare persons who seem never to act aggressively are found to attack themselves, to fantasy attacking others, and so on.

2. *Early appearance.* Another argument offered for the instinct theory is that aggressive, attacking, destructive behavior appears very early in life. John B. Watson, as a result of his early experiments on infant emotions, believed that rage was an innate emotional pattern because his infant subjects, when free movement was restrained, thrashed around in what looked like an attempt to attack the interference. Isaacs (1933) and others have shown the extensive manifestations of hostility in nursery school children.

3. *Intractability.* Aggressive impulses in children and adults are highly stubborn and difficult to eliminate. As Dr. Kinsey has so well documented, the sex impulse is potent and likely to find all manner of outlets, regardless of social disapproval and threats of punishment. Hostility resembles this pattern. After several thousand years of a

¹ For example, in the railroad strikes of 1877, it is reported that 77 men were killed. The estimated total at Ludlow was 33, many of whom were women and children.

cultural tradition dominated by the command, "Thou shalt not kill," we still have a rather high homicide rate; and the rates for other crimes of violence also remain distressingly high. This phenomenon, when set against early socialization and adult penal threats, seems to indicate an innate force which demands expression.

The instinct theorists do not hold to the view that we should give up and allow aggression free rein. Freud stressed the necessity for social controls of the sex impulse, and likewise for the death instinct. Organized society is impossible without restrictions on both these impulses. However, the instinct theory is both more pessimistic in outlook and less helpful in specific tactics for dealing with aggression, when compared to the environmental view.

The frustration-aggression hypothesis. In opposition to the instinct theory, an environmental interpretation of aggression as response to frustration has become dominant, at least in American psychology. As Fletcher (1932) and Gundlach (1940) have shown, the instinct theory is rejected by an overwhelming majority of American psychologists when it is placed in the context of making war inevitable. This does not automatically mean that all American psychologists rejected the instinct hypothesis; however, an examination of the literature makes it clear that this view has little support today outside of psychoanalytic circles.

The environmentalist position was first put into systematic form by Dollard, *et al.*, (1939). They took the position that "*aggression is always a consequence of frustration.*" This was later softened to indicate that aggression was one response to frustration, and the most characteristic one. The contrast with the instinct theory, in any event, lies in the crucial role ascribed to frustration. The instinct view holds that human beings inevitably become aggressive and attack others, regardless of environmental circumstances. The Dollard group holds that aggression is environmentally determined, that it is a characteristic way of mobilizing additional energy when a motivated response sequence is blocked (Fig. 6.1).

As regards the strength of an individual's tendency toward aggressive action, Dollard *et al.* stressed the following three determinants: (1) the strength of the impulse which is being blocked; (2) the degree of interference with the desired response; and (3) the frequency with which this interference occurs.

Strength of blocked motive. If an individual is striving for some goal which he perceives as extremely important, any barrier, even slight, may set off vigorous attacks on the obstacle. In contrast, if the goal is trivial, a barrier may evoke little or no aggression.) So, if a




Fig. 6.1. Aggression resulting from frustration.

worker has a strong desire for security, any interference with his security-seeking actions will evoke strong hostility; and, if his desire for self-expression is relatively weak, blockage of self-expression will not elicit much aggression.

In this connection, it is essential to keep in mind two concepts developed in the preceding chapters: (1) deprivation-satiation; and (2) perceived probability of goal achievement. The first of these means that, if a particular desire is well-satiated, it is weakened; a man after a full meal will not be much disturbed by a barrier between him and food, but, if he has been deprived of food for 24 hours, he may attack the barrier vigorously. The second point implies a somewhat more complicated relationship; if a goal is perceived as either certain to be attained or certain not to be attained, little motivation is involved; but a goal for which the chances are 50/50 or better will tend to elicit higher effort. A goal perceived as near, in time or space, evokes more energy than a distant one. Generally speaking, the first factor operates as a multiplier of the second; i.e., perceived probabilities determine whether a person will move toward the goal at all, whereas relative deprivation or satiation affects the vigor of this behavior. (See, for example, our analysis of the motivation of the underprivileged worker, pp. 137-138).

Degree of interference. We have, implicitly, defined what is meant by degree of interference with the motivated response. A minor interference is a slight barrier to achievement, one which can be pushed aside, a slight reduction in the magnitude of the reward anticipated, etc. A major interference is one which is extremely difficult to by-pass, or one which makes for a marked reduction in reward.)

Dollard *et al.* have failed to consider the case suggested above, in which the individual perceives probability of goal achievement as zero.

Actually, this is maximum interference; but it does not produce maximum aggression. Most probably it will lead to denying the existence of the goal.

In favor of the hypothesis that aggression increases with degree of blockage, Dollard *et al.* cite the study of Hovland and Sears (1940) on the price of cotton and lynchings of Negroes in the southern states. This correlation they computed to be $-.67$; i.e., when the white farmers were more frustrated by low prices, more Negroes were sacrificed.¹

More direct evidence can be obtained experimentally. Solley (1954) allowed college students to solve successfully a series of 6 anagrams. They were then presented with insoluble anagrams. As a measure of the autonomic nervous system's response to this situation, palmar sweating was measured. There was a highly significant increase in sweating when barriers (insoluble anagrams) were presented. This was interpreted as evidence for energy mobilization (presumably, aggression) in the blocked subjects.

Number of blockages. Dollard *et al.* suggest that the instigation to an aggressive response can accumulate over time; that is, a person may experience frustrations A, B, and C without losing his temper, but upon encountering barrier D he explodes with a violence that could not be explained by D alone. This implies—as is obvious—that one does not necessarily respond immediately by attacking every barrier that he encounters. (Some of the relevant factors for this delay will be discussed later.) However, the tension generated does not dissipate but is maintained, and thus it intensifies a later response, perhaps to an entirely unrelated situation.

These three factors—drive intensity, completeness of interference, and number of blockages—are assumed by the Dollard group to account for variations in intensity of instigation to aggression. We have noted above the necessity of modifying this formulation somewhat by taking into account the perceived probabilities of achieving the goal or penetrating the barrier. One other modification seems essential.

The significance of arbitrariness. An important criticism (perhaps we should say clarification) of the frustration-aggression hypothesis has been offered by Pastore (1952). He has shown that people accept blockages without resentment and without any discernible signs of hostility when these blockages are perceived as reasonable in terms of the individual's value system. Thus a person may resent being scolded

¹ It may be noted that Mintz (1946) has reanalyzed the Hovland-Sears data and suggests that the true correlation is nearer $-.34$ than the figure cited. This does not contradict the argument offered, but is more plausible in that many other factors must have been operating in the South to determine lynching behavior.

for singing in an apartment-house corridor, but relax when told that there is a child seriously ill in the adjacent apartment. The barrier to his behavior now is perceived as reasonable, and the aggressive tension disappears.

It must be emphasized that what seems arbitrary is a function of the individual's values and frames of reference, which in turn will be outcomes of group norms that he has accepted. Specifically, to put this into an industrial context, those company rules which fit into established group norms will be easy to enforce and will evoke little hostility, whereas those which seem arbitrary will elicit many violations and much resentment.

Inhibition of aggression. It is apparent that a person may be angry about a certain barrier, yet does not attack it. Dollard *et al.* ascribe the inhibition of overt attacking behavior to the anticipation of punishment for such responses (cf. Fig. 6.2). Punishment may include a




Fig 6.2. Aggression displaced by fear of punishment. (From *Nancy*, by Ernie Bushmiller, reprinted by permission of the Champaign-Urbana Courier and United Features Syndicate, Inc.)

variety of experiences: physical pain; ostracism and ridicule; imprisonment; and so on. These may be legally imposed, or may stem directly from an informal group.

There are other kinds of punishments. *Loss of love* is a major negative valence. Thus a man may be frustrated by his wife but does not attack her because he wishes to retain her affection. Also, if he loves her, any injury to her would be painful to him, hence punishing. *Loss of self-respect*, with associated feelings of shame and guilt, can be punishing. So the individual whose value system rejects violence would feel guilty if he responded aggressively to a frustrating condition.

Displacement. If aggressive tensions can be bottled up and vented upon an irrelevant stimulus, as suggested above, the aggression is said to be *displaced*. Apparently it is more satisfying to attack the object which is the major source of irritation, but, if punishment makes this impractical, some other object will be found. The irrelevant object is

known as a *scapegoat*. There is some evidence that hostility toward minority groups: Jews, Negroes, Catholics, etc., is a scapegoat phenomenon.)

The complexity of this problem can be shown by a comparison of two experiments. Miller and Bugelski (1948) apparently demonstrated scapegoating—displacement of aggression onto minority groups—as follows: Some CCC camp boys were expecting to go to Bank Night at the neighborhood movie, their big event of the week. However, the experimenters knew that some long, dull tests were going to prevent this. They gave scales for attitudes toward Mexicans, Japanese, etc., to the boys early in the afternoon, and again when it was clear that they were going to be prevented from attending Bank Night. The second testing showed more prejudice than the first. Congdon (1954) tried to repeat this experiment. He had college students rate themselves, college professors, and minority groups, before doing some performance tests of mental ability. Some of the students were frustrated by removing (without their knowledge) pieces of the apparatus that were required for a solution. At the close of the experiment, they repeated the attitude scales. No changes in attitude were revealed, although it was clear that the frustrations had evoked strong emotion. The differences from the Miller and Bugelski study seem to be the following: first, the Miller-Bugelski frustration was clearly arbitrary on the part of the camp authorities, whereas most of Congdon's subjects never found out that he had prevented them from solving the problem, and so they tended to blame themselves for their failure. Second, Congdon's subjects probably perceived more clearly the complete irrelevance of the attitude scales to the experiment, and did not carry over to them the disturbance aroused by the barrier. (Higher intelligence, education, etc., are assumed to produce this difference.)

Such observations as these suggest that whether displacement will occur, and what scapegoats will be chosen, will be determined by perception. If the scapegoat is seen as similar to the frustrating agent, displacement should be fairly easy. But displacement is difficult if the proposed substitute is quite different. This is one of the difficulties with such suggestions as William James's "moral equivalent for war." Whereas an attack on natural hazards and physical barriers has some potential as an outlet for aggressive tension, it will be most difficult for some people to perceive any similarity to the individuals whom they hate and want to destroy. (Another weakness is that, if frustrations continue, this indirect release must also be continued indefinitely.)

Associated aspects of a total complex situation can serve as displace-

ments. In later pages of this chapter we indicate evidence to the effect that resentment against one aspect of a job situation can spread to induce perception of unfavorable aspects where objective evidence indicates that the situation is quite favorable.

Parent-child frustration. Space does not permit us to give a detailed evaluation of the hypothesis that much adult hostility stems from the frustrations imposed upon children by their parents. If the child perceives his father as arbitrary, dictatorial, and repressive, this may transfer in such fashion that he perceives all "father symbols," such as employers and governments, in a like manner. Lasswell (1930), has some interesting case reports on a few very aggressive individuals which fit this pattern.

Many industrial executives would like to believe that their workers are well-satisfied, and that they join unions only because a neurotically aggressive "agitator" comes along to stir them up. This view is discussed in relation to studies of union leadership (Chapter 8). We need only note here that the evidence is not favorable. Aggressive tensions cannot be manufactured. The organizer can focus tensions already present, but he cannot create new ones.

Parent-child relations undoubtedly play a major role in the development of chronically hostile, rebellious personalities. The evidence so far indicates that these individuals are relatively rare and can be used in only a limited sense to explain any of the phenomena of industrial conflict.

Resumé on instinct and environment theories. At the beginning of this chapter we noted that some psychologists still cling to an instinct theory of aggression. Our treatment clearly reveals our bias in favor of the environmentalist view. We may briefly state our reasons in the light of the facts and arguments already considered.

1. The evidence favors a view that aggression is related in a meaningful way to external events. Normal people do not simply attack others without any reason. The instinct theory would seem to imply that a need to fight builds up without regard to external frustration.

2. The main arguments favoring the instinct theory—universality, early appearance, and intractability—are equally applicable to the frustration theory. All children must be frustrated in the process of becoming socialized. All adults encounter a sizeable number of frustrations in their daily experiences.

3. A biological instinct of destructiveness (especially if considered in Freud's later version as an instinct of self-destruction) seems like a contradiction in terms. A species born with such an instinct would probably have eliminated itself long ago.

4. Positive work on the control of aggression fits better with the environmental than with the instinct theory. For example, problem children have shown marked improvement when placed in a less frustrating environment. The studies on arbitrariness indicate the importance of considering how the person perceives the barrier. (This is not decisive, since suitable goal objects for such instincts as hunger and sex depend on perception and can be extensively modified by early learning.)

Essentially, persons interested in industrial and social psychology are almost certain to prefer the environmental view because it seems more optimistic. We do not have to deal with an innate, biologically based need, but only with a response to an external situation. Thus it seems clear that ameliorative and corrective measures are feasible. But before we can consider these, we must evaluate some of the studies on frustration and dissatisfaction on the industrial scene.

FRUSTRATION AND EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES

Behavior is controlled by perception; and attitudes can be characterized as generalized ways of perceiving certain classes of situations. So, for example, when we say that a man has an unfavorable attitude toward his job, we imply that in a variety of situations he sees the job as having unpleasant, irritating, or frustrating characteristics. But is this important?

Managerial opinion holds that it is. In a survey made for the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* in May, 1947, top executives of a large number of companies were interviewed regarding worker productivity. Thirty-three, or about two-thirds, stated that worker productivity had declined below 1939-1940 standards. And of these, 29 stated that job morale, or *the workers' attitude toward their work*, was *the major factor responsible for this decline*. We must remember, of course, that it is difficult to prove unequivocally that productivity has actually declined; and executive opinion is not sufficient proof that worker attitude is the cause of whatever decline has occurred. Nevertheless, this widely held opinion is sufficient justification for a detailed study of worker attitude.

Even without this evidence, psychologists would hold that worker attitude is important. It is well-known that in general a man's attitudes predict his behavior. The Nazis who attacked the Jews verbally were the Nazis who killed them in the gas chambers. The Communist who praises the Soviet Union is the one who parades and pickets for pro-Russian causes. At the very least, therefore, we should expect

that negative worker attitudes would be a source of inefficiency; at the most, that they would be related to slowdowns, sabotage, and strikes.

Some employees show mainly negative attitudes: rejection of the work situation, attempts to get away from it, hostility to work standards and requirements. Others like their work, their company, and their union. Our purpose in the following pages is to show what evidence is now available in regard to the frustrations that are the major determinants of these favorable or hostile attitudes.

Methods of studying worker frustration. In Chapters 2 and 3 we indicate an extensive variety of attitudes. Most of them could be used in the study of frustrations, since they can be adapted to the perception of situations that elicit frustration. In practice, we now have usable data from three of them: statements of opinion, unstructured interviews, and projective devices. In the following pages we shall indicate only a few of the investigations which have used these methods, chosen in an attempt to indicate the range of major findings.

The Hawthorne studies. We have previously noted the important contribution made to industrial psychology by the studies of Western Electric employees at the company's Hawthorne plant. After the discovery that social factors played such an important role in worker motivation (see pp. 131-132), the investigators proposed and the company introduced an elaborate program of interviewing and counseling employees. Considered as a research project, this program was intended to collect information about employee desires and frustrations. As a management operation, it was expected to produce data that could be used in correcting conditions which were disturbing to the employees.

The interviews were conducted in a completely non-directive manner. If an employee is encouraged to talk about his job situation, and if he has confidence in the interviewer, he will sooner or later talk about things that are important to him. The Hawthorne interviewers wanted only to get anxieties and annoyances that were close to the surface and related to the plant situation. The workers did not always limit themselves in this way; they talked about home and family as well as jobs and supervisors.

Many satisfactions were discussed as well as many complaints. It was the latter, of course, that received most attention. Management thought that, if workers complained about ventilation, they could correct the problem and that complaint would end; but matters turned out to be not so simple. It soon became apparent that a complaint could be taken as evidence of hostility or resentment or anxiety, but that its specific content—the objective reference—might be of little importance.

Behind this overt complaint was likely to be hidden a frustration or problem which was more deeply felt but which would not or could not be clearly stated. Thus the interview analysts found that they had to interpret the complaints, looking for the hidden significance of a specific grievance. Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) sum up their new way of thinking about employee complaints as follows:

This need of differentiating the actual significance of the complaint from its manifest expression led to the first discrimination which the investigators used in studying and analyzing the interviews. This discrimination was sometimes referred to as (1) the *manifest* vs. the *latent* content of the complaint, and sometimes as (2) the *material content* vs. the *psychological form* of the complaint

Suppose a worker, B, complains that the piece rates on his job are too low. In the interview it is also revealed that his wife is in the hospital and that he is worried about the doctor's bills he has incurred. In this case the latent content of the complaint consists of the fact that B's earnings, due to his wife's illness, are insufficient to meet his current financial obligations. This source of his dissatisfaction can be expressed in many different ways, one of which is to grumble about the piece rates.¹

The problem of interpreting complaints became more complex as the interviewers gathered more and more material. It became obvious that the same complaint could have quite different meanings for different employees, and that the same kind of frustration could give rise to different complaints, depending on the situation. The interview gave presumably objective facts, but these had to be treated as indicative of the employee's way of perceiving. For example, consider the following possibilities:²

<i>Relation of A to B</i>	<i>A complains by saying</i>
A has less service than B.	Earnings are not commensurate with job.
A has more service than B.	Service is not being rewarded.
A is a man; B is a woman.	Woman's place is in the home.
A is a woman; B is a man.	Women are being discriminated against.
A has less education than B.	The company attaches too much importance to education.
A has more education than B.	Brains don't count.

¹ Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939), p. 267. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.

² Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939), pp. 262-263. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.

In each of these cases it is possible to infer some kind of frustration: economic, security, recognition. But to make this inference we have to take account of the worker's situation, the frame of reference which he brings to the plant. We do not accept the manifest content of the complaint, but look for what it signifies to the employee.

After analyzing many thousands of these interviews, the research group evolved a set of concepts and a framework for interpreting employee complaints. These involved the physical work situation, the social situation within the plant, the social situation outside the plant, and the individual's personal history (Fig. 6.3). Frustrations deriving from any of these, it was found, might be expressed in complaints on




Fig. 6.3. A scheme for interpreting complaints and reduced work effectiveness. (From Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939, Fig. 28, p. 327, reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.)

the job, or might be responsible for a reduction in efficiency as observed by the foreman. It had been implicitly assumed, at the beginning of the program, that there would be a specific relationship between a disturbing situation and a complaint, and that most of these would be allocated to physical work conditions. The final conclusions were radically different:

(1) The source of most employee complaints cannot be confined to some one single cause, and the dissatisfaction of the worker, in most cases, is the general effect of a complex situation; (2) the analysis of complex situa-

tions requires an understanding of the *nature of the equilibrium* or disequilibrium and the *nature of the interferences*; (3) the interferences which occur in industry can come from changes in the physical environment, from changes in the social environment at work, or from changes outside the immediate working environment, and the "unbalances" which issue from such interferences may be organic (changes in the blood stream) or mental (obsessive preoccupations which make it difficult to attend to work), or both; (4) therefore, to cloak industrial problems under such general categories as "fatigue," "monotony," and "supervision" is sometimes to fail to discriminate among the different kinds of interferences involved, as well as among the different kinds of disequilibrium; (5) and if the different interferences and different types of disequilibrium are not the same ill in every instance, they are not susceptible to the same kind of remedy.¹

The authors concluded with respect to the different sources of interferences represented in the diagram that the physical conditions of work and the resultant organic changes play a relatively minor part in the determination of complaints and reduced work effectiveness. Similarly, they found that psychoneurosis and factors deriving from the personal history of the worker likewise occurred rather rarely and could not be considered to constitute a significant problem. Greatest emphasis is necessarily placed upon that category of factors designated "social conditions of work"; and this means that the major determinants appear to be within the scope with which management and the union can legitimately deal. This is essentially an encouraging and optimistic finding, in that it does not call for a drastic program of training children or reorganizing our whole culture in order to deal with the major difficulties involved in worker complaints and interferences with worker efficiency.

The Western Electric studies can be interpreted as favoring the frustration-aggression hypothesis, in that they always found some latent frustration behind every complaint. They also emphasize the importance of displacement. In a large proportion of the cases the manifest content of the complaint was something not closely associated with the frustration. Finally, the studies give further support to our stress on ego motivation. It was the social situation on the job (in which pay was sometimes a factor) that was basic to most complaints.

Questionnaire studies. The unstructured interviews used at Western Electric had two major drawbacks: they were very expensive, and they were highly subjective. It is hardly surprising that efforts have been made to adapt the simple, objective, inexpensive questionnaire to studies of these problems. It is more surprising that such good results have been obtained with them.

¹ Roethlisberger and Dickson (1943), pp. 325-326. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press. Italics are added.

The questionnaire has become the most widely used method for studying worker satisfaction and frustration. Houser (1938) has presented in book form some of his extensive and intriguing studies using this method. Many other investigations have been published; some of the best are summarized by Viteles (1953).

As Houser has aptly noted in his discussion of the method, it is not enough simply to ask people if they are satisfied with a specific aspect of their jobs, or what annoys them most on the job. Many motives are unconscious; the average worker is at best not a very accurate reporter on the importance of a given satisfaction or frustration. The best method, he asserts, is to administer a large number of questions, score these for satisfaction, and so divide the workers into a relatively well-satisfied and a dissatisfied group. The differences between these two groups on specific items will then indicate the relative importance of the items.

He illustrates this approach with an ingenious analogy. Suppose that we ask retail storekeepers two questions: Do you keep an exact inventory control? And, do you keep your store clean and neat at all times? We might find that 56% answer yes to the first and 93% yes to the second. But, if we classify these stores into two groups, those making a profit and those not making a profit, we get this:

	<i>Profitable</i>	<i>Unprofitable</i>
Exact inventory control	87%	15%
Good housekeeping	95	91

Clearly, in such a comparison, inventory control "makes a difference"—that is, we immediately judge that it is contributing something to the

Table 6.1 Significance of Specific Job Aspects for Job Satisfaction*

	<i>Rank in Importance</i>	<i>Per Cent Dissatisfied</i>
Knowing whether work is improving	1	13
Fairness of promotional practice	2	78
Encouragement to offer new ideas and try out better methods	3	66
Understanding of difficulties of job by superiors	4	84
Sufficient help to get results expected	5	21
Grievances—assurance of fair hearing and square deal	6	27
Freedom to seek advice in new problems	7	54
Invitation to offer suggestions when new plans are being considered	8	61
Being given reasons for changes ordered in work	9	51
Assurance of pay increases when deserved	10	59

* From Houser (1938), p. 68. Reprinted by permission of McGraw-Hill Book Co.

profit status of the store. Housekeeping obviously is not helpful information in deciding why stores are in one class or the other.

This is the basis for Houser's procedure, which has become standard in this kind of research. So in Table 6.1, we show the results of one of his studies. If we simply took the largest number of dissatisfied answers, "Understanding of difficulties of job by superiors" would seem to be the most important item. But in terms of distinguishing the generally satisfied from the generally dissatisfied workers, it is in fourth place. Frustration of the desire for recognition (Knowing whether work is improving) is the best item for identifying which workers are dissatisfied in an over-all sense.

It will be noted that financial frustration (Assurance of pay increases when deserved) ranks tenth on the list. This does not mean, of course, that employees do not want pay increases. It does mean that employees, in certain circumstances, are more disturbed about ego satisfactions than about economic satisfactions. Houser follows the same line of reasoning that we have sketched in the two preceding chapters and points to the gross overestimation of the importance of pay by executives. He headlines one of his chapters, "Profit Motive or Ego?" He considers poor employee attitudes to be far more often a consequence of ego frustrations than of economic frustrations.

Importance of economic conditions. Houser's findings as to the greater significance of ego frustrations has been confirmed in many other investigations. It must be noted, however, that changing economic conditions may intensify economic barriers and thus push economic aspects of the job into prominence. Stagner, Rich, and Britton (1941) took questions similar to Houser's and presented them in rigid interview form to machine tool workers. The significance of items was determined by splitting the group into those generally satisfied and those generally dissatisfied. The rank of the items in Table 6.2 is based on the success with which each item differentiated these two groups. It will be noted that "Do you feel the factory could afford to pay more?" (and presumably should) is now in first place, whereas in many studies it has appeared far down the list. Houser (1938) remarks that this question, in one of his studies, received 93% answers, implying dissatisfaction with pay, but ranked *fifty-third* in significance. What could explain its appearance in first place in Table 6.2? The authors suggest that it was the pressure of inflation which made the difference. At the time of the interviews (winter 1940-1941) prices had already started climbing, but wages had not followed suit. The workers were in fact feeling economic frustration, and this showed up in the interview study.

Table 6.2 Importance of Job Satisfaction Factors among Machine Tool Workers*

Question†	Critical Ratio between High-Satisfaction Group and Low-Satisfaction Group	
	"Satisfied" Answer	
Do you feel the factory could afford to pay more?	no	6.92
Do you like the kind of work you do on your job?	yes	5.86
Do you get as much enjoyment from your work as from your spare time?	yes	5.77
Are you told when you are doing a good job?	yes	4.47
Do you feel allowed to offer suggestions as to methods of improvement?	yes	3.83
Do you believe that the bosses and supervisors are always fair to you?	yes	3.76
Do you think you could do better if given a chance at another job?	no	3.48
When you make a mistake in your work, do you always get a square deal from those deciding the case?	yes	3.48
Do you feel that your present hours are too long?	no	3.30
Do you feel sure of your job as long as you do good work?	yes	3.13
Would you rather be sure of steady work at your present job than have the responsibility of being a boss?	yes	2.28
Do you think it makes a difference to the company that you're on the job?	yes	1.99

* From Stagner, Rich, and Britton (1941). Reprinted by permission of the *Personnel Journal*.

† Ranked in order of importance (size of difference between high-satisfaction and low-satisfaction workers.)

✓ Importance of union-management relations. To illustrate once more the importance of relating these job-satisfaction studies to a concrete context, let us consider the data on railroad workers reported by Stagner, Flebbe, and Wood (1952). In this case mimeographed questionnaires were presented to workers in groups, with the endorsement of both management and union. High- and low-satisfaction groups were determined, and the questions were ranked for significance. The highest nine items are shown in Table 6.3. In this case the first two questions relate to union-management problems. This might have

been influenced to some extent by the fact that the interviewer had been introduced by speakers representing the company and one of the unions. More important, in the opinion of the authors, was an increasing state of tension involving especially conductors, trainmen, and yardmen, which led to a strike only a few months after the study was made.

Similarities across employee groups. Finally, let us note that this technique seems to be successful in identifying frustrations that are common to a wide variety of employee groups. One might hypothesize that company policies which lead to frustrations—especially ego frustrations—may very well affect almost everyone except top executives in

Table 6.3 Importance of Job Satisfaction Factors among Railroad Workers*

Question	Answer	High-Satisfaction Group	Low-Satisfaction Group
What do you think of the union-management relations on this railroad?	Getting better	86%	18%
How well do you feel that grievances are taken care of on this railroad?	Very well or all right	72	10
Generally speaking, what do you think of the supervision on this railroad?	Getting better	84	26
What do you think of the working conditions on this railroad?	Getting better	88	36
Would you take a job with another company at the same pay you are now getting on this railroad?	Definitely not	76	30
How do you feel about a fellow employee who wins a suggestion award?	Proud of him	84	38
The railroads are very safety minded. How do you feel about the safety conditions on your job?	Excellent or above average	70	26
This company publishes an "Annual Report to Employees." How do you feel about the accuracy of the information in it?	Always true	44	2
Who is the highest officer (of the company) you have met or talked with? What kind of impression did he make on you?	Favorable impression	90	54

* From Stagner, Flebbe, and Wood (1952), p. 298. Reprinted by permission of *Personnel Psychology*.

Table 6.4 Similarity of Items Significant of Frustrations of Various Groups in the Same Company*

<i>Rank in 10 Items</i>			<i>Item</i>	<i>Rank in 23 Items†</i>		
<i>Execs.</i>	<i>Sales</i>	<i>Non-Sales</i>		<i>Execs.</i>	<i>Sales</i>	<i>Non-Sales</i>
6	2	4	a. Assurance that promotion will go to the best-qualified person in the organization.	8	2	4
1	1	1	b. Knowing whether your work is improving or not.	1	1	1
7	6	5	c. Being given adequate information about plans and policies which influence your work.	9	10	6
9	5	9	d. Assurance of pay increases when deserved.	18	9	13
2	4	3	e. Having opportunity for fair treatment when bringing to your superior the things you do not like about the job.	2	5	3
5	8	6	f. Not receiving adequate authority to get your subordinates to do what you want them to do.	6	15	8
4	7	8	g. Not receiving conflicting orders from your superiors.	4	12	10
3	3	2	h. Having a fair opportunity to offer suggestions about your job.	3	3	2
10	10	10	i. Getting the same pay as that for other positions in the organization of equal importance and responsibility.	21	22	19
8	9	7	j. Not having your work interfered with by a superior officer in the organization.	17	16	9

* From Houser (1938), p. 83, by permission of McGraw-Hill Book Co. Questions have been rephrased to indicate more clearly the nature of the frustration, using others of Houser's tables as guides.

† The total questionnaire included 23 items. Rank is based on size of difference between highly satisfied and dissatisfied persons in each category.

an organization. One of Houser's studies seems to verify this expectation. Table 6.4 shows the top-ranking items in a study of "a large commercial organization." It suggests that certain policies and practices are characteristic of the company, presumably starting with the president of the company and being repeated at successively lower ranks. Out of 23 items in the original questionnaire, "Knowing whether work is improving or not" was the most diagnostic item *for all three groups: executives, selling employees, and non-selling employees*. This type of practice is readily imitated by successive levels of supervision; if the practice at the top is to give no praise or commendation for a good job, this practice will soon spread to all supervisors. Similarly, the encouragement of suggestions (self-expression) is readily spread through any organization; in the firm studied by Houser, it would appear that policy, intentionally or not, frustrated this desire at all levels. On the other hand, payment policy had apparently been handled fairly well; these items were near the bottom for all groups.

The similarity in response of these three groups can be related to the findings on "attitudinal climate" to be presented later (p. 398). In a given company, reports of conflict and cooperation are found to vary similarly at different levels in the organization. Houser's data indicate that job frustrations may be related to similar factors at differing levels. Apparently motives and perceptions operate in comparable ways for all these people. As Houser puts it, "All are urged by the same needs for certainty and for initiative at their own levels; all resent unreasonable curbs" (p. 84).

Houser, like most other students of this problem, finds that in different organizations the ranking of items is different. If a company has steady production, job security is not a touchy issue. Installation of job evaluation plans is reported to have changed the ranking of items relating to fair pay compared to other jobs in the plant, and so on. Thus, we cannot interpret the results of this technique as showing the generalized importance of motives. In this kind of research we are studying *the effects of specific frustrations* which are a part of a particular company organization and structure, at a particular point in the business cycle, and we must expect the results to change as one frustration is removed and another takes its place in the center of employees' attention.

The theoretical significance of these investigations lies particularly in the concept of displacement, although it should perhaps be called a distortion of perception. The man who is angry about an important issue is assumed to see many other frustrations around him; he finds a lot of things to complain about, and so falls into the dissatisfied group.

On the other hand, a man who experiences a minor frustration displaces very little hostility onto other topics, and so he falls into the satisfied category.

Strong evidence for the displacement of annoyance onto topics for which there is no "realistic" justification is provided in a study by Grove and Kerr (1951). They compared job satisfaction data for two groups of girls: one, in the office of a bankrupt firm where the jobs were of a clean-up nature and were known to be limited to a few months; the other, in a nearby continuing firm. The bankrupt office was physically more pleasant, pay was higher, etc. Yet the girls' satisfaction scores were much lower than in the other office; furthermore, they complained even about pay and physical conditions, which were objectively superior. Because of their insecurity and general disturbance (some of them had been with the bankrupt company for several years), they displaced their discontent onto every feature of the situation.

Need intensity and goal probability. At the beginning of this chapter we indicated that the amount of aggression likely to result from a given frustration is a function of two main variables: need intensity and goal probability. Two studies have used theoretical formulations essentially similar to this. Morse (1954) has stated her conceptualization in terms of strength of need and "environmental return" (goal achievement or frustration). Schaffer (1953) used a more elaborate method for estimating strength of need and covered a wider range of motives, but his study resembles that of Morse in general conception.¹

Morse's study of white-collar workers. Morse (1954) reports on an excellent study of job satisfaction among white-collar workers, organized around the theoretical framework suggested above. She obtained estimates from the employees of the strength of need for promotion (how important it was to move up in the organization) and also of the perceived probabilities that promotion would be forthcoming (how good was the chance of promotion). Satisfaction should be high when the need is strong and perceived probabilities are high; with decreasing strength of motivation, variation in satisfaction should decrease.

Table 6.5 shows how well the first prediction is borne out. Employees whose need and perceived opportunity are both high have nearly maximum satisfaction (maximum was 5); within the group, all

¹ Comparable to these is the formulation by Rosen and Rosen (1955) on the satisfaction of union members with their union. That member was most likely to be satisfied whose perceptions of what his union was doing coincided with his norms of what his union should do.

of whom rate their motivation in the highest category, satisfaction declines rapidly as the *perceived chances* of promotion decline, the group with "no chance" having almost the minimum possible rating on satisfaction.

Other data by Morse in general confirm the frustration hypothesis. Two points deserve particular mention: (1) Those employees with low-level motivation were generally mildly satisfied or neutral. This seems to mean that some fairly strong motivation is essential if the person is to respond to frustrations in any way. (2) For those workers with high-level motivation, satisfaction scores were lower at every level of probable goal achievement, than for those with moderate need.

Table 6.5 Job Satisfaction Related to Strength of Need and Perceived Opportunity for Promotion*

<i>Reported Need</i>	<i>Perceived Opportunity</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Mean Satisfaction</i>
Very important	Very good	37	4.24
Very important	Fairly good	102	3.61
Very important	Some chance	136	2.88
Very important	Little chance	174	1.84
Very important	No chance	80	1.35

* Data from a study of 742 white-collar workers (Morse, 1954, p. 36.) Reprinted by permission of the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan.

We interpret this to mean that, when need is strong, even a rather favorable environment may be frustrating, because gratifications are not immediately forthcoming. These two points fit also with the well-established finding in animal psychology that efficient performance goes with a moderate degree of motivation. Either very weak or very strong motives interfere with coordinated performance.

Satisfaction of specific needs. An extension of this formulation of the problem is found in a study by Schaffer (1953) of a more analytical type. Schaffer proposed to study the strength of a variety of needs and relate job satisfaction to the perceived opportunities to satisfy some of these needs. It would follow from the formulation already given that frustration of an intense need would have a greater effect (reducing job satisfaction) than frustration of a weak need. It should be possible to predict relative job satisfaction more accurately, then, by using the individual's strongest needs than by using all his needs.

According to his hypothesis, the correlation of specific need satisfaction with over-all job satisfaction should be highest for the need

Table 6.6 Correlation of Specific Need Satisfaction with Over-All Satisfaction*

<i>Rank of Need (Relative Strength)</i>	<i>Pearson Correlation of Need Satisfaction with Over-All Satisfaction</i>
1	.54†
2	.47†
3	.36‡
4	.18
5	.21
1 plus 2	.58†
1 plus 2 plus 3	.57†
1, 2, 3, and 4	.51†
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5	.49†

* From Schaffer (1953), pp. 16-17. Reprinted by permission of the American Psychological Association.

† Significant at .001 level.

‡ Significant at .01 level.

which, *in this person*, had ranked highest. To test this, he selected for each subject the highest-ranking need and correlated relative satisfaction of that need with over-all satisfaction. As can be seen from Table 6.6, the prediction is confirmed. The single correlation based on the need of rank 1 was higher than that for any other need and was almost as high as the multiple correlation based on the top two and top three needs. It is particularly interesting that, as more needs are brought into the pooled correlation, the predictive value rapidly declines. Apparently, at a given point in time, only a small number of motives are significant factors in determining satisfaction or frustration. (As was noted in Chapters 4 and 5, a change in situational context may decidedly alter the ranking of specific needs.)

The problem of generalized frustration. One serious limitation affects the interpretation of data, gathered by the methods that we have described, which involves comparisons of relatively satisfied and dissatisfied workers. This limitation lies precisely in the fact that we are relying on comparisons within the group. Any pressing frustration that affects everyone in the group studied will automatically disappear from view by such methods of analysis.

The method of intragroup comparisons is excellent from the point of view of pin-pointing for management certain sore spots to which attention should be given. Thus, if a job satisfaction survey indicates that the most effective frustration (in lowering job satisfaction) is bad

human relations tactics by foremen, the curative methods can be identified quickly—selection, training and reward based on human relations criteria. If, on the other hand, inequities in pay are at the top of the list, job evaluation may be the most useful tool in the manager's kit.

The method of intragroup comparisons does not allow for the effects of frustrations that affect all members of the group. Thus, if *everyone* were dissatisfied about pay rates, the method would not reveal this item as very important.

One way of approaching this problem, when we reach agreement on a good instrument for estimating job satisfaction in any job, is to accumulate normative data on satisfactions in all kinds of economic situations. The deviation of an entire group from this norm will then be a danger signal. At present it appears that 65% to 75% of workers in a given job report themselves to be "reasonably or well-satisfied." We may well speculate that lower percentages lead to open violence or such conflict that changes are brought about to improve the situation. Similarly, the average worker, if presented with a list of 20 to 30 items covering his pay, working conditions, supervision, and such topics, will say he is satisfied with more than half. Again it seems likely that he will leave the job if his satisfaction level falls below some threshold value.

This logic is involved in the assumption that absenteeism and turn-over reflect job satisfaction. But these overt indices of behavioral dissatisfaction fail when economic conditions change. If there are no jobs to be had, the discontented worker does not quit. He stays—and perhaps causes trouble to his employer, his fellows, and himself. Knowles (1952) has commented that, among the British coal miners, absenteeism goes up in years without strikes, and down in years with strikes. He suggests that the worker needs some time off and takes it one way or another. A sounder interpretation might be that, in years with strikes, his economic need is greater and he cannot afford the luxury of staying off the job. In either event, we must recognize the role of the larger economic context in determining the expression of the aggressions deriving from frustration.

Satisfaction of coal miners. The coal miner is a good illustration of the problems that we have raised here. All over the world, from Poland to Australia, coal miners are reputed to have very militant unions. Kelly and Harrell (1949) studied job satisfaction in a group of coal miners and found their over-all satisfaction to be very low. Yet, by and large, they considered management to be fair (70% agreed), and wages were high enough (65% agreed). Probing indicated that

their almost unanimous hostility to mining as an occupation stemmed from feelings about the unhealthy and unsafe conditions under which they worked.

In earlier chapters we have stressed the basic role of biogenic needs in determining motivation. This finding would seem in harmony with that emphasis. A job that involves considerable physical danger may not be satisfying even though it pays high wages, has lots of fringe benefits, and does not involve many of the ego frustrations mentioned in the foregoing pages. The coal miner may answer favorably 19 out of 20 questions about satisfaction, yet his negative answer based on health and safety hazards may outweigh all the others. And the potency of these biological frustrations may account for the violence and stubbornness which seem to be characteristic of industrial conflict in the mines all over the world.

Maintenance of ego status. Physical danger is not the only frustration that can overrule all the positive valences in a given situation. We have called attention to the importance of a rather vaguely defined goal which was named "maintenance of the self-image" or ego status. If either a single blockage or an accumulation of blockages threatens this picture that the individual has of himself, he is likely to quit the job as a protective action. Conversely, even if he is well-satisfied, he may leave to get another position which enhances his ego.

We are interested only in pointing out that the various "segmental" motives, such as money, security, prestige, and so on, provide us with information about the probable behavior of the individual; but beyond these segmental needs there is also something pertaining to the person-as-a-whole. This need we can best describe as maintaining and enhancing the perceived position of the self.

Too many writers on industrial psychology treat these segmental needs as if they were electric batteries, such that the employer can plug in on one or another to get an increased output of energy. Things are not so simple. When dealing with groups, of course, it is reasonably safe to assume that these segmental goals are effective; but, when you try to work with John Jones, you must consider the situation as he perceives it, including both the specific goals and his perceived ego status.

This consideration need not lead to abandonment of the equilibrium or homeostatic theory of motivation. All that we are now asserting is that, once a favorable ego status is achieved, the preservation of this equilibrium will take precedence over most of the segmental needs. Many specific frustrations may have little effect on an individual; but, if one frustration or the sum of them is perceived as a threat to the

ego, then dramatic mobilization of energy occurs. The amount of aggression is much greater than could have been predicted from the magnitudes of the separate frustrations.

IMPLICATIONS OF JOB SATISFACTION

We have seen that executives are concerned about worker satisfaction, and that some companies have gone to a great deal of trouble and expense to get unbiased estimates of their employees' attitudes toward job and employer. We must now ask whether this information helps in the prediction of behavior. In brief, is job satisfaction an important aspect of the industrial relations picture?

Job satisfaction and productivity. We introduced the study of job satisfaction and frustration by pointing out that executives believe that a decline in worker productivity, dependent on poor attitude, has occurred since World War II. Let us now turn to an examination of the thesis implied in the executives' complaints: Are satisfied workers more productive than workers low in satisfaction?

We first have to qualify our answer by noting that, in extreme cases, the answer must be affirmative. Workers who are so dissatisfied that they quit, or go on strike, are clearly unproductive. But, if we exclude such extreme attitudes, we have the great mass of employees who stay on the job. Their gross satisfaction scores range from nearly perfect reports (absence of frustration) to nearly zero satisfaction (everything about the job seems frustrating). Can we establish any relationship to productivity within this range?

Surprisingly enough, the answer seems to be that the relationship is slight and undependable. In May, 1947, the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* reported on a study in a plant where individual productivity records were available. Table 6.7 shows that there is only a modest tendency for attitude to be related to productivity. Of the workers who are medium or low in satisfaction, only 8% more fall in the lower half of productivity than fall in the upper half.

Table 6.7 Job Satisfaction and Worker Productivity*

	High Job Satisfaction	Medium and Low Job Satisfaction
Workers in upper half of force on productive efficiency	82%	18%
Workers in lower half on productive efficiency	74	26

* From *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, May, 1947, p. 33. By permission of Opinion Research Corporation.

This finding is supported by Gadel and Kriedt (1952), studying IBM operators, and Cicirelli (1954) studying women employees in an electrical appliance factory. On the other hand, Neel (1952) found a significant tendency for workers in a heavy industry to produce more if they were satisfied. A tentative conclusion is that job satisfaction favors higher productivity, but not by as large a margin as might have been expected. Further research is needed to identify the conditions under which the effect of attitude on production is greatest.

Absenteeism and turnover. It has often been assumed that employee attitude is particularly effective in determining both absenteeism and, if attitudes are intense, turnover in the form of quits. Some investigations lend support to this view. Giese and Ruter (1949), for example, gave job satisfaction questionnaires to most of the employees in a large factory. They computed mean satisfaction scores by departments and correlated these scores with other departmental indices, such as percentage of absenteeism, percentage of turnover, estimates of error efficiency, tardiness, and so on. They found that the best prediction of departmental satisfaction score was given by the following beta weights derived from a regression equation:

- .4894 (per cent absent)
- .4348 (per cent turnover)
- .1674 (error efficiency not affecting customers)
- .1227 (error efficiency affecting customers)
- .0758 (per cent tardiness)
- .0630 (per cent productive efficiency)

These figures mean that departmental absenteeism and turnover records correlated well with mean satisfaction, whereas tardiness and productive efficiency correlated about zero with satisfaction.

Other studies contradict these findings. For example, Kerr, Kopelmeier, and Sullivan (1951) found that the correlation between departmental mean score on job satisfaction and turnover was only $-.13$, much too small to be of significance (but in the expected direction). However, the correlation of satisfaction with absenteeism was $+.51$, which indicates a significant tendency for departments high in satisfaction to be *high* in absenteeism. The authors were presumably disturbed by this, for they broke down absenteeism into several components and were pleased to find that *unexcused* absences correlated $-.44$ with mean satisfaction. This latter finding, however, may only indicate that foremen who were easygoing about excuses were also easy on other matters; the relation to satisfaction, then, is at best unclear. Cicirelli (1954) correlated job satisfaction scores by individual employees with their absence records over the previous 6

months and found no significant relationship. His data did not distinguish excused from unexcused absences.

Workers' perceptions of management efficiency. It is common enough to hear of managers complaining regarding worker inefficiency, but few people have been interested to ask the opposite question. Noland (1945) tested the hypothesis that workers in a war industry would show higher absenteeism if their attitudes toward management and their jobs were unfavorable. He tested 383 production workers anonymously, asking them not only about absences but also about job satisfaction, attitude toward foreman, attitude toward top management, and so on. Although job satisfaction gave the highest correlations with absenteeism, a belief that management was not doing an efficient job was almost as highly correlated. Noland interpreted this as indicating that, if workers see management doing a poor job, they feel that they might as well take it easy too.

Breakage of machinery. Many observers have reported that disgruntled workers may jam or even damage machinery as a means of relieving pressure or even as an expression of annoyance. Mathewson (1931) relates the following incident:

Don went to work in a can-manufacturing plant When he approached his new job he saw a pile of cans on the floor, and more cans from a conveyor being added to this pile at the rate of 80 a minute. He was instructed to pack these cans into cartons, seal the cartons and truck them away. The plant ran nine hours, and Don decided at once that no one person could pack all those cans at the speed they were piling up, much less seal and truck the cartons away . . .

Don said the line formerly produced cans at the rate of 60 instead of 80 a minute, but that a "cheese engineer" had recently made some changes and speeded it up $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent. Don discovered that it was common practice for any worker who wanted to stop the line to put a can in crookedly, or even to throw in a piece of scrap tin to jam the works. Before long, whenever Don felt that the pile of cans was getting ahead of his packing, he would leave his place and go up the line to the machinery, throw in a piece of scrap tin and get relief from the pressure of trying to pack 80 cans a minute. The girl operators and other workers on the line seemed to feel that the stoppages were justified, as an offset to the "cheese engineer's" work in speeding up.¹

In the foregoing example the workers were not unionized; however, organized employees can do an even more effective job of expressing their resentment and hostility in this manner. Whyte (1951a) interviewed workers in the Inland Steel Container Company, where a long period of bitter conflict was finally replaced by relatively peaceful

¹ Mathewson (1931), pp. 21-22.

relations. Referring to this time of conflict, he says, "The men now freely say that they were cheating as they broke down machines and held up production. *They felt that this cheating was justified because they felt that management had cheated them.* The main purpose was to get back at management, and anything that enabled them to do this was justified."¹

Political attitudes. The individual may not damage machinery or attack the employer directly. He may, however, adopt political attitudes which are hostile to business interests; he may, for example, endorse punitive policies directed by government against industry, even though these policies have no plausible relation to the plight of the individual.

As an example, let us consider some material collected by Kornhauser (1938). He classified people of different economic levels according to whether they were personally satisfied with their situation and with their children's opportunities. He then asked them questions about various policies such as government ownership of industry. The results for this particular question are shown in Table 6.8.

The proportion in each group favoring government ownership of industry increases as we go down the income scale. This is to be expected; the upper income groups feel that they have more to lose

Table 6.8 Dissatisfaction and Approval of Government Ownership of Industry*

Question		Per Cent Favoring Government Ownership		
		Income Groups		
		Upper	Middle	Lower
Children's opportunity	Satisfied	7%	9%	23%
	Dissatisfied	24	31	38
Pay	Satisfied	8	12	26
	Dissatisfied	27	26	42
Treatment by employer	Satisfied	10	14	30
	Dissatisfied	(100)†	38	48
Job security	Satisfied	7	14	20
	Dissatisfied	26	22	44
Opportunity to enjoy life	Satisfied	5	11	24
	Dissatisfied	33	28	39

* Modified from *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1938), 2, p. 266. Reprinted by permission.

† Too few cases to be taken seriously.

¹ Whyte (1951a), p. 212. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

by government ownership, both in relation to profits and in relation to ego satisfaction (power and freedom of action). What is more interesting is that in every case, without exception, a larger portion of the group which is *dissatisfied* on the question asked (about children's opportunities, about job security, etc.) favors government ownership than the portion of the group which is satisfied. Most of these differences are statistically significant.

Similarly, a poll by the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* (May, 1947) asked workers, "In industries where there is competition, do you think companies should be allowed to make all they can, or should the government put a limit on the profits companies can make?" When these respondents were classified according to job satisfaction, the percentages endorsing government ceilings on profits ran as follows: highly satisfied, 28%; medium satisfaction, 34%; low satisfaction, 51%.

It seems likely that these attitudes of dissatisfied individuals stem from their feelings of aggression against business. The man who is frustrated by job insecurity, by low pay, or by apparent lack of opportunity tends to build up aggressive tension. In some cases this is drained off into hostility toward minority groups or other irrelevant objects (displacement). In most cases it appears that business is perceived as the frustrating agent, and that government ownership is a way of "getting even" for these perceived abuses, even though this may not lead to any positive gain for the individual.

Attitudes toward unions. It seems reasonable to suppose that feelings of frustration on the job predispose the worker to favor unionization. It is difficult to test this hypothesis with factory workers, since such a large proportion is already organized. Among white-collar workers, however, only a small minority are in unions. The following figures from the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* (February, 1953) will therefore be relevant to this question: "In general, do you favor white-collar workers joining unions, or do you think it's better if they stay out of unions?"

<i>White-Collar Workers Showing:</i>	<i>Favor Unions</i>
High satisfaction	26%
Medium satisfaction	43
Low satisfaction	61

These figures indicate that, among unorganized workers, job satisfaction is probably an important determinant of readiness to join a union. As will be seen in later chapters, it is not necessarily important in determining devotion to the union and hostility to the company,

after a worker has become settled in the union. But in the early stages, or before joining, the relationship is clear. It apparently depends on the fact that the union is often perceived as a technique for expressing aggression against management.

The union as a punitive agency. It is appropriate to note that the union has as one of its major roles the venting of hostility toward management. Houser makes this point and characteristically ties it in with his emphasis on ego motivation:

It is an insult to human nature to believe that men would go into picket lines and endanger their lives in bloody violence for the mere wage increases or shorter hours which unions demand. Behind every blow in every strike are days and months and years of hurt feelings over acts emphasizing men's insignificance and enforced inferiority, accumulated into a resentment which is bitter and strong because it expresses the very will to live: a resentment which will drive men to almost any limits, either in the hope of realizing some measure of relief from petty tyranny, or to gain significance as part of a group gesture of punishment.¹

This view leads logically to the interpretation of economic demands as punitive rather than as expressions of positive motivations. It also ties in with our discussion of displacement; since the worker may only vaguely understand his own frustrations, or may be unable to attack top executives directly, he may vent his aggression on non-strikers, on the police whom he perceives as aiding management, or on throwing bricks through factory windows.

These three kinds of behavior—interference with production, political expression of hostility, and union policies as punishments of the employer—are enough to suggest that employee attitudes are important. The elimination of needless job frustrations, then, may benefit the employer in many ways, entirely aside from the greater happiness it brings to the employee.

Occupational neurosis. Job satisfaction may have other implications of importance to the worker or to society. One of them is as a possible causal factor in neuroses of occupational origin. The study of this problem has scarcely begun, but it seems possible that job satisfaction will prove to be an important consideration. This opinion is stated by Halliday (1948) on the basis of his work with coal miners drawing sickness compensation because of neurotic breakdowns, and it is supported by data collected by McMurry (1932) and by Fraser (1947). The latter study was particularly careful in that

¹ From Houser (1938), pp. 79–80. Reprinted by permission of McGraw-Hill Book Co.

each worker had both a physical and a psychiatric examination by a practising physician, and in that a wide range of jobs was included. Its weakest point is the assessment of job satisfaction. However, the results given in Table 6.9 show clearly that the employee's feeling

Table 6.9 Relation of Neurotic Illness and Physical Illness to Job Attitude and Wage Rate*

No. of cases	Factor Attitude to Job	Men	
		Neurotic Illnesses	Physical Illnesses
861	Like the job	24.6%	46.2%
392	Neutral	29.1	49.4
193	Dislike, boring	43.0	55.7
	<i>Weekly Wage†</i>		
152	Low	23.9	58.1
196	Below average	27.4	48.6
534	Average	27.7	45.2
362	Above average	29.9	42.2

about his job is related to the incidence of neurotic disturbance, whereas weekly wage is not. By contrast, wage is more closely related to the incidence of physical illness, with low-paid workers showing more; for neurotic illness, the trend actually is for higher paid workers to have more, but the difference is slight.

It would be premature to say that continuing job frustrations induced the neurotic disturbance; the association, none the less, is marked enough to show the importance of further research in this area.

FRUSTRATION WITHIN THE UNION

Since so many production workers are now in unions, it is appropriate to speak briefly of possible frustrations the employee may encounter in his union role. Relatively little tangible data have been collected on this topic, and therefore the following comments are mostly in the nature of questions for further exploration.

* Data from Fraser, R. Incidence of neurosis among factory workers. *Industrial Health Research Board (London) Report 90*, 1947, by permission of H. M. Stationery Office.

† The wage groups are: Low, £5 or less per week; below average, £5-£6; average, £6-£8; above average, above £8. Percentages should be compared within columns; i.e., of the men who liked their jobs, 24.6% were diagnosed as having neurotic illness, whereas among those disliking the job, 43% were so diagnosed.

A worker may join a union because he is mad at the boss, because he hopes to get a pay increase, or for additional security. He may join because a union-shop contract requires him to or because his fellow-workers put on so much pressure that he gives in and joins. Whatever the motive, once he is in the union, his other needs become relevant, just as they do on the job.

Economic frustrations would not be likely to show up in a study of unionists, with possible exceptions such as complaints about high dues. The studies that have been made so far (Rose, 1950; Rosen and Rosen, 1955; Davis and St. Germain, 1952) indicate few complaints on this score. Research in more expensive unions, such as the typographicals, might reveal more problems of this type.

Ego frustrations, on the other hand, are fairly common. Rosen and Rosen report data suggesting that business agents are often perceived as taking over functions that properly belong to the rank-and-file members (Fig. 6.4). Developing hostility and "revolts" against union leadership are not unusual. In the smaller locals it is fairly easy to express this aggression by voting the rascals out. In large locals and in international unions such tensions must build up over considerable time, and usually have to become channeled in a political machine, before the attack on the leaders has much chance of success.

Ego frustrations also derive from factionalism within the union. One group may perceive another as controlling the union, getting preferred treatment on grievances, slanting contract negotiations to benefit their jobs more, and so on. This situation, if not handled skillfully, leads to splitting of the local and probable affiliation with a rival international. We have more to say on this later.

The problems of frustration and aggression within unions are important. They represent a promising area for future research.

FRUSTRATIONS OF EXECUTIVES

Few studies have likewise been made of frustration at the executive level. We have cited the data gathered by Houser (1938) in his demonstration that company policies may operate to frustrate people at all levels in the organization (Table 6.4). Cherington and Bergen (1941) reach a somewhat similar conclusion, in the sense that they stress frustrations resembling those brought out in the rank-and-file studies already mentioned. They asked 51 senior executives to fill out anonymously a questionnaire form about satisfaction with various aspects of their jobs, and they found that dissatisfaction with recognition, promotion policies, comparative pay, and similar items was wide-

spread. Since they did not use the technique of comparing high and low groups, we cannot evaluate the significance of specific items; their conclusions stress ego satisfactions as important to these executives.

The projective test data reported by Henry (1949) and discussed also by Gardner (1948) do not lend themselves to any clear-cut interpretation of perceived barriers to the executives. However, it is noted that a "pervasive fear of failure" runs through the records. This is not acute anxiety, but it does tie in with the desire for achievement. The successful executive wants to be making decisions, accomplishing





Fig. 6.4. Union members' satisfactions with employer and with union. (From Rosen and Hudson, 1952, Chart 1, p. 74, by permission of *Current Economic Comment*.)

things, building his organization; as Gardner comments, "any inability to do so successfully may well result in feelings of frustration."

Development of special projective devices for the purpose of studying aggressive reactions to common frustrations in industry is illustrated by Fig. 6.5. Preliminary results with such materials indicate



(a) "Go ahead and strike"

(b) "Let's check the facts first."

(c) "We will lose our customers if we slow down — then, no jobs."

Fig. 6.5. A structured projective device for studying aggression in industrial situations.

consistent differences between executives and union officials, but more extensive studies will be required to establish any useful generalizations. Experiments are also in progress using photographs and drawings as stimuli. When these have been correlated with data from the actual union-management situation (cf. Chapter 12), we should know a great deal more about aggression among executives than we do today.

Competitors as frustrations. In the absence of special psychological instruments, we can draw some conclusions from everyday observation of the executive's situation. It is clear that one major source of

frustration to the executive derives from his competitors. Lost sales, a decreased share of the market, new processes and styles developed by the competition—any of these may involve a keen blow to the executive ego. It is not clear whether such frustrations lead to any identifiable hostility. All the extra energy mobilized may be channeled into competitive strivings.

Subordinates as frustrations. Another major source of executive frustration arises from his subordinates. This takes two common forms. One is the ego assertiveness of the subordinate, which may be strong enough to induce him to question top executive decisions (this is apparently rare, but it is said to happen occasionally). To a top officer, whose image of the ideal organization is one in which his decision is instantaneously and unquestioningly executed, this can be very frustrating. Another frustration is found in lack of understanding or competence in subordinates. Since the executive may be either more intelligent or better informed than his staff (cf. p. 245), what is perfectly simple to him may not be to them. If he does not know how to communicate effectively, he may feel blocked by their failure to implement his plans.

Aggression toward subordinates is, of course, a common industrial manifestation. McMurry (1944) gives considerable space to this phenomenon. Such aggression may be "realistic," i.e., related to the behavior of the subordinate; or it may be irrational, i.e., displaced from some other frustration. Middle-level executives are often browbeaten from above and vent their anger on those below.

The occurrence of displaced aggression may also be accompanied by the rationalization that the subordinate is really to blame for something when this is unjustified. It is often "face-saving" for the foreman to blame his workers for an error which really grew out of his own inadequate instructions; and this also happens fairly often at higher levels.

The union as frustration. Finally, it should be noted that the union constitutes a major frustration for many executives. The executive has been accustomed to issuing orders based on his perception of a situation. This perception has included assigning workers to jobs, determining pay rates and work loads, laying off workers when orders are down, disciplining employees for violations of his rules, and so on. Each of these activities is motivated, some of them very powerfully so. When the union enforces demands for seniority in layoffs and transfers, limits arbitrary discharges, opposes faster work paces, and exacts higher wage rates, the manager is bound to be frustrated and his hostility level in many cases is high. As one executive said in an inter-

view in the Illini City study: "I'll tell you what I think. I think what they ought to do is tie the business agent up right out and shoot him." Even discounting the literal interpretation, we can have no doubt about the highly aggressive feelings of this man toward the union.

An operational index of executive hostility is found in the purchase of tear gas, machine guns, and other weapons by industry during the period of union expansion in the early New Deal days. The LaFollette investigation (Senate Civil Liberties Committee) reported that in the 5-year period, 1933-1937, Republic Steel Co. purchased \$79,712 worth of gas and gas equipment; U. S. Steel bought the same items to the tune of \$62,028; and other companies likewise bought a great deal. Other forms of violence employed against unions have been dramatically described in such volumes as *I Break Strikes* and *Spy Overhead*.¹ Even allowing for some exaggeration, they document an amazing story of planned violence against those venturing to organize and join unions.

Anti-unionism among non-executives. In this context, it is easy to see why executives would be aggressive against unions; but how can we account for the aggressions of non-executives? It might seem that only those members of the general public whose dividends were threatened by union demands would perceive the union as a frustration. The evidence does not support this view. Indeed, Hart (1949) goes to the other extreme.

The group most vociferous and violent in its opposition to unionism, whether it be the old families, the Chamber of Commerce, the local politicians . . . proves to be a group which is not threatened financially to any noticeable extent by union activity . . . their shouts . . . are reflections not of a threat to their bank accounts but to their prestige and to the power symbols they have hitherto enjoyed.²

This view asserts the predominance of ego motives in the behavior of such community leaders. This would not be surprising, in view of the data on industrial groups cited in Chapter 5.

It would be a mistake to assume that only upper class antagonisms are directed toward unions. The extent to which even non-managerial, propertyless lower middle class individuals vent their hostility on unions is striking. Jones (1941) cites an interesting example:

A male stenographer scored four (very conservative) on every item of the interview with the exception of the stories on bootleg coal, the farm mortgage foreclosure, and the rent eviction. On these three he scored zero

¹ See Levinson (1935) and Calkins (1937).

² Hart (1949), p. 69. Reprinted by permission.

(very liberal) The man was in his late thirties The W.P.A. was paying him \$71.40 a month. "You're telling me it's low. I used to make \$400 a month."

He said: "I approve of what the miners did. My wife and I have watched our kids eat and not eaten ourselves. We didn't have proper food, nor enough." And, "I'm for the poor tenant. I don't believe in evictions." But when it came to the stay-in strike in Michigan, "I wouldn't give the workers anything. I have no use for unions. I hate unions. I've never joined and I never will."¹

The fierce defensiveness of this man suggests that for him, accepting union membership would mean a terrific ego injury. The bitterness derived from his frustrations had been almost completely channeled into defense of his ego against such a loss of status.

CONTROL OF AGGRESSION

The theoretical position we have taken assumes that there are three ways in which control of aggression is possible: (1) reduction of frustrations (reducing the number of instigations to aggression); (2) inhibition of aggression by punishment (including loss of positive valences); and (3) catharsis, or the release of hostility in socially harmless ways.

The first needs no particular clarification here. If we assume that all aggression stems from some frustration (even though some frustrations set off patterns other than aggression), then it must follow that a net reduction in barrier situations ought to diminish the amount of aggressive tension built up. Practical implications of this point are developed in later chapters.

Inhibition of aggression. Overt aggressive behavior follows frustration if aggression is not perceived as leading to punishment, loss of love, or other motivational consequences. For thousands of years society has operated on the principle that men can be compelled to give up the overt expression of hostility by threats of punishment. Opinions differ as to how well this principle has worked. Some experts hold that the continuance of crimes of violence indicates the futility of punishment as a deterrent. Others have commented that punishment keeps violence down to a level such that social organization can endure.

On the other hand, much evidence indicates that *increasing* the customary amount of punishment for violation of social rules does not reduce the number of violations. Indeed, it often seems to bring on a

¹ Jones (1941), pp. 293-294. Reprinted by permission of the author.

larger number. Thus, management may be disturbed by the number of latecomers, smoking in no-smoking areas, horseplay of a dangerous character, and so on. A fairly natural tendency is to "crack down," to impose stricter discipline and more severe punishments. The result usually is even more trouble. Frustrations lead to aggressions, and an increase in frustrations is prone to set off more aggression.

In considerable degree this is a function of accepted group norms, and of Pastore's (1952) principle of arbitrariness. In any establishment, certain norms become established and are generally understood. These norms may include extensive modifications of the rules as perceived by management (cf. p. 65). So, workers may understand the rule to be "no smoking here unless you are very careful to put out butts" whereas managers believe the rule to be absolute. Sudden enforcement of a managerial version of the norms, especially when no attempt is made to clarify understandings and to explain the reasonableness of the rules, creates considerable hostility. Punishing men for violations which previously have not been punished is seen as arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. More trouble, rather than less, is likely to ensue.

Thus the evidence indicates that some use of punishment can be effective in controlling behavior, but that the use of punishment to compel suppression of aggressive acts may backfire and produce more trouble. If new rules are to be imposed or old ones enforced more severely, great care should be taken to get clear perception of the rules and an acceptance of them as reasonable.

Catharsis. The concept of catharsis assumes that, whenever a tension is built up, it must be discharged in some form. Thus, a husband who is angry with his wife and slams the door as he leaves is assumed to be releasing some of the tension which might otherwise have taken the form of a physical attack on her. Displacements fall in this category. The scapegoat is not the source of frustration, but beating on him releases some of the tension felt by the aggressive individual.

The assumption that catharsis is a legitimate way of dealing with the problem of aggression runs through many common and scientific ideas about the control of human behavior. Parents are urged to let their children pound nails into a board or smash old light globes when angry. Many adults feel that swearing about some irritating situation relieves their feelings and lets them consider it calmly. Psychotherapists usually operate on the assumption that some verbal expression of hostility must be achieved before the patient can begin to acquire a normal view of his problems.

Catharsis vs. habit. The chief controversy in this area arises from the fact that two principles, diametrically opposed, can be applied to the same situation. Catharsis suggests that the angry person should be encouraged to vent his aggression in some harmless way. The principle of habit seems to say that practicing aggressive behavior will make it more and more probable that attacks on others will occur in the future.

Regardless of the role of habit, one point seems to be clear about catharsis: any benefits derived are strictly temporary. Thus, a chronic frustration will continue to build up tension as fast as it is relieved. Catharsis may help in reducing the strain following a specific blockage which is not going to be repeated, but otherwise the more useful approach seems to be that of removing the barrier.

REALISTIC AND NEUROTIC AGGRESSION

We have now considered some of the relevant facts regarding aggressive manifestations in industry. Although frequent references will be made in later chapters to these investigations, it will be worth while to consider for a moment certain theoretical implications and generalizations.

The evidence has in general been interpreted as support for an environmental, not an instinct, theory of aggression. It would not be correct to say that the point is proved. We observe people expressing hostility where no immediately preceding frustration can be identified. Furthermore, we see some individuals whose aggressions are so extreme, so persistent, and so stubborn that "instinct" seems like a justifiable explanatory concept. They hate almost everybody almost all the time.

On the other hand, many instances of aggression are clearly related to specific frustrations. Indeed, responding aggressively is an adaptive way of dealing with some problems. Mobilizing additional energy to break down a barrier is often the key to survival.

This suggests the need for distinguishing between two kinds of hostility, those aggressions related to real frustrations and those that are persistent personality characteristics. This view has been proposed by Erich Fromm (1947), who defines rational "reactive" aggression and irrational or "character-conditioned" aggression. He defines these terms as follows:

Reactive rational hate is a person's reaction to a threat to his own or another person's freedom, life, or ideas. Its premise is respect for life. Rational hate has an important biological function. It is the affective

equivalent of action serving the protection of life; it comes into existence as a reaction to vital threats, and it ceases to exist when the threat has been removed; *it is not the opposite but the concomitant of the striving for life.*

Character-conditioned hate is different in quality. It is a character trait, a continuous readiness to hate, lingering within the person who *is* hostile rather than reacting with hate to a stimulus from without. Irrational hate can be actualized by the same kind of realistic threat which arouses reactive hate; but often it is a gratuitous hate, using every opportunity to be expressed, rationalized as reactive hate. The hating person seems to have a feeling of relief, as though he were happy to have found the opportunity to express his lingering hostility.¹

Fromm further proceeds to show that irrational or character-conditioned hostility need not be considered innate. Adults who are irrationally destructive, who seem driven by a need to attack or destroy other human beings, are invariably found to be cases of disturbed psychological development. They have experienced extreme insecurity in childhood. They have undergone chronic frustrations. They have come to perceive parents, acquaintances, and perhaps all the human race as sources of threat. Under these circumstances, constructive motives are transformed into hostility. Fromm expresses this idea as follows: "If life's tendency to grow, to be lived, is thwarted, the energy thus blocked undergoes a process of *change* and is transformed into life-destructive energy. *Destructiveness is the outcome of unlived life.* Those individual and social conditions which make for the blocking of life-furthering energy produce destructiveness which in turn is the source from which the various manifestations of evil spring."²

We thus conceive of the irrationally destructive person—the paranoid, the anti-Semite, the unionist who hates all industrialists, the executive who wants all union organizers jailed or shot, the destructive communist, and the tyrannical fascist—as persons whose early frustrations prevented the development of full, mature personalities. These fanatics provide a core of individuals who nourish the seeds of social conflict, while men of good will are working together constructively.³

It is obvious, on the basis of this kind of analysis, that such paranoid individuals cannot be numerous enough to provide a psychological understanding of mass conflict and social violence. The diagnosis of Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia as a "paranoid culture" is ridiculous.

¹ Fromm (1947), pp. 214–215. Reprinted by permission of Rinehart & Co.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 216–217.

³ For a discussion of the concept of "leadership for destruction," see Halliday (1948).

Neither would it make sense to say that all striking unionists or all anti-union employers are pathological.

The solution to this problem is to integrate Fromm's two concepts—of rational and irrational hate—into a complete picture of group conflict. Under conditions of widespread frustration it is natural and reasonable that great numbers of people will experience aggressive tensions. They will be thrashing around, trying to find and attack the source of their troubles. Such forms of aggression are realistic and, indeed, essential to survival. However, the source of frustration in modern society is far from obvious. The Iowa farmer whose farm was lost in a mortgage foreclosure in 1932 because the Vienna Credit-Anstalt went bankrupt in 1930 is a case in point. Factory workers lose jobs, businessmen lose customers for reasons far beyond their control, and perhaps beyond their range of knowledge.

Under these ambiguous conditions, some nearby person or group may be "misperceived" as the frustrating agent. Here the paranoid, the hater, comes into his own. Hitler, who had ranted across Germany from 1920 to 1928 without success, attracted great support when depression thwarted millions of Germans (see Fig. 6.6). In the United States the depression was blamed on the inventors, the banks,




Fig. 6.6. Effect of the depression on Nazi strength. (From Stagner, 1946, Fig. 41, p. 332, by permission of McGraw-Hill Book Co.)

the communists, the capitalists, the Jews, etc. Fortunately, no paranoid leader attracted a large enough following to cause serious social damage. We may not be so lucky if history repeats itself.

Briefly, then, this point of view holds that social conflict arises on a large scale when realistic frustrations set off what Fromm has called rational aggression, but the direction of this aggression may be influenced by the presence of paranoid leaders who are full of irrational aggression. The role of these pathological characters has been overestimated (specifically, by refusing to perceive the very real frustrations affecting a large group of people), but we should not overlook their existence. We have more to say about them in our analysis of union and management leadership.

Groups and Group Behavior

Industrial conflict is a process of interaction between organized groups. Individual employers and employees do, of course, interact, fight, or cooperate, but, in western civilization, the major problems of industrial relations have become group problems. Although groups are composed of individuals, and we have in the preceding chapters laid a groundwork in individual psychology, our considerations of industrial relations situations from this point on stress the role of organized groups.

Our earlier discussions have, of course, given considerable emphasis to the importance of the group. Perceptions, motivations, paths of action, frustrations, and aspirations are profoundly affected by group definitions and group norms. Both the employer and the employee experience group pressures toward conformity in perception and in action. To analyze these processes we must first give some consideration to the nature of groups in general.

We have dealt with the employer in this volume largely in terms of the corporation; that is, we have taken for granted that the executive is not the owner of the enterprise but is one of a group of hired managers closely involved with the welfare of ownership but not directly identified with it. In general the conclusions we have reached with regard to the psychology of the executive would not be different if we had dealt with him as also the owner of the enterprise. The only significant difference has been with respect to the fact that the executive is aware of the fact that he is a member of a group and is therefore subject to certain kinds of group pressures. We have considered this approach to the psychology of management as somewhat more fruitful than dealing with the executive-owner as an isolated individual.¹ It seems likely that the dominant form of economic organization of ownership in the near future will be that of the corporation.

¹ As soon as the owner begins to employ foremen and other executives, he becomes in fact a member of the management group, and is affected by the group situation.

This is not to ignore the importance of small, individually owned enterprises, but rather to accept the reality that the tone and pattern of union-management relationships will be established by the relationships between large corporations and large unions and will then be handed down, more or less modified according to the realities of specific situations, to the smaller concerns.

The decision to consider primarily the interaction of organized workers with management is based upon a conviction that more and more workers will relate themselves to their employers through unions (cf. the growth of unions as charted in Fig. 7.1). It also seems probable, as noted above, that union-management relations will establish patterns of behavior which will determine the conditions of employment for unorganized workers. We shall therefore deal with the worker's side of this relationship chiefly as it is expressed through the union.

We are consequently interested in considering questions that involve the basic characteristics of groups and how these basic characteristics relate to the functioning of the corporation and the union. How do these characteristics modify the psychological patterns of company executives, union members and union officers, and how do they help us to understand the processes of industrial cooperation and industrial conflict?

The study of social groups is a complex area of social science and involves the principles of sociology as well as social psychology and individual psychology. We shall limit ourselves in this brief consideration of the problem to those aspects of the group process that are significant for our purposes.

GROUPS AS GOAL-SEEKING DEVICES

A group is a collection of persons pursuing a common goal. The focus may be either a positive or a negative valence; in any event, groups do not form unless some common need satisfaction can be perceived by the various individuals who come to make up the group. Spontaneous organization arises when such a common goal is perceived by many people; as, for example, a crowd of hungry individuals raiding a food warehouse, or conversely a panic mob racing to get away from a fire. In these cases the group has no particular structure but is simply a collection of individuals actively striving to achieve a common goal at the same time. Such groups break up when the possibility of achieving the goal is no longer perceived, or when the goal has been attained, i.e., when the individuals escape from the fire or when they get possession of the food.

However, the majority of group formations relate to the achievement of need satisfactions on a rather long-term basis. Thus the corporation is a device for increasing the capital of the individual entrepreneur, making it possible for him to handle economic difficulties more efficiently, and is a form of social group which exists over a long




Fig. 7.1. Growth of American labor unions. (Data from Bernstein, 1954, and Bureau of Labor Statistics.) Dotted lines after 1948 represent estimates based on partial data.

period of time. Positive valences in the form of profits, competitive success, and power are seen as more accessible by way of group action.

Similarly a trade union is organized because workers experience an immediate common goal or frustration, but, once this particular problem has been solved, the possibility of using the group as an instrumentality for other forms of satisfaction becomes apparent. Thus the group tends to be perpetuated over a long period.

Informal groups. Groups need not be formally organized to function as goal-seeking instruments. Individuals further their own selfish interests, to protect their fellows, by cooperation with an informal group. The study of cliques and factions within management and worker groups probably received its greatest impetus from the famous Hawthorne studies. One of these investigations at the Western Electric plant at Hawthorne, Illinois, dealt with the social organization of non-union workers who were engaged in wiring telephone switchboards. Figure 7.2 illustrates the informal linkages found in a group




Fig. 7.2. Cliques in the bank-wiring room. (From Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939, Fig. 45, p. 509, by permission of Harvard University Press.)

of 14 workers (9 wiremen, 3 solderers, and 2 inspectors). These cliques maintained production norms, helped each other out on the job, and defended themselves against supervisory pressures.

Since the time of the Hawthorne studies, many other investigators have uncovered similar social structures in industry. Warner and Low (1947) studied informal organizations among the shoe workers in Yankee City. Their research indicates that informal groups can achieve higher wages, freedom from supervisory domination, and other goals sought by workers. The following passage graphically describes a most effective informal group:

Perhaps the outstanding case of a high degree of worker solidarity was found in the wood-heeling department. Of the forty-five men in this department, thirty-three were native Yankees and twenty-six of these were "Riverbrookers." The Riverbrookers were the most "clannish" and socially solid group of workers in the shoe factories . . . this extremely well-integrated group controlled the department to their own advantage in many ways. For example, having strong prejudices against members of the newer ethnic groups, they were able to prevent members of these groups from getting jobs in the department. A factory manager said that if a Greek, for instance, were to be given a job in wood-heeling, the Riverbrookers would make life so unpleasant for him that he would be forced to quit. In the matter of wages, too, the solidarity of the Riverbrookers appears to have stood them in good stead, since the earnings in this department averaged 12.8 cents per hour over the factory average for men . . . Management had made no attempt to adjust rates downward in the wood-heeling department; apparently the saving that could be effected by doing so, . . . was not sufficient in the eyes of management to warrant risking the disruption of production that would occur if the wood-healers had taken concerted action against management. Thus the social solidarity of the workers in this department gave them considerable bargaining power in advancing their interests over those of management.¹

Managerial cliques. In theory, the modern bureaucratic corporation treats its human participants as depersonalized functions. Thus, an officer manager is supposed to carry out certain duties and is to be judged on how well he executes this role. He is not to be evaluated on whether he plays a good game of golf, laughs at the boss's jokes, or belongs to the right church. In reality, this depersonalized operation as a kind of social machine rarely occurs; an executive is constantly being evaluated as a friend and as a member of a clique, not simply as a device for getting certain tasks done. Similarly, people do not communicate just along lines in the organizational chart; and clique members help each other out with information and "pull," quite without regard to formal structure. To some extent this is necessary. Thus, as Moore (1951) has commented,

To the extent that departures from the formal and impersonal norm parallel the formal organization, they may actually be advantageous in the operation of the official system. To the extent that departures from the norm represent the introduction of "machine politics," or devices for the protection of incompetents on extraneous grounds, a clique situation has developed . . . Irrelevant considerations, such as nationality, fraternal affiliation, family connections, and a host of others, may thus play into the relationship . . . The clique functions to reduce purely individual com-

¹ Warner and Low (1947), pp. 92-93. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

petition through the substitution of group action and to establish standards of conduct that are well understood, even though at complete variance with the primary objectives of the organization as a whole.¹

Social groups among owners. Since the time of the Western Electric studies, informal groups among workers have been generally recognized as an important feature of industry. Cliques among management also have received a good deal of attention in the last several years. Lamb (1951) calls attention to another kind of social grouping which has some significance for our problem: the development of regional groups of capitalists and entrepreneurs. Specifically, he examines the history of the "Boston Associates," the Lowells, Higginsons, Cabots, Lees, Jacksons, and Storrows. These families, pooling their talents and their fortunes through factories, investment houses, and similar ventures, exerted a powerful influence in developing industry in New England.

The social values entwined with this non-economic grouping of persons ultimately led to the ignoring of economic demands and thus contributed to the decline of New England as an economically dominant area. For example, as Lamb points out, competition in shoes and textiles began to develop outside the New England region. "To meet such competition, the Bostonians needed to staff their textile and shoe companies with the ablest leaders they could find, inside or outside the family group. Instead, the job of mill treasurer tended to be handed on by nepotism. . . . These jobs, moreover, were reserved for the less able members of these families" (p. 74). Thus it appears that the protection of the slower and less efficient members of the group is not confined to factory workers; it is also a feature of informal group structures at the highest level of our economic society.

Groups based upon frustration. We have asserted above that groups can be organized around either a positive or a negative valence—that is, the persons making up the group may find that they have some positive goal in common, or that they encounter a common threat or frustration. Since every society involves some frustrations to individual motives, there will necessarily be many opportunities for groups to become organized around programs of hostility.

Maier (1942, 1946) has propounded the view that "hate groups" are essentially collections of individuals who find that they have in common a need to attack others, and who join together primarily if not admittedly for that purpose. He says, "It is also possible for a frus-

¹ Moore (1951), pp. 140–141. Reprinted by permission of the Macmillan Company.

trated group of people to become organized. Since aggressive behavior tendencies are present in such people, they are susceptible to being organized or united around a pattern of aggression. We have already seen that *no specific aggression is demanded by the frustrated individual*; as a consequence, any form of aggression will appeal to him."¹

It is only on the final sentence of this quotation that we part company with Maier. As we have noted in Chapter 5, frustration usually tends to set off aggression; and this aggression has a *preferred* target, which is the barrier itself. Persons who build up aggressive tensions do not, it is true, always attack the source of their frustrations. The barrier may be beyond attack (frustration by an economic system) or the possible punishment may be too great (worker considers attacking foreman) or other motives may be involved (superego, love for the person constituting the barrier, etc.). Under such circumstances, aggression may be displaced onto irrelevant objects, such as foreigners and minority groups. However, the evidence seems fairly clear that *the most satisfying release of aggression is against the agent perceived as frustrating*.

We shall distinguish between groups which serve only as a generalized release for aggression, regardless of source, and other groups which relate to a specific frustrating situation. In the former category fall those groups resembling the early Nazi Party, which thrived on hatred of Jews, communists, big landowners, the western democracies, and assorted other social objects. A glance at such groups clearly indicates that the members have only hatred and nothing else in common. Furthermore, it is difficult or impossible for them to agree on any kind of positive program—as was true also of the Nazi Party.

In contrast to these groups, the labor union is seen as a group of people who have in common certain frustrations and hostilities, but who are responding fairly specifically and realistically (within the kinds of limitations specified in Chapter 2). Their aggressive tensions are directed toward clearly identified negative valences.² Golden and Ruttenberg (1942) have stated the matter graphically:

As we look back upon the scores of union meetings we attended and spoke to in the last decade, the purpose they served becomes clear. Here workers would come—and they came in droves—to cheer a speaker for denouncing

¹ Maier (1946), pp. 70–71. Reprinted by permission of Houghton Mifflin Co. Italics are not in original.

² See especially Kerr and Siegal, "The interindustry propensity to strike," in Kornhauser, Dubin, and Ross (1954). An interesting analysis of the formation of groups around common frustrations is offered on pp. 191–195 of that volume.

the boss, whom they dared not denounce face to face. From these meetings workers derived great personal satisfactions. In them Fletcher Brown, John Rider, and countless other workers ranted and raved, and rightly so, against the things in their industrial experiences that frustrated their creative desires, took their personalities away from them, and denied them any substantial satisfaction in their daily work.¹

We have shown in Chapter 5 that it is possible to identify specific aspects of management policy or the work situation which function to frustrate the individual worker. Generally speaking, it is precisely these kinds of conditions which serve as nuclei for union organization. As any union organizer can testify, there are many establishments where he cannot establish a beachhead because no frustrations are serious enough, or affect enough people, to provide this nucleus. One example will suffice:

We tackled the X Company, in a small town in Indiana, at least three different times. We could get a few men signed up, and they usually thought more would vote for a union in a secret election, but wouldn't sign up. So we demanded an NLRB vote three times, and every time we lost by a healthy margin. The CIO also tried them, with the same result.

One day a couple of men from this plant came to my office and wanted me to come out again, but I wouldn't do it. Then they asked for membership application cards, and I gave them enough for the whole plant. Believe it or not, they were back in a week with 90% of the work force signed up, and we won the election hands down.²

What had happened in the interim? It was later learned that the elderly, highly respected owner and president of the company had died. His heirs chose as general manager a man who had a great deal of technical skill, but who was contemptuous of the workers and paid no attention to their needs as individuals. Within 3 months he had most of the workers in the plant furiously angry with him, and the others convinced that it would be their turn next. Union organization seemed to them the only feasible protective action.

Unions differ from purely aggressive hate groups in that they are capable of adopting, and organizing continuous action around, a positive program. Many local unions have come into being, like the one described above, as a result of specific frustrations. But, once in existence, they adopt tangible positive goals, such as wage increases, pension plans, safety programs, and the like. This is possible only be-

¹ Golden and Ruttenberg, 1942, p. 21. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

² Personal communication.

cause the workers perceive their environment as having many common approaching common positive goals. This is not possible in the mon features, and they perceive joint action as a feasible pathway for groups which are purely aggression-oriented.

Group goals and individual motives. The formal organization ordinarily will have explicitly stated goals and purposes. These derive from the conscious needs of individuals and represent, by and large, rational attempts to achieve satisfaction for these motives. Informal groups, on the other hand, are likely to represent unconscious or poorly verbalized needs; the Yankee City shoe workers could not have explained their solidarity as a way of protecting their wages, and indeed it did not originate for that purpose. It represented social, not economic, motivation. In the same way, workers (or managers or capitalists) who protect an incompetent member of the group are not acting on conscious, rationally formulated grounds; they are expressing sympathy and cooperation, which is usually rationalized on some other basis such as excessive work standards.

However, as we have already noted, the desire to be accepted in a group, and to maintain the social equilibrium thus established, is a strong motive for most persons.¹ Thus, if the group adopts a goal of which the person disapproves, he is still likely to work for its success to protect his position in the group. The union member who disapproves of a contract policy may still fight for its acceptance by management, and an executive who thinks a company project unwise will, as a rule, try to see it through to success.

In some cases people become identified with a group to such a degree that goal attainment by the group sets off the same exuberance as individual success; and conversely, failure leads to intense frustration or depression. When this happens, we are justified in saying that this group is now perceived as part of the person's ego, and maintenance of the group is an essential steady state, to be defended vigorously when it is threatened (cf. pp. 95-98). The phrase "ego involvement" is often used for this situation. It seems somewhat more accurate than "identification," which is more appropriate to a comparable relationship to some other person. (Thus a man might be "identified" with his union president, but "ego involved" with the union itself.) Ego involvement implies a high level of dynamic interaction between the member and the group; it means that the member perceives his personal goals and those of the group as highly similar.

¹ For a review of work in this area, see Horwitz (1953).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF GROUP NORMS

Social scientists used to argue over the correctness of the generalization: "A group is more than the sum of its parts." A reformulation has eliminated most of the controversy; it is now considered more accurate to state that a group is *different* from the sum of its parts. Two differences with which we shall be particularly concerned relate to the terms *norms* and *roles*. Let us first consider the development of group norms.

A norm is defined as a standard of behavior approved by the group and enforced upon the members by mutual pressure. The existence of such norms means that people, in a group, do things which they would avoid doing in isolation. A familiar example is found in the area of mob action. Workers on a picket line may throw bricks through factory windows, overturn police cars, and rough up men trying to go through the line, actions which each as individuals would find quite inconceivable outside the group setting. These workers are not in the grip of a "mob mind," but different norms are operating; their standards of behavior are changed by the presence of the group and awareness of group norms. Individual workers stimulate each other to higher pitches of emotion; some people suggest violence; there is an illusion of group approval and support for violent action. Similarly the fact that company executives may purchase machine guns, tear gas, and other forms of industrial munitions (as the LaFollette Committee so amply demonstrated back in the 1930's), was undoubtedly an indication that executives in groups reinforce each other's suspicions, anxieties, and aggressions and thereby make possible forms of behavior which would be relatively improbable if the executive were acting on his own.

The very existence of a group makes possible certain kinds of social phenomena which could not occur if each person behaved only as an isolated individual. The process of developing a norm, or standard of accepted behavior, is an excellent illustration. A laboratory example of norm formation is the study by Sherif (1935) cited in Chapter 2. In that instance each experimental group developed a common standard for the amount of apparent movement reported (Fig. 2.7, p. 26). In everyday situations we see norms of adolescent behavior (bobby sox, blue jeans, and other clothing fads, dances, etc.), norms of behavior within a college faculty, and many other cases of group uniformity. By suggestion and imitation, such patterns rapidly spread to all members of a group.

Persons who fail to conform to group norms, once they are established, encounter punishments. A person is not acceptable in a group

of middle class intellectuals if he dresses in dirty clothes and uses bad grammar. The college graduate getting training "on the job" in a factory will not be accepted by the workers if he wears flannel suits and white sport shoes and eats lunch at a swank hotel.

The development of such behavioral norms is essential if the group is to serve its purpose. Informal work groups protect their members against rate cuts and layoffs by limiting production. Trade unions achieve wage increases through social solidarity in pressing demands against management. Corporations set company policy and insist that all executives, regardless of personal opinions, conform to this policy.

Norms are enforced by both rewards and punishments. In the case of the company, an individual who refuses to conform may be discharged. Persons who manifest approved behavior unusually well are given pay increases, promotions, and status. Within an informal group, rewards are purely social, like approval and status, but these are highly valued by most members. Punishments may include scoldings, ridicule, physical coercion, or ejection from the group. By these methods, informal groups have a decided influence on behavior of their members.

Norms and shared frames of reference. Ordinarily the term "norm" refers to a pattern of behavior. However, as Sherif's experiment so neatly shows, the group also influences the perceptions of its members. This process operates through the development of shared frames of reference.

The frame of reference is profoundly affected by group membership. In Chapters 2 and 3 we noted evidence that the manner in which a person perceives issues involving union and management can be predicted with fair accuracy simply by knowing his membership in certain significant groups. Other groups, however, give us no information about these perceptions. When a person's way of evaluating certain situations is affected by membership in a group, we can say that this is a *reference group* for him.

Executives learn to adopt a common point of view with regard to all aspects of company policy, including unions. Because the union represents somewhat of a frustration, the typical executive is likely to perceive it as a negative valence. Through informal discussion, as well as written statements of company policy, this perception is transmitted to all members of the executive structure.

Unions make an even more organized attempt to influence the perceptions of their members. So, for example, the stories of past atrocities by management are repeated long after the objective conditions relevant to a specific incident have changed. Speeches by elderly

unionists, slide films, and motion pictures are utilized to establish the shared frame of reference, the union point of view.

The two main ways in which organizations influence their members are through the formation of norms and shared frames of reference. The distinction between the two is not clear-cut; customarily norms are *patterns of behavior* and frames of reference are *consistent ways of perceiving*. In practical situations they are so intimately related that the difference is not important. However, it should be apparent that a person may conform to a norm without accepting the frame of reference.

ROLE DIFFERENTIATION

Another important respect in which a group is different from the sum of its parts is with regard to the existence of differentiated roles. Taken as isolated persons, all executives have roughly similar behavior potentialities, or all union members are alike. But when placed in an organizational setting, they take on different roles. These roles are supported by group norms (as regards appropriate behavior); that is, we expect the superintendent to tell the foreman what to do, but we do not expect the foreman to give orders to his boss.

The smallest human group would involve two members. Such groups may be a husband and wife, or a leader and a follower. The social role of the leader is necessarily different from that of the follower. In most cultures, husbands and wives are expected to behave differently. Although groups of two can exist without such a differentiation, the spontaneous tendency seems to be for such variation in individual roles to develop relatively early in the existence of the group. As larger numbers of individuals become involved and as the life span of the group lengthens, the differentiation of social roles becomes greater and greater, until we have a very complex hierarchy such as a modern factory system with selected functions assigned to different executives, line and staff organization, production workers, salesmen, etc.; or the modern army with its various groups of specialists all coordinated by the assignment of interlocking functions. Formal groups usually have these role differentiations in written form; informal groups rely on person-to-person communication.

Role and goal-attainment. *Social roles differ with regard to the degree of motive satisfaction attainable.* It is obvious that as soon as we get differentiation of social roles, we have an important variable as far as the individual is concerned. Persons assigned to a leader-

ship role will necessarily have greater potentialities for satisfaction of such motives as the desire for dominance. Similarly they have available to them the potentiality of greater satisfaction of biogenic motives, as, for example, through higher incomes, preferred living quarters, better food supplies, etc. Some individuals adapt very readily and naturally to the particular pattern of satisfactions associated with their assigned social roles. In other cases we find people assigned to a particular social role, yet unable to function comfortably within it because of a conflict between the aspirations and desires built into the individual personality and the possibilities for gratification built into the structure of the social role. Under these circumstances we find individual psychological conflict arising (and frequently group conflict as a secondary phenomenon). It is obvious, for example, that an individual with frustrated desires for leadership may break away from an established group and set up a rival organization. We see this clearly in situations such as the formation of rival union groups or the separatist movements within nations.

It is worth while noting in this connection that the prerequisites attached to a particular social role depend upon how this role is perceived by the effective majority of the group. An individual cannot function as a leader, for example, unless the effective majority of group opinion accepts him as the leader. An industrial executive who is not perceived by workers as speaking with authority will be very ineffectual. Similarly a union leader who is too far in advance of the opinions of his membership will find himself without a following. Various techniques in the nature of rewards and punishments are, of course, available to leaders in certain situations by which they can reinforce and build up their perception of authority. The ruler of a communist country can impose his perception of power on his rank-and-file citizens as long as he has the loyalty of the army. (This is what is meant in the preceding paragraph by the phrase "an *effective* majority of the group." As long as the instruments of power are in the hands of an appointed leader, he will probably be able to induce this kind of perception in the rank and file.)

Role expectancies, it may be noted, are enforced in the same manner as any other group norm. A person who fails to execute his role, or who grossly exceeds it, is subject to various forms of group punishment. The unanimity (among the remaining members) of inflicting such treatment will depend on such variables as group cohesiveness and morale (see below). When group members no longer enforce role expectancies, the group is well on the way to dissolution.

NORMS AND ROLES AS FRUSTRATIONS

The enforcement of group norms leads to frustration of individuals, often with consequent aggression. To the extent that the goals of individuals coincide with those of the group, of course, no problem of enforcement arises. But each person will have some goals other than those of the group. Enforced conformity to norms is likely, therefore, to result in blocking some of the person's behavior tendencies. Even the executive often finds himself hampered by company policy, or by the necessity of handling routine problems when he prefers to go fishing. The worker finds himself hemmed in by no smoking rules, time-clock regulations, methods engineers' requirements, and similar controls. Such blockages may easily give rise to aggressive tensions.

Aggression and hostility are particularly prevalent among persons assigned to inferior roles. And group conflicts are most likely to arise when individuals perceive discrepancies in the amount of need satisfaction permitted or the amount of frustration imposed upon persons with different social roles. The French Revolution of 1789 and the Russian Revolution of 1917 stemmed directly from the imposition of frustrations perceived as intolerable by the majority of the population. The American Revolution of 1776 represented the formation of a conflict group based on the presence of certain common frustrations imposed by British parliamentary action upon the rising commercial and manufacturing interests in the American colonies. Unions are organized when factory workers perceive themselves as being denied certain satisfactions which they think are appropriate to their role, or as suffering from frustrations, to which they respond with substantial degrees of aggression.

Different groups may respond differently to physically similar frustrations. The white-collar worker, for example, even though in many cases his income is lower than that of the factory employee in the same company, has generally failed to adopt the technique of union organization. This can be ascribed psychologically to the fact, first, that the white-collar workers have not perceived their role as inferior, nor do they see themselves as being frustrated to the same degree as the factory group; and secondly to the fact that the union group has been perceived as not appropriate to the solution of the white-collar workers' problems. It may be, as one author put it, that "white-collar workers don't hate the boss enough" to organize a union. Certainly it is clear that if a group of people do not perceive their frustrations as severe or do not perceive a union as an

appropriate vehicle for solving their problems, then union organizers' appeals fall on deaf ears.

Another corollary of this idea is that in many cases the presence of a belief in the possibility of certain satisfactions may be more significant than the presence or absence of the satisfactions themselves. For example, many workers, although conceding that they have not received the amount of economic gratification that they would have liked to attain, believe either that it is still possible for themselves or that it is attainable by their children. Such individuals are much more satisfied with the status quo and tolerant of contemporary economic institutions than a comparable group of workers who feel that their children will not have the opportunity to achieve a satisfactory standard of living (cf. Kornhauser, 1938). They are thus less likely to take group action against existing norms and institutions.

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE EXECUTION

We have already noted that roles differ in the quality and quantity of goal achievement open to a given person. It follows that the acceptability of a role depends upon the kind of motivational structure one has already developed (cf. Chapter 4).

Efficiency in executing the requirements of a role also depends upon other characteristics of the individual. Verbal, mechanical, and numerical abilities, sensitivity to the feelings of others, motor coordination, and a variety of other traits may affect role performances. Thus the problems of selection of executives, training of foremen, and choice of union officers, become significant for the successful functioning of different kinds of social groups. It is apparent, first of all, that an individual may be assigned to a particular role or he may be attracted to it. The extreme form of assignment, of course, is that of birth. In a caste society the individual is born into a particular role and will be molded from earliest childhood to fit into this particular function. Secondly, a person may be attracted to a particular role, that is, he may perceive the role and attempt to attain it for himself. Thirdly, he may be assigned to the role by others. The two latter possibilities offer opportunities for mobility and may allow for such variations between individuals as differences in ability, differences in temperament, differences in motivation, etc. Furthermore, we should note that, once anyone has been placed in a certain role, whether by assignment or by self-selection, he will continue to be modified in psychological characteristics by the continued execution

of the duties of this particular role. So, for example, placing a man in a position as operating superintendent of a factory means that his attention will be focused on operating problems; his prospects for praise, reward, and future success depend upon how successfully he solves the problems of production; and various other considerations, such as human relations, are perceived either as irrelevant or as actually threatening to the solution of his particular difficulties. His behavior (norms) and perceptions (frames of reference) will change. Thus, according to some evidence, the longer a person has functioned in a particular role, the more clearly he will exemplify the psychological needs and demands of that particular role.

The group functions efficiently when individuals fit their assigned roles. Conversely, when an individual is assigned to a role for which his ability and personality are inappropriate, he is likely to operate in such a way as to frustrate others. An incompetent leader gives orders that lead to frustration for his followers, or he fails to perceive opportunities to achieve greater need satisfaction for the members of his group. The army commander who fails to be alert to the needs of his troops in the field, like the foreman who fails to consider the social desires and feelings of his employees, will not keep a smoothly working group functioning for a considerable length of time.

Other factors beside the quality of leadership tend to affect the functioning of a group, of course. If roles are poorly defined, so that two individuals attempt to take over leadership of the group, we get conflict and difficulty. This happens in industrial organizations where lines of authority have not been clearly agreed upon, and it happens in unions when cliques and factions begin to compete for control of the entire organization. In many cases what is necessary is a redefinition by the group of the particular functions to be assigned to persons in a given role, or perhaps a re-assignment of individuals according to the characteristics that they possess. Thus an ineffectual union leader may be replaced at an annual election by someone who is perceived by the members as having greater potentialities for successful functioning. Higher executives replace lower functionaries in accordance with their perception of possible efficiency, and, under extreme conditions, stockholders may replace high level executives.

EQUILIBRIUM IN GROUPS

We have noted in Chapter 4 that men as individuals strive to establish and maintain equilibrium. This was traced to essential biological steady states—oxygen balance, water balance, food supply, and so on. We also indicated there that the principle of homeostasis

covered all of man's behavior—that energy is mobilized to protect these essential steady states in many ways. Thus, protection of food stored away is homeostatic, just as is the act of eating to restore a lowered blood-sugar level.

By analogy the formation of groups ought to be an equilibrium-protecting mechanism. And indeed it is. Corporations are formed because the isolated individual cannot raise enough capital to deal with the problems facing him. By organizing a group, he mobilizes additional strength and protects his business (and so his own biological security). Similarly, workers organize unions to restore or protect established steady states. Threats of discrimination, layoff, wage cuts may be met by organizing. The group functions as a protective device for the individual.

The corporation as an equilibrium. So far we have written as if only individuals showed equilibrium phenomena. Obviously groups likewise establish certain routines, certain ways of behaving, and then try to protect these against change. Barnard (1938) has made a great deal of this principle. He writes of the equilibrium existing within an industrial enterprise as follows: "The survival of an organization depends upon the maintenance of an equilibrium of complex character in a continuously fluctuating environment of physical, biological and social materials, elements, and forces, which calls for readjustment of processes internal to the organization."¹

Because the manager perceives various goals that he can achieve by keeping the organization functioning, he takes steps to correct any disequilibrium which arises. Soon he reaches the point of being as highly motivated by these imbalances as by a loss of some needed steady state within his own body.

Union as equilibrium. It is also useful to think of the local union as an equilibrium, a balance among grievances, bargaining, political pressures within the union and threats from outside. The union can endure only so long as it leads to goal attainment for members. This process is constantly being upset by the blockages members encounter on the job. They demand action from their officers, who have the delicate task of extracting as much as possible from management without arousing so much counteraggression that the success of other grievances will be jeopardized. Sayles and Strauss (1953) indicate some of the intricacies of this balancing process as follows:

If he is to win grievances the officer must constantly meet with management—and run the risk of being charged with "selling out." In most cases he will be more successful if he can get along with management. Still he

¹ Barnard (1938), p. 6. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.

must also show an aggressive spirit that will capture the support of the rank and file. If he is to win elections he must be known throughout the plant—and perhaps impinge on the jurisdiction of his fellow officers.¹

Halliday (1948) has also used the concept of group equilibrium as an extension of equilibrium theory. He notes that disturbance of group routines and values may lead to serious social conflicts. For instance, the troubles among the British coal miners are ascribed to (1) mechanization, which disrupted work habits and work groups, with their friendly support for the individual, (2) changing patterns of communication (closer contact with outer world, knowledge of new ways of life), and (3) widespread unemployment, which broke up a traditional way of life.

We need not, however, restrict ourselves to highly traumatic instances of disturbed equilibrium. Anyone who has worked in an industrial organization knows that in undisturbed equilibrium people become predictable, routines are established, and everyone is comfortable. Now let a new top executive be appointed, or a re-organization be proposed, and everyone becomes anxious. Rumors fly; people behave unpredictably; routines are broken up; everybody is upset. These observations show that group equilibrium is a real phenomenon, even though it can operate only through individuals.

Expectancies and behavior. Group equilibrium arises when the expectancies of the members of the group are successfully matched to role execution. If the foreman behaves as expected, the workers know what to do and equilibrium persists. If the foreman does something unexpected (or if a higher executive by-passes him), people do not have suitable expectancies in this situation and so they are disturbed.

Groups tend to take action to protect their steady states, if they can. A corporation threatened with bankruptcy frequently finds that the executives are capable of far more vigorous effort than was normal. A union that has been dormant suddenly is energized when a wage cut or layoff seems imminent. Informal worker groups eject a non-conformist worker (protecting against internal disturbance) and also cooperate closely against management behavior perceived as threatening (a disturbance from outside). Office workers threatened with loss of an established "coffee break" become highly indignant. A great deal of energy may be exerted to keep this customary privilege.

¹ Sayles and Strauss (1953), pp. 162–163. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

With this conception of organizations, the principle of homeostasis is relevant. Individuals form organizations in furthering the protection or restoration of favorable equilibrium states. They consequently attempt to maintain the organization in equilibrium, as long as it continues to serve these ends. Organizations tend to be valued for stability, predictability of results, and effectiveness in dealing with threats beyond the power of the individual.

Development of new goals. It must be noted, however, that the organization, once established, becomes a vehicle for the achievement of other goals and the protection of other equilibria not previously existing. Let us consider first the corporation executive. His office provides him with a variety of comforts and privileges. A proposed reorganization might strip him of these, even eliminate his job. Under these circumstances he fights to maintain the structural rigidity of the organization, because in so doing he protects his own position. This process is one important factor in the loss of flexibility as corporations increase in size. In a survey of one of America's largest corporations, we repeatedly encountered indications of it. One professional employee referred to his job as "a fur-lined rattrap." The organization prevented him from developing his own original line of work as he would have liked, but pay and other conditions of employment were so pleasant that he was unwilling to leave. A common saying in this corporation was: "In this company you produce . . . or you stay!" The structure was maintained with such perfection that even inefficient personnel were rarely dismissed. The rules and regulations of bureaucratic organizations, consequently, do serve a protective, homeostatic function for at least many participant members of the organization.

Whose equilibrium? Some stress must be laid upon the fact that the equilibrium maintained by bureaucratic rules is not equally comfortable for all members of an industrial organization. Indeed, a device for protecting one person or group may be a barrier or threat to others within the structure. Gouldner (1954a), in the course of his interesting study of industrial bureaucracy, raises the following pointed questions:

Do bureaucratic rules provide equally efficient vehicles for realizing the ends of *all* strata within an organization? Do factory rules, for example, enable workers to predict things which are of most concern to them? It would seem that, under certain circumstances, it is normal for factory rules to make prediction difficult or impossible for lower strata personnel; for, given the implicit but pervasive assumption that anxiety and insecurity are

effective motivators, invisibly moving men to obey, employers will tend to leave undeveloped those rules which would strengthen workers' predictability and security.¹

Within this frame of reference, union efforts at stabilizing certain working rules and removing the unpredictable element involved in freedom of choice by the foreman are perceived as striving for stability and equilibrium in organizational areas not covered by company regulations.

UNION-MANAGEMENT ACCOMMODATION AS EQUILIBRIUM

We have noted, in the foregoing passages, that organizations establish an equilibrium in which goal achievement balances deprivation and frustration. Another aspect of the equilibrium is that role expectancies are matched by role execution.

We can conceive of the union-management relationship as involving a process of accommodation between two groups. Accommodation is here defined as any modification of the tactics, perceptions, norms, or goals of one group to take account of the existence of the other group (cf. Chapter 12). Thus, one manifestation of accommodation by management is the establishment of an industrial relations director, a person with a specialized role in preserving organizational equilibrium.

The term "accommodation" as used here need not imply pleasant or cooperative relationships. A strike is a form of accommodative action in which the union members do certain things calculated to improve their status in the total situation. Accommodation, then, goes on as each group tries different techniques for improving its relative position in the relationship.

This approach suggests that an equilibrium can be established on either a favorable or an unfavorable level. To some extent this is true. We have studied some companies where the union-management relationship was highly predictable because the parties fought all the time. This condition, however, is inherently unstable because of the extreme frustration that it imposes upon individuals, who are unable to plan their own activities because this group conflict denies them a stable environment within which to seek their own goal satisfactions.

Such personal frustrations are experienced by persons at every level

¹ Gouldner (1954a), pp. 26-27. Reprinted by permission of the Free Press. (See also his pp. 237-242.)

in the organization. Whyte (1951a) has given some interesting quotations from participants in the conflict situation at Inland Steel Container Co. during a period of bitter controversy between management and union, which he describes as follows:

In the conflict period, workers and union officers were living in what social psychologists call "an unstructured situation." No one ever knew what to expect. The future was unpredictable; the only thing that was certain was that a new crisis was always around the corner.

The interviews, which, of course, were made after a cooperative relationship had been established, reveal the change in the perception individuals had of the group relationship. One rank-and-file worker commented as follows: "It gives you peace of mind. You can go about your business without worrying all the time about what is going to happen next. Before, there was always something being cooked up. You'd see people talking together and you'd want to know what was going to happen next. It took your mind off your work. You'd get careless and wouldn't pay no attention."

A union steward had the following remarks to make about the new relationship: "I think the main thing is that we can relax now. That doesn't mean that we can go to sleep. We still have to watch things but it isn't tense like before, and you can enjoy your work." Finally we may quote the reactions of a member of management: "Now I look forward to coming to work in the morning. I have a wonderful time on this job. Before, I just had to drag myself to work . . . You'd dread coming in to work. You didn't know what would happen from one day to the next, but you could always expect trouble."¹

Goal setting a psychological process. A word of caution is due at this point. When we speak of accommodation and equilibrium as concepts applying to groups, we are assuming that group goals exist separately from the goals of individuals and that behavioral changes in groups can be considered without regard to the component individuals. Strictly speaking, of course, this is false. No organization ever set a goal for itself except as individual human beings chose that goal; no group ever took action except as individual persons did something. We reject the idea of a group mind in any form whatever.

There is, on the other hand, a level of discourse on which the concepts of group goal, group behavior, accommodation, and group equilibrium have real meaning. A group does not spontaneously adopt a new goal in the same way that a person, reacting to deprivation, seeks a new goal. However, if a number of group members experience deprivation, they may by consensus adopt the new goal; thus, the increasing life expectancy of American workers made union demands for better pension plans a necessary development. Group

¹ Whyte (1951a), pp. 210-211. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

goals are also adopted by minorities within the organization if they are in strategic positions. The union officer, for example, perceives the strengthening of the union as a highly important goal; and he may persuade the workers to strike for a union shop or extra seniority for stewards, in the absence of personal goals for the typical worker. Production executives often resist union demands more belligerently than financial executives, simply because the production man encounters personal frustrations from the union. Cliques within management struggle for power, largely because power makes it possible for them to set the goals of the entire organization in line with the goals of clique members.

Goals of groups, consequently, are without exception adopted because they are perceived as desirable by some members of the group. They will be accepted if perceived by the remaining members as compatible with personal goals. (This may mean, in the extreme, simply accepting an organizational goal because you will get fired if you don't. Goals imposed thus arbitrarily evoke little energy mobilization from the group members, and thus are likely to fail. As we noted in Chapters 5 and 6, economic pressure may keep an executive or worker at his post, but it does not insure vigorous, alert action on behalf of company policies.)

Group fragmentation. The principles in accordance with which subgroups form and split off from the parent body are essentially identical with those already discussed as the bases for group formation. Subgroups form whenever some members of a group find that they have a common goal that is not congruent with the common goal of the larger group; or when they find the larger group imposing a frustration upon them that is not general, especially if this frustration is perceived as arbitrary.¹ A large group divided within itself is another kind of unstable group equilibrium. It tends to be resolved by fragmentation, i.e., by splitting of the old group into two or more groups.

We can characterize the relationships between the goals of the total industrial organization and of any particular subgroup within the organization in terms of the two diagrams shown as Figs. 7.3 and 7.4. In Fig. 7.3 we represent the relationship between factory utility in terms of the over-all enterprise and utility for a subgroup such as a group of workers. It is obvious that the rate of functioning which

¹ See, for example, a case of non-cooperation between two groups of office workers, reported by Gross (1953).

is most beneficial to the welfare of the individuals making up the subgroup can vary and that varying rates of functioning can lead to different degrees of reward in terms of the over-all enterprise. The curve represented in Fig. 7.3 indicates that at a certain point x the optimal functioning of the total enterprise has been reached. Continuing to increase the rate of production of the subgroup, however, may lead to further advantages for the members of this group but leads to an actual net loss as far as the total system is concerned. Thus a group producing automobile wheels might very well prefer




Fig. 7.3. Production of a subgroup and its value to the total enterprise. (Redrawn from Firey, 1948.)

to produce more wheels than can be efficiently utilized in the total assembly process. Under these circumstances the top executive's function is to work out a compromise between the demands of the various subgroups and the requirements of the over-all organization. The process of determining such a compromise function is suggested in Fig. 7.4. Whereas the optimum rate in terms of over-all value




Fig. 7.4. Subgroup production, value to the subgroup and to the total enterprise. (Redrawn from Firey, 1948.)

may be at point x and the optimum in terms of the particular group of workers engaged in this operation may be at point y , the compromise (frequently at least) will be worked out at point z . This means that the various subsystems are regulated in such a way that benefits accruing to the various subsystems will not get too far out of line with the benefits accruing to the enterprise considered as a totality.

This analysis is sound in terms of economic theory, and indeed it is rather persuasive. To evaluate it more carefully, we must ask who determines the relative importance of different subgroups in working out compromises? Or, to put the question in terms of our earlier analyses, whose motivations will be considered most important? Is it likely that perceptual distortion will occur in making these decisions?

Consider the situation sketched in Fig. 7.4. The utility accruing to executives, in terms of concrete motivational satisfactions, such as income, prestige, self-assertion, and the like, does not necessarily depend on large volume production. If production is curtailed, executive salaries continue; they have the same powers as before, albeit exercised over a smaller number of subordinates. To the lower level employees, on the other hand, curtailment of production is perceived as involving a serious loss of goals: either layoff or shared work will involve considerable deprivation.

In terms of our general motivational analysis, therefore, executives will be able to perceive the need for reducing production long before workers can see it; and the management decisions are going to be biased by the motives and frames of reference of executives, not by those of the workers.

It should not be assumed that the foregoing analysis is restricted in its utility to the executive-worker subgroups within a company. It also applies to subgroups within management, as for example the conflicts which frequently arise between financial, production, and sales executives. A graphic account of how subgroups within management can arise in response to changes in production, technology, or organizational structure is given by Jaques (1952). The following summary paragraph indicates something of the situation:

The middle management stratum of superintendents and departmental managers had become displaced persons in the executive system following the extensive organizational changes between 1938 and 1942. The extension of the controlling authority of both the established and the newly introduced functional managerial services had diminished the superintendent's authority over his own sphere of control and had given rise to intense feelings of loss of status. This sense of loss of status and authority was intensified by the setting up of the joint consultative system allowing for direct contact

between top management and the workers' representative, and leaving the superintendents feeling squeezed out.¹

Here we see, in fairly sharp form, the personal motivations and frustrations which are involved in a company reorganization. Although this did not lead to the development of a tightly knit group of the middle-management people, partly because of a further split between college-trained and "practical" men, it did produce a feeling of cleavage between themselves and both superiors and subordinates. Furthermore, a tendency developed for them to reject or complain about actions of top management, often on a somewhat irrational basis. This tendency obviously reduced the efficiency of the organization. In other companies the consequence has been the development of a close informal group or clique, which actively protects its members and resists control from outside the group.

Subgroups within unions also come into conflict over similar issues. In one of the establishments included in the Illini City research, workers reported a controversy between production workers and maintenance workers. It was commonly believed that the maintenance workers controlled the union; that contracts were written with a special eye to protection of maintenance group interests, and with less attention to the process group; that grievances of maintenance men got faster handling by the union officials, and so on. If such perceptions became firmly held, we could predict a splitting of the union, perhaps along AFL craft lines, as opposed to the existing industrial union. We must, in other words, assume that the same processes of group formation and functioning which led to the creation of unions can also lead to their fractionation in the absence of judicious compromises among the various interest groups within the union.² This is the task of union leaders as they attempt to preserve or strengthen the union.

Overlapping group membership. Sometimes an individual may try to retain membership in two subgroups which are splitting apart, or he may find himself in a position where he must attempt to function as a member of two groups at the same time. This overlapping is likely to create for him problems based on conflicts of valences, role expectancies, and behavioral norms. We have stressed the point that each group imposed certain expectations upon its members. Rewards

¹ Jaques (1952), p. 204. Reprinted by permission of the Dryden Press.

² For a variety of illustrations of relationships between informal worker groups and the union-management situation, see *Labor-Management Relations in Illini City*, Vol. 1 (1953), pp. 379-538, published by the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations, University of Illinois.

and punishments are available for conforming to or deviating from group norms. When the person is at the point of intersection of two groups and has membership in both, he may find that the task of conforming to both sets of norms is impossible or that he must abandon certain of the gratifications involved in one or the other to retain his position.

Group membership is a major source of security for the individual. When he is with his familiar chums, he is "on sure ground," so to speak. When he is acting out a well-known role, to which he is thoroughly accustomed, he sees the situation clearly and has no qualms about what response to make. On the other hand, novel roles and ambiguous social situations give rise to feelings of insecurity because he cannot clearly see what is required of him. A person who has overlapping memberships, or who is subject to conflict because incompatible norms are imposed upon him, experiences insecurity and disequilibrium. He is likely to become tense and anxious. He is not certain of his footing. Familiar positive goals may now be seen as negative because of conflicting standards of behavior.

The position of the foreman. Let us apply these generalizations to the specific problem of the foreman in industry. Often called the "marginal man" or "the man in the middle," he is especially exposed to the kinds of conflicts outlined above (cf. Wray, 1949). Some of his problems are represented diagrammatically in Fig. 7.5.




Fig. 7.5. An overlapping group situation. The foreman sometimes finds himself in the position of a "marginal man," subject to conflicting pressures from workers and from management, barred from many activities to which he is attracted.

This representation suggests that the foreman is attracted to various activities because of past or anticipated goal achievement. For instance, he is attracted to social participation with the workers, because he has usually been a member of their groups and has enjoyed himself in such affairs. However, his promotion to foreman is likely to bar him from continuing in this association. He is also attracted to social participation with managers, but, when he attempts to do so, he feels inadequate and inferior, not knowing how to behave in these situations. He presumably likes the power position of decision making and giving orders to workers, but either course of action threatens him with negative consequences—worker hostility and blockage of his effort, management reprimand for making wrong decisions or failing to get out production.

The Catholic in a left-wing union. Another example of overlapping groups with resultant social conflict is that of the Catholic worker who is a member of an aggressive left-wing union. Kriesberg (1949) has reported on the cross-pressures, at least as regards propaganda, encountered by a group of Catholic workers who were members of the United Electrical Workers, a union ejected from the CIO in 1949 for adopting policies too sympathetic to communism. In many respects the conflicting positive and negative valences can be represented in the same way here as for the foreman. The worker wants to be accepted by his fellow unionists; he would like to quote the same slogans, praise the same leaders, and so on. But he also craves the approval of his priest and his fellow church members.

The situation here is different in one important respect from that of the foreman. The Catholic member of the UE could escape from many of his conflicts by avoiding union meetings and by keeping the conversation on non-controversial topics when with his friends. Thus it was possible to "escape from the field" and deny or ignore the existence of the conflict. This is not possible for the foremen and for others whose jobs demand this ability to deal with two sets of role specifications.

DIMENSIONS OF GROUPS

We have now established certain basic principles of group functioning which are highly significant for an understanding of union-management relationships. Let us now turn to a problem which, though related, is essentially different: the problem of the accurate description of existing groups. Establishing the dimensions of groups is necessary if we are, for example, to make meaningful comparisons between

the union-management situations in different establishments, and relate these to other variables.

Neither sociologists nor social psychologists have yet agreed on the minimum number of group dimensions which deserve study, nor are there universally accepted definitions for those dimensions commonly utilized. Nevertheless, agreement is steadily increasing on some of these definitions. Hemphill and Westie (1950) have combed the literature and developed a set of fourteen dimensions, each of which is important, and for each of which they offer both conceptual and operational definitions. Space does not permit consideration of all of them, many of which seem not to have any clear bearing on union-management problems. Some of them, however, are obviously important to us.

Control. Hemphill and Westie define control as "the degree to which a group regulates the behavior of individuals while they are functioning as group members. It is reflected by the modifications which group membership imposes on complete freedom of individual behavior, and by the amount or intensity of group-derived government."

Control, as defined, is clearly more characteristic of management than of unions. Duties of members of management are likely to be defined by organization charts and job analyses, not to mention rigid traditions in regard to the duties of people in specified roles. Unions, on the other hand, are likely to be more loosely organized as regards both duties of officers and obligations of members.

There are, of course, variations in control when we compare one management with another. Decentralized and informal management groups exercise less control than centralized, formal groups. Obviously some unions also regulate the behavior of members more than others; the AFL building trades would rate higher on control than an industrial union such as the UAW-CIO.

High degrees of control must be assumed to be related to greater frustration of the individual, blocking him as regards some forms of motive satisfaction. Thus it is not surprising that people are generally found to be happier in informal, decentralized groups. Executives, as a rule, prefer decentralization when they are lower in the hierarchy of authority; but top executives seem to prefer centralized control, since this maximizes achievement for the man at the top. High degrees of control therefore are likely to be tolerated only when they are perceived as necessary to satisfaction of essential motives. Thus Kelly and Harrell (1949) found that members of the UMW complained about the dictatorial control in the union, but accepted it because

of the substantial success the union had shown in getting economic benefits for them. The Survey Research Center (1948) has reported that close supervision usually reduces group productivity (among office workers and among railroad maintenance workers). The opinion has also been expressed by many observers of labor relations that a legalistic, formal approach to contract administration results in more grievances and greater conflict than an informal, flexible pattern. Again, this opinion suggests that greater control leads to more frustration and more aggression.

Attitudinal climate. Two dimensions reported by Hemphill and Westie seem to be related to the attitudinal climate phenomenon in union-management relations. In the Illini City research, attitudinal climate was defined as a phenomenon ranging from an atmosphere of conflict, hostility, suspicion, and rejection to the other extreme of cooperative attitudes, acceptance, and mutual confidence. It was demonstrated in the investigation (see p. 398) that this climate could be reliably measured for different companies and that these measures fell into meaningful patterns when related to other data such as wage rates, union influence, and management policies.

Hemphill and Westie have defined two dimensions as follows: "*Hedonic tone* is the degree to which group membership is accompanied by a general feeling of pleasantness or agreeableness. It is reflected by the frequency of laughter, conviviality, pleasant anticipation of group meetings, and by the absence of griping and complaining." "*Viscosity* is the degree to which members of the group function as a unit. It is reflected by absence of dissension and personal conflict among members, by absence of activities serving to advance only the interests of individual group members, by the ability of the group to resist disrupting forces, and by the belief on the part of the members that the group does function as a unit." There seems to be substantial overlap between these two definitions. The extent to which the group is perceived as a pathway to individual gratifications will probably determine the feeling tone of pleasantness or unpleasantness, and also unity of effort. If many individuals perceive the group as frustrating to them personally, unpleasantness and dissension will follow.

It should be noted that in comparing the Hemphill-Westie definitions with attitudinal climate, we are considering the group as the whole union-management relationship. There could, theoretically at least, be pleasantness and unity within the management group and within the union group, but hostility and conflict between them. To some extent the findings on this point may be expected to differ from one establishment to another. Perceptions differ on the extent to

which union and management can be considered as a single group. One common view sees union and management as separate groups with a small area of overlap on specific functions (Fig. 7.6). The evidence presented in the Illini City study suggests that the average worker perceives the situation as a whole; that is, he tends to be satisfied with the situation and to like both company and union; or he is dissatisfied and dislikes both.¹ However, both management and union officers have shown some reluctance to adopt this view. Possible reasons for this may involve the amount of prestige and ego satis-




Fig. 7.6. Three views of the union-management relationship. (From *Labor-Management Relations in Illini City*, Vol. 1, pp. 136-138. Reprinted by permission.)

¹ For further data on the extent of dual allegiance, parallel acceptance or rejection of both company and union by workers, see the symposium, "Dual allegiance to union and management," *Personnel Psychology* (1954), 7 (Spring), pp. 41-80.

faction available to the respective group leaders under different conditions.

Morale. The term "morale" has become widely used as a term descriptive of both groups and individuals. In this book we confine its usage to groups, including the morale of the individual as a member of a group. The importance of such a qualifying clause is readily seen by an example. When workers are on strike, their morale as union members may be quite high and their morale as work-group or company-group members may be quite low.

As in the case of attitudinal climate, Hemphill and Westie define two dimensions which seem to be involved in morale. *Potency* they define as the "degree to which a group has primary significance for its members," and *viscidity* is "the degree to which members of the group function as a unit." These are logically separable, but it seems likely that they are functionally rather close to one another. We shall therefore discuss morale as if it were a single dimension, rather than attempt to slice it into components.

Morale can best be understood in terms of the extent to which individual goals have become identified with group goals. The channeling of individual effort into the attainment of the group purpose is the dynamic side of morale. On the passive side, morale is a feeling of security and confidence in the group, and an optimistic orientation toward the probability of group success. These attitudes naturally tend to be closely associated with the channeling of effort into group action.

The degree to which management is a highly structured group tends to obscure differences in morale of the management group. Skilled observers do become aware, in fairly short order, of the fact that management in one organization is relatively demoralized as compared with that of another. However, these differences may not be apparent to the outsider; sometimes an organization appears superficially to be functioning quite well and then suddenly to collapse completely. This situation is due to the fact that, as long as each individual continues to execute his personal role, the organization continues to function after a fashion. The state of morale may be very low, and the confidence of individuals in the soundness of the company, their willingness to work on behalf of the group, and so forth, may be at a low ebb; but the low morale is not apparent because the various functions are being executed on behalf of the achievement of individual goals, that is, the pay check and similar considerations.

A state of low morale in a union is much more readily detectable because there are relatively few clearly defined functions and a re-

latively small amount of individual pressure to carry on these functions. Not very many rewards and punishments are available to the union officers for inducing the membership to carry on union activities. Thus when the union membership loses confidence in the group and becomes concerned with individual goals to the exclusion of group goals, the disintegration of the union proceeds at a rapid pace.

Both military and industrial experience indicates that groups of high morale do exert more influence on members. Part of our definition of morale is that members of a high-morale group mobilize more energy to achieve group objectives and accept more frustration without rebelling against the group controls.

Air-crew morale. The attractiveness of group members, and especially of group leaders, is correlated fairly well with morale. Figure 7.7 shows the sociometric choices among members of two Naval Air Force fighter squadrons (Jenkins, 1948). Squadron A has a high proportion of positive choices inside the group, especially of the leaders. Squadron B has a much larger proportion of negative choices of leaders, and many of their positive choices are of men outside the group. It is not surprising to learn that A was rated high on morale by superior officers, whereas B was considered to be a serious morale problem.

Experimental work groups. If attractiveness of work companions makes for higher morale, an arrangement permitting workers to choose their teammates should be beneficial. Van Zelst (1952a) took advantage of the team system used by construction workers in craft unions. In housing construction the foreman normally assigns men arbitrarily to work crews. What would happen if the men were allowed their preferences in teammates?

Figure 7.8a shows the relative materials and labor costs in building rows of houses (a large subdivision project), using the old system. Then the men were given the names of others with whom they might work and asked to indicate first, second, or third choices as to preference for teammates. The foreman then assigned workers to teams, respecting these choices as far as possible. Figures 7.8b, c show results in terms of costs. The savings on both materials and labor are highly significant. The men liked the new system much better than the old.¹

Although such sociometric pairings are more difficult to arrange

¹ The importance of relations among workers as a factor affecting the supervisor's problems is well shown by Handyside in a British study (Livingstone and Handyside, 1953).




Fig. 7.7. Group morale and sociometric structure. (From Jenkins, 1948, as modified by Hartley and Hartley, 1952. Reprinted by permission. Solid lines represent favorable choices; dotted lines indicate rejections. CO and XO are the commanding officer and executive officer respectively.




Fig. 7.8. Effect of sociometric regroup of workers on construction costs: (a) Cost levels before regrouping; (b) labor costs after regrouping; (c) materials costs after regrouping. (From Van Zelst, 1952a, by permission of *Personnel Psychology, Inc.*)

in some types of factory work, the benefits of this technique merit some consideration. Certainly methods that are so well-liked and also economically beneficial deserve extension wherever possible.

Although the Survey Research Center Study (1948) of office workers at the Prudential Life Insurance Co. did not involve experimental changing of group members, it was possible to classify groups doing identical work as high or low on productivity. The high-producing groups were found to show more evidence of pride in their groups, to identify more with their work group, and to like their supervisor better. However, they did not differ as to job satisfaction nor as to attitude toward the company.

We have already noted (p. 179) that individual job satisfaction has

only slight relation to productivity. By contrast, several studies agree that productivity is related to pride in work group and to satisfaction in the work group. These observations would seem to be of considerable interest to both management and union.

Standards for admission. Groups differ, as Hemphill and Westie (1950) noted, in *permeability* or readiness of access to membership. Some groups, such as a hereditary aristocracy, are completely impermeable if one is not born into the right family. At an opposite extreme we find vaguely bounded groups such as the Republican and Democratic parties, to which almost anyone may attach himself. (He may, of course, have considerable difficulty achieving active group support, but this involves more than mere membership.)

The norms by which prospective members are evaluated may be written down and rigidly enforced, or they may be ambiguous and rarely enforced. Unwritten standards may be closely followed, as in fraternity pledging. High-prestige groups can be more fussy about admissions, since they will have more than enough applicants seeking admission to maintain the group as a going concern. Low-prestige groups may have to relax their standards or go out of business.

To translate these points into industrial terms, a company that is widely respected, pays high wages, and offers other advantages can set up a testing program and apply arbitrary personal standards in screening applicants for employment, unless the labor market is very tight. A company which does not attract so many applicants will be unable to function if it attempts to maintain rigid employment standards. Similarly, unions that offer extensive benefits may be able to follow exclusive practices, whereas others cannot afford to restrict membership.

Denial of membership in a desired group is a severe frustration to the individual. A college boy who hoped to be pledged to an exclusive fraternity and is rejected will feel much disturbed. He may turn this aggression inward upon himself (self-criticism, feelings of inadequacy), or he may turn it against the fraternity or the whole fraternity system.

Denial of employment in a desired firm is also likely to be a severe frustration. The possibility of aggression directed against the company in such a situation is quite real and important. The Boston Consolidated Gas Co. reported at one time (1939) that they were receiving 20,000 applicants for jobs yearly, and hiring about 400. If the remaining 19,600 Bostonians felt hostile to the company, this could have serious implications in terms of such possibilities as political control or municipal ownership. Management has therefore

taken pains to try to remove the feeling of arbitrary frustration (cf. Chapter 6) and keep the good will of the unsuccessful applicant. A public utility is particularly vulnerable, but many other companies now act on the assumption that this is a problem meriting close attention.

Ethnic discrimination. A form of employment discrimination which is essentially arbitrary, and therefore especially likely to evoke hostility against industry, is discrimination on grounds of nationality, religion, or color. Political restrictions have already been placed upon management (and unions) in some states to prevent such discrimination. As the educational level of minority groups rises, it will be even less easy to defend such barriers to economic success.

The extent of ethnic discrimination is always difficult to assess. For fairly obvious reasons, it would not be plausible to expect every firm to employ an exactly stratified sample of the national population or even of the community population. Neither is it reasonable, in the present climate of opinion, to expect managers to state exactly how much discrimination they practice. Keenan and Kerr (1952) hit upon the idea of asking private employment agencies how much difficulty they had in placing persons of different group characteristics.

The results are shown in Table 7.1. It is clear that there are three preferred groups (Irish, English, and German), a second group of

Table 7.1 Report from Private Employment Agencies as to Ethnic Job Discrimination*

<i>Ethnic Group</i>	"How difficult is it to place persons of _____ descent, assuming that they are qualified?†				
	<i>Always Place</i>	<i>Easily Place</i>	<i>Average Difficulty</i>	<i>Hard to Place</i>	<i>Never Place</i>
1. Irish	31	51	13	—	—
2. English	38	47	9	4	—
3. German	33	47	16	2	—
4. Slavic	4	33	51	7	—
5. Polish	4	33	49	7	—
6. Italian	2	38	38	20	—
7. Oriental	—	2	22	62	4
8. Mexican	—	2	22	56	11
9. Negro	—	2	2	44	40

* By permission of the American Psychological Association, from *Journal of Applied Psychology* (1952), 36, 362.

†Frequencies of responses are reported as percentages. Their sums horizontally are not equal to 100 because of the instances of "no reply." Respondents are 45 private employment counselors in the Chicago area.

moderate difficulty (Slavic, Polish, Italian), and a third level (Oriental, Mexican), with Negroes forming a fourth, maximum difficulty group. On religious categories, Protestants were reported as always or easily placed by 84 per cent, Catholics by 75 per cent, Jews by 9 per cent. Thus the Jews, at least in the Chicago area, were as hard to place as Orientals.¹

It has been necessary in some cases to take court action to break down union discrimination against Negroes. However, in general, industrial unions have made a virtue of necessity by appealing particularly to the need for solidarity of all workers in a plant, since a union organized on such a basis cannot function while excluding any substantial group. The AFL craft unions have been more resistant in this area, but, like management, their opposition seems to be declining. Tendencies toward friction and fragmentation within industrial groups will undoubtedly decrease as these and other arbitrary frustrations diminish in frequency.

THE GROUP AND THE INDIVIDUAL

This chapter has dealt with the phenomena of groups; their goals, norms, role expectancies, morale, and so on. Most of the discussion, necessarily, has centered around the effects of the group on its members, and its relations with other groups.

It will be worth while to insert a final reminder regarding the importance of the individual. We must keep in mind the fact that both perception (Chapter 2) and motivation (Chapter 4) have determinants that are purely individual in character, in addition to determination by group influences. As far as industrial matters are concerned, it seems clear that the group effects are substantially more important.

However, the human being in our society is a member of several groups. He is thus in a position to carry valences, perceptions, and behavioral patterns from one to another. When we add these to the purely individual factors influencing behavior, we see that this psychological analysis need not predict for man the role so grimly

¹ When we consider that labor unions, as well as the Socialist and Communist parties, derive a substantial part of their dynamic force from hostility to management, it is not surprising that all three of these organizations are likely to be attractive to Jews and Negroes. Communism, of course, represents an especially aggressive policy. Whether these people would be more frustrated under Communism is irrelevant. A man who is very angry rarely stops to count the cost of expressing his hostility.

predicted by George Orwell in his novel, *1984*—that of a mere puppet pushed here and there by totalitarian groups.

The facts that every group originates in the minds of individuals, and that its decisions, policies, and actions must be implemented by individuals, mean that groups can be modified. Mutual accommodation between groups, of course, does lead to changes in group tactics and goals. But purely individual effort can also lead to change. Roles can be modified and new roles introduced. To the extent that any single person brings about such changes, he is exercising leadership. This phenomenon is our next object of investigation.

Leadership

The industrial relations situation tends to evolve in the direction of a relationship between two organized groups, union and management. As soon as such group organization develops, differentiated social roles appear within each group; that is to say, there cannot be an organized group without certain differences in function, which are assigned to different persons within the organization. These differences on the management side are, of course, formalized in terms of organization charts showing the authority and work process relationships. On the union side they are recognized to some extent in constitutions and bylaws which define certain kinds of functions for different officers within the union structure. The importance of leadership, however, is not dependent on relations as shown on the organization charts or in statements of functions on job description sheets or in union bylaws. The importance of leadership derives from the psychological impact of the leader upon the followers. Let us first consider in an abstract way what functions can be identified as leadership functions in general. Then we shall apply these statements of leadership function to the separate groups, union and management.

Structuring the situation. The first function of a leader which we can identify is that he must structure the existing situation for his followers. The term "structure" is used here in the sense in which it has been used with reference to the perception of social situations in general; that is, each situation is likely to present the observer with a variety of cues, the interpretations of which may be highly ambiguous.

The process of structuring a situation involves such activities as interpreting these ambiguous stimuli to the followers, emphasizing certain cues and ignoring others, emphasizing certain goals and deprecating others, denying the existence of facts which might be in conflict with the proposed interpretation, and in some cases distorting the observed data to fit into the total frame of reference. All these

processes will at once be recognized as those which go on during the perceptual process (cf. Chapter 2). The leadership function which is stressed here, consequently, is that the leader must first perceive the situation in an organized way and then communicate this perception to his followers. If the followers are sufficiently receptive to this interpretation, then a group-shared frame of reference, a common way of perceiving this particular situation, will be the outcome. Thus it is possible to have unified, cooperative behavior. If the same external situation evokes a large variety of conflicting perceptions among members of an organized group, the functioning of the group breaks down. Behavior is guided by perception, and satisfactory group functioning without a fairly high degree of uniformity in group perception is inconceivable.

Barriers, rewards and punishments. A second function of the leader is that he can interpose barriers to certain forms of behavior on the part of members. These barriers may be in the form of rules and regulations, as in the case of a company executive who may take advantage of his power to forbid certain kinds of actions. Also, the rule-making power may be used to make certain forms of behavior compulsory. Thus the leader (or a leadership group, when we deal with large organizations) may be able to bar certain kinds of behavior and may be able to compel other actions on the part of members.

The third function of the leader is intimately related with this second point, in that the pressures to conform to group rules and regulations derive from rewards and punishments. This function of the leader, then, is to administer rewards to members when they behave in accordance with the goals and norms set up by the organization, and to apply punishments to members who act in ways contradictory to the welfare or established policy of the group. Rewards and punishments as a means of controlling behavior are, of course, essential to the maintenance of cooperative activity. Both laboratory and everyday psychology agree that people repeat and continue activities for which they are rewarded, and avoid activities for which they anticipate being punished. Thus the leader, to the extent that he has available rewards and punishments which can be handed out to members, has available devices for controlling their behavior.

Expression of feelings. Still a fourth function of the leader is to act as a spokesman for the group. The leader of a group should, and in fact does, express the aspirations and fears, the hopes and anxieties, the hostilities and aggressions of group members. The union executive has as one of his functions the expression of membership hos-

tility towards or agreement with management. The leader of a nation has as one of his functions the expressing of patriotic sentiments of unity, hostility towards other nations, anxiety about the presumed hostile activity of other nations, etc.

It is appropriate to notice, in connection with these general observations about leadership, that the leader must resemble in certain major respects the rank-and-file members. If, for example, in attempting to structure a situation for his followers, he has a perception of the total situation which is drastically different from that of the followers, it is improbable that he will be able successfully to communicate this divergent way of looking at the situation. In that event he is likely to cease being a leader and instead may become a scapegoat. In the same way it is impossible for the leader to function as a spokesman for the group unless he experiences to some extent the same ambitions, hopes, desires, and fears as the group membership. If he does not in fact feel these emotions, he must certainly be sensitive to them and be able to put them into a form acceptable to the group members.

There are, of course, substantial differences between the leader and his followers. If he is to structure situations, he must first understand them himself. His intelligence must be at least superior to the average of his group. If he is to define duties and functions for others, he must be capable of firm decision and persistence in the face of opposition. As we shall see later, the evidence tends to support these predictions.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MANAGEMENT LEADER

If we now attempt to apply this theoretical sketch of leadership function to the concrete day-to-day tasks of the leader within management, we find that most of the ordinary activities of the executive fit comfortably into these four generalized statements. First of all, let us consider the principle that the leader must structure the situation for his followers. Top executives must not only set up company policies but also define and interpret these policies to people in the lower echelons. There is no such thing as a self-executing policy. Policy represents a general line of activity within an organization which must be interpreted when applied to concrete situations. Thus policies with regard to sales, production, finance, and labor-management relations are constantly in need of being clarified and defined as they apply to a particular real situation.

For example, when management finally agrees to sign a contract with a labor union after many years of operating as an open shop, this

concession may be made in all good faith by the people in top management. The contract is signed, and official policy of the organization with respect to dealings with the union is thereby established. However, executives in the lower brackets will have certain habits and ways of behaving that have been built up over many years. Unless top management clearly structures this new situation for these managerial people, the result is likely to be continuous sabotage of the contract at lower levels, even though the intentions of the people at the top were entirely honest. In one of the establishments in Illini City, such a situation still existed. Although the collective bargaining relationship had been established about six years before the time of our investigation, many foremen and minor executives still had not accepted the restructuring of the situation from the old individualistic relationship to the new type of group relationship. The responsibility for this, at least in substantial degree, rested on top management, which had accepted the union for bargaining purposes but had not made a serious attempt to structure the situation for lower level executives so that they would know what kind of actions to carry out in implementing the new policy.

In part, this leadership function involves the question of defining the union as an object of perception. What does the union look like to members of management? During the period of open-shop operations, and especially during a period when open warfare exists as the union attempts to gain a foothold and management offers bitter opposition, the union is likely to be perceived as a dangerous, threatening, un-American, and, indeed, nasty group of people. This perception is, of course, appropriate to behavior of hostility and non-cooperation. If, however, the official company policy changes to one of accepting the union as a legitimate part of the enterprise, presumably therefore sanctioning behavior of cooperation with the union, then these perceptions must change. This does not happen automatically. In Illini City, in many firms perceptions of the union were still highly unfavorable, and it was no coincidence that in these same firms the general state of labor-management relations was poor (see Stagner, 1955). The task of the leader in any organization, then, is to define the characteristics of the out-group, and to communicate this definition to members of his own group. If the leader of the management organization does not in fact communicate a redefinition of the union to minor executives, then the change in policy will not be followed by a change in effective industrial cooperation.

Focus on goals. Another aspect of this first general function is to maintain focus on the major goals of the company. It is oftentimes

tempting to an executive, particularly in view of the importance of self-assertation and ego expansion in labor-management relations, to become focused on opposition to unions as a major goal of life and tend to ignore the other fundamental goals of the organization, such as profitability of operations, continuity of production, good customer relationships, etc. Excessive focusing by any particular individual upon some subgoal (such as union opposition) and losing sight of the major company goals lead to inefficient and maladaptive behavior as far as the company is concerned. The effective top-level leader does a good job of keeping his eye on the main goals of the organization and is willing to compromise on minor controversies if in so doing he can make progress toward a major goal.

Working rules. The function of the leader in erecting barriers and imposing compulsions with regard to certain forms of activity is so obvious as regards management executives that it hardly needs any clarification. The whole task of establishing work rules within a company, insistence upon certain kinds of production and sales activities, and carrying out certain kinds of relationships with organized labor, are all parts of the day-to-day activity of a higher level executive. If the leader imposes too many barriers or too many compulsions upon his followers, they will lead to excessive frustration, and hostility will be generated against his leadership. Such frustration and hostility may result either in the loss of the member, who goes elsewhere, or in revolt against leadership within the organization, which may cause the unseating of the top executive. This reaction can happen, of course, in a management group as well as in a union.

Incentives. The third generalized function is also rather obvious in the case of management. The executive does, in fact, apply rewards and punishments to minor executives at all times. Indeed, the whole incentive system within management is one of offering certain kinds of rewards to the younger executive just entering the organization, and also threatening him with punishment if he fails to conform to company policies and requirements. These rewards and punishments may be economic, or they may involve recognition, security, prestige, and so on. Through judicious manipulation of such incentives, the effective leader can build a high degree of loyalty in his staff members.

Formal vs. informal leaders. Before leaving this topic of managerial leadership, let us note a distinction between "formal leaders" and "informal leaders." The formal leader is one whose status is sanctioned by an organization chart, an appointment, an election, etc. However, his subordinates may not follow his lead; for example, if they perceive him as ill-informed, they will reject his definition of a

new situation. Instead, they may seek a leader from within their own group. This individual, being spontaneously chosen without any formal sanction, can be labeled the "informal leader."

It is common to find, in studying a particular establishment, that authority diverges sharply from the lines on the organization chart. One foreman may in fact be the leader for two or three departments. A staff man may be making decisions that theoretically belong to line executives. A production worker, or a union steward, may play a leadership role where the foreman is weak or inexperienced. (The steward is formally chosen for one set of functions, but may informally take on others.)

A leader executes the same functions, whether formally or informally chosen. The discrepancy here emphasized is important for two reasons: first, it calls attention to the fact that a leader derives his authority in large part from his followers, even though it is believed that, in industry, power resides at the top and is delegated downwards. The leader must not venture to ignore the norms, perceptions, and goals of his followers. Second, these informal leaders make good formal leaders. A worker who is thus chosen by his fellows has one of the requisites of a good foreman. Hence sociometric methods are being used as part of a program of selecting new recruits to the ranks of management.

FUNCTIONS OF THE UNION LEADER

In many respects the role of the leader is more important in a union than in a company. In the latter, once jobs have been planned and a work flow established, the organization will keep going at a modest level of efficiency without top leadership for some time. The union is considerably less differentiated as to specific jobs and union members will constantly encounter ambiguous situations, for which they cannot determine the appropriate action to advance union goals. Thus, the leader plays an important part in interpreting these situations, influencing the behavior of the membership very substantially.

The roles of the national officer and of the field representative of the national union are particularly important here. As compared to the local officers, these men have wider experience of union-management problems, greater skill at interpreting what is happening, and a more extensive repertoire of possible solutions. Further, their positions give them prestige in the eyes of local officers and members. Thus, when ambiguous situations require structuring, the national officers can be of surprising influence. This is particularly clear in a

highly centralized union like the United Mine Workers (cf. pp. 428-430), but it is true in almost all unions. A skillful field representative can point to factors that justify a large or a small wage demand, pressure for fringe benefits, strike action or no strike, and so on. By virtue of the considerations enumerated above, he can usually induce the local members to see the situation as he defines it for them, and thus in effect can guide their policies in negotiation and in grievance handling. (This is subject to certain limitations based on the attitudinal climate in the plant—see p. 389 for an example.)

The union leader's task is made easier by the lack of a differentiated organizational structure, but it is made more difficult by virtue of his lack of rewards and punishments to administer. Whereas the company executive has pay increases, promotions, prestige, power, and other positive valences which he can grant or withhold, the union official normally must rely on recognition and idealistic satisfaction as rewards to individuals. Only rarely does he have economic rewards at his disposal, and then only for a few men who may go on the payroll for organizing and similar jobs. Similarly, the manager has such punishments as layoffs, reprimands, and discharges, whereas the union officer must rely on group disapproval and perhaps expulsion from the union (which is not always easy to manage and in some cases is not an effective punishment).

These factors limit, although they do not abolish, the union leader's function as dispenser of rewards and punishments. They result as a rule in his reliance upon "psychological" incentives, i.e., those determined by relations to the other members: praise, prestige, recognition, approval. By careful use of these techniques, he induces cooperation and effort on behalf of the goals of the union.

The leader as spokesman. One function is far more characteristic of the union leader than of the manager. This is in respect to the role of spokesman for feelings, demands, hostilities, and insecurities among the workers. Few company officials would consider it their function to try to express what their workers, or even the minor executives, felt on certain issues. The typical executive is more likely to express his own ideas and assume that these represent the best interests of the employees, whether or not the latter recognize this fact.

The union leader functions as spokesman in a variety of ways. He may, for example, provide catharsis for aggressions by verbally attacking the employer. An outside organizer can make these attacks without fear of punishment, since he cannot be discharged; the workers cheer and applaud these hostile manifestations, but when they are open to retaliation, they keep their mouths shut. The outside representative

may serve this same function during negotiations; he may ritually attack the employer as an expression of feeling on behalf of the employees (cf. p. 391).

The union leader must also be able to verbalize the demands of the membership, and offer plausible arguments for these demands. In many cases this "spokesman" function may miss the mark, because he (like the company official) overestimates the importance of economic motivations. He may demand pay increases when the real grievances of the workers are in the realm of ego frustrations. However, it must be noted that these ego demands are extraordinarily difficult to voice, and might well be impossible to gratify, rooted as they are in needs ill-adapted to the impersonal routines of mass-production enterprise.

A third, and increasingly important, spokesman function is that of presenting the union's case to the public. This has become especially true at the national level, where men like Walter Reuther and Dave Beck engage in considerable activity that is intended primarily to influence persons who are neither union members nor employers. The formulation of legislative programs, proposals for conferences and similar public relations devices, and the delivery of speeches to public groups come in this category. As we shall note below, the typical union leader is not educated to the level of his managerial counterpart; however, as more college-trained men enter union officialdom, this handicap will tend to diminish. At present it must be granted that union leaders are performing their public relations function fairly well; better, perhaps than some conspicuous members of the executive group.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND LEADER TRAITS

In identifying the major leadership tasks of industry and union leaders, we have specified certain similarities and differences in the groups within which they operate. In industry, power is explicitly concentrated at the top and is delegated downward to the extent required (often far less than top executives say that it is). In the union, power is theoretically concentrated at the rank-and-file level and is delegated upward; as with management, practice often deviates from theory, in that the delegation of power may become both more extensive and more permanent than is intended. Industry involves many highly technical functions, which require that the leader have either first-hand knowledge or college training to equip him to direct them. Only since World War II have most unionists tackled such technicalities as pension and insurance plans; this need is being met by hiring staff men with expert knowledge in these fields. The chief skill re-

quired of the union leader is psychological, for he must sense the feelings of his members, in order to lead them, and must also use psychological rewards in the absence of economic incentives.

These differences define for us, in at least a limited fashion, the effective environment within which each kind of leader must operate. These environmental considerations determine what kind of personality can achieve leadership. There is no such thing as a "general leadership personality"; leadership is always relative to a situation. On the other hand, some personalities are inadequate to leadership under any circumstances that we can imagine, whereas some personalities can lead in one context but not in another. In brief, both situation and personality are determinants of leadership potential.¹

On the basis of the environmental differences noted, we can predict certain differences in personal characteristics of individuals who are likely to be successful in management or in union leadership. It seems safe, for example, to state that technical education will help achieve success in management, whereas it is not likely to help anyone achieve high status in a union. Having a working-class family background, on the other hand, should make a man more acceptable to union members, but it would have zero or perhaps even negative value with respect to managerial status. Because of the relative power distributions, we can hypothesize that managers are more often men who have strong drives for individual power and achievement, whereas union posts attract men who have strong needs for group acceptance and security. Union leaders must almost as an essential have considerable sensitivity to the attitudes and feelings of their members, whereas this trait is considerably less important to success in management (it may have more, in the immediate future). The foregoing list is by no means exhaustive, but it suggests some of the psychological differences that we might expect to find when we compare groups of successful leaders in unions and in industry.

Studies of background characteristics. Let us first consider a few studies that identify similarities and differences of managers and union leaders. One of the main problems here is that of determining comparability of the two groups. It is not appropriate to take a group of business leaders who are heads of billion-dollar corporations and compare them with shop stewards. However, clear-cut criteria for comparability are not available. The data thus do not lend themselves

¹ The literature on personality traits related to leadership has been carefully reviewed by Stogdill (1948) and that on situational factors in leadership by Hemphill (1949).

to sharply defined comparisons and especially not to tests of statistical significance. With this caution, let us skim some of the facts available.

In a study of Illinois leaders, we arbitrarily limited ourselves to full-time paid union officials and to company executives who devoted most of their time to labor relations problems.¹ This eliminated from the union sample stewards and local officers, as well as national leaders; it eliminated from the management sample both top executives and foremen, as well as sales and other managers not directly related to labor. Table 8.1 shows some background factors differentiating the 46 executives from 40 union leaders.

Table 8.1 Social Background Factors for Illinois Union and Management Leaders

	<i>Managers</i>	<i>Unionists</i>
<i>Father's occupation:</i>		
Business owner or manager	42%	2%
Professional man	15	0
Clerical	17	2
Farmer	6	2
Skilled worker	12	27
Unskilled worker	8	55
<i>Family status:</i>		
Above average of community	39	8
Average	39	64
Below average	23	28
<i>First job:</i>		
Manual	12	76
White-collar	87	24

These data suggest that class origin has much to do with leadership success. Over half of the executives came from business-professional families, as against 2% of the unionists; over half of the latter group had fathers who were unskilled laborers, as against 8% of the executives. The data also show a tendency for the business leaders to come from families that are above-average economically, although this tendency is less clear-cut than the occupational differences.

The importance of family background factors in managerial success is further documented by Dalton (1951), who found that belonging to the right church and the best clubs, having the preferred nationality background, and similar factors were essential to promotion through the managerial hierarchy. This is a manifestation of the "mutual assistance" function of groups sketched in Chapter 7.

¹ A detailed technical report of this investigation is in preparation. Other references to it will be found on pp. 151 and 246.

These trends can be supported by a variety of other studies. Wald (1954) reported on 33 top executives—men earning more than \$20,000 yearly, occupying top policy posts in enterprises grossing at least \$5 million a year. His figures on father's occupation duplicate those for managers in Table 8.1 to within a couple of points; on family socioeconomic status, his group reported their family standing higher than that shown in Table 8.1. Sorokin (1925) showed for a group of 248 "millionaires" born after 1860 that only 20% started in poor families and 28% in middle-class surroundings—52% being born into well-to-do homes.

Education and intelligence. As regards education, the data indicate that top industry executives are likely to be college-trained. In the highly select group studied by Wald, 67% were college graduates and an additional 27% had some advanced training. Other studies of business executives indicate a high educational average. Mills (1948) reports that AFL and CIO leaders were better educated than the general population, but only 25% to 33% had attended college (Table 8.2).

Table 8.2 Education of Labor Leaders and of the Adult Population*

	Adult Population	Labor Leaders	
		AFL	CIO
College	10%	25%	33%
High school graduate	14	14	23
Some high school	15	26	24
Grammar school	57	34	20
None	4	1	—

* Based on national, state, and city leaders: 227 AFL, 172 CIO. From Mills (1948), p. 72. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt, Brace & Co.

Are there substantial differences in intelligence to go along with these educational differences? The data cast doubt on such an interpretation. Table 8.3 shows a comparison of 135 plant operating executives (from 35 different companies), 256 foremen from 50 companies, and 64 union stewards and local union officers (from 14 local

Table 8.3 Test Performance of Executives, Foremen, and Stewards*

	Executives	Foremen	Stewards
Word meanings	24	13	20
Logical relations	16	10	13
Arithmetic	10	7	8
Logical analysis	5	2	4

* From Rothe (1950). Reprinted by permission of *Factory Management and Maintenance*.

unions) taken from a study by Rothe (1950). The establishments overlapped, but obviously were far from identical. A look at the table indicates that the steward group is only slightly inferior in intelligence to the plant executives, whereas the foremen lag far behind both.

Wald's highly select group does make unusually high scores on a standard intelligence test; all but two of the 33 were above the 86 per cent level of an industrial population. Even when tested against norms that corrected for age and education, these executives were still clearly superior. Thus both the Rothe study and that by Wald indicate that executives above the foreman level are of superior intelligence, but not as far above union officers as the educational differences would have indicated. Evidently, in either type of organization, intelligence favors the achievement of a leadership position.

Studies of personality factors. Motivational and temperamental characteristics might be expected to have more impact upon career choice and social role than intelligence. There is considerable evidence to support this generalization.

In our study of Illinois unionists and labor relations executives, it was hypothesized that the union men would show more need for group acceptance and security, whereas the company officials would show more concern for individual power and achievement. These hypotheses were tested by structured projective materials, photographs with verbal items underneath to which the individual responded by pressing a key (indicating his choice of one of the alternative answers). In general, the results supported the hypotheses mentioned. Executives chose alternatives that indicated a power orientation, whereas the unionists preferred answers along the lines of being accepted in a group, of being protected and secure.¹ These differences might well explain why these men were selectively attracted to their present social roles; i.e., they were drawn to roles that offered the greatest chance to satisfy their major social needs.

The objection could be raised to this conclusion that these men may have been modified by their roles; this would suggest that they may have been similar at first, but came to enjoy those satisfactions which were available in the role provided by chance. To test this interpretation, we presented the same pictures to a class of engineering students. When these men were divided, by a union-attitude scale, into pro-union and anti-union groups, these groups chose answers

¹ It should be noted that these are average trends only; many in each group chose the answer preferred by the opposing group. However, the differences noted are significant at the 5% level or better.

resembling those of the union and executive samples. The pro-union choices resembled the union leaders' responses, and vice versa. Thus the evidence favors the view that these men were selectively attracted to a place in union or in management because of motives that were important aspects of their personalities.

Successful and unsuccessful executives. Studies of personality characteristics of union leaders are rare. However, the company official has received more attention. We have already cited the investigation by Henry (1949) which compared relatively successful and relatively unsuccessful middle-management men. For our purposes it would be useful to know whether success in human relations was part of the criterion, but, unfortunately, this information has not been made available. The results are still relevant to our topic.

Henry reports that, as compared with the unsuccessful group, his successful cases had relatively high drive for achievement. They perceived themselves as hard-working and as needing continuing accomplishments to be happy. This, he asserts, was not merely a desire for glory, which might be just as strong in the unsuccessful men. (However, he notes that his successful group showed strong desires for status in the company or the community; his differentiation is not clear.)

The successful men in Henry's study had an accepting attitude toward their superiors; they did not perceive authority figures as destructive or threatening, whereas many of the unsuccessful group showed this tendency. As regards subordinates, the successful men had a detached, impersonal attitude, with little indication of sensitivity or understanding of feelings.

The trends that he reports are compatible with the analysis of organizational structure sketched earlier in this chapter. A man who desires success in a company must be motivated to work hard (as indeed he must be in a union). But he must have an accepting attitude toward his superior, or he will be out of a job—or prevented from rising. A similarly accepting attitude toward subordinates is not required for success—since subordinates cast no votes on promotions. (This is an important difference from the union situation.)

Consideration of the actual tasks of the leader indicates other reasons why sensitivity to emotional states and needs is more crucial to the unionist. As an organizer he must identify individual dissatisfactions and channel them into collective action; as a negotiator he must find the demands that are common to the largest number of members and try to incorporate them into the union-management contract. By contrast, the foreman, and even the higher executive, is concerned

with organizational demands which are formulated by a single person or a very small group; it is assumed that the system of pay and promotion automatically takes care of fitting individual needs to company routines. (The inaccuracy of this assumption should now be obvious.)

This point can perhaps be stressed by mentioning another kind of investigation. Sensitivity to others can be studied in a variety of ways; Henry based his conclusions chiefly on projective test responses, e.g., to T.A.T. pictures. Kerr (1947) has developed an objective test which measures a kind of sensitivity (or at least understanding) in relationship to the hypothetical "average man." His test consists of items such as "What music does the average non-office factory worker prefer at work?" "What does the average American choose to read?" "What experiences will be most annoying to the average person?" Since normative data are available which tell what typical populations of these groups have answered, an objective key is utilized in scoring. Kerr and Speroff (1954) report that scores on the "empathy test" correlate .71 with ratings of automobile salesmen by their managers, and .44 with actual sales records; this seems plausible since an understanding of the "average man" is important to successful selling. Van Zelst (1952c) found the median empathy score for 64 AFL business agents to be 112, whereas the score for 124 rank-and-file members was only 74. Several measures of successful performance by the business agents correlated from .38 to .64 with empathy score, and a "leadership ranking" by four district officers of these 64 business agents correlated .67 with empathy score.

Even more interesting, relative to our immediate concern, is the comparison of these union business agents with industrial foremen. The median score of 110 supervisors was only 82, as compared with the median of 112 for the business agents. Only 5 per cent of the foremen scored as high as 112. Thus, whether executives and foremen cannot, or simply do not try to, understand the average worker, the union business agent seems to have considerable superiority in this respect. Since the members could terminate his position if he failed badly in this respect, whereas the workers cannot terminate that of the foreman, we can readily see the logic of these findings.

Alternate paths to success. The possibility is worth considering that many individuals have the dynamic structure, personal sensitivity, intelligence, and other characteristics in such a combination that they are potential leaders in either union or management. If this is true, then chance, or encountering a barrier along one path, may determine the individual's career pattern. Figure 8.1 presents a way of conceiving this process. If the man's goal is success (upward mobility,

prestige, status in the community), he may have open to him two paths or courses of action. One involves hard work, preparation for better jobs, conformity to management philosophy, etc. The other requires the channeling of energy into union activity. Now let us suppose that the employee has worked vigorously to progress along the management path but finds it barred at a certain point. He may then turn to the union as an outlet for his ambition. (Note that Walter Reuther, for example, was a toolroom foreman at Ford until he was laid off during the early years of the depression.)

Imberman (1950) assumes such a view as this when he proposes




Fig. 8.1. Union activity as an alternate goal-seeking technique.

a social frustration interpretation of the aggressive behavior of labor leaders. This view would suggest that the unionist wants to achieve the social status and acceptance freely granted to the high-level business executive. But in fact we know that union officials, regardless of their education, "polish," conversational skills, and so on, are not accorded either the social acceptance or the prestige that accrue to the businessman. Imberman suggests that the union officer would show less aggression and hostility if he were allowed to achieve these goals.

Detailed evidence to support this thesis would be difficult to obtain. Projective testing and clinical interviewing of successful union leaders might uncover relevant data, and, on the other hand, they might not. An interesting, if somewhat indirect, confirmation comes from a study by Lieberman (1954) involving a follow-up of rank-and-file workers who later took positions either as foremen or as stewards. These employees were first tested as part of a company-wide survey covering some 2500 workers. A little over a year later, it was found that 23

of them had been promoted to foremen, and 35 had accepted positions as stewards. Retests were then administered to these two groups and to carefully matched groups who had not become either foremen or stewards.

Perhaps Lieberman's most striking finding is the extent to which the foremen-to-be and stewards-to-be resembled each other on the first testing. Both were relatively *dissatisfied* with their jobs. Both gave indications of intelligence superior (on a very rough measure) to the rest of the group. Both felt that they had more ability than their co-workers; and both reported having read the union-management contract decidedly oftener than the work force as a whole. A picture begins to develop of men who are rather highly motivated, frustrated by their present jobs, and restlessly seeking a channel for their energies in a direction leading to upward mobility. This picture would be compatible with the hypothesis suggested above.

It should not be assumed that Lieberman found no differences between the foremen-to-be and the stewards-to-be. The foreman group was better-educated (61 per cent high school, as compared to 43 per cent for the stewards and 34 per cent for the total group). The foremen had more dependents, and they were "home-town" boys to a greater extent. On the original questionnaire, both groups indicated willingness to take either a foreman role or a steward role more often than the total group, but 78 per cent of the foremen-to-be were willing to take a foreman's job, whereas only 26 per cent were willing to become stewards. Thus there is some slanting of the foreman-to-be toward a culturally stable, locally anchored career, preferably with management, whereas the stewards-to-be are more mobile, less identified with the community culture, and more friendly to the union.¹

We should not be surprised at Lieberman's finding that both foremen-to-be and stewards-to-be were relatively dissatisfied in rank-and-file jobs. As we noted in Chapter 6, frustration may arise for a highly motivated employee under conditions that do not seem frustrating to other workers. Also, more intelligent employees are likely

¹ On the retest, Lieberman found some truly surprising switches in attitude which could only be ascribed to the new social role. The foremen changed from attitudes relatively critical of the company to wholehearted acceptance of company philosophy, whereas the stewards showed practically no change in attitude toward the company. The stewards, however, shifted decidedly to a pro-union position (from a relatively critical attitude), whereas the foremen shifted from somewhat critical to decidedly critical of the union. Thus the assumption of a social role tends to modify related perceptions and attitudes very significantly.

to become restless under routine work conditions. Thus high motivation and high ability may actually increase dissatisfaction at lower levels, and, if the individual cannot see any reasonable probabilities of advancement, he is likely to switch to a different path of action which seems more promising in the near future.

LEADER-FOLLOWER RELATIONS

As regards both company and union officials, leadership depends on the attitudes of the followers. This dependence is clear in the case of the union leader whose members may depose him by election, take the local into another union, disband the union, etc. Very few union officers can hold their posts in the face of determined membership opposition. But the same is true of company executives to a lesser degree. The foreman gives order which are executed if they fall within an area accepted by the group as permissible. An order to a worker to expose himself needlessly to danger would be rejected, and many other orders are silently ignored or quietly sabotaged. Even within the executive structure there are dissents from top-management edicts, and effective leadership may become literally impossible on occasion. The chief recourse of the discontented minor executive is individual resignation, but groups have been known to quit in a body; and they have also been known to communicate with the board of directors in an effort to remove the frustrating top executive.

Most people accept, and indeed prefer, some degree of leadership in their daily activities. In the absence of leadership, one must analyze alternatives and make decisions for himself; many of us do not like to do this and may build up considerable anxiety about it. When situations become confused, chaotic, or highly ambiguous, the craving for a strong leader may reach a high pitch; such conditions foster the rise of a Hitler or a Stalin.

The leader-follower relationship reinstates the parent-child situation. As a child one learns not to trust his own judgment; father is wise, his decisions are safest, one avoids pain by leaning on him. Thus the average person has some residue of a dependency habit and a dependency motive which influences his adult behavior. If now we postulate that modern society presents many problems for which average intelligence, education, and information are inadequate, we can readily understand why so many citizens are only too happy to lean on the wisdom of the employer, the union boss, the political chieftain, or a religious adviser. Slightly over half of the population studied by Sanford (1950) fell into the "authoritarian" category and

might be expected to prefer to follow a leader. Actually, depending on conditions, we might find 75 per cent to 90 per cent of the population seeking leadership. Most of us do not shoulder readily the burdens of responsibility. This does not mean that we accept uncomplainingly a leader who fails to consider our ideas and preferences. We have already shown (pp. 163-169) that executives who ignore the ego motives of employees provoke considerable dissatisfaction.

Structuring and consideration. A major task of the leader is to structure the situation for his followers. Another is to distribute rewards and punishments in the group. It has often been suggested that these two tasks are somewhat incompatible, in the sense that structuring usually involves giving orders and, at the very least, depriving the follower of some freedom of choice. It is likely to require that the leader ignore the personal needs of the follower. But in his task of distributing rewards, the leader must be sensitive to needs and frustrations, encourage individuals, praise them for effort even if results are poor, and so on.

A study of actual leader behavior indicates that, although these two kinds of behavior are not incompatible, they are almost completely independent of each other. Fleishman, Harris, and Burt report on asking foremen to check various items as they applied to the foremen's immediate supervisor. These items were then intercorrelated and factor-analyzed, with the result that two independent dimensions of leader behavior were identified (see Table 8.4). The factor that

Table 8.4 Sample Items Illustrating Factors in Leadership Behavior*

<i>Items heavily loaded on Consideration</i>		<i>Loading</i>
He refuses to give in when people disagree with him		-.68
He does personal favors for the foremen under him		.40
He expresses appreciation when one of us does a good job		.70
He is easy to understand		.70
He demands more than we can do		-.40
He helps his foremen with their personal problems		.32
<i>Items heavily loaded on Initiating Structure</i>		<i>Loading</i>
He encourages overtime work		.40
He tries out his new ideas		.42
He rules with an iron hand		.58
He criticizes poor work		.59
He talks about how much should be done		.60
He encourages slow-working foremen to greater efforts		.33

* From Fleishman, Harris, and Burt (1955), by permission of the Bureau of Educational Research, Ohio State University. Negative loadings, of course, mean that a "no" answer gets a positive weight on the factor involved.

was heavily loaded with items relating to planning, coordination, work standards, clarity of orders, etc., has naturally been labeled Initiating Structure. The factor that includes items relating to thoughtful treatment of persons, giving praise, listening to complaints, and the like, was labeled Consideration.

Initiating structure and giving consideration are obviously two major dimensions of the managerial leader's task. In the light of our comments on ego frustrations, it is apparent that failure to give consideration has been a significant source of job dissatisfaction and of consequent problems on the job. However, inadequacies as regards structuring can also cause trouble. The foreman who cannot make up his mind, who gives vague orders and then scolds because results are not what he expected, who fails to schedule operations so that all activities mesh smoothly is a potent source of trouble in the plant.

Fleishman's results are closely paralleled by the work of Rupe (1951), who studied executives of somewhat higher level. His two factors were labeled Technical Competence and Social Responsibility to Subordinates and to Society. However, examination of specific items indicates that these are similar to Initiating Structure and Consideration. Rupe reports that morale of the work force (as rated by subordinates) is closely related to Consideration or Social responsibility. This finding supports our interpretation that the behavior of the leader in accepting, recognizing, and respecting subordinates has a decisive impact on job satisfaction in the work group.¹

Workers' desire to be consulted. Although followers like to be able to pass responsibility for decisions to a leader, they resent being ignored. Most of them like to have a chance to express an opinion, to be consulted about details of their job assignment. Jacobson (1951), analyzing returns from some 400 automobile workers, states that 70 per cent believed the foreman should consult them about work assignments, and 84 per cent felt that the union steward should discuss union matters with them before taking action. It is no doubt significant that more democracy is demanded of the union than of the management.

In sharp contrast to desired consultation is their report of practice: 45 per cent say the foreman hardly ever consults them, and 14 per cent say the same of the steward. Thus almost half the workers are getting no opportunity to express their ideas about job conditions,

¹ Fleishman (1951) found that departments relatively high in grievance rates were those which were described by workers as having leadership relatively low in consideration, high in structuring.

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¹ Fleishman (1951) found that departments relatively high in grievance rates were those which were described by workers as having leadership relatively low in consideration, high in structuring.

and a fair percentage are not having a chance to talk about union affairs with the departmental steward.

It is worth citing that the foremen and stewards claim otherwise. Both say that they call workers in for consultation to a greater extent than was indicated above. Only 8 per cent of the stewards admit failure to discuss matters with the workers, and only 21 per cent of the foremen. By both accounts, workers get more chance to express themselves on union than on company affairs; this is plausible in terms of the "command philosophy" of management.

Do these practices make any difference? It is clear from Jacobson's data that the workers respond favorably to opportunities to participate. In departments where they report that the steward consults them, they are more pro-union. If the steward consults them and the foreman does not, they are even more pro-union. Consultation by the foreman seems to make little difference in pro-management attitudes, but does decrease the frequency of anti-management attitudes.

The extent of dissatisfaction with company and with union, based on absence of consultation, would make an important research problem. It seems safe to predict that workers may report a substantial degree of frustration as regards both job and union in this respect. For example, according to the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* (March, 1952), only 33 per cent of a sample of CIO members feel that "members have enough say" about the union policies; 42 per cent of AFL members agree. Although this question has not been asked in precisely this way regarding "having enough to say" on job conditions, it is apparent from the studies of employee satisfaction (cf. pp. 163-169) that rather similar findings should be expected. Ego motivations are very strong, and leaders on both the industry and the union side tend to ignore them, often with unpleasant results. Managers have had the worker's desire for recognition impressed forcefully upon their thinking. Union officers, as a result of union growth, more technical problems, bureaucracy, etc., have also become remote from the rank-and-file. These trends could lead to the same troubles as those encountered earlier by industry.

We may conclude that effective leader-follower relations depend on the basic psychological principles elaborated earlier in this volume. The successful leader is one who perceives clearly the nature of the situation facing the organization; he must be able to identify barriers and find the path of least resistance to the most significant goals of his group. Further, he must perceive accurately the emotional needs, hostilities, and anxieties of his followers, and he must either express or devise action calculated to meet these needs. "Human relations training" which is now being widely used by management (cf. Chapter


10) and to some extent by unions (cf. Chapter 11) seeks to develop these perceptual skills and also to teach specific techniques for handling the problems involved. It seems plausible to hope that extension of such training will improve to a perceptible degree the quality of industrial relations.

Value of personal communication. Nostalgic ruminations about "the good old days" in employer-employee relations often stress the importance of personal communications from boss to worker and vice versa. To the extent that these memories are valid, they would tend to reinforce the points already mentioned, with respect to an awareness by leaders of the problems and needs of followers. Another important aspect of this relationship is the matter of communication. If the employer is to structure situations adequately for his employees, or the union officer for his members, there must be some communication. This may be impersonal, by newspapers and letters for example; or it may be through intermediaries, like foremen; or it may be face-to-face conversation. We have cited evidence (p. 320) that personal communication tends to be associated with, and perhaps to induce, higher job satisfaction; certainly such communication tends to satisfy the desire of the follower for some recognition from his superior in the organization.

Some evidence that personal contact with the top executive in industry improves attitudes is offered in a study conducted by the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* (Fig. 8.2). This study shows large differences between groups of employees who say that they are "personally acquainted" with the head of the company (about one-fourth of union members fell into this category) and employees who say that they are "unacquainted" with him (for union members, about one-third). As Fig. 8.2 indicates, those who have personal acquaintance with the boss approve of him, approve of his way of handling the company, and approve of his attitudes toward employees far more than the "unacquainted" group. These observations tend to support the view that the effective leader is the one who establishes a feeling of personal contact with his followers. Industrial television may offer some interesting experimental opportunities in this respect.

Satisfaction with business leadership appears to be somewhat higher than that with union leadership. In the study just cited, it was found that 61 per cent of employees rated the top executive as doing a "very good job" of running the company. In contrast, a survey of union members only, by the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* (March, 1952), led to a similar rating for only 36 per cent of labor union leaders. It must be noted, however, that the question about the boss related to "running the company"—opinions of him on other points were less

Employees Who Know The Big Boss Well
Rate Him High



Employees very well
acquainted with
the boss

Employees
unacquainted
with boss

89%	The boss lives up to his promises	50%
70%	Is more interested in company than in himself	44%
80%	Does a good job of running the company	44%
83%	Is interested in what happens to employees	41%
59%	Tries to pay higher wages as the company prospers	27%
71%	Works hard on the job	26%
79%	The kind one would pick for a friend	18%

Fig. 8.2. Employee approval of the "big boss."
(From *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, October, 1948,
by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.)

favorable. Further, the union questions did not specify a top-level leader; hence the unfavorable reaction may have been to lower-echelon officials; as we know, workers often dislike the foreman much more than higher managers.

PERSONALITIES IN INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT

The foregoing analyses of leadership functions, leadership behaviors, and leader-follower relations have been organized primarily around an interactional approach, using the concepts of social psychology. It is possible also to assert that clinical psychology can make important contributions to our study of factors in industrial conflict. Every objective "real" situation becomes a guide to action only when it is perceived by some observer. Clinicians know only too well how such perceptions can be distorted by inner tensions, by

wishes, fears, and hostilities. It seems entirely plausible that a moderately harmonious union-management relationship might be distorted into conflict by a single neurotic leader, or a few leaders, who persistently misunderstood issues and motives and felt impelled to attack the opposing side for these or other reasons.

Personality "types" in union and management. We are in urgent need of clinical data on the personality make-up of union and management leaders in firms where relationships are harmonious, and in firms where conflict is the rule. Such data will have to be checked carefully against studies of the work situation, to differentiate between realistic, situation-oriented aggressions, and neurotic, personally centered hostility. We must expect that a neurotically overaggressive leader will perceive signs of hostility everywhere, and by his behavior will elicit counteraggression. An insecure leader may think he observes threats, efforts to undermine his power, and may react against them. Because of the greater freedom of action of the industrial executive, it is probable that personal maladjustment on the company side can stir up a great deal more trouble than corresponding conditions among the top union officers. However, it is plausible to suspect that such personality defects in either camp can have serious consequences.

McMurry (1949) has offered a brief "typology" of "some of the more common types of persons who cause trouble in labor-management relations." He finds these to a considerable extent in both camps, but writes about them separately. On the management side, he lists the following: "(1) The man who overcompensates for weakness, passivity, and dependence (the little Hitler); (2) the constitutionally aggressive, hostile individual (the fighter); (3) the psychopathic personality (the criminal or gangster type); and (4) the senile dement (the aging, alcoholic, or arteriosclerotic executive)." As he points out, in trying to solve their own inner problems, or simply as a result of their deeply embedded motives and habits, such executives initiate and exacerbate frustrations among employees, so that group conflict is virtually inevitable. (McMurry also suggests that a consulting psychologist may be able to help redirect some of these motives into less disastrous channels).

On the union side he is no less critical. He considers the following "types" to be important sources of union-management conflicts: "(1) The constitutionally aggressive and destructive (the hater of power, privilege, and authority); (2) the exhibitionistic autocratic egoist who seeks personal power, status, and prestige; and (3) the psychopathic personality (the labor racketeer)." The list, of course, is intended to be suggestive rather than inclusive. These kinds of individuals,

for one reason or another, exaggerate causes of tension and ignore opportunities to establish peaceful relations.

McMurry ascribes his classification to direct observation of unionists and executives in action. However, he offers no estimates of how frequent these "types" are, nor does he offer any data on specific situations to support his interpretations. Further research will be needed to clarify the personality-situation interactions implied by his remarks. There are, however, two points on which both the extent of popular discussion and the amount of evidence justify some expansion; these are the common view that union organizers are just crackpots, "chronic gripers," and the parallel idea that executives are ruthless, selfish dictators.

The unionist as "crackpot." A widely held view, dear to the hearts of many business executives, is that the union organizer is simply a "crackpot," a neurotically motivated, irrational individual who, by some curious hypnotic power, induces otherwise happy workers to sign up in the union. This view even gets some acceptance within union ranks, as suggested by the following poll question asked by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion¹: "Some people say there are too many troublemakers and agitators among union labor leaders. Others say that this talk is only anti-labor propaganda. What are your views on this?"

	<i>Employers</i>	<i>Labor</i>	<i>Public</i>
Too many agitators	58%	31%	50%
Anti-labor propaganda	12	42	23

It is probable that, particularly in plants where management has opposed any unionization bitterly, only a highly aggressive, somewhat neurotic worker will be willing to take the risks involved in becoming a spokesman for a union group. However, if we look over the field of union officials, there seems little justification for this view. In one study of 12 AFL field representatives, we found them averaging just at the middle of the norms for adult males on a scale of "neurotic" characteristics. Personal interviews with a larger group (see p. 246) indicated no basis for considering them more maladjusted than their opposite numbers on company staffs.

Even where we find a neurotically aggressive individual in the role of union organizer, we usually observe that he cannot organize a union unless there are real frustrations and realistic aggressions on the part of a substantial proportion of the employees. Indeed there is considerable evidence that the neurotic individual simply becomes

¹ Survey of Canadian public sample, July 27, 1946. "Labor" includes union members and their families.

isolated from the worker group unless situations arise of such a nature that he becomes a natural spokesman for the aggressive tensions of the majority.

Golden and Ruttenberg (1942) have pointed out that, in a period when jobs were plentiful and workers were scarce, union organization was not necessary as a means of expressing aggression. If the worker was frustrated by the conditions of employment, he could tell the boss "to go to blazes," quit, and get another job. The depression ended all this. It became necessary for the worker to swallow his hostility and resentment and accept the domination of the employer because of the sheer necessity of survival. The strength of the biological drives was sufficiently great to overcome the need to express resentment against tactics of the employer. Thus, they say, the workers "found a new power in group action. What they could no longer achieve as individuals they found they could do by joining together."

Halliday (1948) has propounded the hypothesis that group fragmentation leads to leadership for destruction. Briefly put, what he means by this is that man is normally a social animal and is happy and well-adjusted when he is functioning in a group moving toward a common goal. If technology or economic circumstances cause the break-up of this natural work group, there is frustration of individual desires and motives with the consequent development of aggressive tensions. Under such circumstances, the individual may be attracted to a leader who preaches a philosophy of hostility and destruction even though this hostility is not directed toward the real objects of frustration. Similarly, an aggressive man may be accepted as a union leader when hostility toward the employer is high, but at a later date he may be replaced by a more moderate person.

It is perhaps noteworthy in this connection that group formation focused exclusively around aggressive and destructive impulses is destined to be short-lived. Thus, for example, the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union against Germany was fairly effective during the period when the enemy existed as a real threat. Within a very short time after the destruction of the common enemy, however, this cooperation had broken down and been replaced by the former mutual hostility. It seems clear, on the basis of this kind of reasoning, that a labor union which is organized only around the common motive of hostility toward the employer will have only a short life.

The executive as exploiter. The view of the labor organizer as a neurotically motivated, destructive individual who is "against everything" has its counterpart in the image of the industrial executive as a ruthless, greedy dictator. Here, as in the case of union leaders,

the evidence indicates that this stereotype is accurate only a small portion of the time. Calling people names is not likely to increase our understanding of the problems involved.

The way in which progress can be achieved is through an analysis of the circumstances facing each kind of leader, and of his personality as determined by selection and by role modification. It is clear, for example, that the unionist will be functioning as a spokesman for aggressive workers even if he is not personally hostile to the employer. Further, if he is relatively empathic (as indicated above), he may feel the tensions of his followers, whereas the executive is by comparison somewhat insensitive to these human emotions. The behavior of the union leader will necessarily reflect such factors.

Similarly we can benefit from examining the behavior of the executive in the light of his social role. He must make plans, meet deadlines, and coordinate diversified activities. He feels responsible for a large enterprise, with hundreds or even thousands of employees, so that he must be more concerned with the welfare of the total group than with any single individual. Profits are necessary to the survival of the firm, with which he is highly ego-involved. Thus he will be strongly motivated to hold down wages and other operating costs. It is entirely possible that even a sensitive, humanitarian man, placed in this social role, would find it difficult to behave in such a way as to evade the criticism that he was indifferent to individuals, greedy, profit-centered, and so on.

Authority as frustration. We have said that one leadership function is that of imposing barriers and obligations upon members. Hence, in a considerable number of instances, the follower is required to carry out a course of action directed to organization goals when his own motives point to a different path. As Richmond (1954) has put it, "The exercise of their powers by those in authority involves frustrating some of the private goals held by members of the organization in order to ensure the more effective fulfilment of the shared collective goals. It is this frustration which is liable to generate hostility towards the source of authority and aggressive attitudes of varying kinds" (p. 29).

This frustration is, of course, likely to be that imposed by management, and hostility directed toward management; not imposed by union leaders and directed against them. It is impossible to conceive of any authority system which does not to some extent imply this kind of conflict; but some leaders evoke far more aggression than others.

Authority as gratification. Difficulties are especially likely to arise when the executive is one who has strong desires for power or status (as we have already indicated, these are especially common among

executives). To such a man, the authoritarian role is intensely attractive, and in his exercise of it, he may go considerably beyond the requirements of the job. Jaques comments on his observations of English management in this vein:

Having a position of dominance stirs latent wishes to dominate for the sake of power itself as well as for the requirements of the job. But to the extent that dominance is used for personal gratification, a profound sense of guilt ensues. Conflicts are engendered inside the individual himself, which may be increased if he feels himself to be in conflict with the accepted patterns of . . . culture.¹

Some psychoanalytically oriented writers have speculated that the great fear and hostility felt by executives toward unions are reflections of unconscious guilt based upon the continuing frustration and abasement imposed upon employees by the manager. This seems highly speculative. A more realistic approach is that mentioned by Jaques, to the effect that the executive may have conflicts between feelings of omnipotence and feelings of inadequacy; that he may feel anxious about his subordinates—they can attack him simply by making mistakes and behaving ineptly; that he may wish to chastise them for their errors, and yet fear their rejection or sabotage if he does. Under these highly ambivalent conditions, the executive may develop an unusually high tension level, which may lead to an overreaction where the union is involved.

The top executive is likely to be impatient, and intolerant of the rank and file, for various reasons. His superior intelligence and information enable him to see relationships quickly, and he may become irritated with slower minds. Also, his power is a source of gratification to him, and he may resent any limitation on his freedom of decision. Thus, it is not surprising that we find 76 per cent of a group of top-level executives saying that "children should be taught more respect for authority" and 52 per cent holding that "most people are not capable of deciding what is good for them."² In other words, if the executive did not have an "authoritarian" personality to begin with, it is probable that he will develop such characteristics as a result of his experiences.

We do not know what comparable percentages would be for labor leaders. It is clear, none the less, that some high-level union officials become very impatient with the routines of democracy and question the qualifications of the average member to participate in decision making. This is exemplified in an indirect sort of way by requests

¹ Jaques (1952), pp. 276-277. Reprinted by permission of The Dryden Press.

² Based on a study by Hart (1942) of 50 top executives in a variety of large corporations.

from union officers for training in "how to sell the union program to the members" rather than "how to find out what the members want in the way of a program." In this respect the unionist's ideology resembles that of the advertising man who wants to sell the product whether or not it meets the needs of the customer. This approach may work in the short run; in the long run, it is likely to encounter difficulties in both industry and the union.

LEADERS AND UNION-MANAGEMENT RESEARCH

In examining the role of industrial and union leaders, it has been necessary for us to alternate between two views. In some passages the implication has been clear that the leader, especially on the union side, is a reflection of the followers—that he would not achieve status in the union except as he mirrors their tensions and attitudes. At other times we have stressed the function of the leader in structuring, initiating, and controlling behavior of the followers. Thus the leader is both cause and effect, both determinant and consequence, of events at the rank-and-file level.

It is important to make this distinction for many reasons. Let us note first of all that "devil theories" of social conflict tend to focus on one bad man, or a few bad men, as the cause of all our troubles. Such theories are deceptive and dangerous, because they lead us away from the constructive problems on which we should be working. Thus, an overemphasis on the role of the leader can be unfortunate. By contrast, those who like to write about "the vast, impersonal forces of history" suggest that no one can do anything anyway, and that the leader only appears to be effective because he happens to be moving with the mass rather than against it.

Specifically, in relation to the study of union-management relations, far too much research has been restricted to asking questions of leaders on both sides. Decisions on the level of conflict, the causes of industrial peace, the type of bargaining relationship, and many other important issues have been based on reports from this limited group. A psychological analysis indicates that such reports are often biased, not only by partisanship based on group affiliation but also by personality factors. Union leaders do not necessarily know what their members are thinking any more accurately than employers know what their employees are thinking. Research on industrial conflict and industrial cooperation needs to place the leader in his context; this means observing events and obtaining the perceptions of rank-and-file participants, as well as getting the leader's-eye view of the situation. This point will be expanded in later chapters.

Institutions

In the preceding chapter, we have touched briefly on the relationship between the individual and the institutions within which he must seek satisfaction for his motives. The same topic was mentioned, necessarily, in our treatments of perception, motivation, and frustration. It now becomes desirable to deal in a more formal manner with this aspect of our problem.

It is clear, when we consider the individual's search for goals, that he must come to terms with the physical environment. Although perception can deviate to some extent from the environment as defined by physics, any sizeable or continued divergence must lead to failure and punishment. At a somewhat lower level of probability, the same rule applies to perception of institutions. Those individuals who perceive and act with respect to institutional situations in a manner not conforming to social definitions will usually encounter punishment.

The institutional pattern provides opportunities for goal achievement, and also barriers, threats, and frustrations. To the individual with a strong desire for power, the social system offers institutional roles which will gratify this need—in industry, in politics, in the armed services. If the desire for prestige is more urgent, he finds other institutionalized opportunities for its satisfaction. But the institutional framework is also frustrating. To the person who has no special talent, or whose combination of abilities and motives is unfortunate, barriers may be insurmountable. He may then turn to crime, to rebellion, to new political movements, or other outlets for his energies.

"Leadership for destruction" may be the only alternative perceived as available by the vigorous individual who finds no opening for him in the institutional organization. As suggested in Fig. 9.1, if conventional paths to success are blocked, because of his race, his religion, his lack of formal education, or lack of the right family background, he may elect to seek his goals through other paths.

Our interest in the institutional environment of union-management relations is limited by the kinds of considerations suggested in the




Fig. 9.1. Institutional barriers to goal achievement. If other paths are blocked, "leadership for destruction" may be the only course open to a highly motivated person.

preceding paragraphs. To a psychologist, institutions provide an environment within which behavior occurs, but the chief focus is on the individual. For the economist, interest centers on the labor market, the product market, income trends, and other broad generalizations. For the political scientist, the main concern is government, with legislative, administrative and other organizations, political parties and pressure groups. Each academic discipline finds its own major problem at a different level. Economic and political institutions obey certain general principles which can be enunciated without reference to individuals. The investigation of such principles is not a proper phase of psychology, although some of the ideas developed in this chapter offer psychological conceptions of processes that are microscopic aspects of larger institutional changes.

THE NATURE OF AN INSTITUTION

An institution is a pattern of social roles supported by a system of expectancies and values. The American economic system, for example, can be observed in action by watching businessmen buy and sell, organize factories, employ workers, and so on. Each individual is performing a role, and the role is relatively the same from one person to another. But people perform these roles only because they achieve goals, attain values. Unless food, physical gratifications, and other rewards were forthcoming, people would stop executing the roles. What would happen, for example, if a contemporary Don Quixote tried to act out some of the customary roles of the age of chivalry? He would land in jail, or in a mental hospital. Roles must

therefore conform to expectancies. The economic system works because most of us understand the requirements of our roles and execute them within a margin of error.

The system of expectancies which is an essential element of every institution provides its own code of punishments for failure to conform to role demands. A businessman who fails to operate at a profit will go bankrupt. If he insists upon writing checks when he no longer has money in the bank, he will go to jail. An employee who refuses to obey orders will be fired; if he stays on the premises, he is subject to arrest for trespass. Customers are expected to pay their bills, and can be punished for failure to do so.

These institutions have a self-perpetuating character in the sense that parents behave in a certain way and teach their children to do likewise. But institutions are not unchanging. New expectancies are established, codified into law, and enforced. Persons who refuse




Fig. 9.2. Changes in value of the dollar. Data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

to perceive new developments get into trouble. The buggy-whip business is as obsolete as that of the medieval armorer (perhaps more so; the latter may be experiencing a revival with new styles in military uniforms).

The coercive character of institutional changes as they affect the individual can be illustrated in a very simple way by Fig. 9.2. The monetary system is an integral part of our economic set-up; payment in dollars is required by contracts, and, if people decided that paper dollars had no value, the whole system would collapse. But the dollar is a highly variable phenomenon. As the chart shows, the dollar of 1939 had "shrunk to half its size" by 1952, its purchasing power now being only 53 per cent of its prewar potency.

Property rights. The importance of property rights as an integral portion of our economic system is recognized in our Constitution. The Fifth Amendment to our Constitution asserts that "No person . . . shall be deprived of *life, liberty or property* without due process of law." Thus the right to own property and to forbid its use to others (within limits) is a basic feature of our economic system.

This right has become an important consideration in union-management conflict. Does an employer have the right to close his factory and deny employees access to it? Clearly he does, even though it may be their sole livelihood. Legally he can keep it closed until they accede to his wage demands. But do the employees have the right to close the factory with a picket line, and keep it closed until the owner accedes to their demands? Our expectancies in this situation are ambiguous, and thereby, of course, hangs a great deal of controversy. What an individual feels justified in doing will be determined by how he perceives the rights of the parties involved.

Economic insecurity. The market system of production for profit entails considerable insecurity for all levels of the economic structure. The entrepreneur takes a chance that he will be able to sell his output at a profit. The banker takes a chance that he will be able to recoup his loan to the business. The employee who moves to the city and takes a factory job is risking the possibility of unemployment and financial disaster. If, as a consumer, he buys on installments, he is risking the loss of his down payment if his income is shut off before he completes his payments.

Some notion of the magnitude of this problem as it affects the employee is suggested by fluctuations in payrolls and the cost of living from 1926 to 1933. At the depth of the depression, manufacturing payrolls were down over 65 per cent from the 1926 average, whereas the cost of living was down only 25 per cent. Even the retail cost

of food—which is very directly related to biological motives—dropped only 45 per cent. The discrepancies between these figures provide indices, of a sort, as to the frustrations which were experienced by employees during that period.

These frustrations, of course, tend to elicit aggression; and, under suitable circumstances, the aggression may be channeled into modifying the institutional environment. So, since 1933, changes have been made in the banking laws (to protect smaller savings against loss), in unemployment and old age insurance, and so on. Both direct union action and political action serve as outlets for economic discontent.¹

Profits vs. wages. The economic insecurity, of course, affects executive salaries, profits, and wages. Some economists have asserted that the impact of a declining economy is greatest as regards returns to capital. Others differ. For the layman, the conclusion that he draws will depend on what newspaper he reads. From the same data, provided in the same TNEC monograph,² the *New York Times* headlined a story: "TNEC Finds Stockholders of U. S. Steel Bore Depression Impact More Than Labor," whereas the newspaper *PM* headline read: "TNEC Expert Finds Labor, Not Capital, Takes Rap in Slumps." Clearly, perceptual distortions constitute a major obstacle to agreement on "facts" regarding our economic institutions.

Institutional frustrations. In addition to frustrations due indirectly to the operation of institutional forces, such as the labor market, people encounter frustrations that are directly imposed by government or by an economic institution (the factory). Governments exist because they have been found necessary to survival. It is obvious to even momentary consideration that traffic cannot flow without rules of the road. Similarly, banking, manufacturing, and trade could not function without a rule-making agency. In Western civilization this agency is a government chosen by the people and responsible for protecting a vaguely defined goal known as the "public interest." Protection of this good requires the imposition of barriers upon union and management in relation to some of their goals. Until the current century the power of government was thrown against unions, and individual employees were punished for violating this restriction. During the New Deal period, the weight of government was thrown

¹ A major institutional change directed to reducing economic insecurity is illustrated by the UAW contracts with Ford and General Motors in the spring of 1955, providing for compensation to supplement unemployment benefits.

² Temporary National Economic Committee, "Measurement of the social performance of business," March, 1941.

somewhat to the union side, and employers encountered numerous frustrations. Taft-Hartley represents another swing of the pendulum, and so on.

Frustrations are imposed by the government in the name of "the public interest" or "the greatest good of the greatest number." However, in the light of our discussion of perception (Chapters 2, 3), it should not be surprising that spokesmen for both unions and management usually claim to be speaking for the public interest. Each perceives the goal of his own group as identified with the goals of the public. Government officials therefore are likely to find themselves in the position of having to accept or reject such claims in their attempt to protect the public interest. Thus they will reward or frustrate unions or executives by their actions. If there is any partiality in the way in which the government official perceives the issues, this can be very fortunate for those on one side, and most distressing to those on the other.

The frustrations, barriers, pathways, and goals offered to workers and executives within a given culture are functions not merely of government officials but also of a complex institutional pattern. When we speak of a capitalistic civilization, we mean that certain goals are open to the individual—others are not. The goal of becoming a successful business man, or a millionaire, is available, though difficult. The goal of becoming an absolute monarch is not. Certain barriers are now present—e.g., a law against employing young children in factories—which were non-existent in the early capitalism. The technique of solving a labor shortage by chattel slavery is no longer available. In brief, what we are saying is this: as the psychologist sees it, laws, customs, established social institutions, and practices operate as limiting environmental events. They determine what goals are open, what barriers will be encountered by individuals and groups seeking these goals, and what punishments may be imposed for failing to conform to these limitations.

A detailed consideration of the economic, political, and sociological factors within which industrial relations must operate lies beyond the scope of this volume.¹ However, it would be unrealistic to ignore these factors completely. In the following pages we sketch very briefly some of the implications of the larger culture for the specific kinds of behavior outlined by the preceding chapters.

¹ See, for some excellent contributions in this area, Kornhauser, Dubin, and Ross (1954).

INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT

A major contribution of our institutional environment to union-management conflict is one which is rarely noticed. This is the fact that our culture does not provide a consistent pattern of expectancies and values. Because the individual's way of perceiving social reality derives from these 'institutional patterns, the lack of any uniformity tends to create confusion and misunderstanding. Our American institutions incorporate many mutually inconsistent beliefs. Lynd (1948) has listed a variety of these, of which we quote only an illustrative few:

2. Individualism, "the survival of the fittest," is the law of nature and the secret of America's greatness; and restrictions on individual freedom are un-American and kill initiative.

But: No man should live for himself alone; for people ought to be loyal and stand together and work for common purposes

4. Democracy, as discovered and perfected by the American people, is the ultimate form of living together. All men are created free and equal, and the United States has made this fact a living reality.

But: You would never get anywhere, of course, if you constantly left things to popular vote. No business could be run that way, and of course no businessman would tolerate it

9. Hard work and thrift are signs of character and the way to get ahead.

But: No shrewd person tries to get ahead nowadays by just working hard, and nobody gets rich nowadays by pinching nickels. It is important to know the right people. If you want to make money, you have to look and act like money. Anyway, you only live once.

12. Capital and labor are partners.

But: It is bad policy to pay higher wages than you have to. If people don't like to work for you for what you offer them, they can go elsewhere.

13. Education is a fine thing.

But: It is the practical men who get things done.

18. The American judicial system insures justice to every man, rich or poor.

But: A man is a fool not to hire the best lawyer he can afford.¹

This list of contradictions amounts to a shorthand way of stating that we do not have an institutionalized society in which goals are clearly defined as acceptable or unacceptable, in which techniques of action are unambiguously defined, or in which ultimate value criteria are matters of general agreement. These contradictions are to some extent built into every child by the processes of perceptual and motivational development. They are organized into group structures in accordance with the general principles indicated in Chapter 7.

¹ Lynd (1948), pp. 60-62. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

They provide appeals which can be manipulated by leaders, who may structure a situation in terms of ethical or in terms of economic values (or in other ways) as may seem to them best at the time. Thus, many union-management difficulties arise because executives assume the dominance of individual motives (as in incentive payments), whereas workers are more affected by social motives (group solidarity).

Difficulties also arise because of the basic contradiction between the democratic organization of our political institutions and the authoritarian structure of industry. Men who are given an expectancy that they have the right to vote, a voice in what happens to them, may not adjust well to an economic order in which they are only time-clock numbers with no right to an idea or opinion. However, the authoritarian industrial institution is just as much a part of American culture as is the democratic political system.

Since this is not a book about economics or sociology, our emphasis will remain fairly steadily on the individual. But frequent references to these other levels will be essential in order to place the individual phenomena in their proper context.

Distribution of economic rewards. Our economic institutions provide for differential rewards to persons executing different roles. The marked discrepancy between the reward to executives and that to rank-and-file employees has been a matter of no small importance in industrial relations. Union leaders point dramatically to salaries in the hundreds of thousands of dollars and voice vigorous protests over the inequity as compared to worker rates. When General Motors paid C. E. Wilson over \$400,000 a year, the average GM worker was earning about \$4000. Is this fair? Is one man really worth one hundred times as much as another?

Psychology cannot offer an answer to the question: is this pay discrepancy fair? It might be possible to reach an operational definition of various performances and then compare the company president with typical employees, to see how much more efficient he is; but it is likely that this procedure would lead to an impasse. On routine tasks the executive would at best be about twice as good as the typical employee (based on what we know of individual differences). But it is precisely these tasks which the executive can and should delegate to subordinates. Decision making cannot be delegated, at least on major issues, and the average worker never gets a chance to show what he can do in this respect.

Clearly, the determination of how much is fair pay for executives is made by the executives, and it is not surprising that they evaluate

themselves as worth a great deal. But the great discrepancy between executive salary and worker earning is provocative of widespread frustration, jealousy, and discontent. It is, indeed, a significant factor in the constant cry for higher wages. In our competitive culture, the worker cannot but be affected by this example, constantly before him, of someone getting a much higher rate of return for an apparently similar amount of time and energy expenditure.




Fig. 9.3. Labor's share in the value output of manufacturing (USA). Data are derived from Table 933 in the 1953 *Statistical Abstract of the United States*. (Chart by permission of the Committee for Constitutional Government, Inc.)

Unions have tried to increase the relative economic return to workers by taking income away from either executive salaries or dividends. Generally speaking, they have not succeeded. When unions, through collective bargaining, push up the gross income to workers, managers usually increase prices. Thus, as Fig. 9.3 indicates, over a period of 50 years, the proportionate share received by labor from manufacturing has varied almost not at all. The great expansion of unionism in 1935-1939 hardly influenced the relative share going to workers; and, in the period of rapidly rising wages after World War II, this

share remained almost constant. Thus it would appear that, although unions may affect gross wages, they cannot gain a relatively higher share of total industrial income as long as management has control of pricing policy. It may be, of course, that both union and company have been exploiting the unorganized worker and professional people, but it is clear that, without price control, the union has no way of being sure of winning any net economic gains.

This point is well illustrated by the UMWA and soft coal. Many critics of John L. Lewis have suggested that the miners are "pricing




Fig. 9.4. Relative changes in price of coal and labor costs, 1942–1949. (Reprinted from *U.S. News and World Report*, an independent weekly news magazine published at Washington, D.C. Copyright 1949 by United States News Publishing Corp.)

themselves out of the market" by forcing wages up. The magazine *U. S. News and World Report*, for example, published the charts shown in Fig. 9.4, implying that labor costs were mainly responsible for high coal prices. Yet it is clear that from 1942 to 1949, labor costs rose only \$1.39 per ton, while the mine price jumped \$2.54; or, on a percentage basis, wages were up 83 per cent, prices up 107 per cent. Management not only recouped the higher wage costs but actually increased its operating margin.

A fair profit. This raises another question which often becomes involved in labor disputes (although managers usually deny that it is relevant): "What constitutes a fair profit?" Public opinion surveys indicate that the magic, but meaningless, figure of 10 per cent is widely

accepted. (For example, the same value is usually given whether the question relates to return on gross sales or return on investment.)

Profits can be figured in many different ways, and unions are prone to use one basis whereas executives use another. A simple example can be computed from the General Motors statement for 1953. Net income for the year was just under \$600 million. Dividends paid amounted to over \$361 million. These dividends amounted to 49 per cent of capital stock, which was listed at \$726 million; to 12 per cent of total capital, including earned surplus, which amounted to 2982 million; and to less than 4 per cent on net sales of \$10,027 million. Which figure will be cited by a given propagandist? The answer is obvious: each person will perceive, in such a complex situation, the "facts" that fit his frame of reference, his values, his motives.

Again we must point out that psychology does not offer an answer to the question: what is a fair profit? The question calls for a subjective answer; hence each person can give his own. It would no doubt be feasible to define operationally an appropriate rate of profit for companies in a given state of technical development at a particular phase of the business cycle; at least this could be done if one could gain acceptance of certain assumptions about economic theory as to mobility of capital, reinvestment, etc. But winning acceptance of this as a "fair" rate of profit would involve neutralizing all the powerful psychological factors that would press executives to ask for more and unionists to ask for less in the profit account.

Distribution of ego rewards. We have developed the idea, in earlier chapters of this book, that ego motives may well be as important as economic goals in the production of industrial conflict. The institutional setting for this problem, like that of economic reward, is found in discrepancies and perceived inequities.

The ego satisfactions accruing to managerial positions are extensive. We perceive the executive as having the right to design products, select machinery and materials, choose factory locations, schedule operations, shut down when he chooses, and so on. Thus, entirely aside from any question of economic achievement, the executive role carries with it extensive gratification in the form of power and dominance over others. This was the basis for our prediction (see p. 246) that men with a strong drive toward power would be attracted to leadership roles in industry, whereas men moving into union leadership positions would show this to a lesser degree.

Power means ability to distribute rewards and punishments. The executive role carries with it considerable discretion as to rewards to employees—pay, pay increases, promotions, preferred working condi-

tions, prestige, praise, and the like. Unions have imposed some limitations on this power, but it is still substantial. Conversely, the executive role carries the expectation that this individual can impose punishments on those below him in the institutional structure—layoffs, reprimands, demotions, and discharge being the prime examples. Here again, union limitations have restricted but not eliminated this power.

It is important to observe that the employee does not have any corresponding power to reward or to punish the executive. The extent to which this sentence violates cultural expectancies is indicated by the startled reaction it usually elicits from listeners. We do not expect employees either to reward or to punish those above them in the managerial hierarchy. Yet it is plausible to suggest that, if an employee sees an executive behaving in an inefficient, wasteful manner, he would wish to impose some punishment. And many workers have wanted to be able to show their appreciation of and respect for an outstanding leader by whom they are employed, but have found no way to do so.

The union represents a modification in the distribution of power in our society. Unions, particularly, can punish executives who are arbitrary, dictatorial, bad-mannered, or exploitive as regards the employees. In some instances (see Chapter 14), it has also been possible to work out methods by which the union could reward employers for cooperative behavior. This is an area in which social inventions are still urgently needed.

Business as a system of power. Brady (1943) offers an analysis of the capitalist system as it exists in the United States and in Western Europe which stresses the theme of power. Translating his ideas into the terminology of this book is very easy. Essentially, he says, the businessman, big or little, wants control of a market. This provides both profits and security. As his operations expand, he tries to control more territory or to work out non-aggression pacts (cartels) guaranteeing monopoly in certain areas. But he also must necessarily try to control political institutions which might otherwise restrict his freedom. So he bribes politicians or enters his own candidates, lobbies for legislation,¹ issues "institutional advertising" favoring non-interference with business, and so on. The striving for power, Brady holds, is not merely a feature of individual psychology; it is built into the very fabric of the "free enterprise" system.

Power within the community. Hunter (1953) has defined power

¹ In 1953, for example, registered business lobbyists reported expenditures of \$1,374,000 in the national capital; labor lobbyists reported \$336,000.

as "the ability of men to command the service of other men" (p. 4). The power of an institution or organization is, of course, exercised through men, but for convenience we may say that organizational power is "the ability of authorized group representatives to command the activities of other men." To extend this definition operationally, we must consider the range of activities that can be commanded, the number of men who can be so controlled, and the effectiveness of sanctions that can be applied in case of disobedience to commands.

As soon as we consider such operational criteria of power, it becomes clear that the power of the typical business leader is vastly greater than that of the typical labor leader. The businessman has power to direct his employees to the type of work that they shall do, to forbid them from working at all, to determine the materials that they use, the products that they make, and the kind of building that they shall occupy. He has power to decide to build a new factory elsewhere, to employ new workers, to buy new machines, to manufacture new products. He determines pricing policy, financing policy, sales policy, each decision affecting many persons.

Compare this range with the range of commands open to the labor leader. To some extent he can command men not to work, but even this power is severely limited both by the willingness of the men to obey and by surrounding circumstances. The biogenic needs which force men to seek employment are on the side of the employer; the labor leader has few sanctions to back up his power.¹ The labor leader can bargain within a limited range for power to decide hours of work, pay rates, control of layoffs, discharges, and promotions. In a few instances he is allowed some voice regarding methods of production. The unionist can resist company action; he has very little freedom to initiate new company activities.

Few studies have sought to determine the class status of persons of power. Hunter (1953) applied a complex set of criteria to determine the persons holding power in "Regional City," a city of a half-million population. He winnowed out a list of forty names, distributed as follows: eleven heads of commercial enterprises, seven heads of banks, six professional men, five industrial executives, four governmental officials, two labor leaders, and five "social" leaders. Thus the ratio of businessmen to labor officials is twenty-three to two. A study on the national scale would probably yield a similar ratio.

Anderson (1935) tabulated the family origins of everyone who had

¹ In certain gangster-ridden unions, the sanction is the threat of physical violence. Fortunately, such unions are a small minority.

been a top executive in our federal government (President, Vice-President, or Cabinet member) from 1789 to 1933. Taking a rough division of the population into thirds according to wealth, he found that 74 per cent of all these men came from the highest group, 23 per cent from the middle group, and 3 per cent from the poorest group in the population.

In our society, power takes many forms. We have not had much trouble keeping military power subordinate to civil control. But, as regards economic divisions within the population, it is pretty clear that power has been concentrated on the side of ownership, both in the industrial and in the political sphere. It is probably a tribute to the potency of our group norms and ethical codes that this power has not been abused more often than it has.

Our main point with respect to institutional controls can now be restated. In our society, there are great differences in the allocation of power between executives and employees, and the perceived inequity of power is an important consideration in industrial relations. The organization of unions has probably resulted at least as much from power frustrations as from economic hardships; and certainly in many industries where economic issues are relatively unimportant (e.g., the Airline Pilots Association), controversies over power can result in strikes.

Personal gratifications. Many motives other than economic and power impulses become involved in one's economic role, and there are consequently many gratifications which could be listed in addition to those we have just enumerated. It is necessarily true that that high economic achievement or high power status tends to carry other personal gratifications with them. To some degree this tendency is also a function of our institutional structure; since money can be exchanged for many desirable goods and services, the wealthy man has many other satisfactions available to him. Similarly, power can usually be converted into economic, sexual, and other goals.

The extent to which economic, ego, and other satisfactions are functions of occupational status is shown in Fig. 9.5. In this investigation, several hundred men from executive, professional, and employee categories were interviewed about what they found satisfying in life. Only four of the questions are plotted here, but the results from others are similar.¹ It is clear that, as we move up the occupational hierarchy from unskilled manual workers to major business executives, there is a fairly uniform increase in job-rated satisfactions (kind of work done,

¹ Additional data will be found in Kornhauser (1940).




Fig. 9.5. Perceived satisfaction of different occupational groups. (Data are from Kornhauser, 1940.)

treatment by employer) and also in non-economic satisfactions (opportunity to enjoy life, children's opportunity). The gradient, in fact, is steeper for the non-economic than for the economic questions.

It would appear, from these observations, that our society has built into its structure a wide range of discrepancies in goal achievements. These discrepancies would not be a matter of concern if members of one economic category received satisfactions of one variety, while persons of a different occupational status received compensating attainments of some other kind. The evidence indicates that this is not so. A relatively small group has high satisfaction in all areas; a very large group has comparatively much less in all areas.

Since aggression results from perceived frustration, this difference in occupational goal achievement offers some likelihood of generalized hostility toward the entire institutional structure. This is the problem of class conflict.

SOCIAL CLASSES IN AMERICA

A definite answer to the problem of class conflict requires consideration of two questions. One is: are there social classes in our nation?

The second is: do the members of these classes find conflict a necessary consequence of their relationship?

As regards the first, we have already offered some evidence. Economic, ego, and other satisfactions are distributed in a differential manner, with persons in higher occupational levels receiving more gratifications. The extent to which this creates inequities throughout the entire population is suggested by Fig. 9.6, which indicates that the average family at the top of the income pyramid has 28 times as much gross income as the average at the bottom. The extremes, of course, are far greater than this.

It is hardly necessary to add that consumer buying statistics indicate that in categories such as automobiles, house furnishings, medical care, vacations, and recreation, the proportion of purchases by upper income groups is vastly larger than that in the lower groups. The chance that a family will buy a new automobile, for example, is 30




Fig. 9.6. Relative distribution of income in the population.
(From *Federal Reserve Bulletin*, September, 1952.)

times as great in the income group earning \$7500 and up, as in the income group earning under \$1000. Even with state-financed education, the chance that a boy will go to college is still markedly higher in the upper income categories than in the lower. Discrepancies in terms of food purchases, of course, are much less; when income is limited, a large percentage must go to sustain life.

The subjective satisfactions are also correlated with income. Using Kornhauser's data again, but plotting it by income category, we get the results shown in Fig. 9.7. As in the occupational comparison, both




Fig. 9.7. Perceived satisfaction of different income groups. (Data are from Kornhauser, 1940.)

economic and non-economic satisfactions show a sharp increase as we move up the scale. There is no evidence in any of these data for compensating satisfactions to the low income family.

Economic vs. psychological classes. We could enumerate a variety of data that bear on the question of whether ours is a classless society. Our purpose is only to develop the contrast between theory and practice in our institutions. In theory the United States is a classless society which provides equal opportunity for economic and social mobility to everyone. In fact, to paraphrase George Orwell, "All humans are equal, only some are more equal than others." The statistics on distribution of income, educational opportunities, consumption, and

other variables clearly reveal that some children start life with a heavy ball and chain attached; others are halfway to the finish line when the race opens.

Does this mean that we have to accept the notion propounded by Karl Marx, that society is divided into classes whose behavior is inevitably determined by their relations to the means of production? The evidence does not support this theory either. We have shown that workers differ widely among themselves, as do executives to a smaller extent, in their ways of perceiving and acting on social issues (Chapter 3). These differences grow even larger as we move from specific industrial problems to political and social questions in general. Further, the Marxist view would indicate that people act only on economic motives, whereas we have compiled considerable material (Chapters 4 and 5) indicating that ego motives are often more potent than financial rewards in determining men's behavior.

Over against these facts we must, of course, set the unquestionable reality that workers differ from executives, and that "middle class" business and professional people often differ from both, in their views and in their actions. How can we harmonize these apparently contradictory findings? We propose to adopt the position that *social classes are psychological, not economic phenomena*. This interpretation holds that we can identify a "working class point of view," an "upper class point of view," and so on. These are conceived as *perceptual* phenomena, not always corresponding closely to reality as defined by social scientists. For example, we find an occasional wealthy man seeing issues from the worker's side, and a goodly number of workers who see things as the employers do.

What accounts for the extensive uniformity which does exist with regard to these attitudes? We suggest here, as we did in Chapter 2, that, in the long run, perceptions tend to correspond to "reality," this being defined as a series of events not dependent upon perception. In this sense, economic processes constitute an independent reality which can be perceived by the individual. Take the concept of the labor market, for example. This is an abstract idea which is operationally defined in terms of the ratio of jobs to applicants. But this is converted into a perception for an individual worker as he tries to get a job, or as he listens to his friends report their experiences. The worker's behavior, of course, is guided by his percept, not by the "real" labor market. But what consequences he encounters, whether he succeeds or fails, will depend on the market. Thus he will modify an inaccurate perception to correspond more closely to these consequences.

From such an approach we develop a concept of social class as a

psychological phenomenon. Workers find themselves having the same experiences as others having certain common economic characteristics—housing, income level, type of work, etc. But they see, or hear, that people having other economic attributes do not encounter these experiences. It is still true, for example, that the chances of a boy's attending college are closely related to his family's income. Medical care, Florida vacations in the winter, and similar positive goals are very unequally distributed in terms of income groupings. The popular concepts of "upper, middle, and lower" classes derive from the perceptions of these inequalities. As Centers (1950) has summarized his observations, social classes or status levels *"are constructs which men have imposed upon certain objectively existent phenomena as they are perceived and cognitively reacted to by them."*¹

One further caution should be noted. This interpretation does not necessarily involve the notion of "class consciousness." It is quite likely, for example, that an executive who is completely imbued with the employer point of view will characterize himself as "middle class" or may even reject the "class" concept entirely. Similarly, many workers who show consistent and vigorous attitudes on controversial economic questions representing a "working class" approach may call themselves "middle class." The decisive factor, for purposes of this discussion, is not how the person perceives himself. It is how he perceives others, and most of all, how he perceives significant issues. The kind of class-structured society that we are considering, therefore, depends on how people look at their world; but this dependence is reinforced by events that occur without regard to any specific person's perceptions.

THE INEVITABILITY OF CLASS CONFLICT

The data which have been cited give some support to the view that there are social classes in America, but they do not provide any answer to the question: Will these classes inevitably find themselves in conflict? In a sense, this is not a legitimate empirical question, since we can never answer conclusively that future conflicts are not inevitable. We can say with confidence that there have been numerous industrial conflicts in this country that have resulted in class alignments within the population, and we can plausibly predict that there will be many such conflicts in the future. However, this assertion does not justify a prediction of open warfare between classes.

In so far as available data are relevant, they seem to contradict the

¹ Centers, 1950, p. 500.

prediction of inevitable class war. A number of surveys have shown that, at least as far as the workers are concerned, the possibilities for "peaceful co-existence" of union and management are good. For example, Katz (1949a) writes the following summary of an investigation conducted by his organization in a large automobile factory.

In the plant we studied, the attitudes of rank and file workers clearly indicate a substantial basis for industrial peace. The great majority of workers see no fundamental conflict between the aims of the company and the aims of the union. Ninety per cent of them feel that union and management get along either *fairly well* or *very well*. The dominant tendency among the men is to give credit both to union and to management for the good working relationship. A majority also believe that the company is interested in the welfare of the union, and that the union is interested in the welfare of the company. Moreover, the men feel that the union officials are interested in the welfare of the company. Though most of the men see production as the goal of management, they do not think that management is after an unreasonable profit. They feel that the things the union wants most are fair wages, good working conditions, and fair play. They see no essential reason why both management and the union cannot achieve their goals, but they recognize that each side may have to give up something in the process.¹

It must be noted, however, that the conclusions cited here are based on studies of the rank and file. When we consider the attitudes of people who are more vigorously identified with one side or the other of the conflict situation, the data are somewhat less encouraging. To quote Katz again:

In brief, the conflict phases of union-management relations appear more sharply defined in the attitudes of the leadership groups than in the attitudes of the rank and file. Foremen are more class conscious than stewards in this particular plant. This reflects the fact that the union in this company has won more acceptance from top management and has played a larger role than is customary for a union. Many foremen resent this growth of power whereas the aspirations of union stewards do not carry them beyond the present situation and they see no fundamental conflict in interest between company and union.²

Perhaps particularly encouraging, because it cuts across four major strata of the industrial organization, is the finding from the Illini City labor-management research project. In this case attitudes toward the company and attitudes toward the union were determined for four different groups within each industrial organization—top management,

¹ Katz, 1949a, p. 67. Reprinted by permission of Industrial Relations Research Assn.

² *Ibid.*, p. 69.

foremen, rank and file, and union officers. In all cases where it was possible to compute direct correlations, it was found that these correlations were positive. In other words, the top management groups which saw the situation within the company in more favorable terms were also more favorably disposed toward their union. The foremen who reported well of their company also said good things about the union and so on down the line. This seems to indicate that the concept of an attitudinal climate embracing all the industrial organization is a valid one and in turn leads us to an optimistic attitude with regard to the possibilities for industrial peace. If there is no essential conflict between having a favorable attitude toward the company and a favorable attitude toward the union, even at the higher levels of management and union organizations, then it is certainly psychologically possible for us to work out constructive solutions to our industrial problems without the necessity of class conflict.¹

INDIVIDUAL, GROUP, AND INSTITUTION

Industrial conflict, of course, can appear at the level of interaction between individuals, between groups, and between institutions. Analysis of a given problem may best be centered on one of these levels. But it is characteristic to find that events on one level are reflected in developments on one or both of the other levels. For example, a conflict between a worker and a foreman over a job assignment may be studied purely as a matter of "human relations" tactics (Fig. 9.8). But, when it is pursued further, we learn that the norms of an informal work group were involved as a basic consideration in the worker's objection to the transfer. And in trying to negotiate a solution we discover that a conflict between management and union over the control of job assignments is also involved. Similarly, events that originate at the group or institutional level may be expected to be reflected in interpersonal relations.

Events at all three of these levels are real, and each of them provides a legitimate frame of reference for dealing with a problem. In some instances maximum weight seems to rest on only one of them; in others, an intricate interaction of all three may be observed. What is important is that the social scientist studying these occurrences, and the practical executive or unionist handling them, must keep all three levels in mind. Serious errors in judgment usually result if one level is emphasized to the exclusion of the others.

¹ See also Purcell (1953). For a further discussion of "dual allegiance" among workers, see pp. 400-403.




Fig. 9.8. Levels of analysis of a human relations problem. (Suggested by a diagram in Pigors and Sheffield, 1944a.)

Hence the problem of industrial conflict—like all our other group tensions—cannot be resolved simply by dealing with the component individuals who experience conflict, i.e., by such techniques as mental hygiene and psychotherapy. Nor can it be dealt with merely as a problem in group dynamics, by techniques of clarification, consensus, and decision. It must also be approached at the institutional level in terms of the unconscious assumptions—and their organized embodiments in our economic, religious, and political systems—by techniques appropriate to these problems.

The techniques of psychology are less appropriate than are those of economics, sociology, and political science, when we seek to deal with such problems. The psychologist's primary concern is to show how individual perceptions and motives are important components of such situations, and to insist that they cannot be ignored in the search for solutions.

Culture conflicts and the individual. We can illustrate this point briefly by reference to Lynd's discussion of inconsistencies within our culture, which was noted earlier in this chapter. Lynd commented, for example, on our culturally endorsed assumption of individual self-

interest and its conflict with the cultural approval of altruism and ethical values. At the individual level, such conflicts are manifest in the form of temptation to ruthless self-aggrandizement, regardless of the effect upon others; and certainly we observe men resorting to deception and even to murder for selfish goals. Yet we also find men helping others, giving up selfish advantage to help family and friends. And within a single person this conflict is internalized as a conflict between ego and superego motivations.

At the group level, we also observe this cultural conflict. Teams compete in athletics, cliques compete within management, factions compete within unions. Each informal group may be seeking advantage for its own members, regardless of what happens to the other group. But, with the exception of criminal gangs, this competition is within a set of norms approved by the nation, which limit the degree of group self-interest or its manifestation. And in emergencies we may find such groups cooperating rather than trying to exploit the situation for selfish advantage.

At the institutional level we find management and union officially committed to the individualistic position, "Everything for me that I can take and hold." In the late nineteenth century we had the era of the "robber barons" in industry, and at times we have seen similar behavior among unions. But since 1932 considerable modification of this view seems to have been achieved. Most industries now concede an obligation to customers; a few businessmen still challenge the Pure Food and Drugs Act as an invasion of their right to skin the public, but not many do so. Many union leaders have been participating actively in efforts aimed to benefit the entire population, not just their members. Thus the conflict between the values of selfishness and altruism continues in alternating patterns of competition and cooperation.

It must be remembered that the weight of formal institutions is still on the side of selfishness. When Henry Ford announced his plan to "plow profits back into the business" to benefit consumers and workers, he was stopped by a stockholders' suit¹ in which he was admonished that the sole purpose of a corporation was to make money for its stockholders, not to lower prices or raise wages. Although the judgment of such an issue might not be quite so rigid today, it is clear that a corporation that does not earn profits goes bankrupt. Similarly, a union that earns no benefits for its members will disintegrate.

¹ "It is not within the lawful powers of a Board of Directors to shape, and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others." *Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.*, 204 Mich. 459, p. 460, Feb. 7, 1919.

This conflict creates marked difficulties for individuals in management or union posts who may be willing to cooperate rather than fight. A more detailed examination of the problems involved is given in Chapter 14.

Others of Lynd's cultural contradictions could be examined; for example, the belief in democracy versus the authority of a ruling group to make decisions. Corporations, of course, reject the democratic thesis almost *in toto*; unions adhere to it in principle, but many unions ignore it in practice. The long-range implications of this conflict of cultural assumptions are considered in Chapter 15.

Interaction of levels. Not only do we see these cultural values manifested, in all their contradictions, at the level of individual, group, and institution. We also observe events on one level modifying these on another. Any attempt to spell out these interactions in detail would call for a volume in itself, probably a large one. We have no such purpose here. We have tried to indicate the manner in which institutions provide a set of goals and barriers—reality to which the individual must adjust. We have intimated very sketchily that institutions are independent of *the* individual but not independent of individuals. One man who deviates from the accepted perception of banks and the checking system may go to jail for acting on this view; but, if a majority of people change to his attitude, the system collapses. Thus an institution depends upon consensual validation, and this goes back to individuals.

It is also clear that a specific individual, if highly motivated, may persuade others to see matters as he does, and so may contribute to the modification of institutions. Groups, acting directly or through lobbying and educational activities, may also modify institutions. Thus we get the kind of three-way interaction indicated in Fig. 9.9. Events at the individual level can affect other events at the individual, group, or institutional level. Groups have effects on individuals, on other groups, and on institutions. And finally, institutions affect the behavior of individuals, groups, and other institutions. This interaction necessarily becomes very intricate, and the determination of the key independent variable is often impossible. Thus we have different specialists observing the "same" historical event and arriving at diametrically opposite interpretations of it.

Childhood experiences and institutional patterns. It would not be appropriate, in a treatment of these problems, to ignore those theories which have stressed the key role of certain childhood experiences, the pattern of socialization, in determining institutional forms. Among

		Independent variable		
Dependent variable		Individual	Group	Institution
	Individual	Worker's motivation affects his job performance.	Group morale affects job satisfaction of members of work group.	Inflation affects worker's job satisfaction, demands pay increase.
	Group	A dynamic leader may inspire a group to extra effort.	Group codifies norms and expectancies, thus reducing friction and factionalism.	Taft-Hartley Act imposes restrictions on activities of a local union.
	Institution	Leader may bring about social reform, legislation, etc.	Pressure group lobbies for legislation, persuades public to adopt views.	Price abuses by corporations set off "anti-trust" legislation.

Fig. 9.9. Interactions of individual, group, and institution. (Suggested by a diagram in Horwitz, 1953.)

these theories we may mention, not as horrible examples but only as types, the alleged Russian preference for dictatorial social organization as an outcome of infantile swaddling, the militaristic structure of Japan as a consequence of rigid discipline in infancy, the importance of the patriarchal family in Germany as a basis for Nazism, and so on.

No psychologist is likely to argue against the significance of childhood experiences in determining adult personality structure. This point has been too firmly established to be a matter of debate. But—are these experiences solely a matter of parent-child interaction? Is it not true that the adult climate of opinion is transmitted directly to the child, in considerable degree, and also that the parents must act as agents of society in indoctrinating approved attitudes? If they do not, they are punished along with the child.

In the United States we speak of "fatherland" and "mother country," just as is true in most other western cultures. This does not mean that the boy from a father-dominated family grows up to favor totalitarian views. He may just as readily react by perceiving governmental domination as undesirable, generalizing from his family experience.¹ The experiences of childhood are not self-interpreting; the meanings that

¹ See for example, Krout and Stagner (1939); Lasswell (1930); Stagner (1944, 1954b).

they will have for a child depend on influences from the environment, and to some extent on the child's restructuring of them. Swaddling in Russia may give some infantile basis for acceptance of an arbitrary controlling government; but among the Hopi it may give a basis for a relaxed acceptance of a harsh environment, while a rather democratic-cooperative institutional pattern is maintained.

Halliday (1948) has given a fairly favorable presentation of a neo-Freudian point of view regarding infantile experiences and adult social patterns. But even he finds it necessary to ascribe major roles to technological changes, the shift from rural to urban living, the economic imperatives which have made most people employees rather than independent farmers, group pressures toward social mobility, and so on.¹

This kind of interaction we have tried to summarize in Fig. 9.10.




Fig. 9.10. Interrelations of personality formation, social role, and technological change.

¹ There is a real need for a study of economic motivations and institutions by someone who is thoroughly acquainted with both psychology and economics. Unfortunately much of the material published along this line is seriously biased. Osborn (1937), for example, offers a volume called *Freud and Marx* which pretends to be a re-interpretation of each in the light of the other's ideas, but is in fact a call for psychoanalysts to enlist in the class war. Whenever the Viennese master contradicts Marxism, he is steam-rolled. At the other extreme, we have, of course, the classical economists with their exclusive concern with rational, conscious motivation, thus leaving out more than half of human dynamics. Perhaps further empirical investigation of the psychodynamics of social roles must precede any real advance in theory in this area.

The adult personality is a product of infantile gratifications and frustrations, perceptions and responses. But these experiences are dependent upon an external environment. Perceptions and attitudes derive from group and institutional surrounds. The satisfaction and frustration that a child encounters will depend on his family class status. From this complex interaction develops an adult personality, and this personality in turn can affect the larger environment (reform or revolution). The adult personality also modifies the child of the next generation. Thus economic frustrations of the parents are reflected in emotional disorders of the offspring.¹ This continuing cycle of interaction of economic, sociological, political, and psychological events constitutes the flow of social development and evolution.

If we limit ourselves to any particular set of these data, certain independent variables stand out. The characteristics of John Jones as a total personality derive much more from his early childhood than from the state of contemporary technology. Economic conditions are far more completely determined by prior economic conditions than by John Jones' social values. But in a complete picture we cannot ignore either set of data.

A society in which infantile determinants definitely molded the institutional structure could never change. Once an equilibrium had been established, with optimum socialization patterns for the existing institutional order, everyone would grow up to fit the social structure and the social structure would go on producing children of the same pattern. We know well that such stasis is rare. Social changes affect child rearing and personality; personalities affect social trends. Our preference for steady states and equilibrium no doubt slows down this process; but social change nevertheless does take place.

In Fig. 9.10 we have indicated that industrial conflict can be conceptualized as a form of adult-institutional interaction. Obviously events at this level ripple outwards to induce changes in other areas. However, we must keep our discussion focused to some extent. We have therefore tried to define our task in such a way that it concentrated on the perceptions, motivations, and frustrations of adults, as these were modified by group and institutional influences, and as the psychological processes in turn had some effect upon the socioeconomic environment.

Actually, the treatment offered in Chapters 2 through 8 has concentrated on the first of these two points. We have pictured the in-

¹ Stagner (1948a), Chapter 20.

dividual, with his needs and aggressions, finding his way through and being influenced by a socioeconomic milieu. In the final half of this volume we reverse the emphasis and try to structure a clear picture of psychological factors in their impact upon collective bargaining, union-management accommodation, and society's efforts to achieve a higher level of industrial peace.

Tactics: Management

In the preceding chapters we have tried to give the human basis for industrial conflict. We have developed a picture of man striving for power over his own destiny, dealing with a world of physical objects and a world of social institutions. Each of these presents rewards and deprivations, barriers and frustrations. The formation of groups and the development of organized conflict result from the motives of human beings and their perceptions of these situations.

The evidence has indicated two basic aspects of industrial conflict: first, conflicts over the distribution of economic returns from industry; second, conflicts over ego satisfaction, power, and recognition. If we concede, as seems almost necessary, that the significance of economic gain in American society is very largely related to the ego status of the individual and to his sense of power, and if we recognize also that economic power gives the individual an opportunity to increase his monetary return from industry, then we might even succeed in boiling down this formulation by saying that there is only one single type of industrial conflict, namely, conflict over power.

This is to some degree, of course, an oversimplification. Our analysis of the problem of motivation indicated that for a complete understanding of the motivation of any given individual, we should have to know about the specific objects, activities, and interests which had motivational value for him. However, it has become apparent that economic rewards, interesting jobs, prestige, recognition, etc., are intimately related. Thus, it seems plausible to say that industrial conflict is a conflict over ego enhancement—over that desire for “More!” to which we have already referred.

Thus the study of industrial relations as a day-to-day problem is an examination of the tactics used by both sides to improve their situation. Management tries to get a larger economic return, more power, more security against union interference, and so on. The worker tries, individually or through the union, to get a larger economic return, more recognition, more power, and more security. The present chapter

is devoted to an analysis of management tactics and the defensive actions chiefly of unorganized workers; Chapter 11 will be concerned with tactics uniquely characteristic of workers organized into unions.

We have pointed out that industrial conflicts are exaggerated by two sets of factors: first, the difference in frames of reference among workers and executives. Thus, workers have one conception of what is right and proper; for example, what constitutes a fair day's work or a fair day's pay, what constitutes safe working conditions, what constitutes adequate recognition for any job well done, etc. The executive may have quite different attitudes, expectancies, and judgments about the work situation. These differences in perception tend to sharpen the focus of conflict and to make more difficult the solution of conflicts as they arise. Second, industrial conflicts are exaggerated by the nature of our institutional patterns. The institution of property and legal control over the place of business give much power to the executives. The particular pattern of institutional organization which we know as capitalism is one which tends to strengthen the position of management and the executive. This institutional advantage has been modified very materially since 1933, but that it still exists is, nevertheless, realistically correct. This institutional difference is ultimately perceptual in nature (cf. Chapter 9); if people did not believe that managers have such powers, the powers would cease to exist. Our analysis is based on the assumption that these institutional patterns will command public belief for a long time to come.

TACTICS AVAILABLE TO EXECUTIVES

Let us consider first, the situation of the manager in relation to the industrial conflict over the distribution of power and income return. Various tactics have been and can be utilized by management in its attempt to safeguard its privileged position or to increase its relative advantage. Some of these are: (1) efficiency programs; (2) personnel and welfare work; (3) improved communications with employees; (4) company unions; and (5) attempts to break up unions. The initiative to employ them rests with management. If it is strategic to do so, the manager can close the factory and move far away, buy new machines, introduce new products. However, we shall deal in the main with tactics utilized by management within an established location. Even with such a restriction the range is rather wide.

The situation of the worker is considerably simpler in some ways and more complex in others. It is generally impossible for the worker or his representatives to take positive action in terms of tactics in this struggle. The worker is largely limited to negative action, to expres-

sions of aggression and hostility, to protests against the policies of management. Thus, we have such phenomena as absenteeism, slow-downs, and its counterpart, featherbedding, turnover, sabotage, and strikes. These are the tactics by which the worker responds to the industrial conflict situation, protects his position, or in some cases attempts to gain a relative advantage in the struggle.

What is management? A typical textbook on personnel management (Yoder, 1942) defines management as "the active utilization of men and materials to attain a given objective" (p. 4). Who determines these objectives? Management, of course, within the very broad limits set by stockholders. Continuing, Yoder says, "The basic purpose of all personnel management and administration is that of securing maximum productive efficiency from the manpower involved" (p. 5). Such a definition leaves little place for the goals of the workers (manpower) involved. Maximum productive efficiency may be perceived by them as involving excessive fatigue, economic insecurity, an unfair distribution of income, etc. The purposes of management, however, reflect managerial perceptions and goals.

The 1946 General Motors strike illustrates the role of dominance in industrial conflict. In that case, the union's demand for a wage increase without an increase in the price of automobiles was focalized in the slogan, "A look at the books." The implicit argument was that, if management would only give the necessary information, it could be proved that this wage increase was possible without necessitating a price increase. The corporation countered with a series of advertisements utilizing the slogan, "A look at the books, or a finger in the pie?" The implication here was that the union was really attempting to assume a power role, that is, to get some degree of control over the situation. The union wanted a voice in management. As a matter of fact, it seems clear that the corporation's position was correct, even though the union representatives insisted that they were not attempting to interfere with management's prerogatives. The real point of the conflict situation was power. Management's position was that the decision on price levels was exclusively the right of management. The union's position was that this control should be jointly shared. It is this constant struggle for dominance (or power, or ego satisfaction) that provides us with the key to the understanding of industrial conflict in America at the present time.¹ However, these controversies

¹ It also seems probable that this is one form of industrial conflict that cannot be eliminated even by a resort to a socialistic or communistic society. Specifically, we are told that many conflicts of this type are now appearing in Russian industry. However, Russian "unions" lack the freedom to strike which is essential to attainment of an effective power role.

always have, immediately or potentially, an economic aspect. Both factors must be kept in mind in assessing any situation.

In a sense both of these struggles go back to our basic conception of homeostasis. This, it will be remembered, was the principle that the organism attempts to maintain a favorable equilibrium and takes vigorous action to restore this equilibrium when it is threatened. Thus, the executive in attempting to maintain or increase his profit ratio is actually following the equilibrium principle, inasmuch as this policy fosters his own personal welfare as well as furthers the perceived welfare of the organization. What determines the success of the executive? By what kinds of performance will he be judged as to future promotions, more prestige, more income, etc.? Obviously, the most important criterion will be the profitability of the enterprise that he is managing. Thus, even though he may not receive a direct share of the profits from the enterprise that he is directing, he will still be highly motivated toward a favorable profit ratio under these circumstances, and measures devised to protect or to improve this profit ratio will be homeostatic as far as his situation is concerned.

In the same way the worker, on a simpler level, is concerned with protecting his own equilibrium. He is motivated by such considerations as fatigue, the desire to protect his physical safety, biological needs which demand satisfaction, prestige, security, recognition, and consideration. In attempting to gain more power over his environment and a certain degree of control over aspects of the job situation he is simply attempting to protect and improve the favorable constant states that he has found to exist or that he believes can exist within the industrial environment.

With this general introduction, let us turn to a consideration of some of the specific tactics utilized in this industrial conflict situation. In the present chapter we shall be concerned particularly with tactics developed by and on behalf of management. In Chapter 11 we shall consider tactics as developed by unions on behalf of the welfare of the union and on behalf of the workers as individuals.

EFFICIENCY ENGINEERING


The first classification of tactics covers changes in machinery, methods, job breakdown, time and motion study, piecework incentives, and so on. Obviously we shall not consider any of the technical aspects of these procedures, but only their psychological features. Specifically we shall be concerned with the way in which motivations and perceptions of managers and workers interact in the context provided by such features of the work situation.

In his efforts to increase profits or maximize his firm's security, the manager can sell old machinery and install new. He can break a skilled operation into component parts at a semiskilled level, and in other ways modify the work situation at his convenience. Some of these freedoms are drastically limited by economic considerations outside the union relationship, such as the state of the product market, the cost of different kinds of machinery, etc. It is also true that unions in many cases are attempting to impose restrictions on the freedom of management initiative in these regards for reasons that become apparent as our analysis proceeds.

Job simplification The breakdown of a skilled job into two or more semiskilled jobs has been a tactic widely employed by management since 1900. The possession of an essential skill, in limited supply, by a group of workers gives them bargaining power which they use to raise the wage rate. It is thus economically advantageous to management to have a large number of semiskilled jobs, which do not readily lend themselves to such squeezes.


We have also noted (Chapter 7) that common possession of a rare skill tends to become a basis for group solidarity and that workers in such a cohesive group reinforce one another and are able to demand concessions which they could not obtain without this solidarity. As Warner and Low (1947) have analyzed this phenomenon, the early factory had a series of skill hierarchies (Fig. 10.1) through which a

Hierarchical arrangement of jobs in the days of handcraft shoe-making. The individual's security and prestige increased as he progressed upward from job A to job D.



The upward pointing arrows imply the preparation an individual got by working in one job for doing the next higher job in the hierarchy.

The common level of nearly all technological jobs today, showing the breaking up of each old job into several simple ones (division of labor). Modern operatives are nearly all at the same low level of prestige and security because there is little difference in either of these respects between any of the jobs from A₁ to D₄.



The lack of arrows connecting the jobs A₁ to D₄ implies the fact that working in one job does not prepare the modern operative to do any other job.

Fig. 10.1. Downgrading of a skill hierarchy. (From Warner and Low, 1947, *The Social System of the Modern Factory. The Strike: A Social Analysis*, Chart VI, p. 81, by permission of Yale University Press.)

worker progressed. This gave him a sense of achievement, concrete goals which could be attained within a reasonable span of time. And as he reached each successive rung of the ladder, he tended to close involvement with the other members of his skill category. The modern trend has been to break down these skill hierarchies into a plateau of semiskilled operations. This has been doubly frustrating to the workers, in that their old group satisfactions are missing, and also the satisfactions of moving up a defined ladder of success.

Warner and Low also relate the workers' hostility to an assumed loss of social mobility. Whether it ever existed or not, most Americans believe that high mobility was once characteristic of our culture, and that since 1900 their chances to move up a "social ladder" have also been drastically reduced. Hence, the authors say:

"The workers of Yankee City were able to strike, maintain their solidarity, and in a sense flee to the protection of the unions because the disappearance of craftsmanship and the decreasing opportunities for social mobility had made them more alike, with common problems and common hostilities against management. The craft differences had been wiped out, and occupation mobility in the craft hierarchy and, secondarily, social mobility in the community had been stopped. The workers felt even more alike and were increasingly motivated to act together because their new occupational status had contributed to their downward orientation in the community. There is no doubt that each worker's uneasiness and reasoning about what was happening to the status of his family and himself—a situation which he meagerly comprehended and which was almost beyond his ability to communicate coherently to his fellows—whipped him into attacking the owners, who provided visible targets and could be held responsible for the loss and degradation of the worker's cherished way of life."¹

This development has, of course, been hard on the old craft unions, and favorable to the expansion of industrial unionism. That the officers of industrial unions clearly understand this effect is shown by their resistance to the reintroduction of class distinctions among workers. Managers in some companies have tried to distinguish skill grades and pay differential rates to more highly skilled workers. This would undoubtedly be approved by a large majority of the workers immediately involved (whether or not they got the higher rate at once), because it provides a concrete goal to be achieved. From the union officer's viewpoint, it is undesirable because it breaks up the solidarity of the larger group.

New machinery. Another tactic widely employed by management to achieve economic and ego gains is the introduction of advanced

¹ Warner and Low (1947), pp. 171-172. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

automatic or semiautomatic machinery. This new machinery characteristically is introduced at a point at which it will result in a lower net cost per unit products; moreover, by displacing workers, it seems to reduce the manager's problems in dealing with his employees. Machines do not join unions and tie up production at crucial moments. For that reason, as "automation" continues, the executive feels that he has more complete control over the work situation and is less subject to unpredictable pressures from individuals not under his control.

The new machine as perceived by the executive is, of course, a highly desirable innovation. It represents a more efficient, less wasteful, less expensive and more productive way of turning out consumer goods. It may also, therefore, be perceived by the consumer as a desirable process, particularly if the advantages of the technological advances are passed on to the consumer in the form of lower prices. However, from the point of view of the industrial worker, the new machine cannot be said to have such a desirable appearance. Freeman (1936) tells of an observation of his in a battery manufacturing plant in which a new device was being installed by which two men could do the work formerly done by fifty. Thus, forty-eight men were being permanently separated from employment in this particular industry. Freeman comments that when the machine was unloaded and placed in position a number of men walked past it and spat upon it, at the same time calling it "scab."¹

Management has argued, in this kind of situation, that the worker should take a long-run point of view and realize that new jobs will be made available in manufacturing such productive instruments, that more people can buy batteries, and that the general standard of living will be increased. To this the worker quite characteristically replies that he gets hungry and pays his rent and buys clothing for his family in the short run rather than in the long run. Indeed, unions have been known to reverse this argument, suggesting that management could look forward in the long run to social benefits by paying higher wages without increasing costs to the consumer. The manager, however, says that in the short run he will go bankrupt. Thus, each side is likely to urge the other to take a long-run point of view but to concentrate upon the detrimental short-run effects which make it inconvenient, if not impossible, for them to accept this long-range vision of prosperity and consumer advantage.

Mechanical pacing. The conveyor belt and the assembly line have

¹ The employee's attitude toward new machinery may vary from pride to hostility, and is in part a function of his relationship to management. For an interesting study, see Ouweleen (1952).

become symbols for modern technology. This system for mechanical pacing of work gives the employer considerably more control over the work situation, in addition to the advantages derived from job simplification (which necessarily accompanies the assembly-line techniques). That it is more efficient to bring the work to the worker than to have him go to it is fairly clear. However, the sense of constant pressure, the inability to shift working rhythm from time to time, is exceedingly unpleasant to most workers. Walker and Guest (1952) cite some comments from their interviews with assembly-line employees: "The work isn't hard, it's the never-ending pace. The guys yell 'hurrah' whenever the line breaks down. You can hear it all over the plant." "It's not the monotony, it's the rush, rush, rush." "I'd like my job, if they didn't rush me all the time. I'd hate to have my boy work like this."¹

An English study by Walker and Marriott (1951) confirms these findings on American workers. Personal interviews with workers in two British automobile factories led to the conclusion that 70 per cent (Factory A) and 59 per cent (Factory B) were moderately or very well satisfied. These were broken down into workers paced by conveyors versus workers free from mechanical pacing. Of those on mechanized jobs, only 54 per cent (in each factory) were well to moderately satisfied, whereas those on non-mechanized work rated 72 per cent and 77 per cent, respectively, in these categories. The observations provide quantitative support for the American studies.

Job rotation. Is there any way in which management can maintain the advantages of job simplification and conveyor pacing, while conceding the justification of worker complaints on these scores? One proffered solution is that of rotating workers on jobs from day to day, or even within a day's shift. On most of these jobs, warm-up time is very short because of the semiskilled nature of the operation. Thus a worker can, within a few minutes, be performing at standard speed.

Walker and Guest paid particular attention to this question in the factory that they studied. Their conclusion, based on the data of Table 10.1, is that job satisfaction is materially improved by giving the worker a chance at different jobs. This is particularly true if some of the jobs are not mechanically paced, so that the worker is free of this feeling of pressure. However, even a shift to a different pace is something of a relief to the worker.

¹ Walker and Guest (1952), pp. 51-52. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press. Some of the diverse factors affecting employee attitudes toward monotonous work have been carefully explored by Cox (1953).

Table 10.1 Variety in Work Assignments and Job Satisfaction*

Operations Performed	Men	Number Reporting	
		Very or Fairly Interesting	Not Very or Not at All Interesting
1	57	33%	67%
2-4	64	43	57
5 or more	59	69	31
$p < .001$			

* Walker and Guest (1952), p. 54. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.

¹ *Fortune*, November, 1942, p. 232.

Time and motion study. The term "efficiency engineering" has wider connotations than time and motion study, but this is its meaning for most workers. The amount of hostility it arouses is suggested by a reporter for *Fortune Magazine*, who interviewed Pittsburgh workers in 1942; he writes, "Least popular (with these workers), in this order: The Japs, the Nazis, and the 'industrial engineers.'"¹ This may have been a slight exaggeration, but it is not far off target.

As managers perceive this process, it is one of finding the best way to do a given job, re-arranging the materials if necessary, interspersing rest pauses at controlled intervals. The purposes of the methods engineer are to eliminate unnecessary motions and diminish distances moved, so that a greater amount of work can be done in a given time with the same or less effort. Sometimes this involves slow-motion photography, so that pictures can be studied and non-essential movements detected. Many very rapid operations have been found to include unnecessary movements which could not be detected by the observer. Sometimes it was possible to combine in a single movement tasks that formerly had required two or more movements. Proponents of the technique claim that they have increased efficiency and productivity at no cost to the worker in greater fatigue.

Certainly no one can question that the average worker has many inefficient habits. Surveys of college students indicate that many, if not most, of them read in very inefficient ways. The employee who has been placed on a job without training, or with training only by another worker, probably has a rule-of-thumb approach which is as inept as hunt-and-peck typewriting compared to the touch system. It can be argued, therefore, that the efficiency engineer is doing the worker as well as the boss a favor in introducing the superior technique.

But this is not the whole story. How does the worker perceive this change? Does he see it as a program for his benefit? The evidence

indicates that, in general, the workers object to being told arbitrarily how to do their jobs, in a manner very similar to the way executives resent being ordered by a government bureaucrat how to run their business.

The individual seeks to control his environment; he desires stability and predictability as long as his motives are being reasonably well-satisfied. A change in the environment is usually perceived as a potential threat. Particularly is this true when the change is due to the power of another person. He is capable of disturbing your equilibrium, and there is nothing you can do about it. However, you may be in a position to make life uncomfortable for him in turn (cf. the frustration-aggression cycle, pp. 191-192). Thus, workers may harass the "cheese engineer"—and the boss who employs him—as a form of punishment for the arbitrary disruption of established ways of behaving. That the new way is more efficient is, to the worker, irrelevant. He perceives it as an arbitrarily imposed frustration and responds accordingly.

Taylor and "scientific management." The way in which the executive sees these efficiency measures has never been stated more clearly than by Taylor, the "father of scientific management." In his *Principles of Scientific Management* (1913), Taylor has been quite explicit with regard to his basic principles. He asserts that "there is always one method and one implement which is quicker and better than any of the rest." And, with regard to workmen, "in almost all of the mechanic arts the science which underlies each act of each workman is so great and amounts to so much that the workman who is best suited to actually doing the work is incapable of fully understanding this science, without the guidance and help of those who are working with him or over him, either through lack of education or through insufficient mental capacity" (pp.25-26). However, Taylor takes the position that these superior beings in management should be kind to the worker: "Each man should daily be taught by and receive the most friendly help from those who are over him, instead of being, at the one extreme, driven or coerced by his bosses, and at the other left to his own unaided devices" (p. 26).¹

Critics of the Taylor approach have doubted that Taylor himself, or his followers, took seriously the injunction in the preceding sentence. As evidence they point to the famous case of Schmidt, described by Taylor as an example of how his method could be applied.

¹ These and the following quotations are reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

The setting is the Bethlehem Steel Co., where the average man was loading $12\frac{1}{2}$ long tons of pig iron per day. Taylor's measures convinced him that each man should be loading 47 to 48 long tons per day.

Once we were sure . . . that 47 tons was a proper day's work for a first-class pig-iron handler, the task which faced us as managers under the modern scientific plan was clearly before us. It was our duty to see that the 80,000 tons of pig iron was loaded on to the cars at the rate of 47 tons per man per day And it was further our duty to see that this work was done *without bringing on a strike among the men*, without any quarrel with the men, and to see that the men were happier and better contented when loading at the new rate of 47 tons than they were when loading at the old rate of $12\frac{1}{2}$ tons

In dealing with workmen under this type of management, it is an inflexible rule to talk to and deal with only one man at a time, since each workman has his own special abilities and limitations,¹ and since we are not dealing with men in masses, but are trying to develop each individual man to his highest state of efficiency and prosperity Finally we selected . . . a little Pennsylvania Dutchman who had been observed to trot back home for a mile or so after his work in the evening, about as fresh as he was when he came trotting down to work in the morning. We found that upon wages of \$1.15 a day he had succeeded in buying a small plot of ground, and that he was engaged in putting up the walls of a little house for himself He also had the reputation of being exceedingly "close," that is, of placing a very high value on a dollar. As one man whom we talked to about him said, "A penny looks about the size of a cart-wheel to him." . . .

The task before us, then, narrowed itself down to getting Schmidt to handle 47 tons of pig iron a day and making him glad to do it Schmidt was called out from among the gang of pig-iron handlers and talked to somewhat in this way:

"Schmidt, are you a high-priced man?"

"Vell, I don't know vat you mean."

"Oh yes, you do. What I want to know is whether you are a high-priced man or not."

"Vell, I don't know vat you mean."

"Oh, come now, you answer my questions. What I want to find out is whether you are a high-priced man or one of these cheap fellows here. What I want to find out is whether you want to earn \$1.85 a day, or whether you are satisfied with \$1.15, just the same as all those cheap fellows are getting."

"Did I want \$1.85 a day? Vas dot a high-priced man? Vell, yes, I vas a high-priced man."

"Oh, you're aggravating me. Of course you want \$1.85 a day—everyone wants it! You know perfectly well that that has very little to do with your being a high-priced man. For goodness' sake answer my questions, and

¹ This seems to contradict Taylor's rule that there is one best method for every worker.

don't waste any more of my time. Now come over here. You see that pile of pig iron?"

"Yes."

"You see that car?"

"Yes."

"Well, if you are a high-priced man, you will load that pig iron on that car tomorrow for \$1.85. Now do wake up and answer my question. Tell me whether you are a high-priced man or not."

"Vell—did I got \$1.85 for loading dot pig iron on dot car tomorrow?"

"Yes, of course you do, and you get \$1.85 for loading a pile like that every day right through the year. That is what a high-priced man does, and you know it just as well as I do."

"Vell, dot's all right. I could load dot pig iron on the car tomorrow for \$1.85, and I get it every day, don't I?"

"Certainly you do—certainly you do."

"Vell, den, I was a high-priced man."

"Now, hold on, hold on. You know just as well as I do that a high-priced man has to do exactly as he's told from morning till night. You have seen this man here before, haven't you?"

"No, I never saw him."

"Well, if you are a high-priced man, you will do exactly as this man tells you tomorrow, from morning till night.¹ When he tells you to pick up a pig and walk, you pick it up and walk, and when he tells you to sit down and rest, you sit down. You do that right straight through the day. And what's more, no back talk. Now a high-priced man does just what he's told to do, and no back talk . . . Now you come on to work here tomorrow morning and I'll know before night whether you are really a high-priced man or not."²

We may question whether this is the "most friendly help" prescribed by Taylor to be given the worker. Indeed, reading the first few sentences of the dialogue, one is inclined to wonder who has "insufficient mental capacity," Taylor or Schmidt. The outcome, however, is clear: Schmidt puts out 300 per cent more work for a 60 per cent increase in wages. Furthermore, Schmidt was presumably indoctrinated thoroughly with the rule of "no back talk," which could mean far less frustration for the foreman.

¹ It is interesting to note that Taylor, in his criticism of profit sharing, seems to recognize the fallacy of his approach of treating men in such arbitrary, uniform fashion. He says, "A second reason for the inefficiency of profit-sharing schemes had been that no form of cooperation has yet been devised in which each individual is allowed free scope for his personal ambition" (p. 95). How much "free scope for personal ambition" accrued to Schmidt under the scientific regimen is not indicated. Taylor, of course, was factually in error in asserting that men always placed selfish advantage about group welfare. Indeed, he was often obstructed in his activities by workers' concern for the group.

² Taylor, 1913, pp. 42-46.

Some of the elements in the balance sheet of scientific management become clear from the case of Schmidt. Schmidt received 60 per cent more cash income. Whether he was still able to trot home and build his little house, we are not told. He lost considerably in freedom to determine his own work pace, and perhaps in self-expression. On the management side, as we noted, the gain was 300 per cent in productivity for a 60 per cent cost in wages. Presumably management also obtained somewhat better control of the work force, in the sense of complete submission to orders. From the point of view of the public, some benefits in terms of lowered prices may ultimately have resulted; these must be balanced against the human losses and perhaps also against the bitter strikes and the hostilities of early twentieth-century labor relations in steel and elsewhere.

Psychosomatic illness and efficiency engineering. Even more extensive social costs may derive from the efficiency engineering of which Taylor was merely the first prophet. Halliday (1948), an English physician, holds that the mechanization of the coal mines was an important factor in a tremendous increase in psychosomatic illnesses, as well as group conflict and strikes, among English miners. He contrasts the situation before and after World War I. In the earlier period "the miners formed themselves into little groups, and boys who were friends or relatives often became working mates for the rest of their lives. The work was done almost solely by hand and each man labored according to the rhythms natural to his working group. There was little hurry or rush; the hardships of their life were accepted and shared; they knew their job and were fiercely proud of it."¹

By 1936, he states, over 90 per cent of the coal was cut by machinery. This "prevented the miner from being able to work 'at his own time' or to 'take his piece' (eat his carried food) at his leisure. Instead he had to rush his meal in a quarter of an hour, 'this period of fifteen minutes being the only break allowed during a seven-hour shift which was spent in working in positions and attitudes which must be seen to be believed.' Another and important accompaniment of mechanization was the rapid breakdown of the traditional working pattern of groups of mates united by bonds of affection in a common social purpose, and its substitution by a 'system' in which emotionally lacerated or isolated men were unitary parts of a gigantic clockwork."²

Both Taylor and Halliday stress the tendency of modern technology

¹ Halliday (1948), pp. 189-190, by permission of W. W. Norton & Co.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 190-191. See also Fraser (1947), discussed on pp. 184-185.

to break up work groups, to bind the individual to his job without any support from his fellows. But, as we have indicated in Chapter 4, the need to be related to a group is a powerful motive in modern man. This social frustration may be considered another possible cost of modern technology.

Basic assumptions of Taylorism. Juran (1951) has called attention to a point of considerable importance which is usually overlooked in this connection:

Underlying Taylor's system of incentives were the concepts:

1. The prime concern of the workman is money.
2. The lure of added money is a sufficient incentive to induce the workman to increase production.

These considerations may well have been vital in Taylor's time. When one is at or below the subsistence level, money becomes the basis of liberation from a budgetary prison. The dominant concern is indeed to secure liberation from this perpetual poverty.

But . . . the gathering of evidence indicates that the higher the workman's standard of living rises above the subsistence level, the less is the relative importance of any money increment, and the higher becomes the relative importance of other incentives.¹

The significance of this point can best be understood if we look back at the general principles of motivation. Certain basic survival needs dominate all other motives for the average man. Until these are weakened by some degree of satiation, the ego and social motives have little chance to influence behavior. Taylor can perhaps be forgiven for the assumption that the biogenic needs were so potent that monetary incentives were the only appropriate kind. But such an error is certainly inexcusable today. The increase in the American standard of living may have much to do with the potency of non-economic motives in industry.

By the same token, of course, we must not assume that generalizations valid for the United States will hold for other countries. It may be that in Russia, China, and India the biogenic needs are relatively more potent. Observers of Russian industry are in general agreement that pay differentials are wider there than in the "capitalistic" United States. These economic incentives may have been arrived at of necessity in the attempt to increase productivity among Russian workers. Comparative studies of developing industry in India and other areas still free of totalitarian control would help us decide whether this hypothesis is well-founded.

¹ Juran (1951), p. 82. Reprinted by permission of Industrial Relations Research Association.

Technical shortcomings of time-motion study. The efficiency engineers have claimed that time and motion study, combined with job evaluation and similar procedures, give a truly scientific, impartial basis for determining a fair wage for a given job. Some of the inadequacies in this view should be noted.

Errors in time study. Several investigations have shown that the wage a particular worker receives will be profoundly affected by which time-study man does the basic work for determining his rate. One of the most methodical studies, by Lifson (1953), concludes that variations in rates may derive from variations in the job, in the worker, in the work pace, and in the observer. The chief source of error, he finds, is in the observer. Using experienced time-study men, he found variations of as much as 30 per cent; one man might set a rate as much as 15 per cent above the known work pace, another might be as much as 14 per cent below.

Lehrer (1950) reports that a study of 124 ratings by 31 experienced time-study men gave only 19 per cent of judgments within 5 per cent of the "true value" (work pace). Even if the margin were extended to a 10 per cent error either way, only 42 per cent of the determinations would be included. Thus 58 per cent of pace ratings (which determine piece rate, and thus earnings) were in error by more than 10 per cent. (By the use of training films, Lehrer improved accuracy to the point that only 13 per cent of ratings missed by more than 10 per cent; many workers would probably question whether they want their pay set by a method in error even by this amount.)

Job evaluation. Job evaluation is a related device for standardizing wage rates from one job to another. Contrary to claims, it does not eliminate personal judgments; it only takes an average of the ratings on the various factors by the men doing the judging. This may help somewhat in removing personal whim from pay rates, but it is far from a "scientific, impersonal, impartial" system of pay determination. Chesler (1948) finds that specific jobs fluctuated, depending on the rater, by as much as 4.5 labor grades (anyone familiar with industrial practice realizes that this is an enormous variation), and that 80 per cent of jobs fluctuated by 1 labor grade or more. His data are likewise derived from men experienced in the administration of job evaluation programs.

Motion study. One of the most serious deficiencies of motion study as practiced in industry lies in the common assumption that the whole is merely the sum of its parts. In psychological work we are constantly reminded that this is not so. Hence, when a motion study man makes a micromotion analysis, times each separate ther-

lig, and puts these together arithmetically to make the "one best method" of doing the job, he is doing violence to the facts. It is not permissible, for example, to assume that a total movement pattern can be assembled from the elementary motions of various workers. Nor is it even possible to eliminate certain motions from one man's pattern and assume that exactly that amount of time is cut from his total performance.

There is considerable doubt among psychologists even about the "one best method." Workers vary in the pace at which they perform best, the preferred stance, left-right balance, and so on. What is the best method for Jones may not be best for Smith or Brown.

Workers' perception of time-motion study. The foregoing criticisms of common methods in efficiency engineering seem to provide some realistic basis for worker skepticism about time and motion study, standard production rates, and so on. And many engineers (cf. Juran, 1951) assume that elimination of these sources of error will also end worker hostility. This assumption is unjustified. In fact, it seems probable that few workers know of these inadequacies, and most are not primarily concerned about them.

The primary purpose of time and motion study is to establish an *incentive pay* plan. For example, after a time study has been completed, the company may set a piece rate such that "normal" work pace will provide the same hourly income as before; increased production will lead to increased earnings. Or a *work standard* may be set for the regular work day, with a fixed number of pieces to constitute the normal load. Again, production above the standard is usually paid a premium rate. Thus, the term "incentive plan" usually refers to a plan that gears pay directly to production per individual and is founded upon a time or motion study. This aspect, not the efficiency work as such, is salient to the workers.

We have already noted that workers do not respond as predicted to these proffered economic rewards. In many cases the introduction of an incentive plan has been followed by a brief rise to a slightly higher level, and then a steady plateau. These plateaus are due to the setting of *group norms* by the employees themselves, whether unionized or not. The norm defines the appropriate amount of work on any given job, and a variety of social and physical pressures are applied to compel conformity to the norm.

Many workers perceive the job as a form of competition with the time study man. Roy (1953) writes of his own experiences: "The operator watched the clock as he expended his skill and energy, but sometimes the otherwise guileless face of the timepiece on the wall

took on the crafty features of the time study man At other times imagery of the opponent would shift to the scowling face of the foreman when the triumphant operator sat with folded arms in conspicuous idleness beside his completed work, waiting for a restive boss to say something.”¹

In some degree this hostility to the incentive standard is merely normal human resistance to being dominated by some other person. The worker resents being required to do a job by a specified set of motions, within a specified time limit, when he is not consulted about these conditions. But even more stress seems to be laid on the prospect of rate cuts and layoffs if higher production is turned out. As the worker sees it, there is a certain market to be filled. If he turns out more gadgets per hour, he is simply working himself out of a job. (He might support this argument by noting the situation in such industries as steel, automobiles, and farm equipment in 1953–1954, for example.)

That layoffs follow increased production per man-hour is usually denied by management. The main arguments for such devices, however, lie exactly along this line. As Wrape (1952) points out, “The same output can be achieved from fewer work places and fewer machines; ‘fringe’ and welfare costs . . . decrease per unit of product” (p. 65).

Disagreement also arises over whether management cuts the piece rate when a worker boosts his production to the point where his earnings are extraordinarily high. The manager, of course, usually takes the position that rates are cut only when the work has been simplified or new technical aid has been given to the men. Workers certainly do not believe this, and in a few cases outside investigators have stumbled upon rate cuts based simply on the decision that earnings were higher than was “right for this job.”

For example, Mathewson (1931) tells of a clerk who wondered if the men were right in expecting arbitrary rate cuts. “He found out soon, when a new foreman took charge of this department. One of the foreman’s first official acts was to check up on earnings. He found a woman earning \$6 a day, and a man and wife earning \$8 and \$6, respectively. He remarked that \$6 was ‘too much for any woman to be earning,’ and that \$14 was excessive for a family. Arbitrarily he cut the rates so that the woman could earn only \$4 a day” (p. 56). In a tire-building plant the workers found that, if anyone earned over \$7 a day, the rates were reduced. In view of such observations, it is

¹ Roy (1953), p. 512.

hardly surprising that workers hold back production to avoid the hazards of rate reduction.¹

To understand the rate-cutting behavior of the executives involved in these incidents, we must go back to the problem of perception. The executive has developed a picture of the kind of man who can do a job, the manner in which it should be done, and the earnings it should produce. These percepts are based on an average of a great many experiences, and they have the quality of factual reality as far as he is concerned. If a worker on a job normally paying \$22 a week (Mathewson, p. 60) increases his or her earnings to \$57, the boss decides that he made a mistake on the piece rate and cuts it so that the earnings fit his perception of what is proper for that job.

Mathewson points out that many instances of restriction of production originate with the boss, not with the workers themselves. For instance, a foreman may have a slack period coming up, and he knows that men will be laid off if the jobs in sight are completed. He will then pass the word around to slow down and make the work last. This may be to protect his own job (many companies will also lay off the foreman) but more often it is to protect his men. The foreman, as we have noted in Chapter 7, is in an "overlapping group" situation; he wishes to maintain his friendship with his men as well as with management.

Even the top executive, of course, has other troubles in connection with incentive rates. If he allows earnings of \$57 on a semiskilled job, workers on other tasks at the same general level may be able to reach only \$30 even at top speed. They will then complain about inequities in rates. Thus both the boss and the workers avoid trouble by restricting work within approved norms of production, but the loss of output involved is very large.

Removing worker resistance. The task of removing worker resistance to time-motion studies and similar efficiency programs calls for determining how the employees perceive a given situation, and acting on this. For example, guarantees of "no rate cut" and "no layoffs," when truly ironclad, help a great deal in this area.

Much of the resistance is a function of employee attitude. Devices to eliminate worker suspicion depend largely on working with the union. Bridgeport Brass Co. has disputed jobs timed by two experts, one from the company, the other from the union. When both of

¹ It is relevant to note that in a survey of 4,000 workers in a large appliance factory, Lieberman (1954) reports that 65 per cent responded "yes" to the question, "Is a work standard ever changed just because a man is a high producer?"

them agree on a rate, it is accepted by workers with little demur. Observations such as this lead to the conclusion that it is *distrust of management* which underlies a great deal of opposition to efficiency engineering. When management convinces the workers of its good faith, that the paraphernalia of science are not being used to defraud the employee, such opposition will become a far less serious problem.

This emphasis on considering the worker's point of view is not new. Frank Gilbreth, another pioneer in the motion study field, wrote in 1913: "It should be stated here emphatically that there is nothing than can permanently bring about results from scientific management, and the economics that it is possible to effect by it, unless the organization is supported by the hearty cooperation of the men."¹

Distrust, of course, has been mutual. Shurtleff (1950), describing his experience with union cooperation at Apex Electrical Co., quotes a Cleveland newspaper writer to the effect that having the union time its own jobs is "as unorthodox as if, in law enforcement, a policeman should invite his prisoner to hold his gun." Few executives would relish being cast as policemen, and they would be unhappy at the suggestion that their employees were criminals. Yet too much of this kind of thinking fouls all efforts to reach reasonable settlements of efficiency problems.

PERSONNEL AND WELFARE WORK

Most executives are aware of the existence of employee distrust, although many seem not to realize its extent. Efforts to improve employee attitudes, and presumably thereby to increase cooperative behavior, have been made for many years, taking an especially marked upturn after the great wave of strikes in 1919-1920. Some efforts have been clearly and explicitly directed to making the employees happier (e.g., recreation programs), others to building a picture of the employer as a kind father figure (welfare activities). Much of what is commonly called personnel work (employee testing, training, merit rating) is considered beneficial to both workers and boss. Let us examine sketchily a few examples of employer activities in this area.

Employee testing. Employee testing for selection and placement has often been cited as a contribution of psychology which serves the needs of both employer and worker, the former by finding men who can do the job best and eliminating failures, the latter by helping

¹ Gilbreth (1913), p. 623.

him to get located in a spot where he will be efficient and satisfied. At present no comparative data are available to show that workers are any happier in plants using testing than in plants where no tests are given to applicants. It is true that most workers approve of such testing, largely because they see it as evidence that the employer feels some interest in them as individuals. For example, Van Zelst, Kroh and Kerr (1951) made a survey of several hundred workers in which they asked, "To whose advantage do you believe employment tests to be?" The answers ran as follows: "Your own, 14 per cent; company's, 19 per cent; both, 67 per cent." This seems to indicate that workers accept employment testing as beneficial to themselves.¹

Union leaders in general have had little to say regarding testing, taking the position that they are not concerned with the worker until he is hired in the industry and so eligible for membership in the union. However, to the extent that test scores may be utilized to select employees for promotion, skepticism and downright opposition are manifest. Gomberg (1949), for example, has the following remarks on this question:

It is difficult for unions to become enthusiastic about selection techniques in industries Many psychologists feel that they have an acceptable test with validity correlations of 0.4 and even lower. Unions do not look upon workers as abstract collectives. They are frankly concerned about the injustice to workers who may be falsely classified as incompetent, that is, they are unfortunate enough to fall into that 0.6 part of the correlation remaining between 0.4 and perfect correlation.

If these tests are used to select new workers from the open market to whom the union has incurred no particular obligation, the company and the industrial psychologist are likely to be met with indifference rather than with opposition. If, on the other hand, they are to be used as a determinant of in-plant promotions, then they will have to be a good deal more valid before the union will permit them to be the criterion of judgment of whether or not any particular worker is to be frustrated or permitted to go ahead.²

Left unsaid in Gomberg's remarks, but explicitly stated by other union spokesmen, is the fear that tests are only a bit of scientific skulduggery by which active unionists can be weeded out of the

¹ This is not dependent upon the success of the testing program in placing workers on suitable jobs. In one of the large commercial laundries in Connecticut, a study revealed that the testing program in use for several years had a validity of about zero; i.e., workers could have been placed just as well by chance. But on an employee attitude survey, the testing program was highly approved by the workers. They perceived it as evidence of management interest in their welfare.

² Gomberg (1949), pp. 52-53. Reprinted by permission of the Industrial Relations Research Assn.

labor force or discriminated against in promotions. This anxiety is given some concrete support by psychologists who have at least intimated that this can be done.¹ If a testing program is objectively administered, there seems little chance that union members could be objects of discrimination, but, until attitudes of mutual trust are established, this suspicion is likely to persist.

Merit rating. Another device used by employers for trying to place the worker in a job for which he is best suited, and to reward him for improved performance, is merit rating. This generally consists of a rating by foremen, annually or oftener, in which each worker is evaluated on a number of characteristics such as quality of work, job knowledge, cooperation on job assignments, etc. In many establishments, certain minimum marks on these ratings are required for promotions to higher jobs, for pay increases on the same job, and so on. Employers perceive such programs, like testing, as ways of putting the worker on a job where he can best meet requirements, earn more, and experience fewer frustrations. Few labor leaders quibble about these purposes, but they offer vigorous opposition to merit rating practices. Ratings allow an even wider margin for subjective bias than testing. The foreman may readily perceive an active union member as "uncooperative," as neglectful of his duties, disturbing other workers, and so on. Unions have conducted vigorous campaigns to get seniority, not ability as rated, established as the basis for layoffs, and even for promotions. Many of these campaigns have been successful, in part because executives were not sure that the merit rating plan was in fact identifying superior employees.²

There is some controversy as to what employees think about merit rating. Bengé (1953) has asserted that in the typical firm, 70 per cent to 75 per cent of unionized employees favor merit as against seniority for promotion and pay increases. In opposition to this we have the data of Van Zelst and Kerr (1953), who polled 340 employees from a wide variety of firms across the country with regard to their attitudes on merit rating. The sample was somewhat biased, only 66 per cent being production workers and only 40 per cent union members, both figures being apparently too low in respect to the nature of the companies cooperating in the study. The figures need to be qualified somewhat on this account.

¹ See, for example, Martin (1944).

² For instance, one study—Gaylord, Russell, *et al.* (1951)—showed correlations of only .48 to .55 between merit ratings and objective records of production. These correlations show that ratings of some workers were substantially deviant from "true" production performance.

The data indicate that merit rating plans are fairly widespread; 62 per cent of the sample said they had been rated. However, only 24 per cent stated that the employee's rating was discussed with and explained to him; and only 47 per cent said that the company had ever explained the purpose of the rating program to them. Under the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that 74 per cent held that merit rating was of little or no use to the worker. Table 10.2 shows

Table 10.2 Attitude of Workers Regarding Merit Rating*

	<i>Per Cent Responding</i>
How much weight should be given to merit rating when deciding whom to keep and whom to lay off?	
50% or more	8
25%	42
0%	50
How much weight should be given to merit rating in deciding who is to be promoted?	
50% or more	6
25%	42
0%	52
Do you believe that merit ratings are useful for guidance and correction of workers? (How you are getting along and what you should do to improve.)	
Very helpful; or some help	26
Little use	35
No use whatsoever	39
Do you believe your raters to be influenced by closeness of acquaintance or friendship in their ratings of some of the employees?	
Somewhat influenced or definitely influenced	21
More honest than influenced	59
Definitely not influenced	20

* From Van Zelst and Kerr (1953), pp. 162-163. Reprinted by permission of *Personnel Psychology*.

some of the other findings that bear on employee acceptance of this management technique.

It is clear that this sample of workers does not support Benge's claim. The typical worker in this study holds that merit rating should have no weight whatever on either promotions or layoffs. Why Benge's results are so different is an interesting problem; since his data were collected while he was doing management consultation work, it may be that the employees gave him the answers they thought it safest to give.

The major purposes of merit rating, as conceived by executives, are in the selection of superior workers for promotion and their retention

in case of layoff. The key finding of the Van Zelst-Kerr study, therefore, is that worker acceptance of such practices occurred *only* when the rating was discussed with him, and when he felt that he had a right to appeal his rating. The average worker said that the rating program caused him to feel *insecure*, and this was more pronounced among those currently subject to a rating program. Union members were distinguished in the study particularly by their belief that the rater was *biased*, and also was *unfamiliar* with their performance and personality. Since union members are more frequently found in large work groups, the unfamiliarity may well have been correct. The charge of bias is, irrespective of its accuracy, important because it reveals the worker's view of management.

Training. Training is a device by which the trainer seeks to modify certain perceptions or responses of the trainee. It may involve teaching him to identify the characteristics of a good product, to see the essential elements of a complex operation, to recognize the human problems in a disciplinary or efficiency problem, etc. Or it may involve developing skills in handling machinery or people.

We are not concerned here with the introduction of training programs on job skills, although these are admittedly a tactic used by management to get better products at a faster rate. Both workers and union officials agree that introducing such programs is a management prerogative; indeed, many grievances criticize management for not providing enough training along this line. But we are more interested in training for foremen (and higher-level executives) in handling human problems.

Considerable attention was given, in Chapters 5 and 6, to the desire of workers for a boss who could give orders and criticism in a manner not destructive of the worker's ego. In Chapter 8 we developed evidence to indicate that there are actually two separable leadership functions here: initiating structure (giving orders, correcting errors, etc.) and consideration (making the worker feel accepted and secure). Many a department (or even an entire factory) has been thrown into an uproar by a supervisor who plans well and gives clear instructions, but does so in a manner well-calculated to infuriate everybody within hearing distance.

Because the kickback from such situations became so violent that top executives could no longer ignore it, training programs have been instituted across the country to improve human relations techniques. One of the best descriptions of such training is given by Maier (1952), who uses a careful and methodical approach to the task. He attempts to teach the supervisor to look at problems from the worker's point of view, to consider possible motives, to allow the worker some self-

expression, and to draw solutions from the work group rather than to impose them arbitrarily.

The effectiveness of such methods can hardly be questioned. An excellent illustration is provided in Fig. 10.2, which shows the relative




Fig. 10.2. Effect of employee participation in decision making on production. (From Coch and French, 1948, by permission of *Human Relations*.)

increase in production in three groups of factory operators as compared with a fourth group which did not receive the training. The problem in question was one of transferring sewing machine operators to a new operation, a perennial cause of low production and poor morale in the factory. The experimental groups were allowed, in varying degrees, to set goals and make decisions about their work situation; the control group was simply transferred and given instructions on how to do the new job. As can be seen from the chart, after 30 days the control group was still below its pretransfer production, whereas all the three experimental groups were above their level prior to transfer.

Limitations on foreman training. No one in this country will be surprised that a democratic approach to decision making in industry improves production and job satisfaction of workers. Many observers have pointed out, on the other hand, that such an innovation is distinctly contrary to the structure of industry as an institution. Power is concentrated at the top and delegated downward, with little left to be delegated to the rank-and-file employees. It seems entirely plausible that such training will be effective only when top executives behave in such a way as to permit democratic procedures at the level of foreman-worker interaction.

This limitation has been strikingly confirmed in work by Fleishman (1951). Cooperating with a large farm machinery firm, he got judgments from workers as to the behavior of their foremen, foremen's self-descriptions, and descriptions of the foremen as seen by their superiors. Later these foremen were sent to a centralized training school for leadership development. During this training they learned to give the preferred answers (on listening to the worker, drawing him out, encouraging group participation, etc.) as to proper supervisory techniques. Some time after their return to their jobs, Fleishman again got worker reports on behavior of these supervisors. Some had improved; others were the same as before training. The key to the difference, he found, was this: some foremen worked for higher executives who believed in the human relations approach, practiced it themselves, and praised their foremen for using it. Other executives did not approve of it, did not practice it, and did not encourage its use. The foreman naturally behaved in the way that led to reward; i. e., he followed his boss rather than the training guide.

Is it democracy? There have been some barbed exchanges over the claim, by Maier and others, that this training approach leads to "democratic participation in industry." The reports make it clear that workers are not permitted to make decisions outside some rather sharply limited areas. For example, the workers would quickly be cut off if they attempted to decide to set goals lower than current production, or if they decided to raise the pay rate per unit of output.

Whether this is a "phony democracy" depends somewhat on our prejudices. Even in a political democracy the voter has a highly restricted number of choices; in most parts of the United States, he has a choice of only two parties. In some states, as in Russia, he has only the choice of voting "yes" or not voting. A written Constitution imposes substantial restrictions on the choices open in a democracy. The realities of international relations limit them still more. The fact that group decision, as practiced in industry, can operate only within limits set by top executives proves only that it also is an imperfect kind of democratic functioning.

There may be some very real advantages to the system, nevertheless. For example, it requires that the supervisor communicate much more to the workers than has been common in the past. Since it represents an innovation for executives, they may learn to utilize it on a wider range of problems in the future. And, since it is also an innovation for workers, it may encourage them to participate more actively in other aspects of the work situation as time passes.

Employee counseling. Every employee is a complete human in-

dividual, who may have troubles relating to job conditions or to home situations. Employees in small establishments are usually personally known to the boss; he may be familiar with their troubles, and help them out in a friendly, casual way. Such advice or assistance builds powerful loyalties on a person-to-person basis. (Cf. Fig. 8.2, p. 256.) Workers feeling such loyalty usually reject unions, preferring this more satisfying social relationship to the employer.

As firms have grown larger, this personal relationship becomes physically impossible. Ellsworth (1952) gives a detailed account of the slowly widening gap between owners and employees of a small factory, with subsequent unionization as the workers realized the impossibility of handling problems by personal communication with the owners. Various attempts have been made in large companies to restore this personal feeling; one is the employee counseling program, pioneered by Western Electric Company among production workers, by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company among office employees.

Counseling interviews can be looked upon as sources of data in the light of which top executives can take action to remove sources of employee complaint. On the other hand, they may simply be perceived as devices for allowing the worker to "blow off steam" with the expectation that he will then tolerate more readily the frustrations of the job situation. As Wilensky and Wilensky (1951) put it in their critical evaluation of the Hawthorne interviews, the main consequence of the counseling program may be that it "drains off resentment and bitterness that might otherwise gain expression through militant unionism." This result is improbable unless steps are also taken to remove the provocative situation. As we noted in an earlier chapter, catharsis can relieve tension temporarily, but continued frustration will restore tension within a short time.

Recreation programs. Employers have spent considerable sums of money on recreation halls, athletic equipment, and other devices for the use of their employees. These have been perceived as relevant to the purposes of industry in two ways: first, as a harmless way of sublimating tensions (cf. Fig. 10.3) which are presumably generated in the work situation; and second, as a device for building loyalty to the company and so, presumably, a barrier to union organization.

Draining off tensions by way of irrelevant activities (counseling, athletics, etc.) may have some temporary merit, but it must be supported by a positive program of eliminating frustrations if any long-range improvement is to result. Some reduction of hostility may result from these activities, but the amount is probably small.

As a device for building loyalty, recreational programs likewise have not proved to be of great value. What is really missing in modern jobs, mechanized, simplified, and paced as they are, is *intrinsic* satisfaction. There is no pleasure in seeing a good job finished. To replace this missing ingredient with satisfaction in a good basketball team is not simply difficult; it is impossible.

One of the major problems with administration of these programs is that employees themselves are rarely consulted. Many a company

FAN FARE

By Ditzen




Fig. 10.3. Recreation as outlet for aggression. (From *Fan Fare*, by Walt Ditzen, reprinted by permission of the Champaign-Urbana Courier and John F. Dille Co.)

has erected a recreation hall at a cost of half a million dollars or more, only to find that employees ignore its existence. It does not represent their ideas or their plans. It is therefore nothing with which the average worker can feel any personal involvement.

Welfare activities. Finally we may note that many companies have, at least in the past, done considerable in the way of welfare work. Employees whose families were hard-hit by illness or other unpredictable catastrophes often received loans or outright gifts; Christmas gifts of food and toys were common. Retired workers received assistance long before social security became an accepted norm of behavior.

When these forms of assistance represented warm, spontaneous gestures from an employer who was a personal friend, they usually evoked gratitude and loyalty. However, the depersonalizing process which seems to be an inevitable accompaniment of large organizations has changed this. Once a welfare program is formally organized, and policed by a personnel employee to see that undeserving loafers get no crumbs, employee approval is rapidly changed to re-

sentment. Ultimately, as history shows, the unions demand that these benefits become a matter of contractual right, and they even take over the administration of the plan.

As Houser (1927) notes in his interviews with top executives, the motivation in many cases for indulging in welfare efforts was more a matter of ego-expansion for the manager than a real personal interest in the worker as a person. And in these cases worker hostility was far more common. In firms where the top executive seemed genuinely motivated to help people, regardless of their attitudes toward him, the employee acceptance was much higher.

Attitudes of union leaders. Given this background of motivation and attitude on the part of company executives, it is hardly surprising that union officials have taken a position varying from cool indifference to outright hostility regarding personnel programs. While agreeing that it is worthwhile to "do good" for the worker, they have questioned whether the good is not entirely incidental and the main purpose is to maintain managerial control. With this the psychologist is likely to agree. On the other hand, in trying to follow through on this position, the union officer sometimes gets himself into a contradictory position. Let us consider the remarks of Barkin (1950) on personnel programs. He says, "Some management spokesmen . . . have argued that loyalty to the company and to the union can be maintained concurrently, without contradiction. Unfortunately, this well-meant concept does not stand up under even a cursory examination" (pp. 63-64). This, of course, is simply contrary to fact, since dual allegiance under appropriate conditions is well confirmed by the studies of Purcell (1953), Katz (1950), Stagner (1954a), and others.

What is even more interesting is the dilemma Barkin gets into a few sentences later. "While on the one hand, management is relinquishing more and more personnel matters to the union, on the other hand it is attempting to fight a rear-guard action against the union through its personnel program. A more realistic philosophy is essential . . . This will involve a new basic premise—that the enterprise must seek to achieve the goals of both management and the trade union" (p. 64). But this is precisely what he has asserted to be impossible. The "dual loyalty" argument was that the enterprise does satisfy the needs of both the worker as employee and the worker as union member; hence he can be loyal to both. If a conflict arises between management and union, he must choose between them, but this is no more than the problem that arises regularly for all of us. A college professor has a sick child; he also has a class to teach. He must choose whether he will take care of the child or meet his obligations to his

students. This does not mean that he cannot under ordinary conditions feel loyal to both.

Management has undoubtedly been unwise in using personnel programs to fight unions. In the first place, the tactic usually has not succeeded (even Western Electric, with its fine program, was eventually unionized); in the second place, the hostilities that are generated during this resistance often linger on to handicap future relations. But, given the motivations and perceptions of the typical executive, it is perfectly logical for him to follow this course of action.

COMMUNICATIONS

Another part of the repertoire of tactics available to management comes under the heading of communications. Before examining this problem in its concrete form it will be helpful if we look back at some comments on role, norm, and frame of reference (Chapter 7).

We have noted that a role is a set of behaviors, a way of acting in a social context. However, the role also has its subjective side, a set of expectations (this is what I am supposed to do; people will ridicule me if I do that; and so on). To the extent that the group has built up a shared frame of reference, these expectations will be similar or congruent for various members of the group. Hence, when one person acts as required by his role, this will be perceived by others and will cue off appropriate interlocking behavior on their part. Such an arrangement is necessary to any complex group structure.

We wish to place managerial communication within this context. The executive has a role to carry out in the industrial system. This role includes as a major aspect that of *structuring the situation* for the lower echelons of the organization. Effective downward communication is thus an essential part of the managerial role. Training the worker to execute his task is a part of the managerial role. This is also true as regards dissemination of company policies, and so on.

If the executive fails to communicate structure clearly, workers will have misperceptions of company norms, will misunderstand rules, and will not perform their duties adequately. Any of these results, since they evoke worker behavior that is contrary to executive expectation, produces friction and frustration. If the executive punishes workers for such inappropriate behavior, he will evoke counteraggression. Effective communication thus becomes a significant part of union-management relations.

Personal communication. In the small establishment, the employer can have direct contact with each employee. This is important

because a great deal more than purely intellectual information and instruction can be communicated. Personal interest, warmth, and recognition are transmitted in this interchange. In terms of feedback, the employer picks up information as to employee anxieties, aggressions, and insecurities. It is then possible to take corrective action before emotions become too intense.

Impersonal communications through letters, pamphlets, employee




Fig. 10.4a. Trends in the use of communications devices by management. (From *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, October, 1953, by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.)

magazines, and loud-speakers cannot meet these requirements. Effective human relations training for foremen has aimed at trying to improve direct communication at this level, to restore the personal aspect. Where the training has been successful, improved management-worker relations have rather uniformly been reported. It is relevant, for example, that Stagner, Flebbe, and Wood (1952) find no

agreement between job satisfaction and reading company communications; but they report highly significant correlations between job satisfaction and being kept informed by the foreman. They also find that job satisfaction improved when the worker had some personal contact with a higher-level executive.

The increased magnitude of industrial enterprises has meant that executives cannot have intimate personal contacts with any large sample of the work force. Nor can they make personal contact with community people who are important in terms of various executive goals: the maintenance of a political climate friendly to industry, public resistance to aggressive unionism, etc. The enforced result has been an increasing reliance on impersonal communications.




Fig. 10.4b. Trends in the use of communications devices by management. (From *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, October, 1953, by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.)

The range of industrial communications. The goals which the executive tries to make more attainable by improved communications are varied. He wants to improve employee performance and employee attitude; he also aims to develop and maintain favorable public

opinion in regard to his labor relations. He must cover a range of publics: lower management, production employees, local and national community leaders, and so on.


For each of these publics he is likely to utilize a different medium of communication. It is clearly impossible for us to give any consideration to most of these media in the present volume. Figure 10.4 indicates the increasing use by management of a very substantial arsenal of communications devices. As can readily be seen, many executives, having come to the conclusion that better communications are of the highest importance, are mobilizing vigorous effort in that area.

Communications to lower management personnel are directed largely to building a feeling that they are part of management, not "in the middle." However, a substantial portion of these activities still take the form of telling the foreman he is an executive, without giving him opportunities to participate in decisions so that he will believe this.

Better communications with foremen are also important in such matters as how to explain the incentive pay plan to workers, understanding the union contract and applying it uniformly, and giving them the information to pass on to workers regarding company prospects. The importance of these will be expanded upon in connection with employee relations.

Communications to employees. As is shown in Fig. 10.4, the number of companies making use of special devices for communication to rank-and-file employees has been rapidly increasing since the end of World War II. There is some evidence that the over-all effect of these efforts has been to improve employee attitudes, although we know relatively little about the specific utility of each. On principle we could predict that personal appearances by executives, involving questions and answers, would be more effective than printed material; however, there is reason to believe that even printed pamphlets can be of some use to management in this way.

Profit reports. In view of the fact that so much industrial conflict centers around the division of net income from the enterprise (wages vs. profits), it might seem that executives would have been concerned to see that employees had accurate information regarding the profit status of the firm. Actually, the average worker *overestimates* by a substantial amount both the proportion of income going to profit and the net gain he could achieve without bankrupting the company. Here is a point at which better communication from executive to workers would probably reduce the steam behind drives for wage increases. However, when such attempts at communication were



HOW KOPPERS DISTRIBUTED ITS REVENUE DOLLAR

Fig. 10.5. Graphic profit report to employees. (From Koppers News, February 1, 1952, by permission of Koppers Co., Inc.)

first proposed, they often encountered violent resistance from top executives. In many companies the typical reaction was: "What in blazes business is it of theirs, how much we make?" The answer, of course, is that employees, through the union, make it their business. Most executives now understand this.

Since World War II the technique of preparing special, simplified profit reports to employees has spread rapidly. As shown in Fig. 10.4, 45 per cent of the companies questioned by the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* indicated that they were using such reports in 1953.

Diagrams, cartoons, and other simplification devices are utilized to communicate information about the relative division of income in attractive, easily comprehended form (see Fig. 10.5 for an example).

The evidence to date indicates that such reports have an interested audience and that they do influence the attitudes of the employees. In a survey by the *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, it was found that 71 per cent of union members (67 per cent of non-members) thought the idea of issuing special profit reports to employees a good one. However, some skepticism must be anticipated; 67 per cent of union members (56 per cent of non-members) thought that management would not reveal all the important facts in such a survey. Where reports have actually been issued, the attitude of suspicion is not so marked; Stagner, Flebbe, and Wood (1952) find that only 19 per cent of 715 railroad workers questioned the over-all accuracy of the company's annual profit report. And 44 per cent of the highly satisfied workers (but only 2 per cent of the dissatisfied employees) thought the report "always true."

Information on work standards. We have noted that one reason for discontent with piecework, incentive rates, and production standards is that the employee cannot understand how his pay is figured. Thus he is likely to overestimate his income, get a smaller amount, and suspect the company of cheating him. That this is not due to ignorance or stupidity on the worker's part can be illustrated by the following bonus pay formula, from a large corporation:

$$\text{Net wage} = 1.2 \times S \times Rb + \$0.10 \times A + D \times Rg \\ \times \frac{(\text{Actual ult. yield})}{(\text{Std. ult. yield})}$$

Even if we assume that all the component terms are clearly defined for the employees, this would be an exceedingly confusing basis on which to be paid. But apparently much work on standards and rates is never explained to employees at all—or so they perceive it. Table 10.3 shows the proportions of workers in various categories who report that the management has never explained to them how work standards are set for their particular jobs. Two facts are clear from this table: almost half of the workers questioned claim that they have not had a clear explanation of work standards on their jobs, and lack of this explanation is closely related to job satisfaction. The conclusion would seem to be that better communication on this score could be quite remunerative.

A further exploration of this problem in two British factories by H. Campbell (1952) sharpens this conclusion by bringing out the

Table 10.3 Employee Reports on Explanation of Work Standards*

'Has your company explained to you how these standards are set for your particular job?'

	Yes	No
Manufacturing manual workers	51%	45%
Union members	51	44
High job satisfaction	59	36
Medium job satisfaction	44	53
Low job satisfaction	34	64

* From *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, May, 1947. Reprinted by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.

following points: first, one-fourth of the workers in one factory and two-thirds in another (with a more complicated system) had no knowledge of how their bonuses were determined. Second, workers who did not know how the payments were computed were consistently more hostile to the incentive plan. Third, although it was impossible to get individual output records, the records of group productivity seemed to justify the conclusion that men dissatisfied with the incentive plan produced less. Campbell places considerable stress on the notion that management could help this situation by giving simpler, clearer information on how standards are determined and how the individual worker's pay is computed. Unclear perceptions are always uncomfortable and often threatening. A better system of communication could probably relieve much of the dissatisfaction in this area.

Increased productivity. In the light of public complaints about worker productivity by top executives, it is surprising that so little seems to have been done in the way of employee communication on this point. According to a *Public Opinion Index for Industry* report (May 1951), only 32 per cent of manufacturing employees say that the employer has sent any communications to them about productivity.

Part of the problem, of course, derives from the difficulty of discussing worker productivity without scolding or criticizing. Another difficulty lies in the fact that few workers see any personal advantage in increasing production. The *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, in the same survey, asked: "When employees *do* turn out more work, who do you think benefits?" Workers' answers were: the company, 47 per cent; both company and employees, 27 per cent; employees, 13 per cent; everybody, 11 per cent. Thus about half of the group sees only the company as benefiting if they become more productive. This has very little motivational value.

Competition offers a concept around which such communications can be organized more effectively. In a survey, in August 1953, the

Public Opinion Index for Industry asked: "Does it make any difference to you personally whether the company is able to do a good job of meeting the competition or not?" To this question 84 per cent of workers replied that it does make a difference. Clearly, then, if the worker's desire for a steady job can be brought into the picture by pointing to competitive relationships, messages about employee productivity will get a better reception. The failure of management to communicate this point is well illustrated by a comparison of the two following questions:

"Does raising individual output improve chances for steady work?" Of all manufacturing manual employees questioned, 40 per cent say the chances improve, 30 per cent say the chances are worse! (For union members the figures are 32 per cent and 41 per cent.)

"If the company meets the competition, does that improve chances for steady work?" Of all manufacturing manual employees questioned, 81 per cent say "improve," and 83 per cent of union members give this answer.

The lesson should be clear. Messages that merely attack the worker as if he were lazy evoke resentment and refusal to cooperate. Messages that tie the question of productivity to the worker's desire for job security will get at least a thoughtful reception.

Suggestion systems. One method for improving upward communication has been the employee suggestion system. This usually offers cash awards for suggestions to improve productivity, increase safety, reduce waste, etc. Some companies are very proud of their success with this kind of program; others have abandoned it as a failure. Results seem to be affected by many factors; some companies have used awards which were too small to have much incentive value; rejections have been handled in a way to make the suggester seem stupid; foremen sometimes see the plan as by-passing them or even making it appear that they don't know their jobs, and so on.

Workers appear to approve of the idea; 87 per cent of manufacturing employees endorse it in a *Public Opinion Index for Industry* survey. In the study by Stagner, Flebbe, and Wood (1952), 62 per cent of railroad workers said they felt proud of a fellow employee who won a suggestion award; a majority gave this answer even among those who had never submitted a suggestion. The authors also report slight evidence that railroad divisions with high suggestion participation have higher job satisfaction, but, of course, cannot say which is cause, which effect.

Employee magazines. Finally, we may note the widespread publishing of employee magazines, which may be used as vehicles for

profit reports, suggestion system news, and information about competition, but are chiefly aimed at building a feeling of personal involvement with the company. They now have a fairly standard format, which includes heavy use of personal appeal, photographs, gossip about individuals, and a very simple prose style. For example, an issue of a representative employee magazine (*Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates*, July–August, 1954) provides the following for its readers: a cover showing two workers with suggestion award checks in their hands (poster about suggestion system in background); five pages of picture story on the suggestion plan; some news of top executives; a page about a customer company, and one about an employee who had received a local newspaper feature write-up; five pages of photos of Boy Scouts, children of employees; a story on a company-owned ship bringing iron ore from the new South American development; two pages on credit unions; two pages of pictures of 25-, 30-, 35-, and 40-year service pin recipients; a story on a new company-owned retail store; and several pages of news from subsidiary companies. The back cover has an amusing safety cartoon. Photographs of rank-and-file employees and their children are featured. The style is chatty and easy to read. There are no sermons on free enterprise, no exhortations to work hard. The magazine hews close to its line as a builder of good will and favorable attitudes.

Unfortunately, in this case as in so many others, we know relatively little about the actual effectiveness of such devices. In general, companies conducting progressive personnel programs and communications methods have less union trouble than others. This, however, may be a function of over-all emotional climate rather than of any specific procedure such as the magazine.

Results. One way of estimating the consequences of a good employee communications program is to find the job satisfaction scores of companies that do and others that do not have such a program. Information on this point is limited. The *Public Opinion Index for Industry* has reported one special study of a company with a well-developed communications program; this company had 77 per cent of manual workers in the "high job satisfaction" class, whereas the typical firm surveyed had only 56 per cent in this category. Many other variables, may have, of course, affected job satisfaction in this company.

Another bit of evidence is also offered by the *Public Opinion Index for Industry*. Fifty firms were classified into four groups on the basis of the over-all labor relations program, including efforts to improve communication. Groups 1 and 2 had very little employee re-

lations work, and Group 4 had a well-developed program. As Fig. 10.6 shows, the Group 4 companies experienced less labor trouble than those in Groups 1 and 2, in the 1950–1952 period. Here again we must recognize the probable importance of many factors besides communication. Indeed, it would seem plausible that communication is effective only when it is closely integrated with policy; false com-




Fig. 10.6. Work stoppage records, 1950–1952, in companies with different labor-relations programs. Companies in Group 4 have advanced training, communications, and similar programs; those in Groups 1 and 2 have few or no programs in these areas. (From *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, October, 1952, by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.)

munications or irrelevant material only widen the employer-employee gap.

The importance of upward communications. The importance of *feedback* was stressed in our treatment of perception (Chapter 2). It is vitally important in connection with communications. Unless

top executives know what is going on at the employee level, and how their communications are being received, the program can only blunder aimlessly.

The foreman should make upward communication one of his major functions. However, he will have strong motivation not to report troubles in his department, especially if they may be derogatory to his ego. (Higher executives in the line will also distort reports to put their own departments in a good light.) Hence, troubles due to poor supervision will be especially unlikely to be reported.

The suggestion system has been introduced in many companies as a means of upward communication. However, workers may be unable or unwilling to write down their troubles. Foremen sometimes discourage employees from submitting suggestions, perceiving such actions as a criticism of themselves.

Employee counselors often provide management with "inside information" about what employees are thinking and what kinds of situations are provoking hostility. The counselor can keep confidential the identity of his informants and still provide top executives with important information.

Finally, the union is a major channel of upward communication; indeed, some observers hold that this is the major constructive function of the union. The union, through its grievance function, compels executives to face unpleasant facts which foremen have glossed over and concealed. Reports that employees have feared to make for fear of punishment now come through when union protection is available.

Attitudes of distrust. Failure of management to make optimum use of this channel of information derives from mistrust of the channel. As we have noted, feedback tells us whether our perceptions and actions have been "realistic." But one will correct his mistakes to conform to the feedback only when he trusts the channel through which it comes. If I believe the union officials to be irresponsible agitators, I shall ignore their reports of defects in working conditions and supervision.

Workers likewise may be suspicious of information as to "how I'm doing," if it comes from a source in which they have no confidence. Complaints regarding quality of product, for example, may be ignored because they come from management. An interesting device for by-passing this barrier to communication is said to have been tried by several manufacturers. Essentially, it involves sending a union committee out to listen to customer complaints. If the customer is another manufacturer, sending a committee of three workers to learn

what is being done improperly is not too expensive. These men bring back information that their fellows trust, and marked improvements in quality are said to have followed.

Use of research organizations. Where mistrust is mutual and intense, an employee attitude survey by management may not get information because the workers refuse to take chances on questionnaires. In such cases an impartial research organization, particularly one connected with a university so that it has some prestige value, is usually the best device for obtaining communications upward. Information so obtained can guide management in correcting conditions; as management gives evidence of good will, distrust usually diminishes in the lower ranks.

Some companies have made periodic attitude surveys a major portion of the communication system. The Florida Power and Light Company, for example, is reported (Smith, 1942) to make such a survey annually and chart progress on specific managerial techniques by the changing percentages of employees satisfied. There is much to be said for such a procedure in large organizations. The best method, of course, depends upon breaking down barriers to communication between persons, so that this formal check is less necessary.

Communication prevents hostility. We have stressed, in the preceding paragraphs, the role of hostility in preventing communication. But the reverse relationship is also important. If communication is broken off, then minor grievances seem to become larger and larger, so that aggression is intensified. Many irritations seem unjustified when an explanation is forthcoming. But, if there is no communication, one gets no information as to the other person's point of view, and so the frustration continues to appear arbitrary and even malicious. Hence, every effort should be made to keep clear channels of communication in both directions, so that this build-up of hostility is less probable (cf. Newcomb, 1947).

Communication with the public. We noted above that managers are concerned nowadays about communication directed to the public. The days of "the public be damned" are apparently gone forever. More and more labor relations problems are involved with the public interest, and with a political complexion. Managers are clearly aware of the importance of inducing perceptions among the public, especially leaders, that are favorable to the management side of conflict situations.

Because of the great prestige attaching to top executive positions in business and industry, pronouncements by these leaders usually get wide dissemination in the newspaper and on the radio. Businessmen can also make use of expensive media of public relations not available

to unions. For example, institutional advertising (selling attitudes, not commodities) involves millions of dollars each year. The National Association of Manufacturers alone has frequently spent \$3 million a year, much of it devoted to material critical of unions, and specific companies undoubtedly spend a sum totaling much more than this.

Industry can also circulate opinions of a favorable nature, when these are voiced by "impartial" political, educational, and religious leaders. Substantial sums are spent each year on the distribution of such materials. No one will be surprised that money is not similarly spent to distribute statements critical of the operation of the industrial system.

On radio and television, industry finances news commentators who seem by and large to take a dim view of unions. Sussman (1945) monitored a series of radio newscasts on all major networks for a period of several weeks and found that the unfavorable comments on unions outnumbered the favorable by ratios ranging from 2:1 to 7:1. Commentators have often claimed that they have been forced off the air for taking a pro-union stand; no one, so far as is known, has ever claimed that he was dropped for being favorable to industry. Even persons outside the journalism area have been subjected to pressure for pro-union sympathies; college professors who supported unions in the years prior to 1935 were frequently warned and occasionally discharged. Hunter (1953, pp. 176-179) gives a brief account of such tactics. The enormous financial power of industry, reaching into Community Chest Boards, university trustees, and even the financial sources for religious institutions, can suppress persons critical of industry and assist those who perceive numerous virtues in the present order.¹

These tactics, like some of the others that we include in this chapter, seem to be on the decline. The possible exception is that some use seems to be made of current anxiety about communism to censor some pro-union spokesmen. It is fairly easy to spread a rumor that "so-and-so is a communist," and the denials never catch up with the accusation. Since, to some executives, any stubborn defense of a union demand is communistic (cf. p. 387), the rumor may really reflect the situation as this individual perceives it. (Also, see Blumenthal, 1939.)

Little is known about the effectiveness of these communications (and censorship of negative communications) with the public. Labor

¹ See also Kornhauser (1946) for evidence that public opinion polls have been something less than impartial toward organized labor. Since these polls are business enterprises, this is not exactly surprising.

unions reached their present membership of 15 million despite the strong past opposition of newspapers, radio, and similar media. Approval of labor unions "in principle" is still reported by two-thirds or more of the general public on every opinion poll. We can only conclude that the mass media do not exert a *decisive* influence on opinion formulation, either among potential union members or in the public at large.

On the other hand, it seems necessary to assume that public support for such measures as the Taft-Hartley Act is mobilized in large part by a barrage of propaganda critical of unions, with little or no propaganda favorable to the union view reaching most of the public. Since political pressures are coming more and more to be decisive in union-management controversies, this control of communications to the public may be an important weapon in the executive's armory.

COMPANY UNIONS

Another tactic by which the employer has attempted to strengthen his position (or, more accurately, to head off forces threatening him) is the organization of a "company union." Generally speaking, the term can be applied to any union that limits its membership to employees of a single firm and rejects any affiliation with other labor groups.

This kind of union has a certain appeal to workers, in that it seems to offer them the satisfactions of an independent union (a voice in control of job conditions, a way to bargain collectively on wages, restoration of a feeling of work-group unity) at very low dues and with less friction from the employer.

From the executive's side the company union also looks more attractive than a truly independent union. The company union has no staff of outside expert advisers; it has no treasury based on wide membership to provide emergency support; it has no members outside the plant who might help with picketing, financially, etc. Officers of the company union are his employees—they can be threatened, bribed, and subjected to many pressures not to act aggressively.

The weakness of the company union as a goal-seeking device caused most workers to switch to genuine independent unions at an early date. A typical example was that of The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company's Employee Representation Plan, which was elaborately planned to resemble the United States Congress. When, in 1935, management announced the reversion from a 6-hour to an 8-hour work day, the employees' assembly voted to keep the 6-hour day. The president of the

company vetoed their action, and they switched to the CIO rubber workers union *en bloc*.

It is theoretically possible for genuine collective bargaining to take place between an employer and a company union. In practice, the great disparity in power provides an inescapable temptation for the employer to ride roughshod over the expressed demands of the employees when these demands would be very frustrating to him. This has generally led to the collapse of the company union.

"UNION BUSTING"

Finally, it is necessary to say a few words about tactics that have been used in the past, that are rarely used now, and that (one hopes) may never be used again. They involve open violence against union organizers and members, labor spies and provocateurs inside the union, blacklists, "yellow dog" contracts, etc.

Managerial hostility has led in past years to the purchase of machine guns and tear gas, to hiring of thugs and goons, to violence against union organizers and union members. It has included inciting townspeople to "tar and feather" union leaders and run them out of town. In addition, it has included payments to local law enforcement officials to use force against union spokesmen.

Infiltration of unions by management agents (labor spies) used to be a rather common tactic. Extensive accounts of the activities of the detective agencies handling such work are given in such books as those of Levinson (1935) and Calkins (1937). Levinson quotes from the letter of solicitation of one of these firms, addressed to top executives, as follows:

First:—I will say that if we are employed before any union organization is formed . . . there will be no strike and no disturbance. This does not say that there will be no unions formed, but it does say that we will control the activity of the unions and direct its policies . . .

Second:—If a union is already formed and no strike is on . . . we could—and I believe with success—carry on an intrigue which would result in factions, disagreement, resignation of officers and a general decrease in membership.¹

Although it is by no means certain that these aggressive tactics for smashing unions, stealing their treasuries, beating up organizers, and blacklisting members have completely disappeared from the American scene, they are certainly less common. As in the case of other matters

¹ Levinson (1935), p. 241.

of history, they operate as determinants of labor relations mainly in the extent to which unionist frames of reference are still anchored to such events. As they fade into the past, they will no longer be effective instigators of hostility toward management.

The most important consideration, from our point of view, is the psychological determinants of such actions by the executive. We have already tried to enumerate the motivational and perceptual factors that make his resort to such tactics almost inevitable in a time of crisis. In those cases where the evidence is available, it seems clear that the executive perceived the struggle as a life-or-death affair. A quotation given by Gottlieb and Kerr (1950) from the history of the Buchsbaum Company, a small jewelry manufacturing enterprise, is relevant:

Mr. Buchsbaum reports that the company, with the financial and moral support of its employers' association, used the following devices to discourage unionization during those years (after 1935): scanning all employees for union tendencies and "discharging them quickly if any were evidenced"; teaching trade to "new helpers"; refusing to hire "ringleaders" in association shops (blacklist); employing a "labor spy both before and during the strike." Workers responded in this attitude of management with slowdowns, breakage, stealing, and bad discipline. Mr. Buchsbaum remarks of this period, "I thought if I let the union in, it would ruin my business. It seemed to me that I was fighting for my business life. So I felt that I was really defending my constitutional rights."¹

This brief quotation exemplifies most of our psychological analysis of anti-unionism. The union-busting executive does not adopt these tactics because he is inherently bad and malicious, nor because he is driven by Marxist dialectical forces. As *he sees it*, the union is a threat to his most valued equilibrium, the business as a going concern. If the union did indeed possess the characteristics he attributed to it, his tactics would be relatively defensible. It is easy to argue, since thousands of employers had already signed up with unions, that Mr. Buchsbaum's perceptions were decidedly distorted. But the fact is that a great many persons, both employers and others, saw things as he did at that time—some of them still do.

Given this particular perception of the union as a monstrous threat, powerful motives are energized in the executive. His business is endangered, and with it his economic security, his prestige position, his status in the industry, and perhaps other important satisfactions. He gets support from his trade association; this group approval tends to weaken any moral qualms he may have had about some of his methods.

¹ Gottlieb and Kerr (1950), p. 447. Reprinted by permission of *Personnel Psychology*.

The superego motives are products of social training; if group norms contradict these ethical standards, it is easy to find rationalizations or to misperceive actions as socially defensible.

Moral indignation over the actions of either management or union has little relevance to a scientific approach to the problem. Our task is to find out what observable conditions determined such behavior, and whether these conditions can be changed to produce a different result.

TRENDS IN MANAGEMENT-WORKER RELATIONS

We have noted that violence against unions, and the cruder forms of opposition—spies, paid agitators, etc.—have been clearly on the decline since 1939. The establishment of a new group norm—approval of collective bargaining—has apparently penetrated to the top executives. Top executives are still concerned with protecting their power and profit status, but the trend has been toward better human relations programs, persuasion, and carefully chosen concessions. This trend does not mean an end to industrial conflict, but it suggests that this country is moving from the “bare knuckles” days to orderly conflict under rules.

The traces of “the bad old days” are not gone and forgotten. But they are kept alive mostly by reminiscences of old-timers in the labor movement, who try to communicate their experiences to the new union officers. A man’s frame of reference, however, is chiefly the result of his own personal experiences, and so the memories of anti-labor violence are gradually becoming less potent influences in thinking about industrial relations.

Has this change in company policies led to any change in worker attitudes? Encouraging evidence suggests that the workers perceive and endorse this change. Data do not go back far enough to be entirely satisfactory, but the trend is clear.

The magazine *Factory Management and Maintenance* has for 10 years reported at periodic intervals on what a random sample of factory workers says about their employers. It is interesting to observe that there have been fairly consistent increases in the number of answers favorable to the company over the period since 1944. For example, the question was asked: “Would you rate your company as ‘good,’ ‘average,’ or ‘poor,’ on handling worker grievances?” The number of workers responding ‘good’ increased from 45 per cent in 1944 to 51 per cent in 1948 and 54 per cent in 1952.¹

¹ *Factory Management and Maintenance* (September, 1952).

A related finding is that workers seem more optimistic about the degree of interest in their welfare by company executives than had been true in the past. For example, the survey just mentioned included the following question: "Do you feel that the head men of your company have the workers' interests at heart, or do you feel that they are not much concerned about what happens to the workers?" Perception of top executives as being interested in the workers increased from 56 per cent in 1944 to 66 per cent in 1952. However, it should be noted that on the same poll the workers still reported about a 3 to 1 preference for union leaders in terms of this particular question: "Who would you say was *more* interested in the welfare of the working man—the heads of your company or the union leaders?" For "company heads" the figures were 14 per cent in 1944, 17 per cent in 1947, and 17 per cent again in 1952. For union leaders the corresponding figures are: 1944, 60 per cent; 1947, 57 per cent; 1952, 47 per cent. Part of the difference is accounted for by the marked increase in the number of workers answering "both," which increased from 18 per cent in 1944 to 27 per cent in 1952. As we shall note in another connection, this is in conformity with the current research finding that workers prefer a conception of *dual loyalty* to the notion that they must prefer management or the union.

Tactics: The Union

In Chapter 10 we indicated some of the tactics utilized by managers to increase their relative share of economic and ego gratifications to be derived from the industrial enterprise. The activities indulged in by individual workers and by unions in resisting managerial tactics were outlined briefly. The present chapter focuses primarily upon tactics initiated by the union and refers only casually to the tactics of management in resisting these efforts.

It will be necessary for us to keep the following points in mind in developing a psychological analysis of union tactics: (1) What motives are involved? As we shall quickly see, the motives of the worker and the motives of the union officer are both involved, and these are not necessarily identical. (2) How is the situation perceived? The characteristic frame of reference of the employee (see Chapter 3) determines judgments in this context. (3) What frustrations are most important in influencing behavior? (4) What principles of group organization and functioning are relevant? (5) How do the leaders operate to influence perceptions and actions of members? Not all of these points, of course, are relevant to every issue. However, each question is important in the over-all psychology of union tactics.

MOTIVATION WITHIN UNIONS

We have devoted considerable space in earlier chapters (4, 5) to an analysis of motivation. Particularly we noted that the employee is attempting to satisfy both economic and ego motives within industry. He may take a job for purely financial reasons, but he immediately seeks opportunities to satisfy needs for recognition, prestige, security, power, and self-expression on the job.

This same generalization applies to the employee in his role as a union member. A man does not join a union for one single reason necessarily, but, even if his primary goal is economic, his ego motives will quickly come into play. This statement holds true both as regards

his pressure for union action in relation to the employer and as regards his activities inside the union. For the most part we shall be concerned with employer-union relations, but occasionally it will become important to consider intraunion factors as they relate to the collective bargaining process.

Collective vs. individual bargaining. The distinctive feature of the change from employer-worker to employer-union relationships is, of course, the switch from individual to collective bargaining. The introduction of the union does not involve a drastic change in all aspects of the relationships between the employer and the workers. As evidence has already shown, workers before the development of unionism indulged in a variety of tactics calculated to improve their status relative to management or to harass and punish management for activities perceived as frustrating by the workers. Restriction of output, leaving the job, absenteeism, and even destruction of machines and material are frequently found in unorganized plants. Indeed, some of these activities are relatively more frequent at the unorganized location than they are after unionism is introduced.

Individual bargaining between worker and employer has been a feature of the relationship for thousands of years. Certainly in unorganized plants individuals do attempt to gain from the employer such goals as higher wages, promotions, preferred treatment, and so on. Where the worker has a unique skill or some other bargaining point that makes it undesirable for the employer to dispense with his services, the worker may win this particular kind of bargaining process. In general, however, the advantages in individual bargaining are on the side of the employer. The number of potential workers looking for jobs is normally considerably greater than the number of potential jobs open to individual workers. Thus the employer is in a better position to dispense with the services of an individual employee than is the employee to dispense with the income from his job. Furthermore, the individual worker lacks a financial reserve and therefore is not in a good position to bargain, if this means holding out for a substantial period of time in an attempt to bring pressure to bear upon his employer to raise the rate at which his services are compensated. The employer, on the contrary, is likely to have a substantial financial cushion on which he can rest if it is necessary to shut down operations. Thus the relative bargaining strength is quite disproportionate.

Another unequal aspect of individual bargaining derives from the fact that the business man is customarily a specialist in bargaining; that is to say, he has skills related to this kind of negotiation which the average worker is not likely to have. Some sociologists have charac-

terized the business man as a specialist in bargaining, defining this as his unique role in modern society. Under these circumstances, to pit the average worker who has no bargaining skills against an employer who is a specialist in this particular type of human relationship is obviously somewhat inappropriate.

The necessity for bargaining. Why is a process of bargaining necessary? Obviously, if we look at the economic basis of modern society as was done briefly in Chapter 9 of this volume, we see that a fundamental assumption is that certain commodities and services, objects, and relationships valued by individuals are scarce and there is competition for them. The necessity for bargaining, then, arises from the facts of human motivation and human frustration. The employee desires certain kinds of gratifications in the nature of physical, biological comforts as well as ego satisfaction, prestige, and power. Furthermore, he is subjected to various kinds of interferences and blockages as regards his activities aimed at the satisfaction of these impulses. Bargaining, then, is a process of attempting either to increase the number of motive satisfactions actually available to the individual or to remove from his path one or more frustrating conditions that block activity directed toward goal satisfaction and goal achievement.

The necessity for bargaining exists, of course, on the side of the employer also. First of all, employers bargain with each other as regards sale of commodities and sale of equipment and other kinds of necessary business transactions. Secondly, employers must bargain with employees, at least under conditions where the oversupply of labor is not so great that workers are willing to take jobs at any pay rate available regardless of subsistence level. In a sense, the work force is as essential to the employer as is the employer to the worker. The individual employee is dispensable but the work force as a group is not dispensable. One cannot be an employer without having employees and one cannot be a manufacturer of commodities or engage in any of the ordinary business activities of western civilization without having a staff that will carry on the necessary labor. Therefore, it is necessary for the employer to indulge in a certain amount of bargaining over conditions of employment if he is to continue in the social role that he has adopted for himself.

The necessity for collective bargaining. Individual bargaining was the rule, in the United States at least, for a long period in the development of our industrial civilization. Even today a sizeable percentage of the employed population indulges in individual bargaining with the employer as regards rates of pay and other sources of satisfaction.

It should be noted that much of this, which is ostensibly individual bargaining on the surface, actually constitutes no bargaining at all. In many large corporations, for example, the collective bargaining relationship between management and union establishes a certain policy with regard to wage payment which is then automatically carried over into the relationship between the company and the white-collar employees without any consultation with the latter group. We find, for example, that General Motors, General Electric, and a number of other large enterprises make a policy of granting to white-collar employees wage increases, pension benefits, and other advances in proportion as they are won by the production employees union in collective bargaining.

From the point of view of the worker, collective bargaining has certain fairly obvious advantages. One is that, although it is easy to replace an individual worker, it is quite difficult to replace the entire work staff if all of them withhold their labor at the same time. Furthermore, of course, picket lines and other forms of pressure may make it less likely that other workers will come in and compete with the present group for the available jobs. Secondly, the organized group of workers can employ a *bargaining specialist* to compete with the employer on more or less equal terms. It has always been a source of considerable amusement that the average employer back in the 1930's had no compunctions about hiring a New York lawyer as a specialist on industrial relations to represent his point of view but issued newspaper blasts against the union for bringing in "outsiders" to represent the employees in contract negotiations. Actually, one purpose of the corporation is to pool the capital of various stockholders to hire specialists who will do the best possible jobs in their particular types of work. One purpose of the union is to pool the resources of the individual workers so as to hire specialists who likewise will do the best job for the rank-and-file workers, specifically with regard to the process of negotiating with the employer.

In addition to these advantages the existence of an organized union makes possible the building up of a financial reserve which strengthens the individual and gives him a feeling of protection in case he has to undergo the hardship of an actual strike. And furthermore, by the linkage of local unions with national and international organizations, the resources of those unions not on strike become available to give assistance to those in which a strike is in progress. This pooling of individual power into collective strength gives the workers greater bargaining power and a feeling of confidence and security, which

enables them to present their demands more vigorously than would otherwise be possible.

Social motivation. In addition to these fairly obvious and tangible aspects of collective bargaining as perceived by the workers, there are certain less tangible but nonetheless significant aspects of the process. Perhaps the most important is what we have noted in connection with the process of group formation. When workers function as isolated individuals, there is always the danger that any one worker who attempts to withhold his labor in order to bargain more effectively with the employer will be undercut by some other individual who needs a job and who feels no particular compunction about taking it away from the present employee. On the other hand, when workers are organized into groups such as unions, the feeling of *social solidarity*¹ and obligation toward one's fellow members drastically reduces the readiness with which workers will scab on one another. This weakens the bargaining position of the employer by making it more difficult for him to replace individuals who withhold their labor. Furthermore, the sense of support from one's fellow members, from the international union movement, and from skilled leaders in whom one has confidence, tends to give the worker additional courage and therefore to support his bargaining activities. Without this feeling of confidence in the social group and the leadership of the group, union bargaining would be much less vigorous and much less successful than it has been up to the present time.

The question of exclusive bargaining rights. One of the issues in the establishment of collective bargaining relationships that is difficult for outsiders to understand is the insistence by unions upon gaining exclusive bargaining rights for all the workers in the factory regardless of whether they are or are not members of the union. The basic reasons as seen by union spokesmen are three: first of all, that the existence of a divided situation (in which some workers are in the union and some are not and in which the unorganized workers deal directly with the employer) provides an excellent opportunity for the employers to indulge in favoritism to the non-union group. Thus pay increases and preferred jobs handed to this group would tend to weaken the morale of the union members and induce them to break away from the union in order to enjoy these special benefits. Secondly, of course, when there are individual bargaining relationships it is easier for the employer to threaten and intimidate individuals to keep

¹ Cf. Dean (1954b).

them out of the union, whereas, if the protection of the union is extended to all workers regardless of affiliation, this kind of undermining process is more difficult. In the third place, and this is actually important from the employer's viewpoint as well, the existence of two separate organizations, or an organized and an unorganized group, often leads to contradictory demands. The existence of separate unions, for example, is an incitement to competition between the unions to achieve greater advantages for their own members. The system of having a number of different bargaining agents within a single employing establishment thus frequently leads to confusion and chaos. The union leaders obviously are not concerned with this problem primarily from the point of view of the welfare of the employer. They are concerned with it in terms of the maintenance of group solidarity within the work group and in avoiding the possibility of playing off one group against another. However, this is one case in which the employers' side may actually find substantial advantages in going along with the preferred union relationship.

In summary, certain individuals perceive the union as a problem-solving device of greater efficiency than individual bargaining. In motivational terms, the union is a method of protecting certain favorable situations, of defending against threats, of eliminating frustrations, and of achieving positive goals.

Why workers join unions. A given worker probably does not consider all these possibilities when he joins a union. In fact, such considerations may be irrelevant to his becoming a member, although they may have important effects on his behavior as a member.

Few studies deal objectively with the motives involved in organizing unions, or in joining them after they are organized. Golden and Ruttenberg (1942) offer some interesting anecdotal material, but no quantitative data. They assert, "Workers organize into labor unions not alone for economic motives, but also for equally compelling psychological and social ones, so that they can participate in making the decisions that vitally affect them in their work and community life."¹ This generalization is backed up by numerous instances of workers organizing as an expression of aggression against management, as a way of maintaining group solidarity, and to obtain freedom of expression. However, the authors recognize that the motive which was decisive in inducing a group to join the union will not be the sole determinant of tactics after they join. It will, at most, determine the first area of concentration of collective energy.

¹ Golden and Ruttenberg (1942), p. 3. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

Emphasis upon economic motives is common among workers who are asked directly why they joined. This reply, however, is subject to the criticism noted in Chapter 4 with regard to purely verbal reports of motivation. It may be the only answer a worker can verbalize, not necessarily the most important consideration. La Point (1954) found that the chief difference between members and non-members of a newly organized union was in hostility to management (see p. 184). Behind this hostility, if we had time to inquire closely, might be a variety of frustrations which focused on a common source.

Rose (1952a) asked 392 members of a teamsters local why they joined the union. The results are shown in Table 11.1. Almost half joined because of union shop clauses. Among the others, economic motives seem to predominate, although security and group solidarity seem also to have been important considerations.

Table 11.1 Reasons for Joining the Union*

Had to—I work in a union shop	45.9%
For my own benefit	20.9
It is a good cause	16.3
For higher wages	7.7
For better working conditions	6.6
For security	4.3
There is strength in numbers	3.3
The majority wanted it	2.8
No answer	1.3

* From Rose (1952a), p. 61. Reprinted by permission of University of Minnesota Press.

Another question from Rose's study also places the emphasis upon economic goals. He asked, "What are the purposes of the union and how well are they accomplished?" Table 11.2 shows the items most often mentioned. Here the economic factors are stressed heavily.

Table 11.2 Perceived Goals of the Union*

<i>Purpose</i>	<i>% Mention</i>	<i>Unusually Well</i>	<i>Pretty Well</i>
"What are the purposes of the union and how well are they accomplished?"			
Get specific economic benefits (higher wages)	75.3%	39.4%	41.8%
Get job security (seniority)	31.1	51.1	39.8
Gain rights (free speech, welfare, fair deal)	16.6	34.3	49.3
Get benefits off the job (recreation, legal, medical)	10.7	52.1	27.1

* From Rose (1952a), p. 63. Reprinted by permission of University of Minnesota Press.

However, security, freedom of self-expression, and other impulses are clearly recognized.

Instead of simply asking questions, it may be more fruitful to observe an actual organizing process and see which workers provide the nucleus for the union. Strauss (1953) reports on an independent union which finally went over to the CIO after a campaign of 9 years, including defeats in three bargaining elections. He finds that the groups which gave persistent support to the CIO were those most dissatisfied with wages and working conditions; attitudes favorable to the CIO spread along the channels of communication among workers; informal groups provided centers for union organization. Thus it appears likely that both economic and social influences contributed to the pressures to join the CIO union.

Building loyalty. A major consideration for union officers and active members is that of strengthening the union once it is formed. Before the establishment of a union security contract clause, strengthening the union means attaching the member firmly to the union by psychological means. These include: indoctrination training, in which the new member may be required to read union history and documents showing union activities and benefits; speeches, mass meetings, songs, and rituals, in which group solidarity is emphasized; drawing him into activities, so that he feels ego-involved with the union, and so on.

Loyalty is often equated with active participation in union affairs, despite extensive evidence that such equating is not justified. Purcell (1953), on the basis of a detailed study of the members of Local 28 UPWA (Swift & Co.), estimates that the core of "actives" is about 40 in number, with a much larger group of about 500 who are "occasionally active." These push and pull an inert mass of some 2700 other members who are inactive most of the time. Yet—and this is important—he estimates that almost 50 per cent of the workers are *very* favorable to the union, with another 30 per cent favorable, less than 10 per cent neutral, and about 10 per cent unfavorable. It is plausible to interpret these findings as indications that members may be quite favorable, and presumably loyal, to the union without participating actively in its work.

Against this observation must be set the finding by Jacobson (1951), that stewards have a decided effect on member acceptance of a "union frame of reference." If the steward consults with workers about union affairs in his department, workers are relatively more likely to favor the union as opposed to management. Especially if the steward seems to be more active on consultation than the foreman, workers are favorably inclined toward the union.

This participation, of course, is a somewhat different kind from that considered by Purcell, who was inquiring about attendance at meetings, voting, etc. It may well be that this difference is important. Participation at the departmental level, on the job, may be much more important than attending meetings, just as a worker's communication with his foreman is more important than what he gets from an employee magazine.

Protection against discrimination. Not only is the frustration due to foreman favoritism and other forms of partiality a potent motive for union membership; it is also a cause of anxiety, once a man joins the union for any reason. Many companies have made a policy of firing unionists; others give them dirty jobs, deny them pay increases, and apply other pressures. A tactic that appears early in any union's history, therefore, is to achieve security for individuals against discrimination.

Usually this takes the form of a *seniority* clause. Such clauses restrict management's freedom as regards layoffs, and, as the union gains strength, seniority may be extended to cover job transfers and promotions. Pay increases are often tied to length of service on a given job.

Special seniority protection is usually given to union officers. Thus it is common to find that a union official cannot be laid off until every other man in his department is laid off; in other words, for his term of office he goes to the top of the seniority list.

These seniority clauses are defensive in character. They do not, as is commonly thought, involve rejection of the desirability of rewarding people of special ability. What they embody is a pervasive distrust of favoritism, and of discrimination against active unionists, which calls for rigid rules to insure impartiality.

Grievance procedure. Another early demand of every union is for an established grievance procedure, a channel of upward communication by which workers can protest against frustrations or express their positive goals in the work situation. If the major considerations involved in organizing the union were related to lack of any channel of self-expression, then this demand is not surprising; but, in any event, the union must have such a channel. As soon as organization is completed, workers start using it to call other problems to the attention of executives. Thus the union becomes a multiple-purpose institution almost as soon as it is in existence. The grievance procedure is the formal aspect of the organization that makes this possible.

In many establishments the grievance machinery makes it possible for the first time to carry a complaint past the foreman to his superiors.

As we have noted earlier, this frustration was a major one to workers, since they had no means of defending themselves against arbitrary authority. Having the union as protection, the steward as spokesman, and the higher steps of the grievance procedure as a way of insuring that top management learns of the situation, the worker is in a better situation. One long-service auto worker expressed the change laconically this way: "Before the union you could never talk to a foreman; when the union was organized you could talk if you had a steward with you; and now you can talk to a foreman anytime."

Most contracts provide that grievances be first presented orally to the foreman, with or without the steward. If the foreman denies the grievance, it may be reduced to writing and transmitted to a higher level, or there may be a second oral hearing. By the third step, grievances are always in written form, usually with statements of facts as seen by the foreman, the worker, and the steward. That the facts reported are not the same goes without saying. Each gives the situation as he perceives it. The steward, of course, may give only the worker's view without adding any comments of his own.

Like other aspects of union-management relations, grievance handling is perceived differently by union and management spokesmen. Lawshe and Guion (1951) report that the typical executive endorses the following propositions: "No outside persons should be called in on grievance negotiations." "Levels should be set beyond which some grievances can't be taken." "A grievance procedure should give the worker a chance to take his grievance directly to top management if he wants to do so." To the unionist, these propositions mean that the manager wants to exclude the outside expert who may be called in to help the local union (though the manager probably hires an outside lawyer as an adviser on labor relations); he wants a firm limitation on how far the union can go; and he wants to encourage workers to by-pass the union committee in favor of individual negotiations with the company. Not unnaturally, the unionist opposes such provisions.

Conversely, the union officials in the Lawshe-Guion study endorsed the following: "Grievance handling guarantees each worker a square deal and an even break." "Workers are more likely to stay on the job where there is a good grievance procedure." "Arbitration which is final and binding to both parties should be the last step in a grievance procedure." The executive may well reply that there is no evidence for the first two, and that the third represents an attempt to impose an outside control on management's freedom to run the enterprise.

Both executives and union officers agreed on many points; for

example, they endorsed this statement: "A grievance is any real or imagined feeling of injustice on the part of the employee." This is the essence of a grievance policy; every frustration, perceived as such by an employee, is a potential source of aggression. The grievance mechanism is a device for removing aggressions before they reach the explosive stage. Since the immediate supervisor is a common source of frustration (cf. Chapter 6), the grievance procedure is an important device for bringing to the attention of higher management those problems which are not being resolved at the shop level. It thus becomes an instrument of value to management in that it provides a channel of communication upward, a source of information about shop conditions. It serves a real purpose in this respect, but, like all other channels, it is imperfect and its output must be interpreted with caution.

When we speak of the grievance procedure as a channel of communication upward, we are including more than purely cognitive information to be communicated. The grievance procedure should also communicate to executives the *emotional state* of the employees, the intensity of feeling with which certain demands are associated. Lacking this information, management will fail to evaluate the situation correctly and may ignore grievances that seem "trivial" when workers perceive them as highly important.

Just as the foreman and the middle-level executive were blocks to certain communications on the management side, so some union officers may be blocks to this kind of communication. Gouldner (1954b) analyzes in considerable detail such an instance in a wildcat strike in a gypsum mine and processing plant. In this union the officers were divided into two cliques: one including mostly men who were respectful of authority and therefore submissive to management; the other including men who were less inhibited in expressing aggression toward authority. The respectful, conforming officers had been receiving grievances about supervisory actions; these actions were not in a strict sense violating the contract, but they violated traditional expectations of the workers. These officers transmitted the grievances, but in a half-hearted way so that management did not realize the seriousness of the situation until the strike broke out. When the men struck, the second clique took over union leadership (cf. pp. 419-422).

Grievances as harassment. Grievances can become weapons as well as a communications device. If union officers are annoyed with a particular supervisor, they can arrange to have him flooded with grievances. They need not manufacture such complaints, if their dislike of him is related to his poor tactics in handling the men. On the

other hand, it is not as a rule difficult to find contract violations, or at least incidents which can be labeled violations, in any active department. Under ordinary circumstances these occurrences would be ignored, but grievances can be used to communicate to top management the resentment felt toward this particular foreman.

Some officers use grievances as "trial balloons" in connection with approaching contract negotiations. Thus there may be a rash of grievances about work pace, as a preliminary to a contract proposal that speed of operation of mechanical equipment be a matter of joint determination.

"Left-wing" officers have often been accused of filing many unnecessary grievances merely to harass management and to raise unjustified aspirations among the rank and file (who will then presumably blame management when the grievance is denied). Table 11.3 gives only slight support to this; it is based on the study by Purcell (1953) of the Swift-UPWA Local 28 relationship, and indicates that during the period of left-wing leadership the number of written grievances increased slightly but not by an extraordinary amount.

Table 11.3 Number of Third-Step Grievances in Local 28 UPWA*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of Grievances</i>	<i>Comments</i>
1944	518	Wage-rate cases
1945	177	
1946	173	Strike year
1947	134	
1948	52	Strike year
1949	75	
1950	98	Left-wing activity
1951	91	
1952	56	Right-wing control

* From Purcell (1953), modified from p. 226. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.

WORKING RULES AND "FEATHERBEDDING"

Union organization is in part a defensive maneuver; it is set off by management's technological changes, a speed-up, or some other threat to the workers' equilibrium. It is not surprising, therefore, that some unions spend a great deal of effort on formulation of working rules and the protection of soft jobs.

Particularly in the building trades, prior determination of working rules is important. In an industrial union, a change of job content can always be fought through the grievance procedure; but, on a

construction job, the work would be over before the grievance was heard. However, other unions (railroad, typographical) place great stress on working rules. When these rules operate to protect "soft" job assignments for particular employees, they are often called "featherbedding." The term has spread to include requirement of more men than necessary, requirement of useless work, etc. For example, under certain circumstances the typographical unions require the setting up of type that is never used in printing to protect jobs against the inroads of mechanical reproduction systems.

The economic motivation of featherbedding is obvious. It is somewhat analogous to "tie-in" sales as practiced by some manufacturers and wholesalers, where the retailer, to obtain desired merchandise, must buy something he does not want. Automobile purchasers immediately after World War II found that they had to pay for unwanted radios, heaters, sun visors, and ornamental devices, which increased the profit margin for the dealer. However, featherbedding also has a social motive behind it. Many of the technological changes would cause layoffs; for example, the teletypesetter could demoralize the linotype craft if it were unregulated. Diesel engines on the railroads have reduced the number of trains; hence, the demand for extra personnel on them is a device to protect men against unemployment. The musicians require a stand-by orchestra to be employed for certain kinds of broadcasts to make more jobs in the face of mechanical developments by which one orchestra can play to an audience of millions.

Most union officers concede that there are serious defects in the kinds of policies mentioned. Nevertheless, they perceive them as essential to the protection of their members, until a social policy for cushioning the shock of technological change is developed and put into practice.

UNION SECURITY

In the preceding pages we have stressed union tactics that were relevant to motives of individuals. However, we noted in Chapters 7 and 9 that collective and institutional goals become important factors in our analysis. Once a group exists, there is a tendency for the members to recognize and press for goals relating to the continued survival of the group itself. Thus, if the union is valued as an instrument for achieving individual gratifications, the protection of the union becomes an important consideration.

Union security clauses range from maintenance of membership (a formula devised by the War Labor Board requiring members once

signed up to remain in the union at least until the next contract expiration date) to the union shop (all employees must join the union) to the closed shop (only persons already in the union are eligible for employment).¹ Pressure for such clauses in the contract derive from many considerations perceived as important by the officers and active members of the union.

Employers and outsiders perceive the union shop as a form of coercion, requiring new employees to join the union whether they want to or not. Union members see it differently; their attitude is based on a decided distaste for "free riders," that is, workers who get all the benefits of the union without paying dues and without contributing their energy and effort to the maintenance of the organization. It is deemed quite unfair by the workers who are in the union that others receive the benefits of their efforts without paying any of the cost. Thus we find that the union shop is demanded more and more often in contract negotiations, and in fact it has become a common form of organization in the United States at the present time. As Table 11.4 shows, the majority of unionized workers in this country at the present time appear to favor the union shop as a form of collective bargaining relationship. Support for the closed shop is relatively small. The average union group sees little or no advantage from control of the hiring process. Indeed, many union officers are reluctant to invade this area of management activity because it can be a source of considerable friction within the union if it is necessary for the union officer to place one man on a job and leave another unemployed. The preference for the union shop thus is based on the notion that it is better to leave the employer freedom to choose among applicants, but then to insist that these individuals shall carry their proper share of the burden of maintaining the union as a protective organization.

It will be noted that the move toward the union-shop type of organization has its dangers as far as the union is concerned. We have noted in Chapter 7 the tendency of groups to split into factions or even into conflicting groups when there is a substantial discrepancy in goals between any considerable segments within the larger group. The union shop contract necessarily brings into the union many individuals who feel no personal loyalty to the union and may even be actively hostile to it. Under these circumstances the human relations conflicts faced by union officers are substantially magnified. The great increase in interest shown by unions with respect to training in psy-

¹The Taft-Hartley Act banned closed-shop contracts. However, in some industries where they are traditional, operations go on as if the closed shop were still in existence.

Table 11.4 Worker Opinion on Open, Union, and Closed Shop Conditions*

	Preference for:		
	<i>Open Shop</i>	<i>Union Shop</i>	<i>Closed Shop</i>
All factory manual workers	32%	50%	16%
All union members	18	64	16
Non-members	54	31	6

* From *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, February, 1954. Reprinted by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.

chology for union officers, human relations courses for stewards, and similar devices for dealing with unhappy and dissident individuals within the union testifies to the extent to which this has already become a major problem.

Knowles (1952), in his interesting book on industrial relations in Great Britain, points to the extent to which factionalism within unions has become a serious question in that country. One hundred per cent union membership is the rule rather than the exception in many British industries and, of course, industry-wide bargaining as well is standard practice in a large number of industries. Consequently, the union negotiators may find themselves attempting to bargain on behalf of a number of diverse groups whose motives are in fact not harmonious. They may find it necessary, for example, to hold back an advanced section of the industry in order to win concessions for another area that is retarded in pay rates or working conditions. Such bargaining necessities make some members of the union unhappy, and, as Knowles points out, strikes in defiance of the union leadership are far more common in Britain than they are in the United States. Such conflicts are a potential consequence of the increasing tendency to formalize the collective bargaining relationship on a larger and larger scale.

Management's view of union security. The executive is likely to oppose union shop clauses for at least two reasons. In the first place, he perceives it as strengthening the union, and he has a typical tendency to oppose anything having this consequence. In the second place, he may feel a real aversion to requiring any man to join an organization when he is unwilling to do so. It must be remembered that the executive is more individualistic, more self-assertive, and less group-centered than the typical unionist. He would himself resent, and he assumes that others object to, this compulsion.

Some executives have also felt that union security clauses interfere with efficiency of operations. The reasoning behind this ap-

parently is that, if workers feel more secure, they will exert less effort. We have been unable to locate any opinions by any substantial group of executives on the union shop; but *Fortune's* Management Poll asked several hundred top executives in 1941 whether they had a closed shop in any of their operations and, if so, whether it interfered with efficiency. Table 11.5 gives the responses of those who had a closed shop arrangement anywhere. The results do not look alarming; about two-

Table 11.5 Management Opinion on Closed Shop*

	"Has the closed shop interfered with the efficiency of your operations?" †		
	<i>Seriously</i>	<i>Not Seriously</i>	<i>Has Improved Efficiency</i>
In output per worker	23.8%	70.0%	6.2%
In cost or speed of production	30.5	64.2	5.3
In overhead expense	32.9	63.6	3.5

* *Fortune* Management Poll, November, 1941, p. 204. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

† Asked only of executives who had a closed shop in some or all of their operations.

thirds say the effect has not been serious, and a small fraction even think it has been beneficial. When we consider the nature of the respondents, this is very faint criticism indeed of the closed shop.

Union exclusion policies. Like all other groups, unions have boundaries and requirements for admission. Under a union shop clause, the only requirement is that a person be employed in the establishment. Closed shop provisions, in which the person must get into the union in order to obtain employment, are more complicated.

If we assume that wage rates are responsive to the law of supply and demand, we quickly see that control of supply can lead to rate increases. Thus the closed shop clause, if it can be established and enforced, gives a high degree of protection to workers in the union, maximizing both income and security. However, this also requires limiting the number of persons admitted to the union, particularly since demands of group solidarity will necessitate work sharing if jobs are scarce.

This situation has led to two kinds of exclusion: exclusion based on skill, and exclusion based on irrelevant considerations. The former is obviously necessary; the union is in the position of saying to the employer, "Any member of our union is a skilled craftsman." Thus these unions (primarily the building trades and typographical unions) maintain apprentice training programs and provide certificates of skill

level. Sometimes, as in the depression years, unions refuse to admit apprentices because the supply of jobs is so limited, and this creates a severe shortage of craftsmen in a later boom period; this is parallel to the reluctance of business men to build surplus capacity factories, so that the boom finds a shortage of productive facilities.

The rationale of the closed shop, as seen by the building trades groups, at least, is fairly simple. The employee has no durable connection with a single employer; he may work a week here, a month there, wherever construction is in progress. Under these circumstances, to try to organize and bargain for wage rates, etc., after the men are on the job would be inconceivable. The closed shop is thus the only effective job control measure, and many construction companies accept it as a necessary feature of the industry. At least, these executives say, the man with a union card can be expected to have a certain minimum of skill.

Like other devices, however, the closed shop can be used for other purposes. Exclusion policies can be utilized to insure protected jobs for certain favored persons; thus, some unions admit as apprentices or new members only relatives of present members. This is the familiar group protection mechanism.

Exclusion policies also become vehicles for the expression of prejudice; thus, many unions have "for whites only" clauses in their constitutions. There is as little justification for this tactic among unions as for discrimination on racial bases by employers. Indeed, there is less, since the Negro worker is a potential replacement for the white employee; common group membership is needed to protect wages and working conditions. Failure of the union membership to recognize this danger is, of course, notorious. Union officers are usually several paces ahead of the rank and file on the race question because to them the power implication is obvious. Rose (1952a) brings out the inconsistency in union members' thinking on this point clearly. One question he asked was: "Do you think it is a good idea or a bad idea for your union to try to get Negroes into jobs in the place where you work, when there are vacancies?" To this members replied "good idea" only 16.6 per cent of the time, "bad idea" 44.2 per cent. Yet when he asked, "Is it a good idea or a bad idea to have Negroes on the picket line along with whites?" the proportion of "good idea" answers jumped to 31.9 per cent. Rose, of course, was not dealing with a closed shop union; his observation is relevant because it underlines the failure of the average unionist to see the implications of an exclusion policy.

INDUSTRY-WIDE BARGAINING

Union security tactics follow the logic of homeostatic control, which dictates measures by which the individual can establish more control over his job, his wages, and working conditions. To do this he needs the union; the union must therefore be protected. A logical next move is to protect the employer against competition, at least on the side of labor costs, by moving to standardized working conditions throughout an industry; hence, a demand for industry-wide bargaining. If other firms are free to cut wages or to exploit workers in other ways, my own job is not safe; my employer will have to follow suit in order to meet competition.¹ Thus union leaders find themselves pressed toward industry-wide bargaining (even against their personal inclinations in some instances). This has already happened in many European countries.

Economists predict that the trend toward increasingly wide bargaining units will continue in the United States. Davey (1951) considers that both unions and management will necessarily move in this direction:

The United States may look forward to an era of giant bargaining units. As industries become fully organized, the principal union will seek a structural basis for bargaining first to obtain and then to guarantee uniformity of standards. It can best accomplish standardization of policy through an industry-wide agreement

Also, when management faces a labor organization representing all or nearly all the workers in its particular industry, it will move logically toward increasingly centralized control over labor relations policies. It may appreciate the logic of centralized policy determination more keenly in a highly competitive, small business type of industry such as women's clothing than in an industry that is essentially oligopolistic in its structural pattern, such as the automobile (industry)

With the latter, the more powerful firms in the industry may not wish to surrender their existing sovereignty to a central labor relations policy committee. They may feel that their individual economic strength is sufficient to conduct effective separate negotiations with the chief labor organization in the field.

Eventually, however, the pattern of formal central control of labor relations policy on the employer side will probably become more common in oligopolistic as well as in more highly competitive industries.²

¹ Note, for example, the difficulty faced by the CIO Textile Workers Union, which has been trying to maintain standards in the Northern mills despite competition from the unorganized Southern establishments.

² Davey (1951), pp. 49-50. Reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall.

This is not to say that the individual union member, or even the local union leader, will be happy about this development. Knowles (1952) has called attention to some of the "unintended consequences" of industry-wide bargaining by British unions. To the extent that wages and working conditions are set for a whole industry at one time, it becomes virtually impossible for the workers in a given plant to change their relative status; often they have found that only an illegal strike, in violation of the contract, makes it possible to correct grievances and win concessions to which they feel entitled.¹

Such a conflict of intentions and consequences does not vitiate the essential logic of the union's position. Let us note again that a man striving for security may create conditions that make it harder for him to win a promotion, or vice versa. If the economic situation impels union leaders to adopt industry-wide bargaining as a protective device, it will be accepted, even though some people are made unhappy with respect to goals not attainable in this manner. But some increase in conflict must be anticipated as a result.

The tendency toward loss of control at the local level, as it is transferred to higher levels, is not the only factor producing tensions between local and national union officials. The trend toward employer-financed pensions and insurance programs is another, since the worker now finds his welfare tied to the welfare of his local employer. The dilemma that is being created for local union leaders by these trends toward centralization is well illustrated by the following quotation from one of them, in a recent article by Williams (1952): "Thanks to seniority, pensions, and such, the future of all of us here is tied up with the future of this company, but the future of such union bigshots as Phil Murray isn't. Now that they've all gone 'political,' about the only time we hear from them is when it suits their national purpose to order us here to 'hit the bricks.' We guys believe in unions. We want to be good union men, but we also hate like hell to be bad company men. Can you give us the answer?"

Williams does not offer a satisfactory answer to this problem in his article; however, he does deplore the loss of contact between top union leaders and the rank and file. It would appear, indeed, that the same process is going on now within the unions which created

¹ To some extent small employers also may find themselves hamstrung by an Employers' Association contract. The employer has some opportunity to escape from this dilemma by private "deals" with the union, which apparently are not unusual in this situation.

such a rift between top executives and rank-and-file workers a few decades back. The unions have become so large that the average worker now has little contact with his top union officials; and he feels that his opinion is given no consideration by the higher levels of the union. In this situation, management may well be tempted to lure the workers away from the unions and back into a company-union type of organization. It is to be feared that such a policy, if followed extensively by management, might lead to a substantial degree of turmoil. Some kind of compromise solution which would improve human relations within unions as they have been improved within management would appear to be a more appropriate course of action.

Attitudes regarding industry-wide bargaining. Most corporate executives oppose industry-wide bargaining for obvious reasons. They feel that they have more freedom of action and chances to make a better deal with a local union than in a national association. Support from executives derives from those who have strong unions themselves but have competition from unorganized or weakly organized companies; in this case, they see a chance to eliminate a competitive handicap by raising wages in competing firms.

Union members do not evince any great enthusiasm for industry-wide bargaining. Table 11.6 shows the results of a 1953 poll by the *Public Opinion Index for Industry*. The CIO group shows most

Table 11.6 Opinions Regarding Industry-Wide Bargaining*

"Here are three different ways that companies and unions bargain. Which one do you think is best for all concerned?"

The union makes one contract that covers most of the companies in an industry at the same time.

The union makes a separate contract with each company covering all their plants.

The union makes a separate contract for each plant of each separate company."

	One Contract Covers Most Plants	Separate Contract with Each Company for All Plants	Separate Contract for Each Plant
Manufacturing manual workers	23%	23%	38%
CIO members	46	23	30
AFL members	26	28	34
Proprietors and managers	15	26	49

* From *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, April, 1953. Reprinted by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.

support for multi-company contracts, the AFL decidedly less. Surprisingly enough, even proprietors and managers show 15 per cent approval of this type of contract, perhaps reflecting the consideration noted above.

The NAM and some other employer groups have conducted vigorous propaganda campaigns against industry-wide bargaining. A suggestion that they may be producing results is given in a comparison of worker opinion for 1947 and 1952 reported by *Factory* magazine. The question was, "Do you think industry-wide bargaining should be prohibited?" Responses were 57 per cent no in 1947, 51 per cent no in 1952. This suggests that the workers have been influenced to some extent by newspaper, radio, and television materials arguing against this particular union program. However, it is striking to note—and this is in conformity with what would be predicted from our discussion of perception and controversial issues (see pp. 221-223)—that the result of this change has not been to increase the proportion of workers agreeing that industry-wide bargaining *should* be prohibited. This figure dropped from 27 per cent in 1947 to 21 per cent in 1952. What has occurred is a great increase in the number of "don't know" answers: 16 per cent changing to 28 per cent. As we noted in the prior connection, workers who are subjected to conflicting pressures tend to perceive situations as ambiguous and fail to see any clear-cut solution. In this case, propaganda by the unions in favor of industry-wide bargaining and by the employers against it would appear to have created a psychological conflict for the worker that he has resolved by adopting a neutral or undecided position on this question.

SYMPATHY STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS

We deal with the psychological phenomena of the strike, considered as an event in employer-union relations, in Chapter 13. This separate consideration is justified because the strike is such an important aspect of the relationship, and more specifically, because during a strike some of the psychological principles that we have set forth become very clearly exemplified.

Another kind of strike occurs rarely and seems about to disappear from the American scene. This is the sympathy strike, called to offer support to another local or even another union. So, for example, if factory A is on strike, and orders are transferred to factory B, the workers at B might refuse to do the work in order to express their sympathy with the other group. City-wide general strikes have oc-

casionally been called to support a particular union that was under severe pressure. The British General Strike of 1926 was a national example of the same kind in sympathy with the coal miners.

These strikes are motivated to some degree by a genuine feeling of social solidarity with the other workers, and to some degree by the expectancy that similar help might be useful to "our group" in the future. Since it is the union leaders who are most likely to be able to perceive these possibilities, they are the ones who urge the sympathy walkout. However, in some instances at least, the rank-and-file members become quite excited about the issue once their attention is focused on it.

Boycotts. Unions also use the boycott tactic, a plan for concerted refusal to purchase a certain commodity. With few exceptions, workers have been even less responsive to boycott appeals than to voting instructions. Buying habits are likely to be keyed to cues quite unrelated to unionism, and it is difficult to establish new habits in time to exert an effective pressure on an employer.

Another type of action, and one that has been more effective, is that of refusing to handle certain kinds of commodities (e.g., those from a non-union shop.) This has been held illegal by the courts, and under Taft-Hartley, unions utilizing it can be sued for damages. However, in some instances a union has been able to induce one employer to bring pressure on another to have his employees join the union. (That union officers would use employer pressure to compel workers to join the union is more than a little startling; it only illustrates the fact that they, like other people, become obsessed with goals and refuse to perceive their inconsistencies in tactics.)

JURISDICTIONAL STRIKES

A somewhat similar tactical strike is the jurisdictional strike, in which one union quits work to force an employer to give its members rather than those of another union certain job assignments. The psychological basis for such strikes derives from the workers' demand for job security and the union officers' craving for a stronger union. These two goals merge very satisfactorily to provide energy for inter-union conflict in the form of jurisdictional disputes and union raiding.

Jurisdictional disputes. We can illustrate the problem of conflicts over job jurisdiction by reference to the dispute of some forty years' standing, between the International Brotherhood of Carpenters and the International Association of Machinists. This dispute revolves around the right to install and dismantle machinery. Attempts to

settle it have been made at several AFL conventions, and contradictory rulings have been obtained from the AFL Executive Council, depending on which group was in a position to bring more pressure to bear at a given time. As many employers know to their sorrow, it is still unsettled, and it has cost many a dollar in extra wages, plus tie-ups in the installation of machinery which were very expensive. When construction is going on, the carpenters are in an excellent position to hurt the employer by picketing and keeping other construction crafts idle, if he is using machinists to install new machines. On the other hand, the machinists may have a contract covering maintenance workers (or all production workers), in which case they can damage the company by shutting down operations. The employer is, of course, completely helpless, and his naturally unfavorable perception of unions is painted much blacker by such incidents. Frequently his only solution has been to pay both groups as if the machinery had been installed twice. This touches him in a rather sensitive spot.

Why do workers engage in such tactics, which to the outsider appear completely unethical? From the point of view of the individual worker, each job which his union can control is that much more insurance that employment will be available when he needs it. (These disputes are more bitterly fought when times are slack than when full employment is the rule.) Furthermore, he perceives the work as rightly and properly his. The other union is an interloper, trying to take away his bread and butter.

From the point of view of the union officers, anything that strengthens the union makes them feel stronger. Furthermore, to the extent that they carry on a successful fight for the welfare of their members, the officers are more secure in their posts. Success as a rule has no economic value for the officers themselves. It is primarily a matter of ego rewards, through perceiving oneself at the head of a bigger and stronger organization, with the members feeling more loyal because of the gains registered. We have noted that businessmen show symptoms of the same kind; however, when the businessman takes a lucrative contract away from a competitor, he usually benefits financially as well as in ego satisfaction. Many executives testify that the latter is more potent, especially if the competition between the two companies is keen.

Union raiding. The preceding analogy is also relevant to the kind of situation that develops, most commonly between an AFL and a CIO union, but sometimes within either federation, when one union attempts to sign up workers who already hold membership in another union. Strikes occasionally arise out of this situation, but more com-

monly the employer's headache is distilled out of tension among the employees, rumors flying around, lack of attention to work, quarreling between rival unionists, and so on.¹

There is a sound argument in favor of freedom of workers to change unions. To the extent that certain undesirable situations develop within a union (control by a clique, unrepresentative leaders, changes at the national union level in policy or political philosophy, etc.), for the members to be able to join another union is helpful. This argument is essentially the same as that free competition between sellers is good for the consumer. Monopoly often leads to deterioration in quality. If union officials have the members thoroughly under control, and the members cannot go elsewhere, reform of the union is quite difficult.

The motivations of the union officers doing the membership raiding cannot properly be said to arise out of this idealistic sentiment, any more than that the producer bidding for a sale improves his quality out of sympathy for the consumer. The manufacturer wants to make a sale—whether for the money or for the satisfaction of beating his competitor need not concern us. Quality, service, and promises are means to make the sale. Similarly, the union leaders doing the raiding are concerned with strengthening their own union, and their positions as officers; they may help the workers who switch unions, but this motive is clearly not the primary one.

It is a naive error to assume that the raiding union officers are motivated by economic considerations. The raid frequently costs the union more than the increased dues received will repay over a period of many years. At best, some increase in bargaining strength will result. In many instances where raiding has occurred, even that gain was not involved.

It should be noted, parenthetically, that neither of these factors is statistically important. Jurisdictional strikes involve so small an amount of lost time that it is usually a tiny fraction of 1 per cent of time worked. They are, however, very frustrating to the employers involved, and it is entirely proper that efforts be made to eliminate them. On the other hand, measures designed to end jurisdictional disputes should not function to block legitimate union activities. Avoiding such interference is more difficult than appears on the surface. We shall discuss this point further in later chapters of this book.

¹ As this is written, there are few signs that the AFL-CIO merger will change the frequency of these problems.

POLITICAL ACTION

The pressures leading unions toward industry-wide bargaining are very similar to those leading toward political action. Certain kinds of goals cannot be achieved through collective bargaining with a single employer, or even with all employers in an industry. It has become apparent, for example, that the maintenance of relatively full employment depends on conditions far beyond the scope of collective bargaining. Pensions began with Federal social security legislation, and unemployment compensation is still handled by legislation.¹ Regardless of the fact that American labor has a non-political tradition, unions have come to accept political action as a necessary tactic, and there is no likelihood whatever that such action will diminish in the future. Rather it is likely to increase in scope and intensity.

Union political action has to take the form chiefly of "getting out the vote" at crucial elections. As we have noted elsewhere, unions have not the slightest chance of competing with industry in terms of contributions to campaign expenses, lobbying with legislators, and other financial moves. The union treasuries simply are not in the same league. Thus the resource available to the union leaders is votes; there are 15 million union members, plus at least an equal number of relatives, who might conceivably be used to influence the choice of elective officials to the advantage of employees.


Political action, none the less, is one of the most controversial tactics in the union repertoire. It is a matter of disagreement at the leadership level, where some leaders cling to the "business-like" conception of unions as dealing only through collective bargaining—apparently not noting that American business has used political action as a tactic since 1789. The split at the leadership level is in part a function of the fight between the Socialists who started the American Federation of Labor and the right wing group who took it over, although, of course, most of the parties to this controversy are long since dead. The idea that political activity is "radical" and dangerous still influences many decisions in the labor movement.

Hudson and Rosen (1954) report that the rank and file of a large midwestern local were also dubious about political action. They strongly endorsed action in support of "candidates good for labor" (see Fig. 11.1), but emphatically rejected the notion that the union should tell members for whom they should vote. Interviews indicated that this would be perceived as "dictatorial" and attempts to pressure

¹ The demand for supplementary unemployment benefits (GAW) is, of course, directed to the same goal, by collective bargaining with the employers.

votes in this way might easily backfire. (It is well-known that even John L. Lewis failed in his attempt to swing his disciplined mine workers' union behind Wendell Willkie in 1940. Most other labor leaders have also failed in attempts to "deliver the vote.")

Rank-and-File Norms for Union Activity in Politics



Steward and Local Officer Norms for Activity in Politics




Fig. 11.1 Union members' and leaders' views regarding political action by unions. (From Hudson and Rosen, 1954, by permission of *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*.)

Similarly, the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* (June, 1950) found that 66 per cent of union members felt that it was not a good idea for workers to vote as the union wished; and 55 per cent opposed special union collections for political campaigns. Of those whose unions attempt to influence voting, only 38 per cent said that most of the men that they knew voted as the union recommended.

The problem facing the union in this case is the same as the problem facing management in other instances that we have considered. Managers often propose to introduce a new norm—a new standard of proper conduct—without considering existing norms. The workers may have group ties which are threatened by the new proposal, and as a result they sabotage it. Similarly, if union leaders propose a given political activity which threatens the workers' previously established party loyalties and personal commitments, their efforts will be unsuccessful.

Union leaders are likely to be more favorable to political action than are their followers (cf. Fig. 11.1). This may be because the leader becomes aware of limits beyond which collective bargaining can no longer achieve any gains, and so perceives the necessity for a new approach. Also, the leader may see political action as a necessary defensive tactic. The Taft-Hartley Act is concrete evidence that the opposition can make use of political methods; it has greatly increased union interest in politics.

"The strange case of Taft-Hartley." The specific provisions of laws regulating union-management relations go far beyond the scope of this volume. At most, we have some general comments on the use of legislation as a form of social control in Chapter 15. It is, however, appropriate at this point to say a few words about "the strange case of the Taft-Hartley Act" as it has been handled in terms of public opinion polling.

This strangeness arises from the fact that opinion polls of union members, especially the *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, have repeatedly found that a majority of union members endorse ten specific proposals which are incorporated in the Taft-Hartley measure. This has been seized upon with delight by those who allege that only union officers dislike the law. The conclusion, as many observers have since pointed out, is unjustified. The opinion polls presented only the aims of the law, not its technicalities. We know that people often approve of goals without approving of techniques. We might like to get rid of drunken drivers, but reject the Prohibition Amendment as a device for achieving this goal. So it is quite likely, for example, that a worker would say "yes" to "freedom of speech for

employers" without any intention of endorsing intimidation, threats to move the factory if a union is recognized, and other tactics often used by employers to frighten workers just before a vote. He could say "yes" to "allow checkoff only with worker's consent" with no intention of endorsing an incredible roll of red tape, and so on.

The difficulty of interpreting public opinion data when they are gathered without reference to a concrete situation may be illustrated by a brief reference to investigations on the issue of closed and union shops. The majority of the general public has consistently opposed propositions allowing for compulsory union membership in industries, even where a majority of the workers belong to the union. The figures obtained have indicated that from 54 to 77 per cent of the general public oppose required union membership (depending upon how the question was phrased and the particular social situation at the time of the poll). In the present context it is especially important that even union members have shown themselves to be far from united in support of union security. In a 1947 inquiry 41 per cent replied to such a question that they preferred an open shop, although the majority—52 per cent—supported a closed or union shop. (By 1954, a 64 per cent majority of union members favored the union shop; cf. Table 11.4).

The difficulty in interpreting this kind of finding can be readily illustrated by comparing these observations with the results of National Labor Relations Board elections. The Taft-Hartley Act, as originally written, required that bargaining over the union shop issue must be preceded by a secret election in which this demand was endorsed by a majority of the workers in the bargaining unit (not simply a majority of members voting in the election). As Chamberlain (1954) has pointed out, "one principal reason for abandoning this provision after a four year trial was that with few exceptions the unions consistently polled extremely high majorities. Of more than $1\frac{1}{3}$ million votes cast in such elections in the one year period ending June 30, 1949, 93.9 per cent supported union shop conditions." While we have no record of the number of union members in these voting groups, it seems a safe assumption that non-union workers were represented in some unknown proportion which was often greater than the negative vote recorded. "It seems a still safer presumption" Chamberlain comments, "that even though a union-security shop has already been in effect in most companies where elections were held (an NLRB survey showed that this was the case in 2025 out of 2201 cases in the period May 6 through May 21, 1948), so that most voters were already union members, such *compulsory* union membership is no guarantee of a

favorable vote. The member who joined under compulsion may be an unwilling member still. Nevertheless, the majorities rolled up in NLRB-conducted union-shop authorization elections were impressive enough to convince even the authors of the act of the superfluity of the provision."¹

Contradictions and ambiguities can arise, of course, in interpreting any opinion poll data. Polls can be biased fairly easily—as one advertising man said, “We knew what we wanted and went after it with a poll.” Even impartial polls are limited by the fact that the situation lacks reality. The poll gives an impressionistic response, an indication of how an issue is perceived—whether the worker sees it favorably or unfavorably. But when he comes up against the rough realities of the situation, he may respond differently. The strange case of Taft-Hartley, then, turns out to be a very common one; people are in favor of good and against sin, but they may disagree sharply on how the techniques are to be handled.

TACTICS WITHIN THE UNION

In the preceding pages we have been concerned with union activities externally directed, mostly to the employer but to some extent to the public. However, the pursuit of goals, by both members and officers, leads to some important questions of tactics within the union. And these, in turn, often have repercussions outside the union, in the collective bargaining situation.

Recruiting leaders. As was indicated in Chapter 8, the problem of leadership during the process of getting a union organized is not so acute as it becomes later. Especially if the employer is aggressively anti-union, the only persons who will take the lead in organizing will be those with an unusually high aggression level. These individuals are likely to be rebellious, quarrelsome and masochistic; their need to protest against what they perceive as arbitrary authority is stronger than their desire to avoid pain and economic adversities.

This kind of leader is fine during an organizing campaign. He will take personal risks, verbalize grievances, remind the workers of old struggles, and steam up their emotions. But when the day-to-day job of dealing with management and trying to get benefits for the workers is the main chore, he is no longer a success. It becomes necessary to find a place for him elsewhere—usually out organizing

¹ Chamberlain (1953), pp. 49-50. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

new locals. Golden and Ruttenberg give a number of instances of transferring such hotheads in order to give calmer personalities a chance to handle the business of the union.¹

In such cases the international officers may actively help in the recruiting of new local officers by quietly "building up" a promising man, praising him on the side, using him in committee work, etc. It is relatively risky for the international openly to endorse a local candidate. Union members resent "outside interference" in their elections as much as most other groups.

Officers appear to arise by a combination of self-selection and group pressure. The individual has to be interested in union affairs; usually he has attended many meetings and expressed his views aggressively. Then he must be backed by one or more groups within the union. If he is an informal group leader, his friends will urge him to run for office. After he once gets into the swing of affairs, he may get enough ego satisfaction out of the job to continue and rise in the hierarchy. Since there are no economic rewards worth mentioning in the typical local union job, power and prestige are the main goals he can achieve. (There is some additional security in terms of the seniority provisions mentioned earlier.)

Interview studies suggest that men get into union leadership roles more because of personal frustrations on the job than for any other reason. Ostrander (1951) cites such instances as the following: "In 1939 I had a lottery king for a foreman. Fired a girl because she didn't buy a ticket; other times, laid off, low pay, etc." "Early experience at Ingraham's. Tried to get straight on pay: If a mistake was made along those lines, no one wanted to admit it. There was resentment for any reverses on decisions of others down the line." "It was originally the foreman's attitudes that made me get into the union." However, the interviews indicated that other factors also played a part: "I hated the way the union was being handled, so helped to instigate a change in leadership." "I didn't like things around the shop, was asked to run. I felt that management was fair. Didn't think I had it in me. Could talk. Management gives the workers a break because the union hangs over their head."

Whether these personal self-revelations are accurate is not crucial to our analysis. A man accepts an opportunity to become a union leader because in some way he perceives it as a way of satisfying his motives (cf. Chapter 8). His fellows choose him because they per-

¹ Golden and Ruttenberg (1942). See especially Chapter 3. Also, Sayles and Strauss (1953), Chapter 10, 11.

ceive him as having qualities that will further goal achievement for the group. Management has discovered that the union often does a good job of selecting leaders through this rather aimless process. Some companies systematically look over new stewards and officers for foreman material. This has probably resulted in improving the caliber of supervision; it has the defect of robbing the union of its best leaders. Since the company can offer higher pay, authority, job security, and possible future promotions, the union cannot compete for the services of these men. Some executives are now concerned over the fact that they may have more trouble with the union because of the poorer leadership resulting from this skimming process.

Increasing participation. One of the common laments of union officers is the low level of participation by members. Purcell (1953) rated union members for participation after an interview in which all phases of union work were discussed; using a 5-step scale, he found the average member rated 3.87 (almost at the "very inactive" point).

Participation in union elections runs about like the votes in a typical city election, somewhat less than in a national presidential election. Table 11.7 shows the proportion of UPWA Local 28 membership voting in annual elections. There was a sharp jump in participation during the factional conflict, but even then less than two-thirds of the members voted. Although these figures probably show far more participation than the average stockholders' meeting, they are still disappointingly low.

Participation in the union is apparently related to job status [see Sayles and Strauss, (1953), pp. 202-207]. It appears that the higher-

Table 11.7 Percentage of UPWA Local 28 Membership Voting in Annual Election of Officers*

<i>Date</i>	<i>Per Cent Voting</i>	<i>Factional Situation</i>
January, 1947	32	Right wing secure.
January, 1948	20	
July, 1949	60	Struggle between right and left.
February, 1950	54	
January, 1951	38	Left wing secure.
January, 1952	36	Right regains most positions, but left still has toe hold.
January, 1953	48	Right wing secure; left totally defeated.

* From Purcell (1953), p. 198. Reprinted by permission of Harvard University Press.

status person is more sought after, perhaps listened to more respectfully, and so drawn into union activities while the lower-status individual is left out.

The union officers are well aware of the fact that participation builds loyalty, and they are likely to urge members frequently to take a more active part. Such exhortations, without provision of concrete opportunities, serve no useful purpose. To provide occasions where large numbers can join in a common effort, the officers may present a variety of devices. One that is particularly irritating to management is the dues picket line. In an open shop plant with no checkoff, and with union officers prevented from circulating on the job to collect dues, many members become delinquent. The officers decide that it will provide some excitement, remind members of their obligations, and restore the treasury, to throw a picket line around the gate and insist on collection of dues from delinquent members. This gives the membership a feeling of participation, brings the union back into focus as an important part of the environment, and boosts group morale.

Other forms of participation may include picnics, athletic teams, and so on. Large committees are often set up so that more members are drawn in. Unfortunately, if the committee becomes unwieldy, the inactive members may decide that their inactivity represented good judgment.

Attendance at meetings. One assumed index of participation is attendance at meetings. And certainly it can be supposed that a member who attends is more conscious of his union and its importance than one who does not. On this basis locals have offered door prizes, beer and pretzels, movies, and similar inducements. Others have tried fines for missing more than a specified number of meetings per year. It is generally agreed that such measures serve little or no useful purpose.

The real determinant of attendance appears to be the perceived importance of the business to be transacted. Table 11.8 shows variations in the actual number (and per cent of membership) attending meetings of a newly organized local of about 1800 members. When issues of wide concern were up for discussion, attendance jumped; otherwise it sagged to less than 10 per cent. Later it will probably stabilize at a figure less than 5 per cent of the total.

Some cynics have asserted that the union officers want just enough participation to keep the members bound to the union, but not enough to interfere with the officers' freedom to run things. Probably there is a grain of truth in this criticism. Union leaders are no better than

executives at delegating authority and responsibility, and they have not had as much training in how to do so. Hence, while the officer is busy moaning about the failure of his members to carry part of his burden, he is probably behaving in such a way as to discourage members from offering to do so.

Departments with low job satisfaction are often found to be low on union participation. Likewise, departments which are badly split by factionalism and cliques among the workers tend to be low. In general, it would appear that in an established, successfully operating union, the workers who like their jobs and are part of a high-morale group are also the ones who run the union.

Training in the union. It would follow from the foregoing that local union officers need training in how to delegate tasks, how to draw members into group work, how to smooth over factional quarrels, etc., as well as how to deal with the boss. This kind of training within unions has increased perceptibly, but much still remains to be done.

The internationals have training departments that offer training

Table 11.8 Membership Participation in a Newly Organized Local*

<i>Month</i>	<i>Attendance</i>	<i>Per Cent</i>	<i>Significant Business</i>
July	350	20	Election of temporary officers.
August	320	18	Discussion of contract demands and proposed seniority rules.
September	220	12	Nomination of permanent officers. Some contract questions discussed.
	150	8	Rejection of proposal to allow voting at more than one place. Report on negotiations progress.
October	150	8	Report on negotiations progress. Strike vote taken.
November	325	18	Report on completed contract.
December	750	42	Ratification of contract.
	75	4	Selection of committee to draw up constitution.
January	90	5	Selection of job evaluation chairman.
February	80	4	Blue Cross discussion. Dispute with company over contract discussed.
March	85	5	Complaints about officers.

* Modified from Sayles and Strauss (1953), Table VI, p. 174. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

courses for stewards in grievance handling, for officers in parliamentary law and labor economics, etc. Much union training is now being handled by universities through extension classes, and, as the number of competent teachers increases, more will be done in this area.¹

Union officers need training to deal with the employer, just as employers are providing training for foremen and labor relations staff people on dealing with the union. These training programs are slowly developing a staff of professionals who understand each other and can perceive issues and problems as they are perceived on the other side. It seems certain that progress along this line will smooth the course of union-management relations markedly.

Communication within unions. As compared with the management side, relatively more communication in the union is conducted by word of mouth—rumor, gossip, etc., as well as speeches by officers and organizers. Unless some excitement is afoot, this channel works very inefficiently, and institutional devices for communication are in demand. Larger locals now have weekly newspapers, and smaller ones usually mail mimeographed letters to the homes of members at intervals. This is necessary to keep the rank and file informed of officers' activities.

Upward communication is now becoming as much of a problem in big unions as it has become in big companies. Rosen and Rosen (1955) report on a detailed study of member opinion in a union district with some 22,000 members, undertaken at the request of the officers. They recognized the fact that the lines of communication were not functioning well, and brought in a university research team to get information for them. Some such technique, on a continuing basis, may become necessary: a kind of mail ballot, or poll of opinion on current issues, to keep leaders informed as to member opinion.

The problem of union satisfaction. This trend toward the use of impersonal modes of communication within the bigger local unions suggests that it will soon be desirable to conduct studies of member frustration and satisfaction with the union, just as management has found it useful to study job frustrations and satisfactions. As the data on participation indicate, the average member does not feel a need to take part in all union activities. Nevertheless, he apparently does want evidence that his voice will be heard, that officers will listen if he chooses to speak up. This is the familiar problem of ego motivation in a new context, since the ego motives of officers may lead

¹ A manual for union leadership training has been prepared by Liveright (1951).

them to ignore the desires of the rank-and-file member. Rosen and Rosen (1955) note, with respect to a large union district, that dissatisfaction of members with their business agents was fairly extensive. "Too much authority and not enough responsibility to the members" was a common complaint.

Economic gripes may also enter into union relations. If officers usually come from high-status, high-pay jobs, as is indicated by the evidence, then they may tend to ignore some of the pressing problems at low-pay levels. They may be accused of "selling out to management"—as, of course, has happened occasionally. More often, they simply do not perceive the frustrations of the low-status group, or consider them unjustified (cf. Gouldner's (1954*b*) study of a wildcat strike, pp. 419-422).

Factionalism within the union. This brings us to a very important point, the question of conflicts of interest and factionalism within the union. Some union officers like to pretend that their union is a unified, highly cooperative group. This is about as likely to be true as that the average company, from top management to the workers, is a unified group. It can happen, but it is not common.

It must be understood that union tactics with respect to wage rates, pensions, departmental vs. plant-wide seniority, etc., always reflect the perceptions of a dominant group within the union. This is not necessarily the largest group of members; high-status, highly mobile workers may have control of the union even though they are a decided minority. So, for example, the decision to ask for a cents-per-hour or a percentage wage boost will depend on which group is in control. For the high-paid workers, percentage gives the best results and protects their differential status; for the low-paid workers, the reverse is true. If older men are running the union, pensions get a heavy emphasis in bargaining, which is not observed where the younger group is in office. Obviously, then, the struggle for control of the local union is a matter of importance to the employer, and he will usually watch it with concern, although he cannot take a hand in it.

Problems in large construction projects. The prevalence and costs of factionalism come out in exaggerated form in certain special situations. Consider a large-scale construction project in an isolated area, such as the building of the big AEC plant near Paducah, Kentucky. This operation involved bringing in many new workers, so that some of the local unions grew to twelve times their former size. Diverse issues become involved in such a situation. To induce workers to travel long distances to work on this important project, travel pay was offered by some contractors. Local workers then felt discriminated

against, in that they were getting less pay for equal work. Perhaps more fundamental, in a long-term sense, was control of the local union. "The large influx of migrant craftsmen or new workers, if enjoying full voting rights in a local, would soon be in a position to dominate local affairs. The membership working on the single AEC project would also far outnumber membership working for other contractors, so that bargaining demands and strategies might easily be oriented toward project conditions The dilemma between maintaining a continuity of local union leadership and policies while at the same time providing a measure of participation in union affairs to new craftsmen in the area faces any union under these circumstances."¹

A report of a special team studying this situation comments: "In another serious strike-loss period, in which the carpenters were the most active, sharp disagreements . . . broke out between local union and international union leadership. Other unions also . . . were having internal problems. Apparently groups, sometimes of new unionists, sometimes of old unionists new to the area, were involved in attempts to 'take over' the affairs of the locals. In one union an independently formed group sought a charter for local people, and brought legal action against the international While dissensions within other groups did not take the form of lawsuits, it appeared as seriously complicating the settlement of wage and grievance disputes."¹

However, it is worth noting that even these turbulent conditions did not produce as much loss of working time as newspaper stories would have suggested. "Time lost from . . . construction strikes, despite all the headlines they engender, has amounted to only 1.8 per cent, while 98.2 per cent of all scheduled hours were worked," reported an AEC spokesman.

Factionalism within a union may reflect primarily a struggle for power between individuals or small groups, in which power is the only goal involved. In many other cases we find that a group seeks control of the union as an approach to job control, wage improvements, etc. For example, we have occasionally encountered cases in which a large industrial union local was divided between production and maintenance workers. The problems of the two groups are not the same; they may not want the same kind of seniority clause, they may have varying approaches to wage differentials, shift problems are dissimilar, and so on. These differences may define the real goals in a factional struggle.²

¹ Tripp, Mann, and Downs (1954), pp. 35-36, 56. Reprinted by permission.

² For excellent examples, see Sayles and Strauss (1953), Chapter 5.

When we say that a union officer's job is political, therefore, we mean that he has the difficult task of keeping all these diverse groups happy and keeping them inside the union. This is one of the reasons why it is sometimes hard to get a settlement ratified even after the union committee has approved it, and why unrelated demands pop up after a crisis has developed over a single issue. For instance, it is not unusual to have a wildcat strike ostensibly over working conditions expand into an argument over seniority, speed of operations, the job evaluation program, or other unrelated items. The program must include "something for everybody," or at least it must keep the larger pressure groups within the union contented.

The failure to recognize this essential political feature of union tactics causes many businessmen grief. They either become impatient and angry, or they suspect the officers of doubledealing. A good look at the operations of the national Congress, in which something for the South, the Midwest, and New England may have to be thrown into a package to get nationally needed legislation approved, would provide a good comparison. Even in its undemocratic features, the union gives a rough approximation of our political democracy at work.

Union political machines. In line with the foregoing analogy, we find political machines of all sizes and ideologies within unions. Despite newspaper stories to the contrary, most local unions have annual elections of officers, and national unions elect annually or biennially. However, it is, in some unions, almost as difficult for the members to throw out the national officers as it is for stockholders to evict an entrenched group of managers.

To be elected, a national officer must have votes from a wide range of locals. The group that is in the best position to gather these votes for him is the field organizing staff. Since such staff jobs are on the union payroll, the president fills them with people who support him, as a reward perhaps for rounding up votes. These men service local unions, have prestige, know more about national affairs than the typical local officer, and are usually persuasive talkers; thus they can usually line up votes for the incumbent administration.

The question of racketeering. Some people hold that an analysis of union tactics should include an examination of racketeering by union officials. This problem has been omitted here for the same reason that embezzlement and other forms of fraudulent business practices were not examined in the chapter on management. Unquestionably there are individuals in the labor movement who are criminals, and who take advantage of their opportunities to manipulate the

union and extort money from employers. Similarly persons quite high in the industrial sphere have manipulated stocks and bonds to defraud investors and even employees. These cases are psychologically similar, but they have no basic connection with union-management problems.

Perhaps the most interesting point to be made in connection with racketeering is that publicity of such cases is accompanied by criticism of unions as institutions, whereas publicity regarding entrepreneurial crime does not involve attacks on business as an institution. This apparently derives from the fact that the union is still not completely accepted in our culture. Business is clearly perceived as a "good" organization; hence criminal businessmen are differentiated as atypical. This differentiation of union leaders is not yet clear in our society.

"WHAT IS A GOOD UNION?"

Tactics, whether of industry or of unions, are constantly being judged as "good" or "bad." We have consistently avoided such judgments. Good and bad are always relative to some frame of reference; what is good for United States Steel is not automatically good for the Steelworkers' Union, and what is good from the psychologist's point of view may not be so perceived by others. We have rather been concerned with the motivations and perceptions, barriers and paths of action, that determine certain tactics.

It is possible to apply this same kind of analysis to the judgments often made of "good" and "bad" unions. An interesting example is based on the poll of labor journalists, conducted by *Pageant Magazine*,¹ to name the three best and the three worst national unions. The three "best" were the United Auto Workers-CIO, the International Ladies Garment Workers-AFL, and the International Assn. of Machinists-AFL. The three "worst" were the International Longshoremen's Association, since ejected from the AFL; Hod Carriers and Common Laborers-AFL; and the United Electrical Workers (dropped from the CIO some years ago). As Irwin Ross pointed out in reporting the poll, the "good" unions are characterized by successfully winning benefits for their members, by practicing internal democracy with reasonable faithfulness, and by provision of many fringe benefits. He also suggests that what the public means by a "good" union may be one that is slow to strike; however, it would be hard to justify this for either UAW or IAM. The "bad" unions are characterized by Irwin

¹ *Pageant Magazine*, January, 1953, pp. 76-81.

Ross as having little internal democracy and not much concern for the economic welfare of the member; the typical union in this group, he comments, "does little to enrich its members, but much to enrich its leaders." This comment is more appropriate to the ILA and the Hod Carriers; the UE leaders have rollicked in ideological wealth rather than the capitalistic variety.

Essentially, then, "good" and "bad" relate to the satisfaction of motives. A good union from the member's point of view is one that provides him with economic and ego satisfactions, with benefits and self-expression. A bad union, by the same criterion, is one that obtains for him a high hourly rate but low weekly earnings, or demands a kickback to the union officer who doles out jobs, and beats him up if he opens his mouth about democracy in the union. From the point of view of the average citizen, a good union is one that provides benefits for its members without imposing undue frustrations upon the consumer, and one that shows some thought for the national welfare. A bad union is one that picks the pockets of its members and of the consumer, that ignores the hardships inflicted on the public, and that adopts political stands which seem detrimental to the national welfare.

It must be noted that most unions show some "good" and some "bad" features, by this kind of analysis. The United Mine Workers, for example, scored high for both "best" and "worst." It has won gains for its members, has cooperated on technological improvements in the mines, and has pioneered in medical work on behalf of disabled miners. On the other hand, its leaders have often adopted a "public be damned" attitude, and political opponents of the union administration have often met with physical violence. It is probable that unions, as long as they are run by human beings, will continue to show both desirable and undesirable characteristics as defined here.

THE JOB CONTROL THEORY OF UNIONISM

In closing this chapter, a few words are desirable regarding the most influential theoretical formulation regarding American unionism, that of Selig Perlman. Greatly impressed by the detailed working rules of the International Typographical Union, the building trades unions, and other instances of union control of working conditions, Perlman (1928) developed an interesting and valuable conceptualization of the union movement. "The new attitude," he wrote, "no longer called for a restoration of free competition, but for control and administration by the union of all job opportunities available to the group. This includes *determination by the union of the rules under which the individual was permitted to occupy and hold his proper share of the*

total group opportunity."¹ This matter of job control by the union was, he held, the central and decisive feature of American unionism.

Emphasis upon a "job control" theory of unionism would not be incompatible with the psychological principles that we have presented in this volume. The key principle of homeostasis asserts that man will defend a valued equilibrium and will fight to restore it when it is disturbed. If the job is perceived as the source of biological satisfactions, prestige, status, and group acceptance, the holder of the job will cling to it and attempt to prevent the employer from changing working conditions in any way that would disturb these goal attainments. And, faced with the inadequacy of individual bargaining, the worker will utilize the union as a device for protecting his job and his income.

The inadequacy of the "job control" hypothesis derives from the assumption that this is the *only* function of unions. Actually, Perlman's own analysis of "economic group psychology" provides a basis for comprehending a much more extensive concept of unionism. As he says, "In an economic community, there is a separation between those who prefer a secure, though modest return—that is to say, a mere livelihood—and those who play for big stakes and are willing to assume risk in proportion The limited or unlimited purpose is, in either case, the product of a simple survey of accessible economic opportunity and of a psychic self-appraisal."² In other words, the worker's desire for security is a function of perceived goal probabilities, and a perception of self as inadequate for the risks of competitive business. Furthermore, the average worker perceives a job opportunity only when it is within his skill category and within a reasonable distance from home. Such job opportunities seem limited; a device for establishing group control over these opportunities is thus a natural development.

It is clear, therefore, that there is nothing in Perlman's analysis that is contradictory to a theory of unionism as a device for maximizing satisfactions available to the work group. Job control is important, but so are pensions, hospitalization, recreation, and so on. The decisive difference between the unionist and the non-unionist is not a desire to control job conditions, but a willingness to accept group control. Thus, in our study of union and management leaders (p. 246), we found that the largest differences center around desires for individual power versus desires for group acceptance and security. It is the goal of shared equality through group action that defines unionism; job control is merely its outstanding manifestation.

¹ Perlman (1928), p. 252. Italics are ours.

² Perlman (1928), pp. 238-239.

The Accommodation Process

In the first half of this volume we built up a structure of psychological fact and theory relating the individual to the group and, more specifically, relating individuals to a management group or a union group. This formulation has been developed to bring into focus the principles of psychology as they help us to achieve insight into the phenomena of industrial conflict and industrial cooperation. In the two preceding chapters we have examined some typical instances of management tactics and union tactics as revealing the operation of these principles.

It is now appropriate to consider the over-all process of interaction between union and management with particular reference to such activities as the negotiation of a contract and the administration of its terms. This is a relationship between organized groups rather than between individuals. It will therefore be necessary for us to consider whether psychological principles, which must have an anchor in the actions, motives, and perceptions of individuals, can be applied to group phenomena.

What is a group? In Chapter 7 we proposed the view that a group was an aggregation of individuals sharing common goals and common perceptions. The group, therefore, could not exist apart from individuals. This, however, is not equivalent to saying that the group is *nothing but* the individuals composing it. The group develops certain differentiated roles (leaders, followers, specialists in different functions), and these roles can be executed by many different individuals. Further, since each role involves at the very least a relation between two persons, it cannot be said to exist within each individual. Role perceptions and the desire to achieve a certain role status in the group can, of course, exist only within individuals.

This analysis is relevant to our suggestion that union-management relations are relationships between two organized groups. Such activities as negotiating a contract are conducted by individuals: usually, a committee speaking for management, and a committee speaking for

the union. But these men who make up the committees behave differently in the negotiating context from the way in which they behave in other situations. Each individual tends to be conscious of his status as a representative of the group and to be coerced by an awareness of group policy. It is often true that, within rather wide limits, the individuals doing the bargaining are not important. They could be replaced by others with little change in the outcome.

On the other hand, it would be fallacious to say that the entire group (either of management or of the union) participates in the bargaining. Invariably differences of opinion exist within the union, and usually within the management, as regards demands, resistance, tactics, and so on. Even the make-up of the two groups is somewhat ambiguous; foremen often are not consulted and feel that they are not a part of management; some inactive or hostile union members (in the union because of a union-shop clause, for example) play no part for the union. And certainly the group does not think, desire, or respond to a crisis—these are functions of individuals, and we should be postulating a “group mind” if we implied that they occur in a group level.

In what sense, then, is the group a real entity in this relationship? We suggest that it is real in at least one sense: the group exists as an *object of perception*. The union committee members see themselves as representatives of a group which really exists independent and apart from those specific men and women who make it up. Similarly, the executive sees himself as representing an entity—the company—which has existence independent of the specific owners and managers and employees now carrying on company activities.

In this respect the group—each group—is a real and potent determinant of behavior. The union spokesman, in executing his role, is acutely aware of union policy and of the judgment of his active fellow members. (He is relatively little concerned about the evaluations of the inactive members.) Similarly, the executive has a role to perform, and he knows that his fellow executives (and the Board of Directors) will watch this performance sharply. Thus there are group guides, and group rewards and punishments, which affect the behavior of the individuals who carry on the interaction process. Regardless of whether *groups as such* can interact, it is clear that individuals behave as if groups were interacting, and, by their manner of executing roles, give concrete expression to “group policy” and “group tactics.”

THE ACCOMMODATION PROCESS

When two aggregations of individuals form groups (develop sets of roles and statuses), these groups may or may not interact. The

Methodist Church is an aggregation of people accepting certain religious beliefs and certain loyalties. The United Mine Workers of America is an aggregation of people engaging in certain economic activities. These two groups are not likely to interact because they have no topics of common interest. The various organizations of coal mine operators, on the other hand, must necessarily have dealings with the United Mine Workers. The mine union representatives strive to attain certain goals on behalf of their group, and the representatives of the operators pursue goals desired by their group.

We shall refer to such a process, in which groups interact, as a process of *accommodation*. In the Illini City studies, we describe this process as follows:

We treat accommodation as the process which goes on whenever two groups deal with each other, on however grudging terms. They may co-operate, they may snipe at each other, or they may fight openly. As long as the members of one group recognize the existence of the other, initiate actions toward it, and are affected by its activities, accommodation is going on. Accommodation ceases if one party is exterminated, but we have not considered mere intent to exterminate as evidence of the nonexistence of accommodation.

All accommodation involves a relationship of group goals. However, there are several possible variations. Group A may want the same goal as Group B. Two companies may compete for the same sale or two unions for the same group of workers. Workers want more money, and so do owners. Such situations may lead to conflict. Or the two groups may be striving toward different but incompatible goals. The desire of workers for security may run counter to the employer's efforts toward efficiency. In some cases the goals may be compatible but methods of achieving them come into conflict.¹

Blocking an individual from achieving a goal tends to evoke aggression. This is true even if the goal is being sought on behalf of a group. To the extent, therefore, that the accommodation process involves blockage of goal-directed activities, it is likely to be accompanied by evidences of conflict. On the other hand, if accommodation proceeds in such a manner that both parties achieve what they perceive to be their major goals, harmony is observed.

The recurring focus of this book has been industrial conflict. We now define industrial conflict as a process of accommodation in which frustration and aggression make up a relatively large proportion of the observed events; industrial cooperation, then, is a process of accommodation in which goal achievement is perceived to be relatively predominant.

¹ *Labor-Management Relations in Illini City*, vol. 2, pp. 11 and 13. Reprinted by permission of the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations.

THE NEGOTIATION OF A CONTRACT

A logical point at which to begin an examination of the accommodation process is in the formulation of a new contract (the first, or any later agreement). Here we find the representatives of the two groups asserting their respective goals, proposing courses of action leading to these goals, and modifying (or resisting modification of) goals, policies, and tactics because of the opposition encountered. It is inherent in this situation that someone has to yield. Either management gives ground on a point, or the union must compromise or abandon it.

The goals presented by the union are generally economic in character. However, as has often been noted earlier in this volume, the economic demands may be symbols of or rationalizations for other needs. It is certain that the negotiating process does not have the dispassionate quality which we would expect to enter into a purely economic discussion. Soule (1942) has stressed the emotional atmosphere of most union-management negotiations, in contrast to their alleged economic character:

Some unions and employers do indeed try to act as if the process were the same as a purely rational and prosaic bargaining transaction between business buyers and sellers. But this conception of the affair has never really dominated the action of either side since the beginning of trade unionism, and even when it is approximated in outward appearance, the atmosphere of the relationship is charged with emotions which are far more like those of sovereign nations engaged in diplomacy or warfare than like those of tradesmen dickering over the price of potatoes.¹

This formulation suggests that it will be fruitful to examine the negotiating process as it actually operates. The aim of negotiations, of course, is to reach agreement on certain conditions of employment; in terms of our prior conceptualization, it involves the development or conscious acceptance of new group norms. In the past, the norm has been 44 hours of work per week; it is now proposed that 40 be the norm. Or, in the past, it has been accepted that the foreman arbitrarily chooses men for transfer to higher-rated jobs; now it is proposed that seniority have substantial weight in such determinations.

Agreement on a contract, and the incorporation of new clauses, cannot be said to guarantee that new norms have been accepted. Management may make superficial concessions, knowing that they can be ignored in practice; or the union may sign an objectionable clause but continue fighting it in day-to-day activities. Top management may change, but foremen may try to adhere to prior practices, and so on.

¹ Soule (1942), pp. 187-188.

Thus a study of contract clauses alone does not provide nearly enough information for us to know whether a new norm has been established. Study of the contract is at best a starting point for further investigation regarding daily practice.

Setting up contract proposals. The fact that the committees going into a bargaining session are performing defined social roles becomes clear if we consider the process of planning for a new contract. The task of the union officer is especially difficult. In the first place, the officer is acutely aware of certain demands from his members. These may relate to wages, working conditions, seniority rights, and so on. He is also aware of certain pressures from above, from his international union heads, to stress certain demands. In the background, serving as standards of "reasonableness" are the demands made and achieved recently by other unions, the profits report of the company, cost of living changes, etc. Variations in these background factors will produce variations in the way in which specific contract proposals will be perceived. Finally, we must realize that the tactics of the officer will be modified by residuals of his past experience with this and other employers.

The same processes operate on the employer side. The executive perceives the specific demands of the union. But they are inevitably seen against a background composed of what settlements have recently been made by other companies, his own profit status, the cost of living, his sales and production picture, etc. Thus demands that look reasonable at one time will be seen as totally unacceptable under other conditions. Finally, each employer brings to the bargaining table many residuals of his past experience with this and other unions.

Essentially this process is merely a restatement of the adaptation-level theory of perception proposed by Helson (1947), to which reference has already been made. Helson asserted that the perception of any situation was a function of three factors: (1) the focal characteristics of the immediate stimulus; (2) the background or relevant stimuli; and (3) residuals of relevant past experience. It would appear from Helson's analysis, and some ingenious supporting experiments by Blake (1954), that we could predict in advance what wage and other demands would be made and what success these demands would meet, if we cared to study any such situation in detail. As a matter of fact, such predictions are made all the time. Once United States Steel has settled with USA-CIO, a pattern is set for much of the industry. Minor deviations occur in relation to local background conditions and traditional differentials, but much uniformity is apparent. Thus the question of wage demands, bargaining, and contract

settlement can be treated as essentially a problem in perception. The task of the union officer is to look over the situation and ask for at least a little more than it looks possible for him to win. He considers that he has made a serious error only if he asks for less than he might have obtained. Similarly, the company agent must try to estimate the least that the union will accept, within the context of such factors as industry and community pattern setting, cost-of-living, etc. He considers that he has made a serious error if he pays more than the union might have settled for.

Issues in bargaining. Since traditional work norms were established or sanctioned unilaterally by management¹ before unions existed, the selection of issues for bargaining has mainly been a function of the union group. Issues have become focal as union representatives have decided to press for modification of the agreed working conditions in some specific detail.

Perception of these issues by the union officers, and by executives, will depend on many non-psychological factors. Wage demands, for example, are perceived against a background of the labor market, industry wage levels, community wage levels, cost-of-living changes, and so on. We shall not attempt to consider any such factors here.

Many other demands come up in collective bargaining. First of all, of course, even before a wage demand comes the question of union recognition. This is an important aspect of "agreed working conditions," and many executives still recognize the union only halfheartedly, with a private resolution to break it up if possible (cf. pp. 392-394 below). Another important aspect of working conditions involves protection against arbitrary authority of the foreman. The history of American industry is full of instances in which foremen collected "kickbacks" from workers for jobs; during World War II a number of charges were made by women employees that foremen required sexual favors of them. If the foreman has complete authority to hire and fire, the worker has no recourse against such tactics. An important union demand has therefore been for an impersonal standard for retaining a job or advancing in job sequences; mainly this demand has focused on seniority as the only convenient yardstick.

At one time the speed of work was largely under employee control, and was a matter of agreement among the workers more than agreement between employer and employees. With increasing mechanization (cf. Chapter 10) the possibility of nullifying wage gains by speeding up the work conveyors has become apparent to employers.

¹ Informal worker groups were influential, of course (cf. p. 201).

It was inevitable, therefore, that unions would make demands of a technical character relating to control of work speed and working conditions.

Management prerogatives. Many of these "innovations" in bargaining are bitterly resisted by executives as an encroachment on "management prerogatives." The belief that such prerogatives are somehow fixed and unchangeable is understandable; but in a dynamic, changing industrial scene it would be difficult to defend. In the nineteenth century management had the prerogative of hiring young children; this has been changed by law. On the other hand, management at that time did not have the prerogative of speeding up the assembly line; there were no assembly lines. The rights and responsibilities of management, like those of the worker, change with changing legal, social, and technological conditions. They are defined as much by the perceptions of the general public as by statute or by a union contract. At one time there may be general agreement that the chemicals used in a metal-treating process are chosen by management exclusively; at another there may be a sharp change, and management must accept decisive limitations in this area.

We shall undoubtedly see in the next few years many kinds of technological questions raised by unions. Union bargaining will not be limited to those issues traditionally defined as matters for collective bargaining. Human demands or dynamic human frustrations may appear in almost any sphere of the labor-management relationship. Wherever these dynamic factors accumulate with sufficient force, union leaders will be compelled to take cognizance of them and to formulate demands of some kind, attempting to alleviate those problems. Unions have made collective bargaining issues of questions such as shipments to Fascist or Communist countries, shipments of military supplies, and other kinds of purely political questions. To say that unions should stay out of political problems is to avoid the fundamental question. Unions will take action collectively with regard to any matters that are of concern to a sufficiently large portion of their members individually. Whether this is socially wise or desirable from the point of view of long-range union success is equally beside the point. In some cases pressure from the members will bring about some action by the leaders; and, if the established leaders refuse to act on persistent and continuous demands, they will be replaced by others who will take action on behalf of the desires of the membership. In other cases leaders persuade the members to adopt a new policy. We must assume that the collective bargaining process in the future will involve many issues different from those raised in the past. With changing times and poli-

tical, technological, and economic conditions, new demands will be made and new norms will evolve. We cannot freeze this relationship even if we wish to do so.

Importance of arbitrary frustration. When executives decide to stand firm on a matter of management prerogatives, but cannot win agreement from the union representatives that this stand is justifiable, friction is accentuated. It follows from our analysis of the frustration-aggression relationship (Chapter 6) that conflict is especially likely to arise in negotiations if either side perceives the other as *arbitrarily* frustrating. In such cases personal emotions become involved along with the execution of the social role. If mutual understanding exists, this feeling of arbitrary frustration is less probable, and the negotiations become more nearly the purely economic, rational process hypothesized by classical theory.

Gouldner (1954*b*) characterizes this condition as making a "game" of labor relations. He writes:

Labor relations can take on "game" characteristics when each party is aware of the structural constraints that the other is laboring under. For example, when the union leader knows that the company labor relations man operates in terms of limits set by higher management and cannot transcend them, and when the labor relations man is aware that the union leader *must* bring home some settlement with which he can pacify his own rank and file. If each tacitly expresses awareness of the other's limitations, and signals his intention not to violate them, then a game is being played in which union leaders and company labor relations directors may develop no little camaraderie. In sum, the game framework is one of stable equilibrium between the two players, not merely because each is satisfying the expectation of the other, but because each is helping the other to satisfy the expectation of some *third* party.¹

One senses a certain disapproval of this "game" concept in Gouldner's view of it. Actually, it would appear that the chances of reaching agreement on workable norms of conduct would be considerably enhanced under these conditions. Reasons for this will become clearer as we examine some actual research on contract negotiations.

Analyses of negotiation sessions. If we conceive of negotiations as a process of seeking agreement on new norms, then an examination of what actually happens in the session should tell us something about the chances of reaching such agreement. It should also reveal something about the motives and perceptions of the participants which have important bearings on the success of the relationship.

¹ Gouldner (1954*b*), p. 56, footnote. Reprinted by permission of The Antioch Press.

Haire's study of transcripts. One technique that has been explored as a way of getting information on negotiations is the analysis of transcribed negotiating sessions. Haire (1955) has utilized several such transcripts in this manner. He starts with the assumption that each participant perceives himself as having a certain role to execute (as spokesman for a group, as defender of certain values, etc.). He then attempts to characterize differences between these roles (as between union and management) by the verbal interactions found in the transcripts.

It might first be asked, do the participants perceive themselves as portions of a single group, or of two groups? If new norms are to be established, it will be theoretically easier to do this within a single group. However, verbal analysis indicates that there is a decided difference among the participants on this point. Haire tabulated the usage of pronouns as unifying or divisive ("*we* are here together" versus "*you* have done this to *us*"). More than 75 per cent of all such items were divisive—in other words, this was anything but "one happy family" talking things over. Management used more unifying pronouns, unionists more divisive terms. (Management's usage may have depended on a real perception of unity, or on an assumed tactical advantage in such an approach.)

Another striking suggestion of perceived role differences derived from the use of first names. Over 80 per cent of management remarks to labor used first names; only 10 per cent of labor's remarks to management used first names. This suggests that perceived status differences carry over into the bargaining session and influence the process.

Other tabulations referred to the content of the statements made. For example, some statements were confident assertions; others were made tentatively with low confidence as to their acceptance or rejection. Management made two-thirds of the definite statements; labor made 90 per cent of the tentative suggestions. The union made 80 per cent of remarks in the "we request" category; management made 80 per cent of those in the "compliance" classification. Finally, statements were categorized as factual or as purposive (what ought to be). It is not surprising that the union spokesmen were constantly referring to purpose and value standards, whereas the executives relied heavily on statement of fact.

Haire comments on his findings as follows: "These three bits of evidence . . . suggest a coherent perception of himself and his role in the relationship" for persons on each side of the table. The typical remarks made by the union spokesman indicate "a perception of relatively little power and autonomy The fact that the other partner

shows the complementary picture suggests that he sees much the same role relationship—i.e., that he sees himself as having the balance of power and autonomy.”

Osterberg's observational study. The analysis of transcripts loses much information derived from the manner in which statements are made. Communication depends on facial expression, vocal inflection, etc., as well as on choice of words. Osterberg (1949a, 1950) observed the actual bargaining session and kept a continuous record of the individual speaking, time intervals, and the category of remark made. From these he found it possible to identify some important differences between successful and unsuccessful negotiations (criterion of success was judgment of the parties themselves, as well as the observer and the conciliator, if one were involved). The major source of evidence was the categorization of remarks, which Osterberg set up, after preliminary exploration, into eight classes. These are defined as follows:

A. Aggression against an opponent, either an individual, the committee, or the organization represented. Hostility shown as criticism, sarcasm, insult or threat

N. Negation of opponents' proposal or position. No direct aggression, but refusal to accept or to consider statement made. In effect, a blocking of negotiations on issue under discussion

D. Defense of self or side represented. Repetition of reasons for a position or decision previously expressed

X. Miscellaneous. Statements which are not classifiable in any of the other categories. Original statements of one's position or demand. Incidental remarks having no bearing on the dispute. Answers to questions which are simple facts, not defense or clarification

Q. Question to someone on opposing side, or to whole committee opposing (not question to member of own committee). Not sarcasm

C. Clarification. Restatement of an issue from both points of view (not a defense of one's own). Discussion of how position was established or details of own position—if requested by opponent, and if not defense. Fair restatement of opponent's position in attempt to understand and clarify (not attacking it)

O. Other's argument accepted. Agreement that opponent's position is reasonable. Acceptance of opponent's point of view

P. Project one's own problem to opposing side. No defense of one's demand, but a presentation of the problem one's own side is faced with.¹

Concrete examples of a few of these categories are given in the following excerpt, beginning with the twenty-fifth minute of the meeting. The excerpt² shows how remarks were classified and credited to the person making them, in a minute-by-minute record.

¹ Osterberg (1949a), pp. 13–14. Reprinted by permission.

² Osterberg (1949a), pp. 80–82. Reprinted by permission. The three management representatives are designated *a*, *b*, *c*; the union representatives, 1, 2, and 3.

A glance at this interchange of mutual hostilities will show the importance of attitudes and perception (motivation, of course, can be inferred). The union committeemen perceive the Bureau of Labor Statistics figures as sound, and also important, presumably because they indicated this company to be below the industry average. The company spokesmen perceive BLS data as not comparable to their own situation. The readiness with which both sides slip from a discussion of facts to personal attacks on each other suggests that the attitudinal climate in the establishment has been full of conflict before this meeting.

As indicated above, one of Osterberg's main purposes was to show differences between successful and unsuccessful negotiations. For this task he relied mainly on the categorization of remarks. His eight classes range from "marked frustration-inducing behavior with absence

Minute	Participants		Commis- sioner	Content of Remark
	Management <i>a, b, c</i>	Union <i>1, 2, 3</i>		
25		<i>D</i>		Bureau of Labor Statistics release on industry wages read and compared with company's.
26	<i>A</i>	<i>D</i>		Union selfish and demanding. More BLS figures read and compared.
27	<i>N</i>	<i>D</i>		BLS figures not acceptable. These figures based on fact.
28	<i>N</i>	<i>D</i>		Cannot accept comparisons. More figures read.
	<i>A</i>			You are trying to run the company.
		<i>D</i>		Only giving the facts.
29	<i>A</i>			The union is intolerable, impossible to negotiate with.
30	<i>A</i>	<i>A</i>		You are a red! You drag out red herring when you're licked.
31	<i>A</i>	<i>A</i>		You act like a Commie! Challenge you to make it a formal charge!
32			<i>X</i>	Take it easy.

(After 45 minutes, the Commissioner suggested that the Union committee withdraw. He later met with each group separately. Later in the afternoon another joint meeting was held, but the only agreement was to meet again 1 week later. A work stoppage occurred 3 days after the above exchange.)

of goal orientation on one extreme (*A, N, D*), to absence of frustration-inducing behavior with positive goal orientation on the other extreme (*C, O, P*).” He recorded these graphically as in Figs. 12.1 and 12.2, with aggressive behavior on the left side and problem-solving behavior on the right side of each figure. He predicted that sessions recorded predominantly on the left would be judged failures, those predominantly on the right as successes. This prediction was borne out by his actual findings. For example, Fig. 12.1 shows the entire session, part of which was excerpted above. It was judged by everyone to have been a failure, and was followed by a strike 3 days later.




Fig. 12.1. Collective bargaining session ending in failure. (Redrawn from Osterberg, 1949a, Case 1.)




Fig. 12.2. Collective bargaining session ending in success. (Redrawn from Osterberg, 1949a, Case 11.)

Figure 12.2, by contrast, shows a meeting which threatened (at the sixth minute) to deadlock on a union security issue, but which was successfully gotten back onto problem-solving exchanges and ended in a general agreement.

Tactics in bargaining. The analyses by Haire and by Osterberg are relatively microscopic in that they attempt to derive information from fragments of behavior rather than by simply observing the overall pattern. Some students of union-management relations question the utility of such detailed approaches. It could be argued (with some justification), for example, that any practitioner in the field would know that the meeting excerpted above (represented in Fig. 12.1) was doomed to failure. However, considerable gains can be derived from pinning down in objective fashion precisely what the differences are between successful and unsuccessful bargaining conferences. If, for example, we wish to train company and union spokesmen in tactics for this kind of situation, we have to know exactly what kinds of remarks to encourage and what kinds to eliminate. And if we wish to select from various executives or union committeemen the most effective bargainers, this kind of study should be quite valuable.

It can plausibly be proposed, on the basis of casual observations as well as from Osterberg's study, that aggressive attitudes frequently interfere with the process of reaching agreement in negotiations. This is well-illustrated by several cases cited by Garfield and Whyte (1951). One of these instances is that of a small plant in a declining industry (manufacturing charcoal and wood alcohol). The attitudinal climate in the establishment was full of hostility, and the union negotiating committee insisted upon making punitive demands, e.g., for a wage increase, despite advice from the union's economist that the industry was sick and could not possibly afford such a contract. In this instance the demand for an increase was primarily an expression of aggression. They asked for a 15¢ hourly increase and, of course, met adamant resistance from the company. After several weeks of such negotiations, the international representative was called in, and he argued the case with management, likewise without success. He therefore called a meeting of the union committee and recommended a strike. At once it became clear that the committeemen know that they could not win a strike, but their resentment of management had led them to "get out on a limb" from which they found it difficult to retreat.

In such cases the leader must devise ways of "saving face" for his group. The representative suggested that the union agree to renew the contract, unchanged as to wages, but with a re-opening clause in case business conditions improved. Management was willing to agree

to this, and the union representatives felt that they had not been defeated completely.

This incident is significant, but not merely from the angle of devising trick clauses to "save face" for either management or union. What is much more important is the fact that *hostile attitudes can motivate punitive demands* and prevent agreements which would be reasonable on the facts of the case. In this instance, the union committeemen saw the futility of striking. But suppose that they had perceived the situation as one in which the probability of success was somewhat higher. A long and costly strike would almost certainly have resulted.

By contrast, we can cite another case from Garfield and Whyte, in which good human relations "paid off" for management. In this case, other unions had been winning pay boosts; the union asked for one; it appeared that the company could afford it and that it was justified. The president of the company was embarrassed and asked the union negotiators to trust him by postponing their request for 90 days. Since he offered no further explanation, the union negotiators were not very sympathetic. Finally, they managed to pressure the president into explaining his situation. The management had made some serious mistakes in purchasing policy and was in a very bad cash position at the time. Pressure for a wage increase might create serious problems for the president; apparently, there was some possibility of stockholder action to change the management if this situation were revealed. However, the president had reason to believe that within 90 days he could sufficiently correct this situation so that no further damage could be done. He therefore persuaded the union negotiators to accept a 90-day extension, and, since the union members had memories of favorable relationships with the company, they accepted this extension. Three months later the company's financial position had improved, and it was possible to negotiate a wage increase that was entirely satisfactory to the union.

Uses of catharsis. In the preceding example, open conflict was avoided because management had used good human relations tactics and had built up a "reservoir of good will" which could be drawn upon in a time of need. More common, of course, is the situation in which a deadlock in negotiations occurs against a background of hostility. Then our theory would suggest that catharsis, the draining off of aggression in a harmless demonstration, may relieve tensions to the point that agreement can be reached peacefully.

Another example from the collection presented by Garfield and Whyte can be utilized here. The case involves a small plant of some 50 to 75 workers which was a part of a large corporation. Previous

superintendents had considerable difficulty with the local union, and there were unsatisfied grievances of various kinds, with hostilities rampant among the workers. Under these conditions, when a new superintendent came in prepared to make certain technical changes, a real problem existed with regard to making these changes without provoking a strike. Management discussed the problem with the international representative of the union, who pointed out to the new superintendent and his personnel manager that the existence of this substantial level of hostility was going to interfere seriously with any agreement on changing machinery and processes. He suggested that it would be necessary for the local people to get rid of some of their aggressive feelings before they would be able and willing to talk intelligently about these new ideas. Since neither the superintendent nor the personnel manager was directly involved in these prior frustrations, he suggested that the next meeting between management and the union be devoted to airing the hostilities felt by the employees toward the management, with as little blame as possible being attached to the new executives. This maneuver was successful, at least to the extent that the local union people relaxed somewhat and were willing to discuss the issues with the new superintendent. This good feeling was further advanced when the new superintendent surprised them by giving a favorable decision on eleven grievances which had been hanging fire for some time. The superintendent also stressed the fact that he was new in the plant and that he was not committed to follow the policy of his predecessors. Finally, he astonished the union committee by taking them out to lunch. After this combination of catharsis through pouring out their hostile feelings about prior grievances, plus the favorable experience of recognition and respect indicated by accepting them as equals and taking them to a pleasant place for lunch, the union committee was in a frame of mind to discuss situations in a much more intelligent way.

Here we have instances of three common "tricks of the trade" in meeting a new problem: holding a meeting at which the union representatives blow off steam by denouncing past managerial blunders (from which the new executives dissociated themselves); giving a favorable decision on pending grievances when attempting to win acceptance of changed work conditions; and the free lunch. We hope it is clear that such tricks, by themselves, do not provide a firm basis for new agreements. At best they can clear the air so that new proposals are considered reasonably, without being drowned in a wave of discontent and aggression.

Problem-centered thinking. We may conclude this discussion of

negotiating agreement by suggesting that the key to success involves keeping the focus on the problem rather than on attack and defense. Union and company representatives have certain social roles to carry out, which involve the quest for agreement on proposed changes in working conditions. But the existence of group norms of hostility toward the opposition—or purely personal feelings of hostility—may change the focus to attack and counterattack. Strong motives may cause the individual to become so fixated on one aspect of a situation that he literally cannot see other important details. But reaching agreement on new contract proposals—especially if this agreement is to be translated into action in the plant—calls for clear awareness of the problem and the relevant facts. Thus any procedures that can keep the parties to the controversy focused on defining the problem, seeing its implications for both sides, and understanding its consequences, as opposed to attacking each other for past misdeeds, will be helpful.

CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION

The negotiation of a contract does not insure that new norms of conduct have been established. Both sides often find, to their sorrow, that the contract clauses mean different things to different people. Agreements must be worked out by day-to-day plant practice after they have been ostensibly settled at the bargaining table. It is in this day-to-day relationship, of course, that new ways of achieving goals are worked out or the need for modification is clarified.

The validation of a new agreement depends on a wide variety of psychological processes. In the first place, of course, top management and top union leaders may perceive correctly, or may misperceive, the nature of the norms agreed upon in the bargaining session. Second, they may communicate adequately, or inadequately, to lower echelons in the group structure. Third, these communications may or may not lead to action according to the intent of the agreement.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that behavior at the foreman-worker level often is not that which should have followed from the contract provisions. Students of union-management relations therefore have to study the administration of the contract as well as its apparent content. An agreement with very strict seniority provisions, for example, may be administered loosely, and one with a superficially flexible clause may in fact be executed with very tight seniority controls.

We noted that difficulty arose in the negotiating process because

individuals cling to established norms and resist efforts to change them, or because individuals with strong goal-seeking tendencies become frustrated by such opposition. To some extent the same problems arise in administration of the contract, with differences based on the context. In assigning work, making out pay schedules, dealing with safety hazards, etc., the initiative rests with the supervisor. He acts on his interpretation of the agreement, and the worker can file a grievance if he disagrees. Thus management rarely has recourse to the grievance procedure; this machinery is set up to allow for orderly processing of complaints that the agreement is being violated by management.

Grievance machinery is designed to provide a method for reaching agreement when conflicts arise regarding the meaning of contract provisions. The alternative would be for workers to walk off the job when the action of management seemed to them to violate the contract; obviously such a situation makes orderly production, profitable operation, and continued wage payments impossible. Generally speaking, in plants where such difficulties occur, the grievance machinery is not working, or employees have no confidence in it as a channel for reaching agreement. The situation is as if citizens lost confidence in the courts and settled all their disputes by direct action, as would happen if the courts were heavily biased in one direction and other citizens could not hope for justice.

The umpire procedure. In an attempt to get away from the inevitable biases of top executives and top union officials to an impartial settlement of differences about contract interpretation, several large corporations and even whole industry groups have set up an impartial umpire system. Such an umpire (frequently a lawyer or arbitrator who would not be identified closely with either company or union) is paid half his salary by each party, and he is empowered to make final rulings on grievances that cannot be settled by direct conferences at top levels within the establishment. Interestingly enough, the existence of such a mechanism seems to reduce the necessity for its use. If either side realizes that they have a case which they cannot defend before the umpire, they will settle it at a lower level. Thus General Motors reports that less than 1 per cent of their grievances ever reach the umpire, and this figure tends to grow smaller as mutual understanding and agreement increase.

Characteristics of grievances. Grievances fall broadly into two classes: those in which the worker feels that he has not received what is his due under the contract, and those relating to expectancies not based on the contract, but on past practice and tradition. "Bureau-

cratic" union officials are prone to support the former, but to give at best lip service to the latter; the increasing trend toward following precedents and umpire rulings will naturally accentuate this. Since the impartial umpire cannot ordinarily enforce traditional agreements that are not written into the contract, such cases may cause considerable discontent. Wildcat strikes often result from a piling up of such cases (cf. pp. 419-422), and may lead to modification of the contract. However, it is difficult to write contract clauses that will meet ego needs for recognition and self-expression.

Political grievances. The grievance machinery may be utilized as a tool by union officers or by informal group leaders in opposition to the officers. An unpopular foreman can be harassed with so many grievances that he quits or his superior transfers him. In cases of factionalism within the union, control of the grievance machinery by one group may lead to favoritism, and the prospect of getting help on problems may be used as an inducement to members to support one faction or another. Such tactics are, of course, more likely where union leaders perceive management as basically hostile to the union, or as being unwilling to work out agreements. They have their managerial counterparts in tactics such as granting favorable settlements to one group in the union but blocking or stalling on others, and harassing active unionists by giving them disliked job assignments (especially in isolated locations where they cannot talk to others).

Personality characteristics of grievors. Some executives are prone to shrug off grievances by adopting the position that these are filed mostly by a few "crackpots." Statistically, some individuals do file far more than their share of grievances, whereas others rarely or never file one. This seems to give some support to the view that some individuals are "grievance-prone," perhaps because of personality characteristics.¹

There are occasional observations that suggest that grievors do differ in some consistent fashion from non-grievors. Figure 12.3 shows data for two groups of 15 workers, matched for various job characteristics but differing in that men in one group had filed a grievance during the preceding year, whereas the others had not. On the Guilford-Martin Personnel Inventory, the two differed significantly only on trait O ("objectivity"), the grievors tending more toward thin-skinned sensitivity, having their feelings hurt more easily,

¹ The analogy to the problem of "accident-prone" workers is fairly obvious. It is important, therefore, to recall the study by Mintz and Blum (1949), in which it was demonstrated that such a statistical distribution does not sufficiently validate the accident-proneness hypothesis.

etc. This suggests that some people may tolerate a certain condition without filing a grievance, whereas others will protest. Such a conclusion, of course, does not justify the tendency to ignore grievances; this policy in fact may precipitate wildcat strikes.




Fig. 12.3. Personality differences of grievors and non-grievors.

Problems of discipline. Traditionally, management has had complete control of the operations of an enterprise, in the sense that refusal to obey orders has always been grounds for discharge. However, always implicit in this tradition has been the understanding that orders deviating grossly from the norms of the establishment would not be issued. We can readily comprehend this if we simply

think of a foreman ordering a worker deliberately to undertake a task in which he was sure to be injured. No executive would claim that the foreman had authority to give such an order. And no one would be surprised if the worker refused to obey it.

Refusal to obey orders, however, frequently stems from just such a situation *as seen by the worker*. That is, workers occasionally disobey orders that deviate grossly from the norms of proper authority as they understand these norms. Where there is a sharp discrepancy between worker perception and foreman perception, such disobedience leads to union-management controversy.

Grievances about other contract provisions can also arise out of interactions between individuals in which differing perceptions of the agreement lead to different behavior patterns. Many instances could be cited of grievances based on suspicion and confusion as well as simple misunderstanding of contract clauses.¹ They can be found in profusion in the literature of labor relations.

Grievance as jockeying for position. We have indicated above what might be called an optimistic view of the grievance procedure: it is a mechanism by which verbal agreements on working conditions are transformed into norms of behavior, so that behavior of foremen and workers becomes congruent. Each knows what to expect from the other, and friction is thereby reduced.

Many observers of union-management relations endorse this view, but a sizeable group of cynics is skeptical. They are inclined to the view that the grievance procedure is rather a field on which the parties jockey for favorable positions to engage in the next bargaining conflict. One such pessimist will be cited as an example. Lens (1948), an experienced unionist, has this to say:

Those who look to grievance machinery . . . as a means of ending class strife look in vain. Each side utilizes the procedure for settling grievances to consolidate its base, to plan and prepare for bigger conflicts at the termination of the contract

Grievance procedure can be used by a far-sighted management to create a more suitable framework for harmonious relationships, and by a vigorous leadership of a union to consolidate its ranks. Or conversely it can be used by a conservative employer to rub salt in the wounds of employees and

¹ Consider, for example, the extremely complicated bonus payment schemes which leave workers confused as to their expected pay (p. 324). An interesting example of a serious grievance based on suspicious attitudes is given by Selekman and Selekman (1950). For some comments on "imaginary" grievances which are none the less very important to the employees, cf. Hackett (1951).

make further strife inevitable, and by a lethargic union leadership to fritter away whatever gains have been made already.¹

Lens offers the answer to his pessimism within his own argument. Whether the grievance procedure is used constructively or whether it merely becomes another phase of industrial warfare depends on the perceptions and motivations of the leaders. We have referred many times in this volume to the problem of perceptual constancy: people cling to old ways of looking at situations when the "real" environment has changed. If managers or unionists fail to change their perceptions, then perhaps Lens is right in his gloomy view. But if leaders modify their views and adapt to changing conditions, then the grievance procedure can build norms of working conditions that will make for harmonious relationships.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCOMMODATION PROCESS

Through negotiations and grievance settlements, spokesmen for union and company interact to determine certain conditions of employment in a given establishment. We have called this interaction a process of accommodation. This formulation implies that management may give up certain goals, or accept certain restrictions on goal-seeking activities; that the union may propose new goals, or new activities, and may win some of them, lose others, and compromise on many points. Accommodation, in brief, involves the working out of agreements concerning the conditions of employment, which may involve the validation of old norms or their replacement with new norms of conduct for the enterprise.

The specific goals that are most directly involved, or at least appear in the largest number of union-management relationships, are such items as wages, union security, seniority, promotion policy, discharge restrictions, and grievance procedure. In addition, such items as safety, apprenticeships, fringe benefits, efficiency and technological change, and arbitration, may be found in many contracts. In the Illini City studies, it was found desirable to develop two indices of goal achievement as aspects of the relationship: an index of economic status of the workers, which reflected hourly earnings; and an index of union influence, which reflected the achievement of the union in winning a voice in the determination of working conditions. These

¹ Lens, (1948), pp. 721-722. Reprinted by permission of the *Harvard Business Review*.

two indices were considered important consequences of the accommodation process.

A third index, although it would not ordinarily be considered a goal of either party, was also emphasized as a consequence of the relationship. This was an index of attitudinal climate (a term we have already used frequently in this volume). Attitudinal climate was conceived as a generalized aspect of the relationship, based on the manner in which the parties perceived each other as well as their perception of how well accommodation was being achieved. Climate was considered to vary from an extreme of conflict and hostility (indicated by unanimous reports of bad feeling, friction, and aggression) to an extreme of cooperation and harmony (indicated by unanimous reports of good feeling, cooperation, and mutual understanding). Naturally, no establishment showed unanimous reports in either direction, but it was possible to work out a numerical index from interview data by which establishments could be compared (cf. Table 12.1).

Table 12.1 Attitudinal Climate and Attitude to Union of Employees in Eight Establishments*

	<i>Attitudinal Climate</i>	<i>Attitude to Union</i>
Construction A	84.5	59.2
Construction B	77.8	34.6
Grain processing	71.7	59.7
Trucking A	66.2	70.2
Garment A	60.7	58.7
Metal products	57.8	57.7
Garment X	48.3	42.3
Trucking B	46.7	56.9

* From *Labor-Management Relations in Illini City*, Vol. 2, p. 51. Reprinted by permission of the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations. The figures represent mean per cent of favorable responses to a standard list of questions about management, foremen, job conditions, grievance handling, and union-management cooperation; those for "Attitude to Union" included questions about union officers, union achievements, and general feeling about the union.

Economic status. The Illini City data indicated that worker economic status was chiefly determined by non-psychological factors. Industry characteristics, skill level of worker, competitive status of the company, and similar items were the chief determinants of hourly wage rates, fringe benefits, and annual earnings.

This is in conformity with the point noted earlier in this chapter,

that the motivations and perceptions of the parties contribute only a part of the variance to the outcome of negotiations. The institutional context within which union and management spokesmen must operate places substantial limitations on them. Thus, while union goals may include considerably higher wages, the presence of unemployment, financial troubles of the employer, and similar factors must be taken into consideration. And the employer must consider possible loss of skilled workers to other jobs, slowdowns, and spoilage of materials, as well as the threat of a strike, if he holds wages too low. Thus both are under pressure to reach agreement on a suitable wage level.

Union influence. The Illini City studies indicated that union influence on decision making tends to increase in a number of specific areas at the same time. Apparently a union that is able to achieve an influential position on one issue does comparably well on others. Among the eight establishments studied, influence as measured by degree of union security correlated positively with safety, efficiency, arbitration, and grievance procedure. On the other hand, influence on fringe benefits and on discharge procedure did not correlate with the others. It was concluded that, in this particular community, some issues were good indicators of union influence but others were not. As a result of this analysis, a quantitative index of degree of union influence was computed for each establishment.

Psychological factors were more important in determining degree of union influence than in determining economic status. For example, the attitudes of top management toward the union were important in determining union influence, but not in determining economic return to the workers. In some cases it appeared that the union achieved a voice in decisions not purely through its own power, but because management was willing to grant this voice to the union. Personality factors (leadership skills of union officers and of company executives) also played a noticeable role in respect to union influence. Solidarity within the union also contributed to a high level of union influence. Thus, to the extent that one goal of unions is attaining more influence on decisions about working conditions, this goal will be achieved more effectively when these psychological factors are favorable.

Attitudinal climate. In some instances management has as a goal the development of a favorable attitudinal climate in the work force. Occasionally union officers agree that this is desirable. However, it is likely that, for the most part, attitudes favorable or unfavorable to the relationship develop incidentally, as a consequence of goal achievement or frustration, and friction or harmony in day-to-day

administration of the agreement. Nevertheless, attitudes are an important part of every union-management relationship.

In the Illini City investigation, it was hypothesized that, if attitudes were favorable at the rank-and-file level, they would also be favorable among the foremen, top executives of the company, and officers of the union. It was reasoned that goal achievement, feelings of success, and the expression of friendly opinions at one level would influence perceptions, attitudes, and reports on other levels. The evidence favored this hypothesis, although not convincingly. In general, establishments with a high proportion of reported cooperation from one group of interviews also had high proportions from other groups. The rank correlations for the eight establishments ranged from .30 (foremen with union officers) to .90 (union officers with rank and file). Because some of these correlations were not statistically significant, it could not be asserted that attitudinal climate would be the same at all levels in the company.

The climate at the rank-and-file level was markedly influenced by the achievement of economic goals. This index correlated .65 with hourly earnings, .54 with annual earnings, and .77 with the sum of wage increases 1948-1950. (Interviews were held in 1949-1950.) Thus it seems clear that, where the union-management relationship is producing wage increases and economic security for the worker, he gives favorable reports about the company and the company-union relationship.

A major determinant of attitudinal climate at the rank-and-file level appeared to be the attitudes of top executives toward the union (correlation of .74). When we remember that executive attitudes did not determine wage rates, it is clear that we have an independent factor here which is of considerable importance. Logically it would seem that, if executives perceive the union as irresponsible, greedy, and malicious, they will behave correspondingly; and this will lead to friction and reports of conflict.¹

Dual allegiance of employees. Closely related to the phenomenon of attitudinal climate (which can be defined only in relation to a group) is the matter of worker loyalty. In many establishments, top executives and union leaders compete for the loyalty of the workers as means of strengthening their own organization. It is commonly assumed, on both sides, that a man cannot be both a loyal

¹ For an extensive analysis of the interrelations of these various aspects of the accommodation process, see *Labor-Management Relations in Illini City*, Vol. 2, Chapter 11.

employee and a loyal union member; he must choose between these roles.

Research data have been accumulating for some time to indicate that this view is incorrect. Katz (1949a) reported on a survey of several hundred workers in an automobile plant. He comments that: "Ninety per cent of them feel that union and management get along either *fairly well* or *very well*. The dominant tendency among the men is give credit both to union and to management for the good working relationship. A majority also believe that the company is interested in the welfare of the union, and that the union is interested in the welfare of the company. Moreover, the men feel that the union officials are interested in the welfare of the company. Though most of the men see production as the goal of management, they do not think that management is after an unreasonable profit. They feel that the things the union wants most are fair wages, good working conditions and fair play. They see no essential reason why both management and the union cannot achieve their goals, but they recognize that each side may have to give up something in the process. Negotiation, compromise, and understanding the other side's problems seem to them the way to reduce conflict. Only one in five say that union and management are not usually pulling together for the same kind of things."¹

Another study on dual allegiance is that of Purcell (1953). In his interviews with packinghouse workers, he inquired about their feelings regarding the company, supervision, job conditions, union policies, union officers, and so on. From the total interview he rated each employee as to company allegiance and union allegiance. His outstanding conclusion was that about 75 per cent of Swift employees showed dual allegiance—that is, they approved of both company and union, wanted both to succeed and grow stronger, did not consider it necessary for the two to conflict.

This does not mean, as Purcell carefully notes, that these workers will refuse to go on strike if the union leadership can make a good case for such a tactic. It does mean an absence of animosity, better cooperation with foremen, quicker return to normal if a strike should occur, etc. He believes, in short, that there are significant desirable features about the dual allegiance relationship, even if it is no panacea for industrial conflict.

Finally, we may note the findings on this point in the Illini City

¹ Katz (1949a), p. 67. Reprinted by permission of Industrial Relations Research Association.

surveys (Stagner, 1954a). Eight establishments were studied; in every case, the interviews with rank-and-file employees supported the dual allegiance hypothesis. In Table 12.2 we show one set of data on this point: these are correlations between attitude toward the

Table 12.2 Correlations between Attitude towards Company and Attitude toward Union, for Selected Illini City Groups*

Group	N	Correlation
Garments A	29	.10
Construction A	34	.25
Trucking A	25	.46†
Grain processing	58	.27†
Metal products	56	.41‡
Combined rank-and-file	202	.32‡

* From Stagner (1954a), p. 45. Reprinted by permission of *Personnel Psychology*.

† Significant at 5% level.

‡ Significant at 1% level.

company and attitude toward the union for the five employee groups with more than 20 persons interviewed. Although these correlations are not large, most of them are statistically significant. Similarly, when we ranked the eight establishments by mean attitude toward the company and toward the union, the rank correlation was .33—not statistically significant, but in the expected direction. (The dual allegiance hypothesis relates to individuals; various factors might confuse data using group means.)

Not all investigations of this problem have found evidence for dual allegiance. La Point (1954) studied a small establishment in which the management had bitterly opposed unionization, in which only about 60 per cent of employees had joined, and in which the union officers still felt quite insecure. Feeling was rather strong between union and non-union workers. It is hardly surprising that, under these circumstances, the findings indicated that those employees who liked the company were strongly anti-union, and those who favored the union were equally hostile to the company.

More research is needed before the relationship between unilateral allegiance and dual allegiance is clear. However, the following generalization is based on the data now available. With a new union, or if a strong conflict situation exists, workers are pulled to one side or the other. They can achieve some feeling of security only by aligning themselves definitely with management or with the union.

After the collective bargaining relationship has been established for some time, and after memories of hostilities have faded, dual allegiance becomes possible. Essentially it is assumed to depend on a tendency for people to perceive a situation as a whole—to see the work situation, for example, as a unit, rather than sharply differentiating the union role from the management role. Thus, if the worker feels that he is getting benefits, satisfactory treatment, etc., and that these “goods” are due in part to the company, in part to the union, he will prefer to feel loyal to both. He will not accept the inevitability of conflict, and he will not wish to bind himself exclusively to one group or the other. Apparently this psychological tendency will favor kinds of interactions moving towards harmonious industrial relations.

DESCRIBING THE ACCOMMODATION PROCESS

In the foregoing pages we have indicated some of the consequences of the accommodation process, in terms of effects that can be represented for the group as a whole, and also with respect to individuals, at least as regards the concept of dual allegiance. However, it has been explicit in these remarks that the process itself is an ongoing activity, a continuing interaction between members of the management group and members of the union. The measures of consequences (economic status of workers, union influence, and attitudinal climate) therefore cannot be considered measures of the process. In fact, no one has proposed a conception of the process that would lend itself to quantification.

Apparently the best that we can achieve at the present time is a kind of over-all description of the process. We can, so to speak, step back and get a perception of the ongoing relationship of union and management in a specific location, and try to get a descriptive term that will convey to the listener a reasonably adequate notion of what day-to-day events are like.

The natural trend in the evolution of such descriptive concepts has been toward a typology of union-management relations. The history of science, of course, is full of instances in which early observations led to inductive generalizations about “types” of phenomena, but later research has shown a continuum of events from one “type” to another. It seems likely that further work on union-management relationships will lead to the same conclusion, but for the present we have only typologies proposed as ways of describing the total event.

Selekman's typology. Selekman (1949) has proposed a rough classification of relationships into eight types, each characterized by

some variation in the pattern of negotiation or administration of the contract. Naturally, he has tried to select descriptive concepts that would emphasize some feature appearing regularly and frequently in the interaction. His eight "types" are named as follows: containment-aggression, ideology, conflict, power bargaining, deal bargaining, collusion, accommodation, and cooperation. The containment-aggression pattern is described as one in which the company allocates a limited, specific scope to bargaining and tries aggressively to hold the union within these bounds. Ideology refers to a conflict situation based on politically oriented control of the union—otherwise it is very similar to the first and third types. Conflict is characterized as more extreme hostility to unions than the first pattern—really, a refusal to accept unionism at all. Power bargaining is fairly obvious—a hard-boiled process of extracting all that the traffic will bear. Deal bargaining alludes to deals between top managers and unionists, with the rank and file left out of consideration. Collusion may go farther, both in including more people and in collaborating to fleece the consumer. Accommodation is used here to identify reasonably harmonious relations, and cooperation refers to harmony that is based on a definite intent to strive for agreement.

As soon as we start thinking about intermediate cases, we see that these types are not truly independent. Certainly many establishments show both containment-aggression and power bargaining; ideological conflict can occur with either of these two; deal bargaining and collusion tend to shade into one another; and cooperation can hardly be separated from accommodation. Hence the typology does not serve the purpose of identifying unique patterns of union-management interaction for which it was presumably designed.

Selekman, of course, indicates that he does not consider the types to be clearly separated from one another. In the first place, every process tends to vary from time to time; none is entirely consistent. In the second, any such descriptive term can only abstract some outstanding feature—it cannot truly characterize the complexity of daily events. In the third, "These 'patterns,' differentiated one from another, summarize multiple gradations of *difference in degree, of more and less, rather than of difference in kind*, among the relations that bind managements and unions in characteristic activities ranging from conflict to cooperation."¹

Harbison's typology. Another typology that has received wide attention is proposed by Harbison and Coleman (1951). This offers

¹ Selekman (1949), p. 177. Italics are added.

only three categories, which are respectively called armed truce, working harmony, and union-management cooperation. However, each type is characterized in terms of a number of specific variables. Here is the list of distinguishing features of the armed truce:

1. A feeling on the part of management that unions and collective bargaining are at best necessary evils in modern industrial society.
2. A conviction on the part of the labor leadership involved that the union's main job is to challenge and protest managerial actions.
3. Basic disagreement between the parties over the appropriate scope of collective bargaining and the matters which should properly be subject to joint determination.
4. Rivalry between management and the union for the loyalty of workers.
5. A frank admission on the part of both parties that settlements of major differences in collective bargaining are made on the basis of the relative power positions of the company vis-a-vis the union.
6. A mutual desire to work out an orderly method of containing conflict and compromising differences by living together under the terms of a collective bargaining contract.¹

It seems fairly plausible that the six points listed would in fact go together, and that an unfavorable position on any one of the six would probably be associated with similar positions on the others. The common feature seems to be *disagreement* with respect to norms: disagreement as to the desirability of unions, as to the issues that they can legitimately discuss, as to their relations to the employees, and so on. The parties agree only that it is better to fight within rules laid down in a contract than simply to engage in permanent guerrilla warfare.

The characterizations applied to working harmony and union-management cooperation are parallel to the preceding six points. Working harmony, for example, involves acceptance of bargaining by both sides, willingness to compromise, some willingness to help the other party. Union-management cooperation includes willingness by company and union to work jointly for goals perceived as beneficial to both sides, joint responsibility in problem solving, visible manifestations of trust and confidence.

When we look at these three types of union-management relations, we see at once that they are not at all separate and discrete. They are merely three descriptive points on a continuum from intensely conflictful to highly cooperative patterns of group interaction. The authors do not deny this; they say, "We look upon these types as bench

¹ Harbison and Coleman (1951), pp. 20-21. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

marks on a kind of continuum of collective relationships. These types are the clustering points on our continuum." In other words, as they observed different establishments, they found a tendency for plants to fall into one of these descriptive groupings. However, it should be noted that they used no quantitative methods in their study; such methods would probably bring out clearly the fact that each type grades off into another, so that the "typological" approach is somewhat misleading.

The conflict-cooperation continuum. Selekman suggested that his types actually belonged on a continuum ranging from conflict to cooperation. The Harbison-Coleman descriptions seem compatible with the same view. In fact, the conflict-cooperation dimension is the one most frequently used by students of labor relations in trying to give a quick description of a situation. "How are union-management relations in that plant?" The answer given is most often in terms of conflict-cooperation. This is a highly visible characteristic; it applies to process, and not merely to consequences (the consequence of conflict is a hostile attitudinal climate). Conflict occurs in the negotiating process, as evidenced in Osterberg's study (1949a); it is readily noted in handling grievances, and indeed, the number of grievances is often an index of the degree of conflict.

Furthermore, a conflict-cooperation dimension can readily be related to the function of reaching agreement on norms of working conditions. Where there is substantial disagreement regarding these norms, neither party will behave in such a way as to meet the expectations of the other party. This behavior raises the tension level; it also elicits feelings of frustration and aggression. As Gouldner (1954b) has commented, an important source of tension within or between groups is this failure of one party to meet the role expectations of the other.¹

It may be fruitful, therefore, to think of union-management accommodation as a process of seeking agreement on norms for employment, specific relationships being characterized by high degrees of disagreement and conflict or by low disagreement and relative cooperation. Accommodation continues as long as the parties deal with each other but remain separate as to identity. The accommodation process would disappear if the enterprise dissolved (managers go one way, employees another), or if the groups amalgamate (as when employees own the factory)—except that, even in such situations,

¹ In *Wildcat Strike*, Gouldner offers a number of specific hypotheses about group tensions. The idea stated above is central to his treatment, the other hypotheses being in the nature of elaborations or extensions.

a managerial group must be chosen, and disagreements then become possible between managers and lower-level employees).

Each party is striving toward certain goals, which reflect the motivations of individual members. Each party also acts in accordance with the norms perceived as appropriate to the situation. The goals may remain unchanged, but, as norms approach closer agreement, the number of frustrations to individuals, and consequent acts of aggression, will tend to diminish.

In the preceding chapters we have given some notion of the kinds of interactions that occur as accommodation proceeds. However, we have not given much attention to the extremes of this hypothetical continuum. A high degree of conflict, at least in an immediate sense, is shown by the strike situation, and this deserves special consideration in the following chapter. A very low degree of conflict, but still involving an awareness of differences in objectives, can be observed in certain establishments where union-management cooperation has been formalized by certain kinds of contractual arrangements. This will be considered in Chapter 14.

COMMUNICATION AND ACCOMMODATION

We have described accommodation as essentially a process of modifying norms of goal achievement and ways of achieving goals as they relate to conditions of employment. Clearly the success of this process depends markedly upon communication. And this communication must be a two-way process; that is, effective communication does not stop when the union tells management what is desired, nor when the management tells employees about norms of work performance. There must be an opportunity for objections to demands, for clarification of perceived consequences, and for the development of mutual understanding.

Furthermore, *formal* communication is almost certainly inadequate to this task. Many significant norms are hard to verbalize, and may even be unconscious. Formal communications may evade issues, omit important problems, and, of course, lose most of the emotional content of the message. Thus face-to-face communication is highly desirable for success in accommodation.

These generalizations are well-supported by Whyte's (1951a) study of changes in labor relations at Inland Steel Container Co. As he has so clearly documented, the relationship from 1940 to 1944 was chaotic and full of conflict. The air was full of grievances and the records full of wildcat strikes. The communications picture at this time is

diagrammed in Fig. 12.4. On the management side there is communication only one way: down. Suggestions and complaints from below are ignored. Top management frequently by-passes middle executives to go directly to foremen or workers. Management does not communicate directly with the union. The union acts on management in a disorderly manner. As Whyte comments, there is only one name suitable for such a situation: disorganized conflict.




Fig. 12.4. Communications under conditions of disorganized conflict. TM—top management; MM—middle management; F—foremen; TU—top union officers; GC—grievance committee; S—stewards. (From Whyte, 1951a, by permission of Harper & Bros.)

Certain improvements were made by management in the period 1944-1946. As Fig. 12.5 indicates, top management began to listen to lower executives. The union organization became crystallized, and




Fig. 12.5. Communications under conditions of organized conflict. For abbreviations, see Fig. 12.4. (From Whyte, 1951a, by permission of Harper & Bros.)

communications to management were channeled more appropriately. However, there was still no direct communication from management to union. The union could complain if management violated the contract; otherwise, there was not supposed to be any contact with the union. This picture is more orderly and connotes better opportunities

for mutual understanding than Fig. 12.4, but it is at best an instance of organized conflict.

Substantial further progress was made at Inland Steel Container. Figure 12.6 shows that changes occurred in the communications pattern. Top management relaxed somewhat in pressure on subordinates, and more upward communication was observed. The union made




Fig. 12.6. Communications under conditions of organized cooperation. For abbreviations, see Fig. 12.4. (From Whyte, 1951a, by permission of Harper & Bros.)

more attempts to explain things to its members, and to control direct action. Most important, executives now communicated directly with their opposite numbers in the union, the company position was explained to union representatives, and concrete proposals were offered. Long-run benefits to union members from a course of action were pointed out, and assistance was invited on certain problems. When this kind of communication exists, clear perceptions can be developed, and common norms can be established. The union officers can understand not only what company policy is but why it takes this form. Executives can learn why the union opposes certain measures and can sometimes reformulate them to by-pass the opposition. Prompt feedback (even before action is taken) makes corrections possible before damage is done.

This example, like many others, indicates that change in the process of accommodation is accompanied by changes in the communications activities of the parties. However, this is not an adequate explanation of the change. Why did communications take a different pattern?

GOALS AND ACCOMMODATION

In terms of the formulation developed in this volume, the major dynamic factor inducing change in the process of accommodation must be the goals of the parties. This statement alone is both self-evident and uninformative. Let us extend it, and see if it can be clarified.

Companies exist and unions exist as devices by which individuals attempt to achieve certain goals. If these goals are being attained in satisfactory degree, by existing techniques, change is extremely improbable. Human beings continue to do those things that lead to reward and avoid those that lead to pain, if they can see the way to do so.

However, the very existence of the union poses a blockage to managerial goal achievement, and many management practices frustrate the employees. Tension is evoked by these frustrations. One outcome of tension is aggression; executives denounce the union, and unionists attack the company. However, aggression is essentially unsatisfying; it does not lead to additional goal achievement, although it does release the unpleasant tension. Sooner or later there will be trial-and-error efforts to modify the situation, to reduce frustrations and increase goal achievement. The nature of the change sought was well-expressed by an Inland Steel Container executive, describing the improvement mentioned above:

Now I look forward to coming to work in the morning. I have a wonderful time on this job. Before, I just had to drag myself to work. I'd wake up in the morning and think to myself—do I have to go to work again? You'd dread it coming in to work. You didn't know what would happen from one day to the next, but you could always expect trouble.¹

Our homeostatic frame of reference suggests that, when conditions are unpredictable, when the individual does not know what to expect, he builds up tension. To escape from tension he may try new ways of behaving. He may even decide that it is better to talk things over with the union officers, better to try to understand what they will do, so that unpleasant consequences can be avoided. The perception of the unionist as an unsavory character may persist, but the act of communicating may no longer seem so objectionable.²

Modification of goals. We noted earlier (cf. Chapter 5) that executives may have goals of power and self-expression as well as profits. The pursuit of such goals by executives tends to impose frustrations on lower employees (Chapter 6). But these goals are not intrinsic to the operation of the enterprise, and as such they can be abandoned. An executive cannot voluntarily give up the profit objective, because the whole company may collapse into bankruptcy. But he can yield on "principles" such as refusal to deal with an outside representative of his employees, complete freedom of management to determine work assignments, and other management prerogatives. Giving way on such goal-seeking tendencies makes possible more adequate communication with the union, and the evolving of mutually acceptable guides to work behavior.

Union representatives also may find it necessary to abandon goals of domination if the accommodation process is to shift from conflict toward cooperation. Not every grievance can be fought to a successful conclusion; not every management proposal can be denounced as greedy exploitation or union busting. However, changes in role perception are likely to occur among unionists more as a consequence of managerial action than spontaneously. After all, the major goals that are being blocked by a state of conflict are those of executives. It is thus incumbent upon them to take the initiative—entirely aside from any philosophy of "leadership" by management. We develop this point somewhat further in Chapter 15.

Modification of pathways. Change in accommodation may involve not only abandoning certain goals but also modifying techniques of

¹ Whyte (1951a), p. 211. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

² Change can also occur if the environment offers new goals or new obstacles.

achieving other goals. Executives may have to abandon wage cutting and speed-up as ways of reducing costs, in favor of better scheduling, reduction of waste, improved methods, etc. Unionists will have to forgo "quicky" strikes, sabotage of machinery, and similar tactics. Again, these modifications probably call for less change on the side of the union. Nobody really enjoys unpredictable walkouts, especially after the first two or three; and most workers feel guilty about stopping or damaging machinery. More difficult for both sides to abandon is the technique of unilateral decision; willingness to compromise is not an attitude widely developed in our culture.

The development of positive techniques of cooperation is another facet of this same process. It is examined more closely in Chapter 14, as we study some situations in which unusually favorable interactions have been observed. Let us note here only that effective communication has to precede such developments. Hostility is possible without communication, and indeed makes communication unlikely. Gestures toward cooperation cannot well be made until a system of communication has been established.

Modification of norms. Thus we conclude that change in the process of union-management accommodation occurs as the parties abandon certain goals, modify certain techniques of goal attainment, and change their perceptions of certain aspects of the relationship. Old norms of management prerogatives and domination must be replaced by norms of leadership and consultation. On a more specific level, wage norms, work-assignment rules, and other traditional guides to the operation of the establishment become modified to provide solutions mutually acceptable to the parties.

Such solutions are never permanent. Human nature is dynamic, and levels of aspiration set new goals for individuals and groups. The process of accommodation goes on and on, never becoming static, because the people who comprise it are always changing. However, industrial peace is not unattainable. At least we know that it is possible to achieve freedom from overt conflict, and to develop methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes that in times past would have led to open warfare.

The Strike

Strikes actually are relatively infrequent occurrences in the United States. Some authorities have estimated that about 95 per cent of union contracts are negotiated and signed each year without a strike. As Table 13.1 shows, only about six working days out of one thousand are lost in this country because of strikes (1927-1950 average), and, even if this figure is corrected to relate it to union workers rather than all workers, the loss rises only to about thirty days out of one thousand. It seems difficult to argue that strikes are as dangerous to the economy as has often been asserted, if they are so rare.

Strikes, of course, have high attention value. Conflict is always news; disruption of customary routines is quickly noticed. Perhaps strikes receive excessive newspaper publicity precisely because they are unusual. But the net effect is to give the general public a perception of a union as group organized primarily to strike, only secondarily to keep work in progress. Yet most unionists dislike strikes intensely; Knowles (1952) quotes one as saying, "The only man who desires a strike for fun is the man who wants to go to hell for a pastime." In the preceding chapters we have attempted to give an account of the psychological factors operating in day-to-day union-management relations, because these are the most important aspects of our problem.

Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the strike as a psychological situation of great significance. The events during a strike represent the culmination of the trends on which emphasis has already been laid: the building up of aggressive tensions, increasing distortion of perceptions, suspicion and distrusts, tactics calculated to strengthen one side and weaken the other. (Such psychological factors as union morale play an important part in strike calculations; no union leader will risk a strike if his membership will crumble and people stay on the job instead of on the picket line.)

In this chapter we first consider the strike as a psychological event—its generalized characteristics. We then consider the problem of

causes of strikes, noting that statistical reports often give a rather misleading picture. The events occurring during a strike, tactics of management and of union, strike propaganda, etc., must also be examined. The costs of strikes, in violence, property damage, and lost production, are noted. Finally, we offer some comments on the trend in strikes and the question of social control of strike action.

THE STRIKE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Perhaps the first observation worth making regarding the strike is that it is essentially a *crisis situation* from the point of view of the participants. Contrary to popular opinion, striking is not a monthly nor even an annual pattern of behavior for most unionists. Thus neither the executives nor the union members have clear-cut perceptions of what is happening, what is likely to happen, and even, on

Table 13.1 Comparative Measures of Strike Activity for Five Countries, for the Period 1927-1950*

Measure (annual average)	Aus- tralia	Canada	Great Britain	Sweden	United States
Workers involved in strikes, as per cent of non- agricultural employment	8.6%	2.4%	2.4%	1.4%	3.6%
Workers involved in strikes, as per cent of union membership	15.7%	11.6%	6.0%	3.1%	17.3%
Working days lost, as mul- tiple of workers involved in strikes	8.3	11.0	7.0	48.8	18.5
Working days lost, as mul- tiple of non-agricultural employment	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.6
Working days lost, as mul- tiple of union membership	1.1	1.3	0.5	1.5	3.0

* Kornhauser, Dubin, and Ross (1954), p. 13. Reprinted by permission of McGraw-Hill Book Co.

occasion, what ought to happen. The situation, therefore, is what we have called an ambiguous situation: it is susceptible of a variety of interpretations in accordance with motives, frustrations, and pre-existing attitudes of the perceiver.

This ambiguity leaves ample room for rumors, perceptual distortions, and misunderstandings to occur.) Communications are likely to be disrupted, not only between management and workers but also

between union leaders and workers. (Especially if a strike is not going well, leader behavior is often misperceived as a "sell-out" or as excessively radical, in accordance with the leanings of the member.) People are readily influenced by suggestions; propaganda is relatively more effective in the context of a strike than when the employees are at work. This set of characteristics means that the strike is an *unstable* phenomenon in which predictions of behavior are less dependable. Since management and workers need to be able to predict what is going to happen, this instability increases tension and makes for more violent reactions.

A second major feature of the strike is that it is an opportunity for expressing aggression. First and foremost this applies to the workers, who are likely to have bottled up tensions based on real or imagined grievances, or on environmental restraints even if these are not perceived as grievances. The strike atmosphere encourages and indeed even seems to sanction the open expression of hostility. Such expression is easier to observe in the workers, but it is also observable among executives. Violence of verbal expression and encouragement of aggressive action by law-enforcement officers and company guards illustrate this point. Aggression, as was noted earlier, is restrained by certain group norms (legal and ethical restrictions) which become internalized as the superego motives. The strike provides a situation in which these norms are seen as inapplicable. Consequently, inhibitions on both verbal and overt hostility are lifted.

In terms of group processes, a third feature of the strike is a reduction in the areas overlapping for management and union. Normally a member of management can discuss issues with unionists, socialize with them if he wishes, etc. Under strike conditions the number of incompatible activities increases, the rigidity of barriers increases, and the number of negative valences increases. For example: friendly relations between top executives and union officers on a purely personal basis decrease in frequency and are more often perceived as forbidden to members of the group (either management or union). The strike obviously makes certain activities impossible (work, issuing orders, etc.). Executives find new and more rigid barriers to their goal of profitable operations; workers encounter barriers to income aspirations. Those individuals who attempt to carry on normally may encounter ridicule, threats, or violence. Pickets also risk violence from police and company guards. All these factors tend to sharpen the perceived separation of the groups and decrease the probability of harmonious relations if they continue for more than a few days. It is obvious, for instance, that the individual living within this kind

of environment will build up more tension and more hostility, which will be directed against the opposing group. Thus any long-continued strike is likely to leave a residue of bitterness which may be greater than the accumulation that precipitated the break.)

(The strike is perceived as a major threat to each group. In terms of our homeostatic formulation, the top officials and even lower echelons of each group must be expected to respond by rallying around the group symbols, developing rationalizations to justify group policy, and affirming even more emphatically the programs that preceded the strike. Members of management who may have seen something of the employee viewpoint, and urged a conciliatory policy, characteristically move toward a "firm stand" once the strike is on.)

These phenomena are especially visible on the union side, where group solidarity is not reinforced by managerial controls. Just as national patriotism is heightened in time of war, so it can be expected that feelings with regard to unions will be intensified in a period of crisis. Since outsiders are likely to be perceived with suspicion at times of conflict and strikes, research data on this point have not been extensive. Carlson¹ was able to make contact with a local of a large CIO union, where he was already known, and induce ten of the officers to take a series of attitude tests during a strike of the local. He also obtained ten officers of other nearby CIO locals which were not on strike. On both indirect and direct measures of attitude toward unions, he found the striking group more intensely pro-union. Thus the strikers not only endorsed more statements vigorously favoring unions but they exaggerated the number of union members in the United States, exaggerated corporation profits, overestimated public support of unions, and rejected items of information derogatory to unions, significantly more often than did the comparable officers not on strike. Although the number of cases is small, the tendencies fit with what strike observers have often noted: that the emotional tension of the strike heightens feelings of loyalty to the union and increases the amount of perceptual distortion, regarding union-management issues.

(This exaggerated in-group solidarity is, of course, in some degree a by-product of the displacement of aggression onto the common enemy. Frictions between factions within the union will be diminished as both groups join in hating the employer. For this reason some union officers have been tempted to risk strikes that were of doubtful validity.)

¹ J. S. Carlson. A study of attitudes of striking and non-striking union officers (unpublished project report, University of Illinois).

(The tactic is risky; if the strike fails, the leader becomes the object of intensified hostility.)

Another aspect of this exaggerated union loyalty is diminished concern with other group memberships: nation, church, etc. This shift in values underlies the sometimes surprising rejection of legal restraints and ethical norms by striking unionists. (We know, of course, that management also, on occasion, refuses to abide by either legal or moral codes in strike emergencies.)

Perhaps, then, the best generalization about the strike is that it represents a sharpening of all the factors that we have stressed so far in this volume as bases for division and conflict within industry. Differences in perception, motivation, and aggression become intensified. Group solidarity is strengthened. Attitudes opposing the other group are reinforced. It is hardly surprising that mediators and conciliators strive by every device available to keep the parties talking and avoid the open break involved in a strike.

Job satisfaction of strikers. As was noted above, research on union members and officers during a strike has encountered many obstacles.

Table 13.2 Job Dissatisfaction among Strikers and Controls*

	<i>Strikers</i>	<i>Controls</i>
Number of cases	241	103
Per cent reporting some dissatisfaction with:		
Income	89.6%†	71.8%
Working conditions	72.6	62.1
Good boss	51.0†	35.0
Workweek	50.2†	35.0
Chance to get ahead	81.3†	69.9
Interesting job	57.7	60.2
Seniority rights	93.4†	53.4

* Modified from James (1951), pp. 214-215. Reprinted by permission of University of California Press.

† The hypothesis of equal proportions is rejected at the .05 level of significance.

A study by James (1951) is thus of unusual interest because he was able to obtain job satisfaction data from a large group of strikers and from a control group doing relatively similar work but not on strike. His findings are summarized in Table 13.2.

(The two major issues in the strike were retention of an established seniority plan, which management wanted to change, and wage increase (also opposed by management). As can be seen from the

table, both of these issues show large and statistically significant differences when the strikers are compared with a control group doing somewhat similar work. Even more interesting, perhaps, is the fact that significant differences also crop up on three other points: satisfaction with the boss, the workweek, and chances to get ahead.)

James interprets his findings on this point as indicating generalization of dissatisfaction (cf. pp. 173-174). "The high tension that the strikers expressed with regard to desired changes in Income and Seniority Rights apparently 'spilled over' into the rest of the sectors, except Interesting Job and Working Conditions In other words, high tension tends to move out from the source of its generation and spread to surrounding areas" (p. 231). This interpretation is compatible with the evidence, but, of course, lacks strong confirmation. It could just as well be argued that the willingness to strike was a function of dissatisfaction in many areas, although only two of them found formal statement as issues in the strike. Considerably more research will be required, particularly following up the same group of workers over time, before we can be sure about the sequence of events here.¹

Workers vote to strike because of a complex of factors which includes, at the very least, some aggression and some perceived probabilities of achieving goals through the strike. But the evidence suggests that the goals are by no means uniform throughout the membership; indeed, strike demands multiply because the leadership must get "something for everybody" into the demands if members are to be held in line. Once these demands have been formally presented, many members will repeat them and emphasize them, if only because such expression provides an outlet for tensions which they might otherwise be unable to verbalize.

THE "WILDCAT" STRIKE

(Our discussion so far has implied consideration primarily of "legal" strikes, those formally voted by the membership. An even more interesting phenomenon, from some points of view, is the spontaneous

¹ Interesting, although contributing nothing to our knowledge of strike phenomena, is James's finding that goals that can be defined objectively, such as dollars or hours per week, "tend to have different psychological import among the members of a group." This simply confirms our repeated emphasis on perception as an important variable; a dollar may look much bigger to one employee than to another. Hence the "objective" units of the economist are less useful, for some purposes, than subjective units of satisfaction.

walkout without sponsorship by union officers. During World War II the term "wildcat strike" came into common usage to identify these work stoppages. The most fruitful study of this phenomenon has been done by Gouldner (1954*b*), who points out that there seem to be three defining characteristics of such strikes: (1) the official union leadership either cannot control the members, or secretly encourages the strike while publicly deploring it; (2) the issues involved are ordinarily of "little interest" to formal labor leaders and executives, i.e., the issues do not conform to their expectations of significant problems; and (3) the workers' aggression is directed especially at the dilatory handling of grievances, i.e., the "run around" they have received.

In the specific strike studied by Gouldner, the "Oscar Center" strike, the official union leadership was split into cliques. The grievance machinery was handled by officers who "went by the contract," and who felt that workers were not justified in filing complaints unless there had been a contract violation. They transmitted other kinds of grievances to management, but in such a manner that they failed to communicate the intensity of feeling which had been aroused by changes in machinery, closeness of supervision, pressure for production, and loss of customary privileges. Thus, these officers did in fact lose their ability to represent the workers, and could not have controlled the strike (failed, in fact, in an effort to delay it). It is conceivable, of course, that under other circumstances officers have tried more vigorously to convince management and have therefore been able to foster an "unofficial" walkout while pretending innocence.

From the psychologist's point of view the central feature here is the perception of grievances. The union officers held a legalistic view of worker motivation—i.e., that workers had no right to complain except about contract violations. Management held the same view. Thus the union transmitted grievances feebly, management ignored them, and the workers got the "run around." Eventually the aggression being built up by violations of informal expectations accumulated to the breaking point, and the strike was on.¹

The fact that the strike was unauthorized, was opposed by the union officers, and included no demand for wage increases, does not mean that it was unexpected. As Gouldner remarks, "Members of the research team . . . did not find the strike a 'surprise.' Neither did

¹ Training programs for both foremen and stewards now stress the notion that "any grievance is important to the man who has it." It is probable, none the less, that such errors in perception and communication of grievances will continue and conflicts will follow from them.

we consider the omission of a wage demand so remarkable. For more than a year and a half we had looked upon the strike as 'inevitable' . . . both management and the workers also found little about the strike that was unanticipated. When the labor relations director of the company was asked whether he knew the strike was coming, he replied: 'Yes. We've been struggling against time since last January.' . . . How did it happen that an *anticipated event*, one which men on both sides of the dispute foresaw and did not desire, nevertheless came about?"¹

Apparent issues. The superficial issues in the "Oscar Center" strike were: transfer to this plant of an urgent order for export from another plant of the same company, struck by another union. (There was no love between the two unions, and no suggestion of loyalty to the union movement had cropped up in previous relations of this kind.) Secondly, new machinery and faster operation of older equipment created disturbance among the workers. Third, the workers' complaint that supervisors were being used to do production work, contrary to contract provisions. Fourth, a personal quarrel between the chief steward and the efficiency engineer.

(The strike as perceived. We have defined a strike as an ambiguous event, readily perceived as a different phenomenon by different observers.) This strike is an excellent example, since it was seen differently by various groups among management as well as among the union.

(One section of top management viewed the strike as a calculated stratagem on the part of the workers.) These executives called attention to the export order and to the fact that the larger plan was already closed down, indicating that these factors gave the "Oscar Center" employees a tactical advantage. (These same executives were prone to see the strike as a struggle for control, an expression of a desire on the part of the workers to "run the plants.")

(Another section within management viewed the strike as an irrational, emotional outburst. They looked upon events as in the nature of catharsis, and referred to the necessity for letting the men "blow off steam" before seriously attempting to reach a settlement.) Some executives accepted both this and the calculated power struggle interpretation; the apparent contradiction they resolved by referring the irrational emotions to the rank and file, the deliberate strategy to the officers.

Both views, Gouldner notes, serve the purpose of evading a compul-

¹ Gouldner (1954b), pp. 40-41. Reprinted by permission of The Antioch Press.

sion to look carefully at the nature of the grievances precipitating the strike. If this is a power struggle, then management must protect its right to manage, and ethical questions are by-passed. Similarly, if this is merely an emotional outburst, one can wait for it to blow over without paying serious attention to the content of the frustrations involved. It is interesting to note that production executives mainly endorsed the "power" hypothesis, and personnel executives accepted the "emotional" view; this difference is plausible in terms of the problems that each group meets in its daily functioning.

Union views of the strike were also divergent. One perception focused on the violation of customary practices, the ending of the "indulgency pattern"; the other stressed business-minded concepts and the alleged violations of the contract. When the tradition-minded group spoke of management's "broken promises," they referred to breaking long-established traditions, to demotion of supervisors with 20-year seniority, to excessively close supervision of employees, and other violated expectations. When the contract-oriented group spoke of "broken promises," they were more often pointing to practices forbidden by the contract. Thus even the same phrase did not indicate the same percept in this case.

Naturally enough, these two groups desired different outcomes from the strike. The tradition-centered men wanted a return to the old "indulgency pattern," the removal of the efficiency engineer, the restoration of the informal groups that had run the plant for years until the new impersonal program had been instituted. The contract-oriented members wanted to change the formal organization to insure themselves against further frustrations. They asked for control of speed of operations to be shared with the union, and for other changes in the contract to protect the members.

These divergences contribute in considerable measure to problems of resolving the differences in any strike. In the specific case under discussion, it was virtually impossible to move toward the old, informal, indulgent pattern; the solution introduced even more bureaucratic controls, restricting the work of the efficiency engineer but in general extending formal rules and reinforcing impersonal attitudes. It is unlikely that such a settlement resolved the basic problem, which was the breaking up of old, informal groups, good personal relations with foremen, and special privileges for the workers. However, the possibility is worth considering that this basic difficulty was beyond the capacity of either managers or unionists to resolve. No contract can provide a solution for problems based on emotional expectancies.

CAUSES OF STRIKES

The preceding discussion indicates that deciding upon a specific "cause" even for a single strike may be a complicated problem. It is likely that every strike has several causes, and virtually certain that every strike will be viewed as having a different "real" cause by varying persons involved in it. How much more difficult, therefore, is the task of generalizing about the causes of all strikes!

(Most national governments now collect strike statistics which include some judgment as to the major factor involved in causing each strike. These are then tabulated to give estimates as to proportions of strikes due primarily to wage demands, organizational and recognition questions, jurisdictional disputes, and so on. Table 13.3 gives such an annual summary for strikes in the United States in 1953. According to this table, as is commonly reported, the major cause of strikes is a demand for wage increases.) However, it would be a serious mistake to assume that the classifications given in these reports

Table 13.3 Reported Principal Causes of Work Stoppages, USA, 1953*

Issue	Per cent
Wages, hours, and fringe benefits	77.1
Union organization, wages, hours, and fringe benefits	4.4
Union organization	3.3
Other working conditions	12.6
Interunion or intraunion matters	2.4
Not reported	0.2

*From *Monthly Labor Review* (1954), 77 (5), p. 503.

identify the "true" causes of strikes. At best these can be considered rough approximations; at worst, they are arbitrary categories based on the snap judgment of someone who may have had a highly biased view of the situation.

(Here, as in almost all social science research, the word "cause" is a source of confusion. It would be desirable if we could specify the *necessary and sufficient* factors for determining the occurrence of a strike. But this is extraordinarily difficult.) How a concrete incident will be perceived by union leaders, or by members, will depend on extensive background of other interactions. Many strikes, for instance, have occurred "because" an employee was arbitrarily discharged. But many other discharges, equally arbitrary, do not culminate in strikes. Refusals of wage increases sometimes lead to strike action, sometimes not. The economic issue is often at best a "trigger factor,"

a precipitating cause, not a sufficient cause. Important contributions may derive from the attitudinal climate in the establishment before the onset of wage discussions.

(In some instances wage issues are introduced only as an afterthought, after a strike has begun. The strike that is a spontaneous explosion of aggressive tension must be made to appear rational. Workers who walk out because of repeated ego frustrations cannot give this as a reason for their action; such frustrations are probably unconscious, and in any event would sound strange if put into words. Wage demands, being culturally sanctioned as a proper union function, are inserted to *make the strike seem like a rational action.*) For example, Warner and Low (1947) comment: "Most of the formal demands of the strikers concerned wages and the recognition of the union, but interviews with workers during and before the strike clearly showed that many of the basic grounds for discussion had little to do with the amount of wages received . . . the unions served as a composite symbol of protection for all those social values which were in themselves inexpressible as well as for the protection of reasonable wages."¹

Another function of wage demands may be as a *device for punishing management* for what employees perceive to be its shortcomings. Gouldner (1954b) suggests that wage demands may, in fact, be ways of striking back at the company in what is conceived to be the *only area* that managers care about. He quotes one worker as saying: "What's wrong with this country and plant is the all-mighty dollar. This plant doesn't care about the men and the way they live, but only about 75 per cent profit." Gouldner comments: "To the degree that a bad company is defined as one that 'only gives a damn about money,' then retaliation is likely to take the form of impairing the very pecuniary values that the company is believed to hold paramount; aggression will be directed at what is held to be 'the root of the evil.'"²

Immediate and remote causes. A major source of the difficulties noted above is to be found in the relation of immediate to remote causes of strike action. The report of a strike can give, at best, the issue that precipitated a walkout, and, at worst, an issue chosen because it sounds plausible, to rationalize the action. A more useful approach, at least in terms of such considerations as preventing strikes,

¹ Warner and Low (1947), p. 131. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

² Gouldner (1954b), p. 26. Reprinted by permission of The Antioch Press.

is to inquire into the remote or long-range factors that predispose workers to strike.)

In a sense, this approach has been the purpose of the present volume. We have pointed to a variety of circumstances that contribute to the occurrence of industrial conflict. A more purely objective approach utilizes the analysis of strike statistics in relation to a variety of economic and social factors. Curiously enough, such studies are rare in the United States, despite our reputed mania for statistics. For an excellent example of what is possible, we turn to the investigation by Knowles (1952) of strikes in Great Britain 1911-1947. His work is based on the rather plausible assumption that, if objective relationships are demonstrable, such an approach is more informative than simply asking people what caused a strike.

(*Strike-proneness by industries.* An interesting contribution, and one that most observers agree is applicable to American experience, is the concept of strike-proneness. Workers in some industries strike more often, for longer periods, than in others.) Knowles computes an index which relates the number of workers in an industry to the number of strikers in that industry. By putting these on a percentage base, he gets an average strike-proneness of 1.0. By comparison, mining and quarrying rated 6.7, textiles 4.3, transport 1.1, and, at the lower end of the scale, building 0.4, and clothing 0.4.

This computation supports everyday observation, at least in the sense that, in this country too, mining seems to have more than its proportionate share of strikes. The figures fit in with the emphasis by economists on the nature of the industry as a major determinant of strikes. But it is not at all in contradiction to the emphasis here proposed on the frustrations of individuals. Certainly in mining there had been accident hazards, physical discomfort, the anxiety attendant upon working in the dark with only a tiny lighted area, low wages, dirt, and occupational illnesses as potent sources of job dissatisfaction. Furthermore, the physical living conditions (homes grouped around the mine) fostered an awareness of group problems and the growth of solidarity. Thus a psychological approach may help us to understand why strike-proneness is so much higher in certain industries than in others.

(*Strikes and the economic cycle.* If strikes are motivated primarily by economic conditions, there should be easily detectable and predictable relationships between the changes of major economic indices and the frequencies of strikes. Unfortunately, as soon as we begin considering the various economic indices, such as production, price level,

cost of living, etc., it becomes apparent that no simple relation to strikes can be predicted.) For example, strikes may be stimulated on a rising cycle by the pressure of cost of living, and on a declining phase by the effort to resist wage cuts. The American evidence, as analyzed by Levitt (1953), indicates that a rising economic trend led to *more* strikes up to 1920. The prosperity of the 1920's, however, showed a decline in number of strikes, and this trend was broken only momentarily in 1929. Again after World War II, rising prosperity has been accompanied by a reduced number of strikes (see Fig. 13.1).




Fig. 13.1. Strike statistics and economic activity. The chart shows economic activity in the USA from 1881 to 1919 as fluctuation about a computed norm, and from 1919 to 1950 in terms of Gross National Product figures. (1935-1939 = 100.) (From Levitt, 1953, by permission of *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*.)

The British record (Fig. 13.2) is likewise unclear. Knowles abandons his search for economic determinants of strike frequency with the somewhat astonishing remark that "there is little value in measuring the relative degrees of correspondence between the incidence of strikes and the different economic series mentioned. Apart from the minor difficulty that the different economic indices are by no means equally precise, no one can say how far the 'imponderables' affect workers' reactions at different times to the various conditions which the indices describe."¹ This seems to lay emphasis on the psycho-

¹ Knowles (1952), p. 148. Reprinted by permission of the Philosophical Library.




Fig. 13.2. Strikes, prices, and wages in Great Britain. (From Knowles, 1952, p. 147, by permission of Philosophical Library, Inc.)

logical view to a greater extent than even the psychologist might desire. (*Strikes and unemployment.* One phase of the economic cycle can be shown to have an unquestionable relationship to strike frequency. This is the state of unemployment.) As Fig. 13.3 shows, the curve for strike frequencies in Great Britain is almost a mirror image of the proportion of unemployed workers in the population. A glance at the chart prepared by Levitt (Fig. 13.1) also shows for American data sharp drops in strike frequency at times when depression was severe. The correspondence does not seem as close as for Britain, but it is clearly present.




Fig. 13.3. Strikes and unemployment in Great Britain. (From Knowles, 1952, p. 148, by permission of Philosophical Library, Inc.)

Adverse social conditions. Knowles begins his discussion of "underlying causes of strikes" with a consideration of what he delicately calls "adverse social conditions." These were studied, in a series of British statistics, in terms of indices of unemployment, poor relief, social class status of the population, housing conditions, and wage rates. For 81 County Boroughs, a composite index based on these five factors correlated 0.57 with strike-proneness of these regions. As Knowles points out, a higher correlation should not be expected; at the very lowest levels of living conditions, despair rather than aggression may be the response of the workers. "It is well above the lowest levels of poverty that workers are most capable of self-discipline and common action, and are readiest to resent insults to their self-respect."¹ We note that only a fairly involved kind of statistical analysis brings forth objective evidence as to the effect of these unfavorable conditions of life, with their constant frustrations to the worker's aspirations, but the evidence, once uncovered, certainly seems to fit our analysis in terms of motivation and aggression.

Is the individual member important? The analysis of strike causation in terms of statistics ignores the specific psychological question of the role of individuals. If, as Knowles asserts, strikes increase in frequency when prices are rising, this may be because rank-and-file workers experience economic frustrations and demand increases in wages; on the other hand, it may be because union leaders perceive this as an opportune time to win concessions from employers. Some students of the union movement have taken the rather cynical view that research on the motivations and perceptions of the ordinary union member is trivial, in that it fails to get at the true seat of decision, the union officialdom.

We have been reluctant to accept this view for several reasons. One reason derives from the fairly well-known fact that, even in some rather well-centralized unions, locals do often refuse to strike, or refuse to call off a strike, regardless of pressure from above. A second consideration is that union leaders do take account of rank-and-file attitudes in making decisions. Unions in which the leadership is so entrenched that possible member aggression against the leaders can be completely ignored are relatively few. A third factor, somewhat more subtle, involves the attitudes of members toward union officers as experts.

There are good grounds for recognizing a distinction between going on strike because of "orders" from union officers and going on strike

¹ *Op.cit.*, p. 213.

THE STRIKE

because of expert advice from union officers.) The significance is this: many a corporation president follows the advice of lawyers, engineers, and others with respect to specific decisions. He is not taking orders; he is assuming that these people with specialized knowledge can be trusted to select the wisest course of action, even though he does not see these facts himself. Similarly, interviews with many unionists suggest that they accept the union leader as an expert whose advice can be relied upon. Karsh and London (1954) talked with many members of the United Mine Workers regarding the question of striking "on orders" from John L. Lewis. Most of them indignantly rejected this interpretation. Typical was one miner who admitted that "Everything is handed down from the International," but continued, "They know what's going on in the whole industry all over the country and we don't know that stuff. That's what they're being paid for."

Centralized control was defended as a necessity. "When I was in Kansas," commented another miner, "we had a problem in that state and it was just a local problem . . . The state went out while all over the country they were still mining coal. Why we could have stayed out for twenty years and not gained a thing." As Karsh and London indicate, it is ironical that labor unions which start as protests against the autocratic structure of industry tend toward centralized bureaucratic structures in which the individual member has less and less of a voice in decisions.

Given the membership attitudes reported by Karsh and London, UMW leaders did not need to "order" a strike. The traditional slogan, "no contract, no work," plus the faith in the expert judgment of the leadership, was enough. Thus the men interviewed were virtually unanimous in asserting that they were never ordered to strike. "Say a contract expires at midnight on such and such a day. Well, a telegram comes from Washington that says so. It doesn't tell us to shut down but we know we don't work without a contract . . . they never tell us to shut down."

The "no contract, no work" policy has become rationalized in businesslike terms: "You wouldn't hire yourself out to make a suit of clothes if you didn't know what you were going to get paid for it, would you?" "We want a contract so we know what we are going to get." But behind this facade strong social motives are operative: "If the majority of my buddies working with me see the reason for it and I didn't, I'd still go out with them and help. Belonging to an outfit like this, you can't do what you feel as an individual. You have to do what the majority wants." There was apparently no recognition of the possibility that each individual might be confusing the

preferences of the leaders with the preferences of his fellow workers. Over a long period of time we can probably assume that this distinction will be recognized, but in the short run, and in a highly centralized union, this factor may be a potent one in strengthening the hand of the leader.

Against this emphasis on leaders as the decision makers we must place the numerous observations that indicate that leaders are often pressured into strike action from below. The "wildcat strike" as described by Gouldner is, of course, an extreme case. In Chapter 12 we quoted an instance of a local that almost got involved in a strike under most unfavorable conditions, because of general hostility to management; it would be possible to cite many in which the strike actually occurred. Under high emotional tension the members may even perceive the restraining leader as having "sold out" to management; in this case he can no longer function as a leader.

As a minimum, therefore, it seems necessary to conclude that in most unions the state of mind of the individual member is important. Perhaps the UMW receives overemphasis because of the extreme nature of the leader-follower relationship. Less centralized unions do not show concentration of decision making so clearly, with regard to strikes; and in British unions, where centralization is extensive, strikes continue to occur without national leadership sanction. Thus the data cannot be said to justify ignoring the member in favor of the leader as the decisive factor in strike policy.

The "true" causes of strikes. It has been necessary, at various points, to concede that the ostensible cause of a strike is not always the "real" cause. It has been implied that in some way we could apply criteria to decide what was the "real" cause. Usually we have suggested that incidents immediately preceding the strike give more valid data than the verbalizations of the strike committee, or even those of individual members chosen as a representative sample. But causation in social science (as in physical science) is always complex, and in labor relations we cannot apply experimental methods to determine the effect of varying a single factor while holding all others constant. And certainly economic statisticians know that two trends may vary together without either "causing" the other. (It has also been necessary to recognize that in some strikes the psychology of the leader is decisive, whereas in other instances the followers are the effective decision makers.)

(Within the rather broad limits laid down by these reservations, let us try to offer a summary statement regarding the "true" causes of strikes in a psychological frame of reference. Striking is always an

act reflecting a variety of motivations and perceptions. It is thus a "balance of forces" problem in which the level of aggressive tension may be so high that unfavorable chances are ignored; on the other hand, the tension level may be much lower, but, because economic conditions offer a high probability of achieving gains, the strike is called anyway. "To strike or not to strike" is a question that is seriously debated by most unions, with strong resistance to an affirmative decision. The labor market, the price trend, the pattern set by other unions, the situation of the employing firm—all of these are perceived as factors favoring or inhibiting strike action because they indicate the relative probabilities of success. Within the individual motivation and level of aspiration constitute pressures for additional goal achievement; if these are strong, a gamble may be taken even in relatively unfavorable circumstances. Likewise, frustration and aggressive tension provide pressures for hostile action against the employer; for a variety of reasons, these are unlikely to provoke strikes by themselves, but they reinforce the positive goal-seeking tendencies at the point when a decision must be made. High levels of tension may cause people to distort the perceived situation and to believe that they have a chance of success when the cards are stacked against them.

Union leaders structure the situation for the members and so help to determine the perceived environment. However, the leaders (other than local officers) are less involved in the aggressions generated by working situations; and their motives are tied to factors other than the specific economic status of workers in a given firm. Thus, to the extent that the leaders are successful in leading, it is likely that psychological factors become less potent and economic trends more decisive for strike policy. But observation certainly indicates that this result has not yet been widely accomplished.¹

The "true" causes of strikes, then, may be considered to be economic in the respect that the environment, the probabilities of success, may most appropriately be analyzed in economic concepts by economic methodology. But it is just as plausible to say that the "true" causes of strikes are psychological in the respect that motivation, perception, and aggression are the ingredients of a decision-making process which actually determines the occurrence of the strike. It is impossible to say that one of these perspectives is "basic" to the other. Our analysis has treated perception of the economic environment as de-

¹ Knowles offers evidence that strikes are declining in Britain, and that the increasing role of national union officers is an important determinant of this trend.

rived from a "real" economic environment; but, on the other hand, when economic factors are virtually ruled out at the local level, as in many British unions, local strikes continue to occur. The best interpretation seems to be that most of these strikes reflect factors coming within the framework of psychology. We cannot, therefore, hold that the "true" causes of strikes are psychological, or that they are economic in character. As elsewhere, we must conclude that both levels of analysis are valid, and that a complete picture undoubtedly must attempt to incorporate both perspectives.

TACTICS IN STRIKES

In our discussion of union tactics (Chapter 11), we ignored the matter of strike tactics. Some attention should now be paid to this question. We are not concerned with discussing a wide variety of specific devices, as is done by Steuben (1950), but only to consider some of the ways in which tactics reflect the basic psychological considerations already set forth.

Successful tactics, from the point of view of union leaders, are those which maintain the unity of the group, channel aggression against the employer, prevent the employer from operating, and maximize the chances of achieving important goals by the union. The most important specific device for serving these purposes is the picket line. Picketing is often defended as a form of "free speech" by which the union members present their case to the public. Actually, the significant functions of picketing are as a control measure and as a morale device for the membership.

Picketing as a control tactic. We have stressed in earlier chapters the principle of homeostasis and the specific application of this principle to the job situation. Workers strive to protect themselves against perceived threats by collective action. When this action culminates in a strike, the necessity for control is still acute. If the employer is free to bring in replacement workers, the worker has lost his entire struggle. Picketing is thus an inevitable extension of the psychological factors that made the strike possible.

Furthermore, when the union members are on the picket line, they tend to perceive "loyal workers" as scabs and strikebreakers as sub-human monsters who would snatch bread from the mouths of babies and children. Open aggression is thus not only considered legitimate, but righteous; control of the plant becomes a kind of religious goal.

It goes without saying that executives of the company perceive all these events quite differently. It is a highly important goal for the

executive to have control of his plant. To allow another organization the right of determining who can enter, and on what terms, is inconceivable. Thus he too sees his cause as righteous, and the resort to violent tactics as a painful but unavoidable choice, (Fig. 13.4).

"WELL, SOMEONE HAS TO LOSE"



Fig. 13.4. The righteous exercise of power. (By permission of the Lynchburg News.)

Picketing as catharsis. If no attempt is made to keep the plant operating, and no violence occurs, the picketing may serve as catharsis for pent-up aggression, leaving the air clear for peaceful settlement and satisfactory relations. As many observers have noted, peaceful picketing tends to have a fiesta atmosphere for the first few days of a strike.) Coffee and sandwiches are usually provided, singing and group marching reinforce feelings of group membership, and slogans voice feelings of hostility to management. But this gets boring after a rather short time, and, of course, the continuance of the strike may pose new frustrations, evoking newly heightened feelings of aggression. It is thus fortunate if the strike can be settled early.)

The phenomenon of catharsis and the morale boost provided by joint membership activity mean that a short strike may actually benefit a union, if not the union-management relationship. However, the possibility that it might become prolonged makes most union officials fear strikes and call them only as a last resort. As Garfield and Whyte (1950) point out, "From the union's standpoint, if a strike is inevitable it should, ideally, last for one or two days and result in a quick settlement. Such a strike serves the purpose of demonstrating to management the union's solidarity, enabling the members to take an active part in the conflict, and yet not continuing long enough to involve severe hardships. But since no union officer can be sure that a strike will end after one or two days, it is advisable to resort to this weapon only after all other possibilities have been exhausted."¹

Propaganda in strikes. Favorable public opinion has become a goal, and propaganda a technique, for both sides in a strike situation. Businessmen took a "public be damned" attitude back in the late nineteenth century, with respect to how the business operated and what issues existed. In the early twentieth century industrialists realized their error and began trying to persuade the public of their virtues. For a considerable period union leaders seemed to imitate the early industrialists; they denied the relevance of public opinion and often acted in ways almost deliberately calculated to excite hostility. Such actions may reflect faith in union strength and the righteousness of its cause, but they do little to line up public assistance for the strikers. In the 1935-1939 period, public support for unions was crucial. Had the attitudinal climate allowed extensive use of law-enforcement officers against picket lines, the demand of unemployed workers for jobs might well have wrecked the expanding union movement. It is

¹ Garfield and Whyte (1950), 9(4), p. 28.

thus no surprise that unions began to use propaganda and advertising as weapons in the struggle for a favorable public opinion.

Business had some advantage in this competition, in that skilled advertising men were available to use the best layout, the shrewdest appeals, the most effective language in strike advertising. Money was available for widespread coverage; in the "Little Steel" strike of 1937, Blumenthal (1939) reports that employer organizations spent at least \$179,000, with only incomplete reports. Unions cannot match this array of talent and space. Nevertheless, the unions have received some volunteer assistance from the "intellectuals" and more recently have employed trained journalists to assist in their efforts.

Functions of propaganda in crisis. In a crisis situation such as a strike, propaganda may serve three functions: (1) to align neutrals on "our" side; (2) to unify our own forces; and (3) to weaken the enemy. The first function has been extensively recognized since 1933 by both sides. Both executives and unionists have sought to influence public opinion in their favor. Management has had little reason to use propaganda for unifying its ranks; the industrial organization involves a fairly small number of persons who are closely knit by training and by social controls. However, industry often uses propaganda to try to demoralize the union. Conversely, unions do not make much use of propaganda against management unity (some ingenious splitting off of management groups is seen in negotiations and face-to-face communication), but they find it necessary to direct some propaganda to maintaining morale in the membership. Devices include strike bulletins, speeches, and face-to-face communications. These stress the probability of goal achievement, the support coming from other unions, the power of unity, the alertness of the leaders to any opportunities and threats, and the virtues of the union cause.

On a more concrete level (perhaps these should not be classed as propaganda), the union sets up soup kitchens to provide food for strikers and their families, provides coffee and sandwiches for pickets, doles out relief funds for emergency expenditures, and in other ways attempts to maintain the workers' loyalty to the union. Teams of women are often organized to talk to strikers' wives, so that they will not weaken the will of the men to continue with the strike.

Employer propaganda designed to divide the union and reduce its

¹ See, e.g., Menefee, "Propaganda and symbol manipulation," in Hartmann and Newcomb (1940). Of particular interest is the "Mohawk Valley formula," pp. 483-485.

QUESTION:**WILL THE STEEL STRIKE
VIOLATE the CONTRACT?****ANSWER:****NO!****Question:** *Is the steel strike a violation of contract?***Answer:** No!

The Steel companies maintain that our Union, the United Steelworkers of America will be breaking a pledged word if we strike.

BUT—WILL WE?

The answer again is—NO.

On what basis?

On the basis of a provision included in the contract drawn-up last spring between the United Steelworkers of America and the Steel Corporations.

What is this provision?

"In the event of a change in the National Wage Policy the matter of a general wage adjustment can be reopened by either party for collective bargaining."

Question: *Did the Steel Corporations agree to this provision in the contract?*

Answer: Obviously, or they would not have signed the agreement.

Question: *Was this agreement approved by the National War Labor Board?*

Answer: When the Union requested that a clause be included in the contract granting the right of either party to reopen the matter of a general wage increase in the event of a change in the National Wage Policy, the War Labor Board granted the request.

Question: *Has there been a change in the National Wage Policy?*

Answer: YES . . . By executive order of the President of the United States . . . "There is a change in the National Wage Policy." (August, 1945)

Question: *On the basis of this change in National Wage Policy, what is the Union asking?*

Answer: A \$2.00 a day wage increase.

THEREFORE:

Since there has been a change in the National Wage Policy,

Since the Steel Companies ignore the Union's request for collective bargaining,

Since the contract reads that a change in the National Wage Policy is a basis for re-opening negotiations.

Why, then, are the steel companies centering their campaign on this phony issue?

Simply because the steel companies are unable to refute our claims that a \$2-a-day wage increase is essential to the welfare of the nation . . . and want the nation to become confused on the real issue.

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA—CIO

COMMONWEALTH BUILDING

PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

Fig. 13.5. Differing perceptions of the same strike. In an ambiguous situation, each side can find support for its position. (By permission of United Steelworkers and American Iron and Steel Institute.)

IS THIS A "SCRAP OF PAPER"?

The CIO United Steelworkers Union said that its strike does not violate its contracts with steel companies. Here is the "no strike" clause taken from a typical contract. *Let the words speak for themselves!*

"During the term of this Agreement, neither the Union nor any Employee, individually or collectively, shall cause or take part in any strike, or other interruption or any impeding of production at any plant of the Company covered by this Agreement. Any Employee or Employees who violate the provisions of this Section may be discharged from the employ of the Company in accordance with the procedure of Section 8 of this Agreement."

This provision, or one similar to it, is contained in each contract between the Union and the various steel companies. These contracts continue by their terms until the autumn of this year.

American Iron & Steel Institute

350 Fifth Avenue, New York 1, N. Y.

93 PER CENT OF THE WORKERS IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY ARE EMPLOYED BY OUR COMPANY MEMBERS

GET THE FACTS - Send postcard for copies of recent interviews with steel industry leaders

Fig. 13.5. Continued.

effectiveness most often utilizes the technique of splitting leaders from rank and file.¹ This technique may utilize the "communist" stereotype, which is likely to be very effective. Another device points out that the international officers' salaries go on while the local workers are on strike and getting no income at all. If it can be shown that union leaders live luxuriously, this may be even more effective in rousing envy and resentment. "Missionaries" are often employed to visit homes and frighten wives with the possibility of violence on the picket line, the chance that the factory may move away, that strikers must come back to work by a certain date or be permanently discharged, etc. Rumors are started to the effect that the strike has been called off, that men are to report for work tomorrow. When the union leader has to deny these, it is expected that the disappointment will weaken the workers' attachment to the union. "Framing" union leaders with law violations, bribery, and other charges was not uncommon in the early decades of this century, although it is apparently rare today.

A substantial advantage formerly held by management lay in the fact that the news and editorial columns of the local newspaper usually presented full statements of the company case, but no mention was made of the union position. Since 1935 this situation has been materially improved: most daily papers seem to make an effort to give parallel space to both sides in the news columns. Even advertising space was denied to unions for a long time, and as late as 1950 some newspapers were still refusing to print advertising by unions that named a particular employer, although they printed similar advertisements by the company naming the union.

Because of the ambiguity of the situation, and the break with customary social roles that occurs when a strike begins, there is ample room for propaganda to influence both workers and the general public. To build up a picture highly favorable either to the employer or to the union in the average situation is not difficult. Each side can always find elements in the environment that can be emphasized to its own advantage, while refusing to note other factors which might be detrimental. An unusually apt example is that shown in Fig. 13.5, derived from the steel strike of 1946. In this case the steel industry appealed to the public by charging the union with violating its no-strike pledge. The union countered by citing a *different clause* in the contract which could be interpreted as nullifying the no-strike provision.

Millions of dollars are spent each year by industry, and a smaller

but not inconsiderable sum by unions, on strike advertising. Unfortunately, we know virtually nothing as to the effects of these communications.

THE COSTS OF STRIKES

Strikes are costly to both sides. If man were the rational economic animal postulated by classical economic theory, strikes would long since have disappeared from the American scene. These costs take many forms: loss of wages, loss of profits, loss to the public in commodities, violence to persons and damage to property, disruption of related industries, increased friction among groups, and so on. Many of these costs cannot be evaluated at all; most of them are perceived quite differently by observers with pro-union and anti-union attitudes. However, it will be instructive to consider briefly some of the relevant evidence.

Wage losses. The loss that is most obvious, most easily computed, and most often cited in this connection is the loss in wages to the employees themselves. Such an approach is illustrated in Fig. 13.6, reproducing an advertisement by a larger paper manufacturer regarding a 1946 strike in their mills. As the advertisement shows, it will take the main group several years to recoup the wages lost in this one strike. These figures are predicated on the fact that the company increased its wage offer only 5¢ per hour as a result of the strike; hence it would take over 5 years to recoup the wage loss.

What the advertisement does not show, of course, is the fact that the company lost materially in profits as a result of the shutdown. How many years did the company have to operate to recoup the profits not earned? This is difficult to compute, but it is clear that if the additional 5¢ had been granted without the strike, earnings for the year would have been much higher.

In October, 1949, the magazine *U.S. News and World Report* computed that strikes since V-J Day (4 years) had entailed wage losses of \$3 billion. Even if this computation were substantially incorrect, the figure must have been quite large. The losses to stockholders and to the general public must likewise have been very impressive.

Does this mean that either union leaders or company executives will suddenly start settling controversies without pushing to a strike situation? Not at all. The company official feels (with some justice) that he cannot continually make concessions to worker demands. He must occasionally resist in order to protect the firm and insure its

WHAT DOES A STRIKE COST?

The Hinde and Dauch Strike at the Sandusky, Ohio, Factory lasted 103 days . . .

Beginning July 17, ending October 28

JULY							AUGUST						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
							4	5	6	7	8	9	10
17	18	19	20				11	12	13	14	15	16	17
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
28	29	30	31				25	26	27	28	29	30	31
SEPTEMBER							OCTOBER						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7							
8	9	10	11	12	13	14	1	2	3	4	5		
15	16	17	18	19	20	21	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
22	23	24	25	26	27	28	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
29	30						20	21	22	23	24	25	26
							27						

IF

we could start full production at once, to make up **WAGES LOST**, it would take —

OCTOBER							NOVEMBER							DECEMBER						
S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S
							1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
							8	9	10	11	12	13	14	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
							15	16	17	18	19	20	21	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
							22	23	24	25	26	27	28	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
							29	30	31					29	30	31				

When a Union calls a Strike, who pays? It is only possible to estimate the loss, but let's take a look at our recent Strike called by United Paperworkers' of America, C.I.O. The following figures are based on the period prior to the Strike, on wage figures offered by the Company before the Strike was called (13 1/2% per hour general increase).

	TIME LOST	TIME REQUIRED TO MAKE UP LOSS
SANDUSKY FACTORY	July 17 to Oct. 26, 1946 Wages Lost, \$225,589.06	5 years, 11 months, 23 days
SANDUSKY MILL NO. 2	July 22 to Oct. 26, 1946 Wages Lost, \$98,223.19	(Never can be made up—no wage or other dispute existed)
DETROIT FACTORY	July 17 to Oct. 26, 1946 Wages Lost, \$64,947.75	(Never can be made up—no wage or other dispute existed)
GLOUCESTER, N. J. PLANT	Aug. 12 to Oct. 26, 1946 Wages Lost, \$158,627.59	(Never can be made up—no wage or other dispute existed)
KANSAS CITY PLANT	Aug. 12 to Oct. 26, 1946 Wages Lost, \$125,827.68	(Never can be made up—no wage or other dispute existed)
ST. LOUIS PLANT	Sept. 23 to Oct. 30, 1946 Wages Lost, \$11,139.12	(Never can be made up—no wage or other dispute existed)

TOTAL LOSS IN WAGES - - \$684,354.39

survival. Similarly, the union official cannot accept the company's "final offer" as final. He knows that if the executives perceive the union as unwilling to strike, they will hold back on concessions. An occasional strike is therefore necessary to "keep them honest" or to keep executives informed that the union will strike if pressure is high enough.

Knowles (1952) has pointed out that the number of wage increases given annually in Britain is vastly greater than the number of strikes. However, there is a clear relationship between the pattern set by striking unions and the concessions granted to other groups. In other words, the gains from a given strike may be wage increases for many unions that never "hit the bricks." Union leaders, therefore, are prone to perceive the gains from strikes as much greater than the benefits to the employees immediately involved; employers characteristically do not see this extended benefit as a relevant consideration.

Losses in production. One of the chief arguments used in favor of legislation to restrict the strike is that it involves a great loss of productive time and consequently is a major source of inefficiency in the economic system. Great injury to the consuming public is usually lumped in with this assertion.

Before World War II, the average loss of working time through strikes was only 0.27 per cent, despite the fact that this average was computed across 1935-1940, the period of CIO organizing activity generally believed to be a very strenuous period of strikes and industrial unrest. Even in 1946, the highest postwar year, this percentage rose only to 1.43 per cent of working time (cf. Table 13.1).

Comparative figures on other sources of lost time are hard to obtain. However, the Social Security Administration estimates that the average worker loses 7 days from work each year as a result of illness unrelated to his occupation. On a basis of 250 working days, the time lost due to illness is 2.8 per cent, or just double the figure for the worst strike year. Similarly, a Gallup poll in 1941 showed an average worker reporting sickness time lost at 2.3 per cent; and a special survey for the Social Security Administration in 1949 found 2.62 per cent of workers off the job because of illness. By comparison with the figure of 0.27 per cent for strikes, these illness figures indicate losses ten times as great.

It is difficult to get any kind of meaningful figures on absenteeism unrelated to illness. It would appear possible, on the basis of the studies cited in Chapter 6, that improvement in employee attitudes could lead to increased attendance at work, in such degree that the time lost in strikes would be more than recovered. Knowles (1952), for ex-

ample, has analyzed strikes, illness, absenteeism, and layoffs as contributing to loss of production in the British coal fields during the period 1938-1947. His findings are shown in Table 13.4. They indicate that even in coal, which there as here has a high strike average, the maximum annual production loss has been about 2.7 per cent. Absenteeism, including both illness and voluntary factors, has run twenty to thirty times as heavy in causing losses; and managerial shut-down due to lack of trade was causing thirty times as much production loss as strikes in the period 1938-1939.

Instead of man-days lost, strike costs are sometimes computed in terms of product losses. Thus, in the combined steel and coal strikes of early 1946, the steel industry estimated that 12 million tons of steel were lost (this could have been converted into so many autos, refrigerators, etc.). On the other hand, in 1954 steel was operating at only 60 per cent to 70 per cent of capacity, and at least 26 million tons of steel were lost to production as a result of this managerial decision. Production losses due to strikes, therefore, seem relatively small as compared to production losses due to illness of workers, to voluntary absenteeism, and to layoffs by management.

Table 13.4 Strikes and Other Causes of Production Loss in British Coal Mines*

Percentages of Coal 'Lost' Through Various Causes

<i>Years</i>	<i>Holidays</i>	<i>Strikes</i>	<i>Absenteeism</i>	<i>Lack of Customers</i>	<i>Other Causes</i>
1938-39	18.6	1.4	31.0	42.7	6.3
1940-45	19.9	2.7	65.8	3.1	8.5
1946-47	20.3	2.7	71.7†	0.0	5.3

* From Knowles (1952), p. 280. Reprinted by permission of the Philosophical Library. Figures add horizontally to 100 per cent.

† Voluntary 37.6, involuntary 34.1%.

The purpose of these figures is not to suggest that strikes have no harmful effects. On the contrary, it is obvious that any strike involves losses to the worker and his family, to the union, to the employer, and to the consuming public. However, as long as employers are able to lay off workers without regard to the wage losses or damage to the public involved, it will be difficult to convince unionists that they should be prevented from striking because of wage losses or loss to the public in commodity production.

Violence against persons. A second major source of loss in strikes,

one that perhaps deserves even greater emphasis than the economic consequences noted above, is in the violence inflicted upon human beings as a fairly common, if not universal, concomitant of a strike. Violence has frequently been employed by company guards and by law-enforcement officers against pickets, and likewise by strikers against non-strikers.

The psychological factors decisive for violent actions by strikers against those who attempt to take their jobs have already been enumerated (cf. pp. 7-9 and 163-179). Aggressive tensions build up; particularly if the standard of living was low to start with, or if the strike has been long and consequent hardships severe, conditions are favorable to violence. Thus in mining, where wages were traditionally low and the mode of life harsh, violence has been somewhat more common than in other industries. The "Herrin massacre" illustrates how these factors may combine to produce grim consequences in a union-management controversy.

The Herrin massacre of June 21-22, 1922, was one of the bloodiest events in American labor history. The United Mine Workers had been on strike since April 1, about 11 weeks. The Southern Illinois Coal Co., owned by William J. Lester, operated a strip mine near Herrin. Pressed by heavy indebtedness, Lester attempted to re-open operations in mid-June; he brought in armed guards and strikebreakers from Chicago. On June 21 a large group of UMW pickets approached the mine belligerently; the guards fired, one man was killed, and two were seriously injured. On the next day, about 500 miners and sympathizers attacked the mine. The strikebreakers surrendered on promise of safe conduct out of the county, but, as they were marching away, firing opened and nineteen of them were killed.¹

Many factors contributed to the occurrence of the Herrin bloodshed. Not the least, of course, was the fact that the miners had been on strike for 11 weeks, and their families were suffering severe hardships. To have Lester operating with non-union workers was a bitter threat to the goals for which they had been fighting. The area was solidly unionized; it was popularly considered sheer insanity for a mineowner to attempt to operate during a strike. Moreover, the cultural pattern of the region was one threaded with violence; as Angle (1952) points out, Williamson County had known bloody feuds in its past; shortly after the Herrin strike, it came under the dominance of the Ku Klux Klan for several violent years; still later it was the scene of bloody

¹ For a graphic account of the affair, with extensive background material which seems fairly impartial, see Angle (1952).

gang warfare. The violence of the Herrin affair thus reflects much more than the usual hatred of pickets for "scabs."

The problems of enforcing laws against violence during strikes are well-pointed up by the Herrin debacle. When a coroner's jury was convened on the deaths of the strikebreakers, they found that the deaths "were due to the acts direct and indirect of the officials of the Southern Illinois Coal Company." Similarly, despite ample evidence, juries refused to convict the mine union members who were charged with the murders. The affair was generally perceived as one in which honest citizens defended their homes against invasion. It seems clear that, when the climate of public opinion is vigorously pro-union (or anti-union), the impartial enforcement of the laws is seriously hampered. Group norms determine when violence is legitimate; it is difficult, if not impossible, to enforce laws that do not conform to these norms.

Violence against pickets. A gruesome box score would be computed by searching the records to parallel instances of violence against strikers and against non-strikers. A major instance of violence against strikers was the so-called "Memorial Day massacre" in the Republic Steel strike of 1937. In this case the strikers were trying to parade and picket in front of the plant gates. As Barbash (1948) describes the scene,

A long straggling line of pickets numbering about three hundred parade across the field leading to the plant gates. They are led by bearers carrying American flags and behind them are placard carriers with slogans "Come On Out . . . Help Win the Strike," "Republic vs. the People," and "C.I.O." The spokesmen for the line argues with the "police officer who appears to be in command" insisting on permission to continue through the police line of about three hundred. "The spokesman's expression is serious but no threat of violence is apparent." The police officer refuses to let the picket line through. "Then suddenly, without apparent warning, there is a terrific roar of pistol shots, and men in the front ranks of the marchers go down like grass before a scythe." The police then charge on the marchers with riot sticks and tear gas grenades and the "ground is strewn with dead and wounded." When the casualties could be counted it was found that "ten marchers were fatally shot. Seven received the fatal wound in the back, three in the side, none in the front."¹

It is difficult to assess the psychological factors that may have been involved in so far as the policemen themselves were concerned. It seems likely that hostile attitudes, stereotypes of unionists as "bad"

¹ Barbash (1948), p. 136. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros. The quotations within this passage are mainly from accounts published in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, June 16, 1937.

and "communistic," must have facilitated the shooting. Soldiers are encouraged to shoot the enemy, not think of him as human; police on strike duty are given similar attitudes if not explicit instructions along these lines. Since the number of pickets seems to have been about equal to the number of policemen, fear of attack can hardly have been important. Perhaps the cultural norm of violence was as relevant here as in Herrin; by reputation, Chicago in those days was a fairly violent city.

TRENDS IN STRIKES

The history of organized labor, both in this country and in western Europe, indicates that union-management relations are in constant change. Once upon a time the mere act of joining a union was illegal; under the Conspiracy Acts, in Britain, collective work stoppages could result in penalties against individual strikers. Similarly, in the Danbury Hatters' case, American strikers were subjected to damage suits and heavy financial penalties. From these days to the Wagner Act seems a long time, and even the withdrawal of governmental support for unions in the Taft-Hartley Act seems slight when viewed against this time perspective.

We have noted casual evidence to the effect that violence, both by workers and by employers, is on the decline in strikes. There is also some reason to believe that strikes are becoming less important features of our economic environment. Knowles (1952) offers fairly convincing evidence as regards Britain that strikes have declined in respect to both magnitude and duration (Fig. 13.7). Frequency (sheer numbers of strikes) has not decreased, but, since it is plausible to assume that the number of unionized establishments has been increasing, this should not be expected.

The decreases in magnitude (number of workers involved) and duration of strikes are ascribed by Knowles to a combination of factors, including the increasing tendency for contracts to be negotiated on an industry-wide basis, with only local issues settled by local bargaining; the consequent concentration of power and authority in the hands of national union officers, who are less affected by local irritations; and the associated "professionalization" of union-management relations, which fall into the hands of experts who less often allow controversies to reach the striking stage. It is possible that a slowly rising standard of living, and better managerial techniques, may have contributed. Essentially, the declines in both magnitude and duration point to the occurrence of short, local "wildcat" strikes, as opposed to industry-

THE STRIKE

wide, bitterly fought stoppages. Many of these local strikes are due precisely to the factors just listed; e.g., local grievances get no airing in national negotiations; outdated managerial practices (or managerial efforts to adopt modern methods) may be sources of irritation, but the national union officers ignore such grievances. Thus the only outlet is a short, unauthorized work stoppage which forces official attention and usually results in correction of the frustrating situation.

Knowles finds little evidence to indicate that legislation for control




Fig. 13.7. Decline in magnitude and duration of British strikes. (From Knowles, 1952, p. 155, by permission of Philosophical Library, Inc.)

of strikes has been effective in Britain. He is definitely of the opinion that legislative penalties have had little to do with the declines cited above. British experience, for example, indicates that where efforts have been made to penalize strikers for illegal stoppages, more strikes have occurred in protest. Thus the "cure" may simply spread the "disease." "It has not, of course, been by legal prohibitions or political restrictions that strikes have been controlled," writes Knowles, "so much as by the development of a powerful Union leadership and the evolution of voluntary and statutory procedures for negotiating wages and working conditions as well as for avoiding disputes."¹

¹ Knowles, (1952), p. 119. Reprinted by permission of the Philosophical Library.

with each retaining its institutional sovereignty, working together in reasonable harmony in a climate of mutual respect and confidence."¹

When NPA announced its projected study of industrial peace and invited nominations of establishments with unusually good relations, over one thousand nominations were received. About six hundred were eliminated by various criteria. The remaining four hundred were circularized, and some questionnaire data were collected. Eventually, the published series reported on twelve specific company-union relationships, and one comparative report (*Case Study No. 13*) was made dealing with eighteen companies simultaneously. In a concluding report, *Fundamentals of Labor Peace*, the Committee attempted to develop meaningful generalizations based on all the case studies.

It would serve no useful purpose for us to summarize here any of the factual findings of the case studies. Most of them provide well-written, clear, understandable accounts of the more important aspects of the industry, the management, the union, and the history of the relationship. Consideration is given to the causes of peace in each establishment, in so far as the observer could identify them. However, it must be noted that a comparative approach is urgently needed here. A "cause" as seen in one company may be found to be quite unimportant elsewhere. The valuable portion of the series, for our purposes, is the summary report which makes these comparisons across establishments.

Psychological foundations of industrial peace. The purpose of the NPA studies was to seek out certain common factors which appeared in most or all of the establishments selected as harmonious. Such factors might have been found in the economic condition of the industry, in contract clauses, in union structure, in managerial organization, and elsewhere. When we recall the very complex interaction of economic, sociological, and psychological factors that enter into the accommodation process, the number of possible "causes of peace" is seen to be very large.

It is striking, therefore, to find the extent to which the conclusions of these investigations focus upon psychological factors as the basic causes of industrial peace. The Committee offers the following summary statement on this question:

In the Committee's introductions to the *Case Studies* in this series, some basic causes of industrial peace have been listed. The list has varied and

¹ *Fundamentals of Labor Peace: a final report* (p. 7). Reprinted by permission of the National Planning Assn.

COOPERATION

been expanded as the studies accumulated. The list has one distinguishing characteristic. *Each of these causes refers to attitudes and approaches* which the parties themselves have consciously adopted or helped to achieve.¹ Furthermore, each of them was found to be important in explaining the degree of industrial peace found in the specific case. It is worth repeating the complete list here.

1. There is full acceptance by management of the collective bargaining process and of unionism as an institution. The company considers a strong union an asset to management.

2. The union fully accepts private ownership and operation of the industry; it recognizes that the welfare of its members depends upon the successful operation of the business.

3. The union is strong, responsible, and democratic.

4. The company stays out of the union's internal affairs; it does not seek to alienate the workers' allegiance to their union.

5. Mutual trust and confidence exist between the parties. There have been no serious ideological incompatibilities.

6. Neither party to bargaining had adopted a legalistic approach to the solution of problems in the relationship.

7. Negotiations are "problem-centered"—more time is spent on day-to-day problems than on defining abstract principles.

8. There is widespread union-management consultation and highly developed information-sharing.

9. Grievances are settled promptly, in the local plant whenever possible. There is flexibility and informality within the procedure.²

Inspection of these items indicates that the emphasis on "attitudes and approaches" is not entirely justified. However, it is impressive that seven of the nine points are definitely psychological in character, and the other two imply psychological determinants. It should be added, of course, that these favorable attitudes must exist on both sides of the bargaining table; neither management nor union alone can breathe peace and good will into a hostile opposition.

Acceptance of norms. We defined accommodation (Chapter 12) as a process of seeking agreement on norms of employment. It was noted at that time that agreement was easier if the groups had certain perceptions or norms in common. (Cooperation is easier in wartime when a common enemy and common patriotism are focal in perception.) This point runs through several of the items listed above, explicitly in respect to acceptance of unionism by management and of private enterprise by the union, implicitly in several others.

¹ Psychologists may well question the use of the term "consciously adopted." As we have seen in various contexts, perceptions often change without conscious awareness; recognition of the change may come much later.

² *Fundamentals of Labor Peace: a final report* (pp. 93-94). Reprinted by permission of the National Planning Assn. Italics are added.

Absence of conflicting norms. A feeling of membership in a larger group, such as the nation, and acceptance of the larger group norms, fosters understanding and cooperation. Conversely, the presence of conflicting norms tends to increase conflict behavior.

We note this in the NPA cases particularly in relation to wages. Industrial peace was especially likely if the establishment belonged to a relatively high-wage industry but was in a low-wage community, so that the wage norms of the employees did not tend to rise above those of the employer. The executive expects to have to pay approximately what his industrial competitors pay; if, by being in a low-wage area, he saves nothing, this is all to the good. The employee is more likely to derive his norms from the community, and so will feel pleased that his earnings are above those of his friends in other local establishments.

Conversely, a low-wage industry in a high-wage community will be full of troubles, because the employees' wage norms arouse expectancies that cannot be satisfied in this establishment. The conflict between employee and employer norms is a determinant of hostility and friction in collective bargaining. (For example, in the Illini City data, the garment factories, traditionally low-wage employment, scored very low on the measure of employee attitudinal climate.)

Community norms as to union membership also seem effective in the NPA studies. Industrial peace seemed more often associated with "union towns," conflict with "open shop towns." In this instance the employer may cling to "open shop" standards if he is getting some community support; the employees were organized (NPA studies were limited to unionized establishments); hence conflict of norms would be inevitable. Conversely, in a union town, the employer is more likely to yield to the example of other employers in accepting the union as a permanent part of the establishment.

Communication and norms. In Chapter 12 we emphasized the role of communication between the parties in developing understanding. The norms of one side cannot possibly be clearly perceived by those on the other side unless frequent communication occurs. As far as possible this should include face-to-face meetings of people at comparable levels in the two organizations; and it should include meetings for consultation, not merely to iron out controversies that are already in full bloom.

The NPA findings confirm this analysis. The establishments in the "industrial peace" classification showed a great deal of effort devoted to joint communication. This effort was not limited to top leaders on both sides, but was extended to include rank and file as well. Managers frequently reported making use of the union as a channel of

communication to employees. Thus the communications system did not tend to build barriers or emphasize the division between management and the union.

The need for predictability. We have said a great deal in this volume about the individual's need to feel that he knows what is going to happen—that he is not subject to the whims of forces beyond his control. It is apparent that this is just as important when the individual is executing a role on behalf of a group as when he is acting for himself. The principle of homeostasis, the concern with maintaining a stable environment, is just as valid here as at the level of simple and routine biological adaptation.

Whyte (1951a) called attention to the importance of predictability when he noted the tension of "not knowing what would happen next" in the troubled days at Inland Steel Container (p. 217). Purcell (1953) cited interviews relating back to the stormy days of Communist domination of Local 28, UPWA, and the troubles at Swift, which also indicated the anxiety deriving from an unpredictable environment. The same idea occurs in the NPA reports. Here is a quotation from a union leader at Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company:

I hear a lot of people in the union talking about the sincerity of the company. Now, most people are honest, and that goes for most of the company representatives, too. Our real respect for (the management) is that they think out labor relations in a logical way. You know what to expect from them; you know how they will act because they usually take the trouble to find out what the problem really is. We aren't getting along just because they are "sincere" or because we like each other. Our confidence and trust in (the company) is the result of our ability to anticipate this kind of management thinking.¹

It is worth noting, parenthetically, that "knowing what to expect" is not enough; one may know that he should expect a rebuff, but this does not make for good relations. However, within a context of reasonable settlements, predictability does help greatly.

The environmental factors noted in the NPA studies as facilitating industrial peace also confirm the importance of predictability. Harmonious relations are most often found in establishments where production is steady; conflict is commoner if production is seasonal or intermittent. Similarly, harmony goes with moderate technological advance; rapid advances in this area seem to precipitate conflict. Industries especially sensitive to the economic cycle are also prone to conflict.

¹ National Planning Assn. Case Study No. 2, 1948. The Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. and the Federation of Glass, Ceramic and Silica Sand Workers (p. 17).

The internal structures of union and management again lend confirmation of the need for predictability. Unions with frequently changing officers are likely to be involved in many controversies with management; companies with frequent managerial turnover probably would likewise be involved in difficulty. Changes in leadership mean uncertainty as to what is possible; or, if you assume that relations can be carried on as before, the new man across the table may react to your tactics in an unfavorable manner.

All these observations fit into the picture of union-management accommodation which has already been presented. Individuals—whether workers, executives, or union officers—are striving for certain goals. Certain kinds of risk-related goals (high profits on a hazardous venture) may be compatible with an unpredictable environment. However, the typical employee, and the typical union officer, are security-oriented, and security motives are especially frustrated by an unpredictable environment. Under such circumstances tension, aggression, and conflict are sure to be present. Conversely, a secure environment makes for goal achievement—with consequent satisfaction and favorable perceptions of the establishment, the management, and the union.

The environment, nevertheless, is not the decisive factor. The final NPA report says, "These environmental forces, individually or collectively, do not, by themselves, cause peace, but they give the opportunity to develop it. The *attitudes and policies* of the parties, the *personalities of their leaders*, and their techniques bring about the good relations—with the permission of a favorable environment."¹ Environment, as we have often asserted, depends to some extent on perception. If the psychological factors are favorable, even a moderately poor environment can yield a harmonious relationship.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES

Even before the outbreak of World War II, a few advanced firms had experimented with joint union-management committees which had functions other than negotiations and grievances. Some executives decided that, if they were to ask labor to take the role of partner in the enterprise, they ought to tell labor a little more about the situation. Some even thought that it would be easier to ask for higher productivity if some explanations preceded the request. Others were concerned

¹ *Fundamentals of Labor Peace*, p. 60. Reprinted by permission of the National Planning Assn.

about absenteeism, early quitting, horseplay in the plant, and other personnel problems. The joint committee approach was adopted as a potential alternative to authoritarian discipline and unilateral efforts to modify employee behavior.

During the war pressure from government to set up these joint committees was so strong that only the more stubborn employers resisted. However, organizing a committee was not the same as allowing it to function. At least 5000 joint committees were created during the production drive, but it seems likely that only about one-tenth of them actively discussed production problems and attempted to devise solutions.

It is true, of course, that even the organization of such a committee provides an additional channel for communication, and therefore may improve mutual understanding. It is also true that other problems beside production were important at the time. Many committees carried on activities that reduced absenteeism, improved worker morale, decreased turnover, and eliminated safety hazards. These benefits are important, but they are beyond the scope of our concern at this point. We shall consider the joint committees only in so far as they throw light on the question of favorable union-management relations.

Mutual suspicion. Interestingly enough, the joint committee idea was looked upon with deep suspicion by both company and union leaders when it was first proposed by Donald Nelson. Industrialists perceived it as a thinly veiled device for giving the unions a hand in management decisions. Unionists saw it as a "speed-up" device dressed up in patriotic colors. Nelson was denounced for trying to "sovietize" American industry, on the one hand, and for fostering a "company union" in which management would seize control of labor organizations, on the other.

A major fear on the part of management was that the joint committee would encroach upon management prerogatives. The strong ego motives of the executive made him especially sensitive on this point. The social norm of authoritarian control reinforced this attitude. Matters were made worse by the fact that the war followed close upon a rapid expansion of unions, 1936-1940, and an intense period of conflict, including sitdowns and open violence. The typical accommodation could undoubtedly have been characterized as falling into the "armed truce" category. It is not surprising, therefore, that this novel idea met with slight approval at first from either side.

After some delay, the program was endorsed by AFL, CIO, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the United States Chamber

of Commerce. About 2000 were organized during the first year, and by 1945 it was estimated that over 5000 committees were in existence. However, even sympathetic estimates indicate that not more than about 3000 functioned at any one time.

Committee activities. Estimates made by the War Production Board suggest that the distribution of committee activities was somewhat along this line: perhaps 2000 conducted war activities such as bond sales, blood bank programs, and other activities having only remote relations to in-plant situations. About 1500 engaged in such activities as the foregoing, but also served in-plant functions: e.g., suggestion system, absenteeism, safety, etc. A group of perhaps 500 discussed production methods, waste, care of tools, and scheduling.

Table 14.1 Major Activities of Reported Labor-Management Committees, 1944*

<i>Nature of Activity</i>	<i>"Considerable" Participation Reported by:</i>
Absenteeism	777
Safety	773
Suggestion system	612
Transportation	586
Production problems (including plant efficiency)	584
"Stay-on-job" program	496
Quality improvement	446
Conservation and salvage	445
Care of tools and equipment	371

* Modified from DeSchweinitz (1949), Tables 9 and 11, pp. 52-53. A total of 1266 committees responded to a questionnaire on their activities.

Table 14.1, which shows responses to a questionnaire distributed in 1944, gives somewhat higher percentages of committees dealing with production questions (about 46 per cent of those responding). This is considered an overestimate in that reports were received only from fairly vigorous committees, and it can safely be assumed that these included most of those actually getting into the area of production.

Committee success. Evaluation of the success of joint labor-management committees is difficult. It is clear that the active groups served a variety of useful purposes, and many management reports during the war indicated satisfaction with their contributions. To a questionnaire in January 1945, 66 per cent of committees replied yes to the question, "Do you expect to continue committee after the war?"

However, a check in 1947 indicated that, at best, 30 per cent had actually been maintained. These figures, cited by DeSchweinitz (1949), are ambiguous on several grounds. We do not know whether the 1945 reports were prepared by union or company officials; nor do we know whether any governmental pressure seemed to favor an affirmative response at that time.

Some studies by non-governmental agencies indicate that, at least, the joint committees did not fulfill managerial fears. The magazine *Factory Management and Maintenance*, for example, surveyed 181 plants late in 1942 and found 93 per cent of management reporting that the joint committees had not been attempting to usurp management prerogatives. There is scattered evidence that this judgment continued to the end of the war.

Many problems were solved by the joint committee procedure which would have provoked violent reactions had management attempted to achieve the same end by unilateral action. One such was the constantly touchy question of jurisdiction over work by the AFL craft unions. In the California Shipbuilding Corporation, working with the AFL Metal Trades Council, the following developments were reported:

At the October 11, 1943 meeting, the general manager informed the top committee that arrangements had been made between the Boilermakers and Pipefitters, whereby emergency shortages of manpower in one craft could be filled by loan of men from another craft. This arrangement would not only prevent loss of production in departments with a manpower shortage, but it would also keep workers from being laid off in departments that were cutting down their force. He asked for the cooperation of all unions in making such an arrangement possible in all crafts. Since the secretary of the Metal Trades (a committee member) thought that this could be carried out to greater advantage through negotiations between individual unions, the labor members of the committee held a meeting after the regular Labor-Management Committee meeting to "thrash out the matter."

At the next committee meeting it was announced that the loan of men to the Pipefitters from other unions was in effect. The committee agreed that an intensive educational campaign should be carried to all unions regarding the loan of men of one craft to another. Labor members of the top committee (business agents) passed information to their stewards who, in turn, passed it along to the workers. The program was also discussed at any union meetings which were held during this period.

At the January 31, 1944 meeting, the committee was informed that owing to the shortage of workers in critical crafts an intensive training program would have to be inaugurated, and that many inter-union transfers would be necessary; that such workers would transfer on a voluntary basis and hold the status of a journeyman while training for another craft. (Dues would be paid to their original craft.)

At the March 27, 1944 meeting, it was agreed that loans to other crafts should be on a short term basis, and no initiation fee would be charged by the "borrowing" union.¹

Such observations, like those to be presented below on collective bargaining contracts which provide for cooperation, indicate that the workers have ideas and information that can contribute to the successful operation of the enterprise. However, this resource is available only when the workers perceive the situation as one in which they will not be punished for cooperation—i.e., when workers will not be laid off, wage rates cut, etc.

People can cooperate when their activities are perceived as harmonious within some framework of group norms. In peacetime, the group norms of management and those of the union had not been compatible. In war, common membership in the nation as a group permitted new norms to guide behavior. The norms of "good citizenship" and patriotism took precedence over smaller group interests.

We have pointed out the same phenomenon, under more difficult conditions, in the ordinary collective bargaining relationship (Chapter 12). A successful union-management interaction grows as new norms are worked out which are applicable to the whole establishment and are not perceived as the property of either management or the union. The process was greatly facilitated during the war by the presence of a common enemy and by awareness of national group membership as a consideration overriding separate group norms.

Postwar developments. As was noted above, enthusiasm for joint committees cooled rapidly on both sides after World War II. With the removal of wartime incentives to patriotism, both executives and unionists again focused on special group interests. Management decided that the joint committee was a waste of time and perpetuated the illusion that the union had a right to speak on production problems. Unions feared that cooperation would be exploited to reduce the number of jobs, mechanize production even more, and create conflicts between groups within the work force. Thus it is not surprising that only about 200 active committees could be located in 1947 (apparently from the same group of 1266 covered in Table 14.1).

A number of factors contributed to this. As DeSchweinitz notes, in most cases workers suffered a severe reduction in take-home pay with the end of war production. A typical worker dropped from \$63.24 to

¹ The Labor-Management Production Committee of the California Shipbuilding Corporation and The Metal Trades Council, Affiliated with the Metal Trades Department, AFL, WPB War Production Drive Div., October, 1944 (see DeSchweinitz, 1949, pp. 113-114).

\$48 a week. Such a loss of income, she comments, creates an atmosphere that does not foster cooperation. The cost of living was on an upward spiral with the lifting of price controls. Union officials were therefore more concerned about wage increases than about joint committees. Executives who had been on these committees were often swamped in reconversion problems or left for other locations in the great postwar migration.

A formal contract, embodying the principle of union-management cooperation, might have survived these changes. As a matter of fact, however, most American managements had not, by 1945, accepted unions as "here to stay," and therefore such contracts were unpopular. There was a decided increase in their frequency after 1945, for a variety of reasons. In later pages we shall describe a typical instance of this kind and indicate some of the psychological factors involved.

In establishments where labor-management committees were continued after the war, emphasis is on areas where common interests of employee and employer are obvious. Dale (1949) finds that the highest frequency of reported cooperation is in the area of accident prevention. Some other areas with relatively high frequencies of cooperation are the elimination of waste, trying to improve labor's understanding of company policy, attendance, employee insurance plans, and control of quality. At the other end of the scale the smallest degree of union-management cooperation involved areas of technological change, stabilization of employment, utilization of machinery, and promotional programs. In other words, areas where the company and the union obviously have a common interest, as in the prevention of accidents, are appropriate for the early establishment and initial stages of a cooperative program. It is only after a relatively high degree of mutual confidence has been established that management is likely to agree to cooperative work with the union on such controversial issues as technology.

On the whole, Dale reports management in establishments where a cooperative program has been attempted were pleased with the results. Of 145 companies, 37 reported themselves as "keenly pleased"; 66 said they were "moderately pleased"; 8 said that the plan had been only slightly successful; 3 were neutral; 4 were moderately disappointed; and 7 were keenly disappointed with the results of cooperation with the union.

The opinions of union spokesmen were decidedly less friendly. Of a total of 32 top-level union executives who were queried with regard to their experiences in this area, 12 said that they were "keenly pleased" with the results; 8 were "moderately pleased"; 2 were neutral; and

Chamberlain described a small steel fabricating plant, the Adamson Co., which had increased production tremendously by a new form of union-management cooperation. Using the two main features of group bonus (plant-wide profit-sharing) and union shop, the contract had led to a 500 per cent increase in profits, with workers getting half the increase. A typical worker's paycheck showed weekly wages of \$95.20 (hourly wages did not undercut the union scale) plus a month's bonus of \$159.84. The owner of the establishment reported that, by giving half his profits to his employees, he had doubled his own income.¹

The Adamson Company was a small concern with about 100 hourly employees. The spectacular results in both production and attitudes suggested that the Scanlon plan was a good one, but many observers remained skeptical. Perhaps unique conditions explained its success. What would happen with a larger company, especially when economic factors were less favorable than in 1946? The answer has been given by a detailed study of the Lapointe Machine Tool Co. in the NPA Studies of Industrial Peace.² Because this establishment is larger (about 1000 employees) and has undergone some crisis situations since the Scanlon plan was introduced, we shall treat it as a more informative instance of this type of cooperative arrangement.

The Lapointe situation. The employees at Lapointe were organized into Local 3536, United Steelworkers of America-CIO, in the fall of 1944. The frustrations reported by workers who participated in the organizing activity are typical of those enumerated in Chapter 6: insecurity, resulting from the sharply cyclical nature of the machine-tool industry; low wages; dissatisfaction with the piecework rates, and with discrimination against certain workers as regards "soft jobs"; grievances against foremen on the preceding point and also for sheer arbitrary authority. After a rather short campaign, the union won the certification election with a little less than 60 per cent of the valid ballots.

About a year later came the nation-wide steel strike. Although the Lapointe local had not grown substantially, the strike was completely effective. Moreover, Local 3536 did not return when the national contract was signed. Because of a variety of non-wage grievances, the strike dragged on for about seven weeks more. This open conflict

¹ *Life*, December 23, 1946.

² The Lapointe Machine Tool Co. and United Steelworkers of America, a case study by George P. Schultz and Robert P. Crisara. Washington, D.C.; National Planning Assn., 1952.

naturally left a climate of suspicion and antagonism; the surprising aspect, to the observers, was the speed with which constructive approaches were made.

The initiative actually was taken by the local union president, Jack Ali. An hourly worker, he represented a group that resented the piece-work system by which some employees gained extra benefits which the hourly worker had no chance to win. Ali read about the Adamson Company and persuaded management to consider the example. Union and management men visited Adamson and other Scanlon-plan enterprises. Gradually the discussions shifted from "Is it worthwhile?" to "How can we use it?"

The profit-sharing basis. Adamson had used an accounting procedure of estimating profits and paying 50 per cent of this figure to the employees each month. Lapointe decided to use a plant-wide bonus plan which returned *all* the increase in productivity directly attributable to worker ideas and effort. A ratio of labor costs to sales value of production, over several years, was set as a base figure. For each 1 per cent of increase in productive efficiency as reflected in production value, a bonus of 1 per cent was paid. All employees (except top management) received the bonus. Thus white-collar, hourly, and minor supervisory employees had an incentive to cooperate.

From January, 1949, to September, 1952 (45 months), there were 9 months with no bonus, as a result of lack of business. The highest bonus was 52.1 per cent, earned in June, 1952. The net bonus for 45 months averaged slightly over 14 per cent. This is less dramatic than some of the gains reported by Adamson, but nevertheless the figures reflect a substantial gain to the employees. The ability of the parties to adapt to a crisis situation is shown by the fact that the profit-sharing ratio was recomputed when machine-tool orders dropped suddenly. Although some tension developed, the change was negotiated and effected without serious conflict.

Profit reports are not available for the company, but the owner stated that he was very well-satisfied with the results. Indeed, he was installing the plan in a plant in England: "I wouldn't have put it in there if I'd been dissatisfied with it over here." Thus it appears that the plan produced net economic gains for both parties in the relationship.

Employee participation. Like all establishments in which piece-work rates are set without employee participation, Lapointe had a bad situation with respect to piecework production. As one executive said, "You couldn't schedule work (prior to the new contract). The operators, particularly in grinding, would pick the good jobs from

the rack and hide them. Eventually they would ring them in, but in the meantime we would lose track of them." And the union president tells of one grinder who, after holding his production back to an average rate of \$76 a week under the old contract, shot up to \$184 a week under the new plan—a rate of output that he would never have dared show before. Now, with group approval, he turned out all he could. Hourly rate employees, those who serviced the piece-rate workers, now had an incentive for keeping things ready at all times. Grievances dropped to a new low—only 3 were processed in 24 months.

Employee suggestions on cost cutting suddenly increased tremendously. Engineers began to consult foremen about approaching jobs, and the foremen took blueprints to show to workers. Not only did the operators make good suggestions for efficient scheduling, but they liked knowing what was coming, and they felt better for being consulted. In one case, workers converted a 10 per cent loss on a sizeable job into a 10 per cent profit.

Management attitudes. Few executives are willing to accept critical comments and suggestions, even from men at their own organizational level. It is not surprising, therefore, that many management people found the shift to the new policy frustrating. However, the success of the program, and the fact that aggression plays a lesser role in criticisms, have led to increased acceptance by all executives. The decision-making function of management is now more willingly accepted by the employees, because there is better understanding of the problems involved.

Management has learned to share formerly secret information with the employees, and in return has received much information formerly held back. The result has been that both sides have a clearer perception of problems and of relevant facts for the solution of these difficulties.

Union shop. All Scanlon-plan contracts require a union shop clause to protect the union against possible internal dissension which may result from efforts to increase production. When this clause went into effect at Lapointe, only three individuals were affected; everyone else had already joined voluntarily. The purpose of the clause, therefore, was protective rather than compulsory. If the union officers were to cooperate with management, they did not want to be losing members at every turn as some worker's toe was stepped on.

Any extensive program of change in working conditions involves frustrations for some people, in the short run if not over a longer period. Union officers who help management cut down on waste,

increase production, and eliminate slowdowns on the job, will tear the union apart unless the union shop clause is in force. There was no indication that any employees at Lapointe resented the union shop.

In conclusion. The conclusion of the NPA study of the Lapointe situation emphasizes the following points: (1) There has been a substantial degree of industrial peace. Each party negotiates from strength, but there have been no strikes since 1946. (2) Union officers and company executives mutually recognize the necessity of both union and company as institutions. There is no hope of eliminating the union, nor is there any deep hostility to the profit system. (3) Both parties see the relationship as fair. The new arrangement has not only increased profits and wages; it has also made for greater job security and profit stability. (4) Employees have security, dignity and recognition as individuals. The worker can make suggestions and criticize his foreman, without feeling threatened. He is respected and cooperative. (5) The net effect of the relationship is not detrimental to the public interest. There has been no collusion to the injury of the public (e. g., on government contracts).

The causes of the change can be identified as follows: (1) a realization by both parties that the situation was unsatisfactory; (2) inability of either side to induce change through sheer force; (3) recognition of the Scanlon plan as a new alternative, something by which both management and union might better achieve their goals; and (4) the successful application of this plan. This last item deserves expansion. Both management and the union adapted to changing conditions. The union cooperated when a sharp drop in orders made payment of the bonus impossible; they agreed to a plan for setting aside money in good months to take care of losses in bad months. Management listened to suggestions and tried to use them properly. Workers trained new employees effectively during the Korean crisis. In short, it was not the contract itself, but the attitudes, which went along with and were supported by the contract, that were decisive in making this an outstanding instance of union-management cooperation.

Cooperation in other industries. Since this book is concerned with general principles and not with extensive factual material, we have limited our treatment to a discussion of Scanlon-plan contracts for union-management cooperation. This is an arbitrary choice, inasmuch as there are many other instances of contracts that provide for cooperation. In point of time, probably the clothing industry led the way to such agreements. In some respects the range of cooperation in clothing is greater than in the Scanlon-plan establishments like Lapointe. The unions (particularly the Amalgamated Clothing Workers-

CIO, and the International Ladies Garment Workers-AFL, which represent the vast majority of the employees) participate in planning production schedules, provide engineering experts to advise small manufacturers, aid in reducing seasonality of production, cooperate on marketing programs, and even lend money to distressed employers. The union has the right to file a grievance against management for inefficient procedures, and, though this right is rarely exercised, it is apparently well-known to manufacturers in the industry.

It would be an error to assume that either executives or union members are unanimous in their support of the cooperative program. Particularly in establishments where poor human relations practices have been prevalent, where the attitudinal climate is full of hostility, the workers may resist efficiency procedures even when introduced with international union approval. Employers in small shops have likewise attempted to evade the burdens imposed upon them by the contract (which is negotiated by the Employers' Association and thus represents the views of the larger establishments in many instances). However, it is still true, as Braun (1947) has pointed out, that "cooperation has persisted in the clothing industry because both sides have felt that it is mutually beneficial Management as well as labor . . . has derived important tangible and intangible benefits from it."¹

Why cooperation works. The analysis of perception and motivation in industry brings out many reasons for industrial conflict. But it is equally clear that there are sound psychological bases for cooperation between management and union. Essentially, the process of accommodation (Chapter 12) is a process of working out new group norms for the whole establishment, rather than for the parties separately. This process is possible because many goals can be better achieved by cooperation than by conflict. However, this generalization will be transformed into action only when the participants perceive these possibilities for goal achievement and are not intimidated by fear of frustration and deprivation.

An early defense of union-management cooperation was offered by Golden and Ruttenberg (1942). They attempted to identify and illustrate the psychological factors that must be faced and manipulated if cooperation is to result in mutual goal achievement. These psychological variables reside within executives, within employees, and within union officers. The chief barrier to an awareness of the great possibilities in this area, they suggest, is the attitude of suspicion

¹ Braun (1947), p. 248.

which usually blocks communication and understanding across these group boundaries.

Persuading management. Management has the initiative in any such relationship. A union officer who attempts to cooperate with management can be voted out by his members; an executive is not subject to this threat. Therefore, Golden and Ruttenberg have been at special pains to show executives that union-management cooperation pays off in dollars. One of their points is that the production workers represent a vast reservoir of information which cannot be tapped as long as unfriendly attitudes block communication. As an example, they cite an instance of the Federal Steel Company which (threatened with bankruptcy in 1938) decided to gamble on a Scanlon-plan contract. This firm, in 1935, had been afflicted with an epidemic of "alligator hide" imperfections in finished steelsheets, which was resulting in scrap rates as high as 60 per cent of production. The company's engineers worked on the problem, without success, and finally hired a consulting metallurgist at \$500 a day. This expert made many recommendations, none of which improved the situation.

After good relations with the union were established, a union committee was asked to work on this problem. One of the men, an old employee with long experience in hot mills, asserted that the trouble was due to "the pairs soaking too long in the pair furnace. When asked why the pairs soaked too long, he replied that it was because the pickler was working shorthanded and couldn't get them back fast enough to keep the furnace going A trial was made, the condition was remedied, and three additional men were placed on the pickling crew."¹

This is not intended to suggest that the outside expert may not be the better resource for some problems. It does indicate that, as regards day-to-day operations, the experienced worker has a store of knowledge that can be of great value if tapped. However, the knowledge will not be released to management unless conditions are such that it will be used in accordance with the norms accepted by the work group. Use of such information to reduce the number of jobs, or to cut wages, or to weaken the union, will shut off the flow of information suddenly.

Satisfactions to employees. From the point of view presented in this volume, many of the more important gains from such a program do not show in dollars and cents. We have emphasized the desire

¹ Golden and Ruttenberg (1942), p. 273. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

of workers for self-expression and prestige and have noted the extent to which management practices deny gratification to such impulses. Executives enjoy solving difficult problems; why shouldn't employees do likewise? Golden and Ruttenberg cite many evidences that tapping this fund of knowledge and ingenuity can lead to great satisfaction for individual workers.

Inefficiencies based on suspicion. The inefficiencies around a plant full of conflict are not entirely a matter of failing to get worker co-operation. Management follows many policies calculated to neutralize the power of the union and to reduce threats at crucial times, which are wasteful. A water-heater company president is quoted as follows: "We only used to be primarily an assembly plant. The parts were contracted out. The old management did not dare make them here for fear that when it needed vital parts the men might strike key operations to press a grievance or win a sharp bargain. Some parts were made in Cleveland, others in Cincinnati, and when they got here we prayed, often in vain, that they would fit together."¹ With cooperative attitudes, the company began making its own parts, which fitted better and also reduced seasonal unemployment.

The mutual suspicions felt on both sides do not disappear overnight. Executives do not believe that union leaders will follow through on their promises to help speed up production, and unionists distrust executive promises not to exploit union weaknesses and factionalism. The mere existence of such suspicions, of course, makes the execution of the contract more difficult.

That union leaders can be depended upon to follow through on agreements to increase productivity is indicated by a variety of evidence. The executives quoted in foregoing passages were in an excellent position to know whether the union officers were sabotaging the program. Another source of information comes from rank-and-file interviews. A special study by the *Public Opinion Index for Industry* compares opinions of workers in a random sample of plants to workers in "Company A" in which a group-bonus plan had been installed with the approval of the union (apparently a modified Scanlon contract). As Table 14.2 shows, the average worker leans slightly to the view that union leaders do more to slow down operations, but in Company A, the union leaders are said to do more to increase the amount of work performed. (The replies of 17 per cent who still say the union leaders are trying to hold down work raises a question. This may

¹ Golden and Ruttenberg, (1942), p. 282. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

reflect perceptual constancy of the employees, who still stick to their views despite a change in officer behavior; or it may reflect a disagreement within the union, with some leaders refusing to go along with the contract.)

Sacrifices involved. Scanlon-plan contracts are not without their costs, as is indicated by the fact that they have not swept American industry. A major cost in management's frame of reference is a loss of flexibility. There is less freedom to shut down particular operations, to lay off employees for the convenience of management, and so on. The contract also tends to reduce the executive's ego satisfactions, in various ways. He has, in a way, been forced to admit that he

Table 14.2 Opinions of Workers regarding Behavior of Union Leaders*

"Do you think union leaders do more to increase or more to hold down the amount of work the individual worker turns out?"

	<i>Increase</i>	<i>Hold Down</i>	<i>Neither</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
All manufacturing manual workers	20%	29%	27%	24%
AFL members	31	27	31	11
CIO members	27	23	34	16
Non-members	11	35	17	37
Company A manual workers	41	17	22	20

* From *Public Opinion Index for Industry*, May, 1947. Reprinted by permission of Opinion Research Corporation.


is not smart enough to manage without help from his employees. He is confronted with the fact that hourly workers may know more about certain operations than he does. Workers now feel free to disagree with him (Fig. 14.1). He loses some of his comfortable feeling of superiority. In effect, he abandons all hope of ever eliminating the union from his establishment.

The executive, at least in the past, encountered other frustrations, in the form of social disapproval and even economic reprisal from his fellow-employers if he cooperated with a union. (Group solidarity, as we have often noted, is not confined to hourly employees.) Golden and Ruttenberg state, "We have entered into union-shop contracts, for example, with one hundred and seventeen firms, employing more than one hundred thousand workers, on a private, semiconfidential, or oral basis, because they fear reprisals from customers, bankers,

or others in the industry if they publicly accept the union-shop principle."¹ This, of course, was prior to Taft-Hartley. Such *sub rosa* arrangements would be illegal today; on the other hand, the norm of opposition to union-shop agreements is no longer so powerful among employers. As we have noted elsewhere, the rather stringent limitations on union-shop elections have hardly impeded the spread of this

STRICTLY BUSINESS

By Dale McFeatters



"What's wrong? All I said was 'No, I didn't like Mr. Pottleby's idea!'"

Fig. 14.1. The danger of disagreeing with the boss. Without the protection of a union, many employees are afraid to criticize. (From *Strictly Business*, by Dale McFeatters, by permission of the Pittsburgh Press.)

¹ Golden and Ruttenberg (1942), p. 196. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Bros.

form of union security contract; it is being accepted as a normal part of American industrial life.

The union officer also makes some sacrifices under this type of contract. He loses his freedom to avoid responsibility for decisions, yet to heckle when things go wrong. Some unions have refused an invitation to sign such an agreement, because the officers cannot perceive themselves as taking the side of management in a controversy. They refuse to accept the idea of norms existing above those of their own group. To them, the worker is always right, just as to the old-line executive the boss was always right. Unionists must abandon this cozy prejudice if they want the benefits of the Scanlon contract. As information spreads, both executives and union members are concluding that the benefits are worth the sacrifices.

We do not suggest that Scanlon-plan contracts are a panacea for industrial relations ills. Poor human relations techniques can still evoke aggression, and technological changes will still elicit anxiety. Factionalism can develop within the union, to bedevil the executive who is an innocent bystander, and interunion rivalries may still rise to cause confusion. Power-seeking union leaders can conceivably take advantage of their situation to exploit both management and workers; however, the greater freedom of communication inherent in this arrangement should make such tactics easier to defeat. Managers and union leaders can get together to exploit the consuming public, if industrial competition is not vigorous. In short, such contracts are only a technique, not a short cut to Utopia. How they will function will still depend upon the human beings utilizing them. Short of the completely automatic factory which has machines both as executives and as production employees, there seems to be no way of avoiding this dependence on the human element.

THE BASES OF UNION-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION

What psychological principles hold for these diverse instances of union-management cooperation? We have considered the NPA studies on selected harmonious establishments, with special attention to the Lapointe Company as representing the Scanlon plan, and have seen some of the results of labor-management committees during the war. The parties cooperate under a diversity of contracts and in a variety of ways. Let us look at a few common ideas that seem to run through all these instances.

We can identify six different and apparently independent sets of factors that are common to the various instances of union-management

cooperation that we have considered. They may be labeled as follows: (1) the goals of the parties; (2) the norms accepted by the parties; (3) the internal structure of management and union; (4) the institutional procedures followed; (5) the leadership of the parties; and (6) the environment of the relationship. Some of these are more important than others. However, all have contributed in some degree to the cooperation observed.

Goals. Cooperation is feasible if two individuals, or two groups, are seeking *the same goal which can be shared*, or if they are seeking *complementary goals*. "A bigger share" of present income is not in either of these categories, but "a bigger income to be shared" is a goal that can be sought by cooperative techniques. Security for workers is complementary to a dependable product market for the employer. Victory in war is a goal perceived as essential by people on both sides.

Cooperation is handicapped if divisive goals are perceived as important. For example, if executives perceive flexibility in size of work force as an important intermediary goal, they will necessarily do things that frustrate the workers' desire for security. If employees hold back production in order to protect job rates, the executives' desire for low production costs is frustrated.

Goals that tend to divide the employee group are also negative indications for cooperation. Individual incentive plans, for example, are perceived as setting one worker against another, and incentive workers against straight-time workers. Plant-wide incentives, or profit sharing, on the other hand, are goals that foster cooperation between groups of workers, and between lower-level supervisors.

Any goals accepted by either side that will be threatening to the other obviously will prevent cooperation. A union that has accepted as an official goal the destruction of the profit system will naturally offer no opportunities for a cooperative relationship. And a management that still clings to the goal of destruction of unions will be equally unacceptable for this purpose.¹

The importance of overriding goals is evidenced in the labor-management committees in wartime. The production of "a bigger pie" to share is a goal that operated effectively in the Scanlon-plan contracts. To the extent that we devise more and more goals which are mutually valued, we can expect increasing cooperation between the employer and the union.

¹ For an elaboration of the importance of political and economic ideology as determiners of a cooperative relationship, see *NPA Case Study No. 1*, 1948, Crown-Zellerbach Corporation and the Pacific Coast Pulp and Paper Industry.

Norms. Groups strive to achieve goals by following certain norms that constitute the rules of the game. Cooperation is fostered when these norms are accepted by both sides, and such acceptance in turn is more likely if the relevant norms arise in a larger group embracing both the union and the management. For example, restrictions on violence by company guards against union men, and by pickets against non-strikers, have become steadily firmer since 1939. The norm forbidding violence is a product of a larger group, the community, state, or nation, to which both union and company are subordinate. When either group rejects these norms, enforcement devices are available that can inflict punishment on the offender.

It is clear, consequently, that, if either group rejects the norms of the larger unit, cooperation is made more difficult—impossible, in fact. As long as executives held that their property rights took precedence over the taboo against violence,¹ cooperation could never be achieved. And the use of violence by strikers to enforce their conceptions of their rights will likewise make cooperation difficult or impossible.

We have defined collective bargaining as a process of setting norms for the establishment as regards conditions of employment. Accepting membership in a group comprehending both management and union is implied. Our observations on dual allegiance (Chapter 12) indicate that such group membership is both feasible and natural to rank-and-file employees. Whether executives will be able to accept membership in such an inclusive group is a problem. Union officers likewise show some resistance to this shift, but in operations such as Lapointe they seem to have done so.

Richmond (1954) considers the presence of common norms, perceived as overriding those of the union and management groups, to be essential for effective cooperation. On the basis of an analysis of British experience with joint committees, he writes: "The imposition of a system of joint consultation between management and workers in industry, in the absence of a commonly accepted value system in which the manifest objectives of the organization are held by both personal and group interests, is bound to be abortive" (p. 31).

Norms of action that reject consultation inhibit cooperation. If management clings to the procedure of unilateral decision on important conditions of employment, cooperation cannot succeed. Similarly, if union leaders refuse to accept a consultative role, or themselves take unilateral action, the chances of success are minute.

¹ See, for example, the hearings on the Ludlow massacre of 1904. U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations.

Internal structure. The problems of goals and norms are the decisive determinants of union-management cooperation, as we read the data summarized in this chapter. However, subsidiary influences can help or hinder cooperative action. One of them is the internal structure of management or of the union.

Stability seems to favor cooperation. This means that rapid turnover of executives, or of union leadership, hinders cooperation. Goals, after all, are perceived by individuals, and actions directed toward them are planned by individuals. Constantly changing leadership means changing tactics, tension, unpredictability for those who are not making the decisions. Two men cannot cooperate if one of them is always changing the course of action.

Factionalism on either side interferes with cooperation, for substantially the same reason. Cliques within management may be engaged in a struggle for power, during which they adopt changing tactics to meet particular threats. Such changes confuse and disturb employees and union officials. Similarly, factionalism within the union may mean politically inspired grievances, arbitrary refusal to settle minor issues, and propaganda against the employer; these tactics are adopted primarily to help one group hold or gain power within the union, but the effect is to confuse and frustrate executives. Thus, a well-integrated but not rigid structure on either side of the bargaining table fosters cooperation.

Institutional procedures. Cooperation does not depend on having a round bargaining table instead of the usual rectangular furniture, and it is largely independent of specific tricks of organization. Setting up a committee with equal numbers from both sides does not guarantee agreement, and unequal numbers will not necessarily lead to an attempt by the larger group to outshout the smaller. Response to these procedures depends on the goal-norm relationship spelled out earlier.

Within this limitation it should be noted that well-conceived procedures can foster the more rapid development of cooperation. For example, holding union-management meetings specifically devoted to production problems other than grievances permits positive rather than negative attitudes a chance for expression. Free discussion, with encouragement of participation on all sides, helps communication and thereby increases information. Understanding the norms of the opposing party is very important. Without free communication this is impossible. Further, such communication lets management learn of the contributions that employees can make to productive efficiency, knowledge the executive will never acquire if he keeps a barrier be-

tween himself and the average worker. Employees have a chance to learn how some of their own tactics create stumbling blocks in the way of achieving their major goals.

Procedures that allow participation by individuals may take advantage of personal goals in addition to group objectives. All of us like opportunities for self-expression, a chance to win recognition and approbation. If self-expression can be achieved without introducing divisive tactics, it channels individual motives into group cooperation. Workers who win the respect of executives and of their fellows for ingenious ideas become solid supporters of union-management cooperation.

Conversely, of course, procedures that suppress the individual make him negative to cooperative action. Close, rigid supervision frustrates the average employee (cf. Gouldner's study of a wildcat strike, Chapter 13). Managerial procedures that deny the union access to executives except at carefully scheduled times will evoke resentment. The most successful instances of cooperation seem to involve democratic unions in which members are free to express themselves without intimidation.

Another procedural hazard is that of by-passing middle-management officials. Scott (1952) comments that, in many British firms, joint committees have operated to increase the insecurity feelings of such individuals, as they feel that they get less information and fewer opportunities to make decisions. Procedures, therefore, must be calculated to protect the security of all the various groups affected by the cooperative program.

Leadership. As both management and union grow larger, in terms of sheer numbers of people, the role of leadership increases in importance. Only general policies can be determined by a mass voting procedure anyway; tactics must always be determined by a small group. And, as we have noted earlier, tactical operations may have a significant impact on the course of union-management cooperation.

It seems certain that the presence of any leader, on either side, with unusually strong desires for aggression or dominance can disturb the group equilibrium. Here, as elsewhere, the quality of management leaders is apparently more important, but an aggressive union officer can keep minor grievances boiling and induce his followers to perceive as threatening many gestures that management intended as cooperative. Attacks on the good will of management will increase suspicion on the part of the rank and file; as we all know, a single belligerent character can usually start a fight, irrespective of the pacific behavior of others.

Positive leadership by individuals on both sides is usually necessary for success. On management's part, men like J. C. Hormel and James F. Lincoln have been inventive and persistent in developing inducements and procedures for cooperation. On the union side, the cases cited by the National Planning Association and those mentioned in Golden and Ruttenberg provide numerous illustrations of persistence by union officials until management agreed to try cooperation. The motives and attitudes that characterize such union and management leaders provide an important topic for future psychological research.

Environment. The emphasis here has been on the psychological factors making for cooperation, both because this book is primarily a study of such influences and because an emphasis upon environment quickly leads to a pessimistic view that seems unjustified by the facts already cited. However, it would not be defensible to deny any role to the environment.

Size of establishment. Cooperation seems to be more readily established in small than in large firms, probably because of ease of communication, especially the person-to-person communication that is so important in building attitudes of trust and confidence. Many misunderstandings that may derive from communications filtered through various levels of supervision or union officialdom are eliminated. However, the Lapointe example indicates that fairly good-sized establishments can work out high-level cooperation, and some of the NPA studies deal with even larger enterprises.

Economic context. Cooperation is naturally easier to initiate in times of prosperity and rising wages (cf. Adamson), but, in fact, most establishments have moved toward cooperation when the firm was threatened with bankruptcy. This crisis makes both sides aware of common goals (no profits, no jobs). However, at such a time, cooperation by the workers is likely to mean wage cuts and sacrifices of soft job practices; we know that behavior that is punished will not be well-learned. Unfortunately, in periods of prosperity, executives are likely to feel smug and contented with present procedures. Hence cooperation is usually tried at the very time at which it has least chance of succeeding.

Technological situation. The NPA studies indicate that firms showing moderate technological advances are relatively more cooperative than those showing very rapid change or none at all. Whether this is a general rule awaits further demonstration. It might be argued that the high stability of no technological change would favor cooperation; however, it is certain that rapid modifications of technique and job conditions make for instability and resistant attitudes. Even in

such a situation, the evidence indicates, cooperation is possible if attitudes are good (cf. Dewey-Almy Chemical Co., *NPA Case Study No. 3*).

Summary. We avoid committing ourselves, at any point in this volume, to a definition of "good" or "bad" union-management relations. We suppose that it would be generally agreed, nevertheless, that strikes are, on the whole, "bad" for the company, for the workers, and for the public. Cooperation, in the instances that we have cited here, seems to be "good" for the company, for the workers, and for the public.

A plausible question, then, arises with respect to the fostering of these cooperative kinds of relationships: what kinds of actions by employers, by unions, by the government, and by the general public are likely to increase the frequency of effective cooperation? Chapter 15 proposes some tentative answers to this question.

Industrial Peace

This volume has been devoted to an exploration of psychological factors contributing to industrial conflict and industrial cooperation. The investigation has uncovered many indications that perception and motivation, frustration and aggression, leadership and group loyalties play important parts in modern industrial life.

It is appropriate to repeat once more the caution that these psychological factors are not operating in isolation. They must be considered in relation to economic, sociological, and political influences. Indeed, in many instances the psychological processes that we have emphasized should be treated as subsidiary and derivative of the other factors that may be considered to have a more realistic or independent basis of variation. Such treatment however, is not intended to deprecate the importance of psychological considerations. The evidence indicates conclusively that manipulation of the economic and technological variables without consideration of the psychological consequences may very well lead to an increase rather than a decrease in conflict.

In this final chapter we consider some general questions of public policy with respect to industrial conflict, as our psychological data appear to be relevant. Again, these questions must be evaluated in the light of other social sciences. But, as will be noted below, some of the formulations of other experts need careful re-examination in the light of psychology.

The goals of public policy. We cannot even begin to discuss public policy without raising psychological questions. What is the goal of public policy? Who defines it? Whose perceptions of positive and negative valences shall determine action? The answers to these questions are fundamental to a valid analysis.

In a sense, these questions go back to the one that we have consistently avoided: what are "good" union-management relations? A relationship which is perceived as good by management may not be so from the union viewpoint. The consumer may see things differently from either the executive or the union officer. And government ad-

ministrators could conceivably have still other perceptions of a satisfactory relationship.

Similarly, various policies of companies and of unions have been criticized as "not in the public interest." But who speaks for "the public"? Do we accept the perceptions of top executives? If judges and political officials come primarily from backgrounds close to industrial executives, can we assume that they define "public interest" impartially? Can we say that union officers are dependable spokesmen for the public interest? The extent of these biases can be illustrated by the question of control of inflation in the "public interest" at the beginning of World War II. Two opinion surveys show the tendency of economic groups to perceive the "public interest" as coinciding with their own.

Fortune Forum of Executive Opinion asked top executives in September, 1941, "Which would you favor freezing at their present levels for the duration of the emergency?" Responses were: wages, 62.6 per cent; raw materials, 52.3 per cent; wholesale prices, 30.8 per cent; farm products, 30.7 per cent; retail prices, 27.8 per cent; all-or-none, 14.3 per cent; none, 11.0 per cent.

In sharp contrast to this is an *American Institute of Public Opinion* poll of March 19, 1941, in which a national sample was asked, "Would you like to see the Federal government fix prices so that as long as the war in Europe lasts everything you buy will cost the same as it does now?" To this businessmen gave 53 per cent approval of price control, whereas skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled laborers gave 80 per cent approval.¹

Thus the executives were perfectly willing to have their major costs (wages and raw materials) frozen, but wanted freedom for prices to change (no interference with the executive's freedom of decision). Although a majority of laborers accepted both wage and price control, they were far more enthusiastic about price control than about wage regulation.

We are therefore compelled to ask, with respect to any assertions about the public interest: what is it, and whose definition are we to accept? Even the college professor will read his own personal and group biases into such an ambiguous situation. The best we can do

¹ It should be noted that on a parallel AIPO question about wage control, the businessmen gave 42% approval, laborers 57%. Since the Gallup poll's national sample of businessmen would be heavily loaded with small retailers, this probably reflects the fact that wages were a small item in their budgets as compared to the "big business" group. Note that they were also much more willing to accept price control than the top executives.

is to recognize these prejudices and attempt to cancel one against another, rather than blindly accept one and attack all the others as selfish and malicious.

We have, of course, one widely accepted criterion of the public interest which may be of assistance. "The greatest good of the greatest number" is a well-entrenched democratic slogan. But what is the greatest good? Is it an immediate short-run gain? Or is it long-run benefit? It is conceivable that a policy might be productive of immediate gratifications for a majority, and yet produce frustrations for this same majority later.

On the other hand, we must be wary of generalizations such as, "This is hard on the people, but it is for the best interests of society." This is the communist-fascist slogan which has been used to rationalize hardships for the many and luxury for the few. It is easy, consequently, to say that strikes are against the best interest of society, and mean only that they disturb the preferred equilibrium of people at the top of the economic pyramid. And it would be possible, in restricting such freedoms as the "right to strike" (which is not an absolute right, any more than management's "right to manage" is absolute), that the majority of people might suffer losses in the future much more serious than the value of the short-run gains from these restrictive measures.

Thus it is not at all clear that industrial peace must be the prime goal of public policy. Some degree of industrial conflict may be a good idea from the point of view of the consumer, and even in relation to the goals of executives and unionists. Labor peace that involves collusion to defraud the consumer is not "in the public interest." Nor is labor peace that is purchased by bribing union leaders.

One solution that has been proposed for industrial conflict is the break-up of large enterprises and unions into small establishments. According to nostalgic memories of the "good old days," which may or may not be correct, employer and employee understood each other when they worked side by side, knew each other personally, and perceived little difference between their roles. But such a change would require a drastic lowering of the material standard of living of the American people; it is unlikely that they would pay the price.

Industrial conflict could, of course, be ended—temporarily, at least—by shooting all the employers (the Communist solution) or all the union leaders (the Nazi solution). It is relatively unlikely that even such drastic measures really achieve their ostensible ends; at least, it is reasonably clear that some Soviet trade unions have become restless under political control, and that there is, in fact, union-management

conflict despite totalitarian suppression. However, we assume that these paths to industrial peace will not appeal to Americans.

The solution, then, must lie in somehow learning to live together. If we are unwilling to exterminate management, or to wipe out labor, then we must devise programs that lead to "peaceful coexistence." As the preceding chapter shows, harmony in union-management dealings is possible under favorable conditions at present. How can public policy and private practice increase the frequency of these favorable conditions?

COOPERATION AND COMPETITION

The essence of industrial conflict as we have identified it in American industry is competition between the two organized groups: competition for larger shares of income, competition for power, competition for employee loyalty. The desirable features of the establishments characterized by "industrial peace" could be summarized by saying that cooperation between the two groups had replaced much of the competition.

We suggest, therefore, that we can arrive at an interpretation of what kinds of policies foster industrial peace by examining the generalized principles of competition and cooperation between groups. In 1937 the Social Science Research Council published a report summarizing and integrating the available ideas on this question. The summary is still an excellent starting point for our discussion:

On a social level individuals compete with one another when: (1) they are striving to achieve the same goal which is scarce; (2) they are prevented by the rules of the situation from achieving this goal in equal amounts; (3) they perform better when the goal can be achieved in unequal amounts; and (4) they have relatively few psychologically affiliative contacts with one another.

On a social level individuals cooperate with one another when: (1) they are striving to achieve the same or complementary goals that can be shared; (2) they are required by the rules of the situation to achieve this goal in nearly equal amounts; (3) they perform better when the goal can be achieved in equal amounts; and (4) they have relatively many psychologically affiliative contacts with one another.¹

This analysis does not differ significantly from that which has been presented in our preceding chapters from a strictly psychological point of view. Specifically, our analysis has emphasized three aspects of the relationship between the individual and the industrial environment: the perceptual aspect, or what he perceives as the real situation;

¹ May and Doob (1937), p. 17.

the motivational aspect, or the goals toward which he is striving; and the institutional aspect, or the structure of the industrial establishment within which he must strive to achieve these goals.

The motivational problem. What has our analysis indicated with regard to "striving to achieve the same or complementary goals that can be shared"? First of all, it can be noted that both management and the union are organized in terms of economic goals. There is an extensive literature, with which our analysis is in agreement, showing that the achievement of larger economic return to both managers and workers can in fact be achieved through cooperation rather than through competition. There is thus no question that, if the economic goal were the only one that is important in industry, this condition of cooperation could be achieved with relative ease.

Unfortunately, our data indicate also the importance of ego motivation, the position of relative power and influence to be achieved by the executive, the union officer, or the workers identified with their union organization. In this instance we find that relative sharing is much more difficult. It is easy to produce a larger pie and thus share bigger pieces. It is not easy to produce a larger total quantum of power so that both the manager and the union officer can achieve their power goals. We seem to reach a kind of logical impasse with regard to the possibility of producing a situation in which the power goal can be shared and achieved with relative equality by the two parties in industrial conflict. Indeed, the very process of increasing the power of the union has automatically been perceived by executives as a decrease in their power.

As regards the subsidiary goals that we have noted as being important for both parties, many of them are also in the area that can be shared: security, for example. Security of the employee against hazards of physical existence, unemployment, technological changes, etc., is by no means incompatible with the security of the manager as the executive of an ongoing and successful enterprise. These security goals, then, can be achieved as a complementary or shared process. Similarly, there is no apparent ceiling on the extent to which praise and recognition can be given to individuals. Management has been deplorably niggardly in handing out praise and recognition to the rank and file of workers. However, the penetration of industrial psychologists into management ranks has been followed by a steady increase in the training of supervisors in good human relations techniques and, no doubt, by a substantial improvement in this particular respect. The desire to belong to a group that is successful, active, and

potent is another goal on which no apparent limitations can be placed. There is no reason why the feeling of satisfaction that the worker gets from belonging to an active, successful union need interfere in any way with the satisfaction of the executive from his feeling of belongingness in the class of successful leaders in industry. Thus, the primary problem in terms of motivation is the question of power. Can we work out any kind of industrial framework within which power as a goal will not produce serious and disruptive industrial conflicts?

The perceptual problem. A second major question with which we have been concerned throughout this volume is the perceptual question. How do people perceive the various pathways by which they may attain the goals which motivate them to action? What "facts" do they see in the industrial situation? What kinds of activities do they perceive as acceptable, and what kinds are forbidden in terms of their cultural background, their codes of ethics, the group pressures to which they feel themselves subjected, etc.? In concrete terms the perceptual problem raises questions such as: how do managers perceive the possibility of cooperation with labor unions regarding various problems in the industrial scene? How do union officers look upon the possibility of cooperative relationships with management? Do they tend to perceive conflict as inevitable and essential, or do they see the possibility of joint action toward common goals or toward goals that can be enjoyed at the same time?

We have also noted the importance of the perception of individuals. Does the manager perceive the union leader as a wild-eyed radical, a dangerous, irresponsible, malicious character who is trying to bankrupt the enterprise? Do the union officers perceive management as a group of fascists trying to grind down the workers and exploit their labor for the profit of a few fortunate individuals? To the extent that we have highly biased perceptions like these, industrial peace is most improbable.

Finally, we may ask, how do the participants perceive the rules under which they are operating? Do they see the economic system as operating fairly and equitably for the benefit of all, or do they see the rules as loaded in one direction or another? We know that before the passage of the Wagner Act many union officials perceived government as strongly biased against labor unions and in favor of industry. With the passage of the Wagner Act, accusations were more frequently made in the other direction; but with the advent of the Taft-Hartley Act, the shoe is again on the other foot. However, there seem to be fewer grounds for an accusation of injustice and bias

today than in the period before 1933. At any rate, it is clear that perceptions of the rules as unfair and arbitrary can only lead to conflict.

Difficulties arise when we attempt to reach agreement on the facts in industrial disputes because every industrial situation is complex and provides cues that can lead to contradictory interpretations. We can illustrate this by listing only a few of the many paradoxes that exist in this field:

1. A company and a union are both economic agents; therefore it is right and proper that both be subject to the same regulations and laws.

But: a business enterprise is regulated under laws evolved for the control and protection of property rights, whereas a union is concerned with human beings, not with property.

2. Maximum production is a desirable national goal; strikes interfere with production; therefore, strikes should be minimized, delayed, and limited, or even outlawed altogether.

But: human rights are more precious than commodities. The thought that men should be compelled to work under unfair, oppressive, or hazardous conditions, even for 60 or 90 days, is repugnant to democratic thinkers.

Further: no laws restrict the right of management to close a plant at any time for any reason whatever.

3. Combinations of employers to raise prices are illegal; therefore, collective action by the employees, aimed at raising wages, should be illegal.

But: denying workers the aid and cooperation of other workers would put them in a hopelessly unequal bargaining position. As long as the present relative distribution of wealth continues, the individual worker will always be in such a weak position that he cannot hope to win an extended economic struggle.

4. No employee should be required, as a condition of employment, to join a union that he dislikes.

But: the union members have made economic sacrifices to improve wages and working conditions, and it is unfair that others should reap the benefits without paying their share of the cost.

Further: management does not come into court with clean hands on this issue, as employers habitually deny employment to men because they are Negroes, Jews, Mexicans, Chinese, etc.

5. Employers can be sued for damages if they injure others economically; thus it is proper that unions should also be suable if they inflict damages on a company.

But: the employer, acting as an agent, is protected against personal liability; whereas the members of a union could be sued and their personal property attached.

6. A strike in violation of a contract should be penalized by action against officers or union or both.

But: management regularly violates clauses of union contracts, and the union's only way of compelling management to obey the contract is to strike, even though this is also a contract violation.

Further: such regulations would be an open invitation to management to stir up trouble, hire a few anti-union people to start wildcat strikes, and break the union.

These examples, which are only a sample of the many possible conflicting views, indicate something of the problem that faces us in trying to achieve peaceful agreement. Because of differences in motives, social roles, family background, and personal experiences, there are wide differences in perception of the facts in industry. Since behavior is guided by perception, conflict is inevitable until some common realities are established upon which agreement is possible.

We propose, therefore, that one of the important aspects of any program aiming at a long-range peace-planning policy in industry must take account of the problem of perception. We must ask the question, how can labor union officials, factory workers, and company executives be induced to perceive things, if not in the same way, at least in ways that are mutually compatible? Communication between the three groups must be improved, and this depends upon the establishment of similar standards in the perceptual field. No matter how good a system of rules we have for governing labor relations, these rules cannot possibly work if the principal parties involved in the controversy perceive them as inappropriate, unfair, or unworkable. The perceptual problem, therefore, stands as one of the most important with which we must deal in this connection.

The institutional problem. Finally, a third problem, that of the nature of the institutional rules and practices themselves, must be briefly differentiated clearly from the problem of perception noted above. In the long run, perceptions do tend to correspond to objective realities in the sense that, if rules are enforced, they create a certain high level of probability that the perceptions of the persons affected will eventually conform to the rules. However, in the short run, perceptions can, as we have demonstrated many times in this volume, deviate very sharply from the characteristics of reality as defined by objective science or as defined by the consensus of other people. Furthermore, if these rules of institutional operation do in fact penalize one side more frequently than another, the perception of unfairness will necessarily arise with the undesirable consequences noted in the preceding paragraphs.

Therefore it becomes necessary for us to give at least passing consideration to the nature of these institutional practices. It is conceded that the area of primary concern with these problems is the area of economics and perhaps of political science; in other words, many

problems with regard to the establishment of economic institutions, governmental control of labor unions, government regulation of monopolistic practices in industry, tariffs and other subsidies to industry, minimum wages and other subsidies to labor go far beyond the scope of psychology. We make no pretense in this treatment of attempting to consider any of these complex issues. We are concerned only with the problem of institutional rules to the extent that they have an impact on the more fundamental psychological processes with which we are dealing.

The importance of this point is emphasized by considering again the SSRC formalization of the conditions of competition and cooperation which has already been quoted. It will be noted that this formulation asserted that individuals compete with one another when "they are prevented by the rules of the situation from achieving this goal in equal amounts," and that they cooperate with one another when "they are required by the rules of the situation to achieve this goal in nearly equal amounts." Now, unfortunately, objective equality cannot possibly be achieved, and perceptual equality is a highly debatable, ambiguous proposition. It therefore necessarily follows that how the rules are perceived will be an important problem in the achievement of industrial peace.

The rules of day-to-day operation of the industrial enterprise have been determined primarily by management. It is obvious, for example, that the enormous discrepancy between the salaries paid top executives and the wages paid to the typical rank-and-file worker are in large part a function of the fact that the top executives determine this distribution of income. Whether the president of General Motors, receiving a salary of \$400,000 a year, and the typical automobile worker, receiving about \$4000 a year, are being fairly paid is a matter that is beyond the scope of this volume and is probably one to which no definitive answer is possible, since it would depend upon how these individuals are perceived and by whom their value to the organization is assessed. By and large, unions have not succeeded in getting a bigger share of economic rewards for labor (cf. Chapter 9). However, it appears likely that the union has had some impact; for example, the fact that the workers have a voice (through the union) in determining the rules in the establishment may have relieved tension to some degree. (We have noted in Chapter 12 that the attitudinal climate is more favorable in establishments where the union has a larger voice in decision making.)

Institutional rules are also imposed by government. The question whether these rules are fairly devised or fairly administered is another one in which answers are distorted by perceptual differences. Parti-

sans of each side view specific governmental activities quite differently. For example, it is now possible for a labor union to be fined for forcing the shutdown of an industrial enterprise under certain conditions defined by provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. On the other hand, there is no provision for fining an employer for closing down his plant at any time. Whether this is, in fact, fair is in the same area of impossibility noted above. How it will be perceived by people with different backgrounds is, of course, highly predictable.

Labor unionists have often protested the utilization of the courts and governmental machinery in labor disputes because they have felt that the socioeconomic and educational background of lawyers and judges has been such that they perceive the facts in the same way as company executives. A reference to some of the determining factors outlined in Chapter 3 will indicate that there is at least an element of truth in this charge. It is, of course, clear that more and more individuals in these categories have developed sympathetic attitudes and ways of perceiving that are more closely similar to those of the unionized worker. However, real confidence on this point has not been established in the minds of a great many union officials.

We may ask: is it possible to change the rules of operation of our economic institutions? Many people have been disposed to think that these rules are the result of the operation of immutable economic laws and are not subject to deliberate intervention by the process of social planning. The fallacy of such thinking is, of course, obvious upon brief consideration. One hundred years ago there were no institutional rules forbidding employers to hire children 6 years of age and work them 10 or 12 hours a day in a spinning mill. Today we have extensive rules and enforcing machinery for the prevention of child labor. In the same way minimum wage legislation, legislation for the control of hazardous conditions of employment, and many other modifications have been made. Institutional rules, then, are subject to deliberate and conscious modification for the sake of socially desirable objectives. It is, on the other hand, obvious that ill-considered institutional rules do not succeed and, in fact, increase rather than decrease conflict. We must, therefore, be quite cautious in considering the psychological consequences of legislation before we decide that changing the rules is a plausible approach to the problem of obtaining industrial peace.

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

One proposal for a modification of our institutional rules is that compulsory arbitration be adopted in the case of major industrial dis-

putes (some have advocated it for all disputes). This would represent a major change from established practice.

Justification for using the force of law to compel a settlement on stated terms is found in the argument that the public interest is above the interest of either of the parties in the controversy. But, as we have already noted, no one knows exactly what the public interest is. Thus, an imposed settlement will necessarily be somewhat more favorable to one side or the other; and this inequality will elicit from the loser charges that the decision was biased, the arbiter unfair, and so on. The reaction of labor unions to the use of the courts—as in Taft-Hartley cases—illustrates one side of this question. The unions have bitterly attacked the courts as being loaded in favor of business. But the other side is illustrated by businessmen's reactions to War Labor Board decisions, and to the NLRB under the New Deal. At that time, Board decisions were often bitterly denounced as politically inspired.

The crux of the matter lies in the existence of mutually accepted norms for solving disputes. As citizens, we have a high degree of unanimity about certain norms, regarding murder, burglary, rape, and other crimes. But even these show cultural variations; offenses by a Negro against a white person in the South are more severely punished than offenses by a white individual against a Negro. Similarly, unionists are by no means convinced that mutually accepted norms govern court decisions on union-management disputes. Indeed, if the norms could be accepted mutually, the dispute almost certainly would not go to court.

Most lawyers are aware of the difference between settling disputes within an accepted framework of group norms and settling disputes where norms are in conflict. Advocates of compulsory arbitration make a specious appeal to the prestige of the established judicial procedure to induce acceptance of a type of institutional operation which is basically inappropriate. To quote Carlston (1952), a legal expert on arbitration procedures,

The term "compulsory arbitration" is a misnomer. The structural elements of a procedure consensual in origin and nature, discharging the judicial function in a system of administrative law . . . are here borrowed to serve the function of *making law for the parties* when the necessary democratic conditions incident to the process of negotiation are for one reason or another ineffective to produce agreement. Compulsory arbitration bargaining process depends The social problem in "compulsory arbitration" is *not the resolution of disputes* as to rights under determined and accepted rules for conduct but is the *formulation of the rules them-*

selves . . . Compulsory arbitration involves an attempt to mask these social realities and to bring about an acceptance by the parties of a novel procedure essentially legislative in character by cloaking it with an inappropriate and misleading symbol.¹

In essence, this view holds that, when generally accepted group norms exist, arbitration can apply them to concrete disagreements; but arbitration should not be utilized to write contracts in the absence of agreement as to basic terms. Thus Carlston apparently would accept arbitration of disputes by an impartial umpire whose discretion is limited to determining whether a given action did in fact violate a union-management contract. Much of the cry for "compulsory arbitration" in labor disputes, however, comes from people who want the state to write terms into a contract when the parties have failed to agree; such procedure is, as Carlston clearly indicates, legislation without the consent of the governed. The results are likely to be unsatisfactory to employer, or to the union, or to both; and they are likely to be honored more in the breach than in the observance.

Historically, many states and nations have experimented with compulsory arbitration, without much success. Since World War II, eight states have passed laws requiring compulsory arbitration in public utilities. Sussna (1954) studied the strike records of these states as regards utility workers. He found that in five of the states (Florida, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) the number of man-days idle declined after passage of the law, but in three (Indiana, Massachusetts, and Virginia) the number actually increased. It is difficult, therefore, to say that compulsory arbitration, even in a field already subject to substantial governmental control, can dependably produce a decrease in strike losses.

Somewhat more support exists for compulsory arbitration among management than among unions at the present time. Table 15.1 shows the results of a survey by Kornhauser (1945). Even among the representatives of management, a majority favors the proposal only with respect to public utilities. Respondents associated with unions are against compulsory arbitration almost unanimously.

This opposition is not to be conceived as a matter of union principle. Unions have called for compulsory arbitration when they perceived this tactic as advantageous. "An example . . . is the support of compulsory arbitration by the weak unions of New Zealand in 1892-1894, while the stronger unions opposed it. As all the unions there became stronger, they favored the use of conciliation procedures but, when

¹ Carlston (1952), p. 647. Italics are ours. Reprinted by permission.

they were weakened again by the depression of the 1930's, they again supported compulsion and caused its readoption in 1936."¹

The relative support for compulsory arbitration by employers (as indicated in Table 15.1) may indicate their belief that the climate of opinion at the close of World War II was favorable to management. Certainly there are hazards in arbitration from the managerial viewpoint.

Employers have pointed out, and with some justification, that coercion in such cases can be exerted against them more readily than against unions. Fines and property seizure are easily directed against a corporation. Because of our constitutional ban on involuntary servitude, it is difficult to insist that a man go to his job when he prefers to stay at home. A ban on strikes can be enforced against a union officer, but not against the members. So, for example, in New York City during World War II the milk wagon drivers had a dispute with their employers while they were operating under a no-strike pledge.

Table 15.1 Vote of Expert Groups on Desirability of Compulsory Arbitration*

<i>Approving compulsory arbitration in:</i>	<i>Management Experts</i>	<i>University & Govt. Experts</i>	<i>Union Experts</i>
Public utilities	61%	34%	6%
Necessary industries (coal, steel, milk, etc.).	14	14	0
Other industries	7	5	0

* Kornhauser (1945). Reprinted by permission of the author and the *American Magazine*. The question asked was phrased as follows: "In your estimation, which of the following policies in respect to industrial relations will be best for the nation after the war . . . III. A policy of having the government step in to protect the public interest when necessary by means of inquiry and investigation followed by recommendations *with compulsory arbitration*."

The union did not call a strike, but all the drivers called in and reported themselves sick on the same day. The courts have, of course, imposed fines on union treasuries in cases of such concerted "voluntary absenteeism," but it would be unlikely that penalties would be imposed upon individual workers. This coincides with British experience as described by Knowles (1952).

A solution of this dilemma based upon coercive measures seems unlikely. There is an unfortunate human tendency to desire to cut all Gordian knots instead of thoughtfully untying them. A psycho-

¹ Hayes (1940), p. 400. Reprinted by permission of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.





Fig. 15.1. Trends in work stoppages in three states having mandatory mediation laws. (From Rose, 1952b, by permission of Personnel Psychology, Inc.)

logical perspective on this problem suggests that the only dependable solution revolves around developing a general consensus as to norms and rules of conduct; then disputes can be settled in a judicial manner. But, as long as perceptions differ sharply and strong motives support these divergent views of the facts, consensus is impossible.¹

"Cooling-off" laws. A more restricted step toward governmental control of industrial disputes takes the form of enforced delays after a strike notice has been filed. These laws apparently derive from the theory that a strike is usually a manifestation of "hot-headed emotion" for which a "cooling-off" period will be a corrective. There is little evidence that the theory is correct, and little support for the effectiveness of these laws. Usually they have meant only that the union takes a strike vote at the opening of contract negotiations, so that the legal delay period will have elapsed by the time a deadlock may have developed.

Rose (1952*b*) has analyzed the strike experience of three states with compulsory cooling-off periods—Michigan, Minnesota, and Connecticut. A graphic presentation of his findings is shown in Fig. 15.1. It is clear that Michigan, with a turbulent record before passage of the law, has the same kind of record afterward. Minnesota and Connecticut seem to have experienced a slight reduction in strike activity following the passage of the law.

Stieber (1949) finds that the members of fact-finding commissions set up under the Minnesota law generally believe that such commissions have helped collective bargaining (presumably meaning industrial peace). Labor representatives on the commissions were most critical, but 62 per cent even of this group gave a favorable report.

The "public" representatives on such commissions are, of course, crucial, since they usually cast the deciding vote for a given recommendation (the Minnesota law does not compel acceptance of these findings, but they carry some weight because of public opinion). It is thus interesting to note how the public members are perceived by the employer and union representatives. Table 15.2 shows the replies given to the question, "In general, do you think that the public members of fact-finding commissions have been impartial, favorable to labor, or favorable to management?" No employers see the public members as being too friendly to management; no unionists perceive

¹ Even the Federal government has had only limited success in preventing strikes by compulsory arbitration (WLB, WSB, etc.) in the absence of common norms by which awards could be determined.

the public members as being too friendly to labor. But a sizeable segment of each group saw the public members as helping their opponents! This problem recurs constantly with tripartite boards—an institutional form, incidentally, of which we shall undoubtedly see a great deal more in the future.

This observation should remind us, incidentally, of the futility of assuming that such "fact-finding" commissions can find the "real facts." What is a real fact to one side is not necessarily real to the other. The commission may do some good by working out face-saving compromises, when spokesmen for the parties have gotten themselves into untenable positions and want an excuse to retract. This function is conciliation, not fact-finding. The really effective job of fact-finding is the job of communication, between executives, employees, and union

Table 15.2 Impartiality of Public Members As Seen by Employers and Labor Officials*

"In general, do you think that the public members of fact-finding commissions have been: . . ."

	<i>Impartial</i>	<i>Favorable to Labor</i>	<i>Favorable to Mgt.</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
Public members	71%	7%	7%	15%
Employers	52	38	10
Labor officials	48	48	4

* From Stieber (1949). Reprinted by permission of *Harvard Business Review*. The fact-finding commissions functioned during a "cooling-off" period to hear both sides and issue recommendations, which were not binding awards.

leaders, of goals, problems, frustrations, and barriers. If management has done a good job of communicating its situation, union demands will be somewhat more realistic. If union leaders have communicated well, executives will be able to judge where it is advisable to yield and where it is less essential. The fact-finding commission is an inefficient and inadequate substitute for this day-to-day process.

VOLUNTARY CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION

It should not be surprising that students of the conciliation process find voluntary conciliation and arbitration far more effective than compulsory measures. Compulsion does, of course, add more motivation toward the acceptance of a compromise norm; but it does not

change the perceptual biases that guided the parties into a deadlock. There is no reason to believe that either side will view the facts differently as a result of an imposed award.

On the other hand, the recommendations of a mediator or an arbitrator voluntarily chosen by the parties are more likely to be accepted without protest. This happens, in part, because some common norms have already been established; the parties were able to agree on a referee, and on the issues to be submitted, whereas such agreement frequently is not true of conflicts covered by compulsory arbitration. Hence, for voluntary arbitration, the acceptance of the decision is facilitated by the prior acceptance of the machinery. Most of the members of Minnesota "fact-finding" commissions favored voluntary as opposed to compulsory arbitration (Table 15.3).

The device of the "impartial umpire" permanently employed by corporation and union jointly, as in the General Motors-UAW agreements, seems to meet these requirements. The arbiter is not called upon to impose rules on the parties, but only to decide if there has been a violation of the rules already accepted. This conforms to the requirements suggested by Carlston (see above) for successful arbitration.

Table 15.3 Opinions as to Arbitration of Disputes Affecting the "Public Interest"*

"Do you believe that arbitration of labor disputes affecting the 'public interest' should be: . . ."

	<i>Voluntary</i>	<i>Compulsory</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
Public members	35%	58%	7%
Employers	62	28	10
Labor officials	74	23	3

* From Stieber (1949). Reprinted by permission of *Harvard Business Review*. The respondents are members of fact-finding commissions appointed under the Minnesota law placing certain limitations on strikes.

Some executives have feared that acceptance of the umpire system would lead to an endless procession of grievances fought all the way to the umpire. Conceivably this could happen in an attitudinal climate of suspicion and hostility. Experience generally has been that this does not happen. Anderson (1949) reports for General Motors that during a 17-month period, only 6/10 of 1 per cent of all grievances went to the umpire. During this same period, General Motors had a lost time record, from work stoppages, of *15 minutes per man-year*.

Hence, grievances were being settled at the local level without excessive pressure from the union. Anderson, indeed, gives explicit credit to the union leaders for "gaining more understanding through experience and maturity." Perhaps an impartial umpire system will be abused if attitudes are hostile and suspicious; but under reasonably favorable conditions, the umpire is called upon to adjudicate only those very tricky questions where the "facts" seem to support opposite conclusions.

Voluntary arbitration does not, of course, resolve those crucial disputes which are at the basis of a demand for compulsory arbitration imposed by governmental power. In such disputes the parties fail to agree on basic norms of working conditions—instances that the umpire plan cannot handle. As we have noted above, that any compulsory approach can handle such conflicts is also doubtful.

When we see no reasonably satisfactory technique for *settling* certain kinds of conflicts, it becomes essential to ask: can we prevent these conflicts from developing? Even the modest percentage that can be prevented represents a net gain to society. Let us turn, therefore, to the question: what guides derive from this psychological analysis with regard to a long-range program for preventing industrial conflicts or reducing their frequency?

ELIMINATING PERCEPTUAL CONFLICTS

The simplest problem to attack, in a long-range program of the sort just proposed, is the perceptual problem. However, we cannot eliminate divergent perceptions of facts simply by telling unionists and executives to "find the real facts." If they had been capable of doing this, the issue would not represent a problem in social engineering.

A major portion of this problem goes back to childhood. We have noted (Chapter 3) that children develop stereotypes about employers, and about union members, at early ages. These stereotypes reflect their family economic status, as well as parental attitudes. This would not matter if these infantile perceptions were modified and clarified with increasing maturity and experience. Unfortunately, it appears that they are not, at least, not often enough. So the individual reaches adulthood with a very narrow, inaccurate perception of the people with whom he must deal in collective bargaining.

The nature of this problem can be well illustrated by referring to the child's perception of his parents. It is literally true that a boy can say to his father, "You are the best daddy I know" and also, "You are the worst daddy I know." The two statements are not inconsistent

because the child's range of experience is limited. As long as he perceives his father as having both roles, no particular trouble results. But if he becomes fixated on the percept of the bad father so that a perceptual constancy develops, then he will ignore evidence of the "good father" and see only those actions which are restrictive, threatening, and punitive.

Within limits, something can be accomplished here by widening the child's experience, giving him an awareness of the range of differences, and helping him to develop a realistic frame of reference. Reading and talking with other children may help him to realize that his father has about the same number of good and bad features as other fathers. Another beneficial procedure is to encourage the child to think about why his father acts as he does—to consider possible environmental determinants, instead of imputing restrictive behavior to hostility and dominance. Psychotherapy, for example, involves, among other things, getting the youth to "put himself in the shoes" of his father and see that, from the parent's viewpoint, his action may have been motivated by kindly intentions.

These considerations are relevant to the problem of mutual understanding between social groups that come into conflict. The employer and the union leader, by virtue of their diverse social backgrounds (cf. Chapter 8), have received a very one-sided view of the opposing group. Their personal environments, the daily problems that they must solve, also tend to bring into focus aspects of reality that are loaded to favor one side against the other (Chapter 3). Finally, their motivations, both as persons and as representatives of organized groups, predispose them to see only one set of facts (Chapter 5). Thus, like the boy who gets a picture of his father as very bad and autocratic, the participants in industrial relations often have quite distorted perceptions of each other and of the situations with which they must deal.

It will be of little avail to pass Wagner Acts, Taft-Hartley Acts, or other legislation if these underlying psychological determinants of behavior are ignored. Experience has shown that both employees and employers have been rather adept at evading restrictions that they perceived as unfair and unjustified. Such frustrations lead to aggression, which comes out in forms harmful to industry and to society in general.

A frontal attack on the problem of perception is not as complicated as indicated at first glance. The two points that were noted in the illustration of the boy and his father provide us with our starting points: first, leaders need a range of experience so that they can

develop a realistic frame of reference regarding the qualities of employers, unions, and other perceived objects with which they must deal; and second, leaders need more practice in "seeing the point of view" of the other party.

Increasing the range of experience. Educational activities even in early years could do much to reduce the sharp divergences in perception revealed by such investigations as the Haire-Morrison study (p. 54). At the present time the schools introduce a knowledge of business practices at an early age; buying and selling at a profit are utilized in elementary arithmetic, and problems of domestic and foreign trade play a role in history, civics, and other social studies. No such background of experience is provided in relation to labor unions and their place in modern society. Many classes take trips to local plants and listen to employers; but on such trips it is rare for union leaders to be invited to speak to the visiting group.

Seeing the other point of view. We have noted in Chapter 10 an increasing tendency for industry to employ as foremen men who have had experience as stewards or even as local officers. This procedure is helpful because it guarantees that the man will have a wider frame of reference than if he lacked the union training. It is subject to criticism chiefly in that it tends to deprive the union of superior leadership and hence leaves the field open for men concerned primarily with expressing hostility to the company through the union.

A few ex-foremen have become union officers (see, e.g., Sayles and Strauss, 1953) but, in general, movement in this direction is rare. Management can offer so much more in the way of both economic and ego rewards that only a man exceptionally interested in group work, or disturbed by his role as an executive, is likely to make the change.

"Multiple management" schemes in which junior executives discuss top-management problems and try to work out solutions have been shown to be good training devices for helping the younger men to see the situation as top executives see it. Such schemes could well be expanded to include union officers, as indeed some companies have already done.¹ These and similar devices broaden the range of ex-

¹ An amusing but potentially serious block to such programs is illustrated by one company where the president and secretary of the local union served on this junior board. After 6 months they resigned, saying that they were afraid they would become too sympathetic to the management point of view and be less valuable to the union! Other companies have not had this problem; executives are more likely to worry about the union officials' picking up information that they can use in bargaining.

perience and increase the possibility of mutual understanding. The shortage is particularly in techniques by which managers can get the union viewpoint. For example, a psychologist addressing a group of top executives tossed in a few casual remarks about the union leader's fear of "raiding" by a rival union. Almost every one of these men found this a completely novel bit of information. It had never occurred to them that "customers" (the union members) could be lured away from one union to another. It seemed probable that they could benefit from learning much more about the problems facing the union official, and that such information might help them to understand (if not to enjoy!) some union tactics.

Much of this problem results from corporate policies in the selection of executives. Men who show any understanding of or sympathy with unionization are discriminated against; young men are chosen for induction into executive posts who fit the norm of hostility to unions. As a personnel executive, Wade Shurtleff, of the Apex Electrical Co., has commented, "The blame is too often ours. We give preference to students who give the least indication of having absorbed any understanding of unionization—we talk of the partnership which should exist between labor and management, our 'mutual' interests, and the necessity for cooperation—and then make certain we hire men who are least likely to succeed in achieving such objectives."¹

Even after the executive is familiar with business, and has achieved a high position, he may not have sufficient contact with employees to perceive accurately their feelings and interpretations of events. This degree of isolation may perhaps be inevitable, in terms of the pressure of other activities and the fact that lower-level supervision will not report unpleasant occurrences for fear that they will be blamed for these developments. A characteristic reaction was given by the president of one of the companies covered in the Illini City investigation. "When the union won the election here in the plant, we were all very much surprised. It seemed to come from nowhere. As far as we knew, there was very little interest in the union and then all of a sudden the union petitioned for an election and there was a very sizeable majority in favor of the union. We had no idea that the sentiment for the union was that strong."

Such observations indicate that social policy needs to aim at methods for increasing the range of experience at all ages and at all levels of the economic structure. Some changes are feasible within the

¹ Shurtleff (1949), p. 384. Reprinted by permission of *The Personnel Journal*.

educational system (see below). More extensive applications call for deliberate changes in corporation and union policies. Whether such changes will be made probably depends on leadership, another matter that we shall discuss below.

The role of education. It is clear from our analysis that the educational system has an important place in planning for industrial peace. We can best hope to modify perceptions through education (not necessarily by reading books). However, the schools should not teach any particular formula for peace.

Spokesmen for both industry and unions have commented on the importance of the schools. Industry has done a rather effective job of preparing propaganda material and getting it distributed through schools to pupils. Unions, with less money for fancy printing and for expert preparation, have done less well as to materials, and, of course, have found their pamphlets barred from many school systems. However, these materials, from either source, have been directed to furthering one point of view; they have not aimed at industrial peace.

This point is well-illustrated by a survey done on the campus of the University of Illinois. Several hundred students were asked to check a questionnaire regarding the teaching of labor relations in the high schools. They also filled out a short scale for attitude toward unions. Each group was shown to want to inject its own prejudices into the schools. The pro-union students thought the schools should teach points like "the brutality with which management fought unions before 1935," "how the new union member can work democratically in his union," "rights of workers to a voice in their working conditions," etc. The anti-union students preferred that the schools "teach prospective union members the waste and futility of strikes," describe "what racketeers have done in unions," reveal "failure of most unions to account for money they collect" (which, of course, would be untrue), and "how unions have become monopolies."

A psychological conception of education for industrial peace would be rather different. Perceptions are modified by experience rather than by books; it would be desirable that all young people of high school age learn something about the functional realities of industry, including unions and management, through actual experience.

Young people of all class levels need more experiences in common. In Chapter 3 we noted that, even before high school age is reached, children have begun establishing differentiated perceptions based on family income and social role. It would be desirable if, at the high school age, foundations for mutual understanding were laid in common

experiences. Not only should the wealthy boy get some conception of life as a factory worker; somehow workers' children should learn the fact that life is not entirely a bed of roses for the upper-income youngster.

Another important kind of education is that which seeks to communicate an understanding of and tolerance for difference in viewpoint. Perhaps the executive will never really learn to think like a worker, or vice versa. But learning to appreciate the fact that reality looks different to others will reduce accusations of dishonesty and stupidity, making possible the acceptance of divergent perceptions.

Education should aim at introducing experiences regarding the harmonious settlement of disputes. Our history books are full of wars but give very little attention to the peaceful negotiation of compromises. The official ideology of the schools is still individual competition; and, where there are deviations from this, as in some modern schools that stress group cooperation, we often see a kind of blind insistence on submission of the individual to the group. The constructive approach, of course, must stress the process of compromise, as between individuals and between groups, with an aim of maximizing goal achievement for all.

Finally, education can make a substantial contribution to industrial peace simply by improving mental hygiene practices and helping to develop stable, emotionally secure young people who can take leadership roles in union and management. As Halliday (1948) points out, "leadership for destruction" is a major modern problem. To the extent that able and even brilliant boys and girls come out of school full of anxieties and hostilities, unaware of their own prejudices, adept at rationalizing selfish interest as idealistic policy, and projecting blame onto others for their own shortcomings, to just that extent our schools are turning out potential leaders for destruction—and followers too.

Industrial conflict is not merely a displacement of hostilities from child-parent frustrations and other non-industrial settings. People who have not learned to recognize their own emotional tensions, or to make decisions without being dominated by unconscious, irrational emotional biases, will be dangerous when they begin to experience industrial frustrations. People who have learned constructive ways of dealing with their own emotional tensions, and those of other people, provide our greatest hope for resolving industrial conflicts in rational ways.

The problem of perception is the problem of developing ways of

looking at facts, at situations, and at people. The devices mentioned above would not, even if completely successful, end all industrial conflict. That they would have beneficial results can hardly be doubted.

THE MOTIVATIONAL PROBLEM

Realistic perceptions, based on shared frames of reference, would not necessarily end conflicts between union and management because real differences exist in motivational satisfactions to members of the two groups. Conflict develops when the parties are competing for the same goal, which is scarce. This is a common, indeed characteristic, feature of our economic system.

Competitive, individualistic behavior provides the individual with the maximum freedom from control by others. However, it often does not provide him with maximum need satisfaction. Under many conditions, cooperation with others would lead to greater rewards in terms of biologically needed goals. The chief difference between competition and cooperation as ways of satisfying motives is that cooperation will be successful only if everyone conforms rather well to group norms. Consider the extreme case of a fire in a theater. The maximum chance for everyone to escape requires that each person wait his turn, no one trying to push ahead of the others. But as soon as a few people begin to push, everyone else sees his own safety threatened, and an orderly departure turns into a panic.

The effect of individualized rewards (as in incentive payments) in breaking up cooperative behavior was demonstrated in an ingenious experiment by Mintz (1951). He had several subjects engaged in the task of pulling cones out of a small-mouthed bottle by means of an attached string. Since the cone almost filled the neck of the bottle, cooperative timing was necessary for efficient removal of the cones. If even a near tie occurred, both cones were jammed into the bottle-neck. He had many groups perform the experiment under varying instructions. Some were told that this was an experiment in group cooperation. Others were given small monetary rewards for removing their cones successfully, and fines for failing to get them out. In a series of 25 groups where no rewards or fines were involved, no "traffic jams" occurred. Each person withdrew his cone in an orderly manner, waiting for an opportunity to do so without tangling with another. There were 16 experiments involving rewards and fines. Of these, 11 developed serious jams at the exit. Mintz concludes

that, whenever the situation is perceived as one in which cooperation will lead to reward, most people will cooperate. If, however, the situation changes, so that cooperation seems likely to lead to punishment, most people will shift to competitive, self-seeking activities.

One important caution needs to be emphasized in this connection. Mintz was dealing with groups that had no friendship ties binding the members together. Cooperative behavior is facilitated when conformity to group norms is motivated by a feeling of loyalty to the group and attachment to the other members. Thus, military panics are more common among green troops who do not know each other well; they are rare among units where the soldiers have developed close friendships and high group morale. Group norms may survive considerable pressure if strong social motives reinforce them; but norms may be abandoned in fragmented groups where little mutual attachment exists.

If we attempt to apply this kind of reasoning to union-management relations, we note first of all the problem of reward and punishment. Industrial production needs cooperative behavior. But, if workers perceive a probability of insecurity (layoffs, wage cuts) as a result of cooperating with management to speed up production, they will not cooperate. This underscores the importance, in Scanlon-plan contracts, of guarantees as to job security and wage rates.

Secondly, we note the importance of group unity. Norms of cooperative behavior are maintained and reinforced if the group is unified. This applies both within the employee group and within the "establishment group" which includes employees and executives. Activities and programs which facilitate the formation of such groups will therefore facilitate cooperative behavior.

We have noted in earlier pages the problem posed for such group unity by wide differences in goal achievement of executives and employees. The difficulty is not insurmountable, but it is serious. As the SSRC memorandum noted, cooperation is facilitated when goals are achieved in relatively equal amounts. This would suggest that relative balance of power between union and management may be a condition favorable to industrial peace. Observation tends to support this notion, but the data are not extensive enough to justify high confidence.

THE PROBLEM OF FRUSTRATIONS

The other facet of the motivational problem is the problem of individual frustration. Groups form when individuals have common

frustrations, and a major function of the union is to provide a safe channel for the expression of hostility. As we pointed out in Chapter 6, most of these frustrations derive from real or perceived characteristics of the work situation. Industrial aggression is not simply a displacement of neurotic hostilities generated in the family or in imaginary frustrations. Some people with a smattering of psychological terminology have become enamored of the idea that all strikes are simply infantile temper tantrums. This view is simply not defensible. We do not question the fact that in some instances individual workers perceive their foremen as father images or that executives may show neurotic aggression based on guilt feelings derived from family conflicts. The evidence is clear: these exceptional cases do not explain mass events. At most the neurotically hostile worker may serve as a nucleus for union organizations, or as a trigger for widespread frustrations. The role of the neurotic executive can, of course, be somewhat more important. By virtue of his power position, the compulsive, dictatorial, or sadistic manager can impose very real frustrations on employees. They may include ego-deflating treatment, economic discrimination, excessive work standards, and blindness to worker needs. In this case the aggressive outbursts of the workers must be considered as realistically determined in relation to their own work environment.

The institutionalized patterns of authority relations, however, produce plenty of frustrations and consequent aggression, without reference to any abnormal condition of the executive's personality. Ordinary operating routines forbid the rank-and-file worker any self-expression. The resulting attitudes are sometimes extremely costly. Workers damage machinery, waste materials, and permit other economic losses to occur which they have the intelligence and skill to prevent. In some cases it is because of poor leadership—as in the case of the foreman who told the worker, "I'll do the thinking around here—you just do your job as you're told." In other cases the poor attitude of the worker is a thinly disguised expression of hostility, based on the multiple frustrations which are only too common in modern industry. Workers' attitudes, perceptions, motives, frustrations, and hostilities are indeed important to industry and to our society.

A constructive approach to the problems indicated will not be achieved by scolding, nor will it result from pep talks and slick company propaganda. It may get a "shot in the arm" from union-management cooperation of the type described in the preceding chapter. But permanent results will be achieved only if the approach is based on an honest attempt to remove the frustrations that a psychological analysis indicates to be basic. Many of the so-called "solutions" to

industrial conflict make about as much sense as rubbing a soothing salve on a skin cancer. It may cover up the symptoms, but it doesn't make any headway in curing the disease.

Aggression and counteraggression. The vicious circle that is so often found contaminating industrial relations is the circle of aggression and counteraggression. When a man encounters a frustration, his most probable response is one of aggression. But the industrial situation being what it is, his aggressive behavior will probably have a frustrating effect on the opposite party. His indifference to job requirements is an aggressive response to arbitrary authority. "If the boss thinks he's so smart, I'll show him." But the employee's action, in turn, is a frustration to his superior. The latter's response is likely to take the form of tighter discipline, still more arbitrary authority, and so on. This action evokes an even higher level of employee resistance, covert sabotage or overt rebellion.

We have pointed out elsewhere (pp. 111, 191) that the addition of new barriers and new threats to a situation increases tension. Such tension may result in the employee's departure from the field (quitting the job, ignoring orders) or in efforts to break the barriers and neutralize the threats to which he is exposed. His efforts threaten the executive, who becomes still more defensive and rigid. The frustrated executive denounces the union; irritated unionists attack business. We cannot resolve this problem by clamping rigid controls on either side; such action will only exacerbate the frustration-aggression cycle. We must somehow get out of this vicious circle by getting at the independent variables that nourish it and keep it going.

A floor under satisfactions. This analysis suggests that one of the long-range measures calculated to increase the chances of industrial peace must relate to frustrations. If we can put a ceiling on frustrations, or a floor under satisfactions, we can limit the range within which aggressions are likely to be aroused in a large number of employees simultaneously.

Steps have, of course, been taken in this direction already. The minimum wage law is an institutional modification which tends to eliminate certain extreme kinds of economic frustration. The application of this law is at present restricted, but there is every reason to believe that it will be extended. Similarly, old-age security, unemployment compensation, and sickness insurance have guaranteed certain minima of goal achievement and protected employees against many hazards beyond the control of the individual.

As guarantees are provided for more and more of the purely biological or economic satisfactions, the most pressing area becomes

the area of ego satisfactions. To some extent, of course, this problem has been met by the sense of power employees derive from belonging to a union. However, if union membership is coupled with continuing ego frustrations resulting from bad human relations practices, the union may be merely a channel for aggression rather than a source of satisfaction in itself. On the other hand, if management continues to improve and expand human relations training, unnecessary frustrations can be avoided in day-to-day operations; a decrease in the frustration level should lead to decreasing tension on all sides.

The fallacy of focusing exclusively upon the institutional side of union-management relations, without considering these ego frustrations, is illustrated in British experience. Joint consultation (rather similar to the labor-management committees described in Chapter 14) has been instituted in many British industries as a means of increasing mutual understanding and joint decision making. Undoubtedly better relations between top executives and union leaders have resulted. However, in some instances it seems to have increased the frequency of wildcat strikes. One hypothesis regarding this situation is that the contrast between democracy in the committee room and autocracy on the plant floor merely makes the ego frustrations in the latter context more irritating. Scott (1952), in the course of an analysis of joint consultation, suggests that ". . . so far as rank and file are concerned, *the institution of joint consultation between higher management and employee representatives has probably increased their dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regime which they experience on the shop floor.*"¹

The demand for more democracy probably grows as it is practiced. The introduction of democratic concepts into the family, the school, and political institutions arouses expectations that carry over into the factory. "The American dream" of equality of worker and boss lays a poor foundation for industrial autocracy. Widespread public education, too, with increasing sense of individuality and self-worth, fosters demands for greater ego satisfactions. Since industry cannot turn the clock back on these other institutional changes, the only wise solution seems to lie in developing democratic techniques of leadership, providing real participation (not shams) for rank-and-file employees, and providing praise and recognition for a job well-done. These recommendations do not seem excessively difficult, but, if put into practice, they could contribute substantially to reduction of frustrations and aggressions.

¹ Scott (1952), pp. 150-151.

GROUP AFFILIATIONS AND LOYALTIES

In the SSRC analysis of group competition and cooperation, one major point related to affiliations and loyalties. If there are friendships and associations that cut across the boundary between the two groups, cooperation is favored. If such affiliations exist only within each group, not between groups, competition and conflict are more probable.

Marshall (1945) has pointed out that informal, friendship groups have a different relationship to the work process from that of earlier stages in our civilization. In an agrarian society, plowing, sowing, and harvesting were group activities, and the pressure of the group was brought to bear against any slacker who wished to enjoy without labor. Today the groups that exercise such functions are more likely to be organized around leisure-time activities—bowling, hunting, fraternal lodges, etc. To the extent that informal groups function at the work place, they more often hold back rather than press for greater effort. The motivational and perceptual bases for this phenomenon have been examined elsewhere (Chapters 7, 10). We need not repeat them here.

The establishment group. Two possible approaches would utilize the principle of group formation to mitigate industrial conflict. One would attempt to develop the "establishment group," having members made up of both employees and executives. Labor-management committees might provide such a group. Another approach would be to develop groups focused around other activities, but cutting across economic status lines, so that both executives and workers would experience common membership norms and would see themselves working together for common goals.

The problem of establishing contacts between union and management representatives as individuals has been discussed many times. Some of the measures previously suggested in this volume, particularly in Chapter 14, derive part of their value from the increasing contact and mutual understanding that can be expected to develop.

It must be recognized, on the other hand, that close friendships between union leaders and company officials will be looked upon with suspicion by rank-and-file employees unless they, too, have some reason to develop confidence in management. In other words, a solution that relies too much on friendships at the top is not dependable. It is also doubtful that mere friendship, apart from group affiliations representing more significant pressures, is enough.

Other groups. The presence of common group norms, relating to membership in groups other than union and management, makes for more rapid mutual understanding and for greater resistance to open

conflict. It is thus unfortunate, for example, that so much of the top leadership in industry has been recruited from the old "Yankee" protestant groups, whereas union leadership has come mostly from minority ethnic and religious backgrounds. It is equally unfortunate that, aside from the nation, there are so few groups in which unionists and executives can pursue common goals jointly. If there were, for example, strong consumer groups, these could provide a common interest. Both executive and employee in one industry are consumers for many others. They could pursue economic benefits through such organizations and build common norms that would influence their behavior in their roles within their own industry.

At present the only group through which both executive and employee can pursue a common goal is the nation, and we know, of course, that during World War II labor disputes did fall to a small fraction of immediate prewar levels. Both German Nazis and Russian Communists beat the drums insistently for national patriotism to hold down labor disputes. The attempt to induce the workers to submit to a program of "guns, not butter" necessarily sets off conflicts. The appeal to abandon labor-management conflict is based on national unity. (Unions in the United States are often more than slightly suspicious of "100 per cent patriots" whose conception of uniting the nation looks very much like the totalitarian unity of Germany and Russia.)

A constructive approach to this problem which by-passes the technique of heightened nationalism involves the building of effective groups across management-labor lines at the local level, working on plant or community problems. This approach means genuine face-to-face communication between high-level executives and production workers. It means working together jointly on problems of mutual interest. It means real participation by lower levels in planning, not simply in taking orders. Groups develop when people solve common problems and achieve satisfaction for their motives through cooperative effort. When this happens, norms will evolve which will provide the essential foundation for industrial arbitration. The task of the arbiter then will be limited to ascertaining whether a violation of norms has occurred; he will not be expected to impose new codes of behavior upon executives and workers.

THE INSTITUTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

A long-range program for industrial peace has three major components: the perceptual approach, the motivational approach, and the institutional approach. These are not separate in any but a logical sense. It has been necessary for us, in the preceding pages, to antici-

pate some of the comments on institutional rules and forms that would be appropriate here.

A solution to the perceptual problem might bring about a high level of mutual understanding among union leaders, executives, and employees. Awareness of common goals and of the value of cooperation likewise need not result in abolition of conflict. To take an example from outside the industrial area, we note that the members of the government of the United States might understand the needs, wants, and perceptions of their opposite numbers in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics quite thoroughly, and might see the economic and social advantages of cooperation. It is even conceivable that this would also be true in Moscow—understanding and recognition of the value of cooperation—with little or no diminution of conflict between these nations. The realities of power distribution, the institutional forms within which our society operates, would still set off anxiety and aggressive behavior.

The conflicts of interest that channel the personal motives of unionist and executive are by no means so deep, and apparently not so irreconcilable, as those of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Furthermore, there is some sign of developing common norms and loyalties. The studies of dual allegiance (see pp. 400-403) indicate that many individuals on varying levels of the industrial hierarchy are psychologically ready to accept a solution that calls for the co-existence of company and union. The logical extension of this co-existence is an institutional formulation that allows for conflict under orderly conditions and within the limiting framework of the larger society (the nation or some international order.)

On the other hand, our findings clearly indicate that the limitations imposed from the larger society must be perceived as tolerable by both sides, and the degree of motivational satisfaction and outlets for frustration must be reasonably equated. In the absence of such perceived fairness, conflicts of motives—and indeed, conflicts of perceptions—can lead to aggression, open violence, and the rejection of the authority symbols of society. This conflict creates a situation of civil war, as opposed to the adjudication of differences under law. The laws, in other words, must be fundamentally acceptable to the parties concerned. Police action can be used to enforce laws against a small minority of the population; when any large segment rejects a legal restriction, either the law falls or the society splits (cf. slavery legislation in the 1850's, the Prohibition Amendment in the 1920's).

The conflicts of economic interest between employers and em-

ployees are considerably easier of solution than conflicts related to dominance. "Making a bigger pie" provides at least a temporary resolution of the economic divergence. There is no way in which a bigger power total can be contrived, so that more can be given to employees without subtracting any from the employers.

It might be fruitful at this point to recall the often-quoted but rarely understood epigram by Lord Acton: "Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." This epigram is generally employed as a weapon: by businessmen against power-seeking union leaders, and by unionists against autocratically oriented industrial executives. But the epigram can also provide a guide for action. As Kenneth Boulding (1953) has succinctly phrased it, "If it is true that power corrupts, one of the objects of social organization should be to distribute power widely in society so that nobody has so much that he is corrupted by it!"¹

It is generally believed that power did corrupt the American capitalists of the late nineteenth century, and that the famous quotation, "the public be damned," did more or less accurately reflect prevailing attitudes of leading industrialists. That power has been whittled down by anti-trust legislation, by threats of political control, and by the growth of an opposing power center in the unions.

Some union leaders have also evinced a "public be damned" attitude. To call a coal strike in midwinter is undoubtedly good bargaining tactics from the UMW point of view, but it inflicts too much hardship on individuals who are neither employers nor employees in the coal industry. The same kind of tactic has also been utilized by other unions.

We have noted elsewhere that the distribution of power between the employer and the individual employee is extremely unequal. The labor union represents an attempt to equalize this power distribution to some extent, and it is actually true, at present, that our society depends chiefly on unions to prevent industrial leaders from being corrupted by too much power. And to keep union officials from being corrupted, we rely on management. Such a balance of power may serve to protect the interests of the consumer and the innocent bystander. On the other hand, it would be fairly easy for the two opponents to join forces and get a great deal more power, at the expense of other portions of the population. This problem is not immediately pressing in all sectors of industry or in all parts of the

¹ Boulding (1953), p. 12.

country; however, the trend is one that merits serious consideration.¹

As a corrective to misuse of power by management, by union, or by collaboration between them, we have relied upon governmental force. But this reliance as we have seen, has not been too successful, and has in itself other dangers, inasmuch as modern centralized government is already within reach of corruption from too much power.

Ordway Tead (1942) has suggested that an institutional redistribution of power, with consequent lessening of the danger of corruption of either executive or unionists, might be achieved by the formal establishment of industry councils, tripartite in character, with consumers represented as the third party. Unfortunately, he proposes no method by which economic power could be placed in the hands of the consumers' representative, and it is hardly likely that the consumer could affect the outcome of quarrels between management and union unless he too were organized in such a way as to wield some power of reward and punishment as regards the parties to the dispute. Up to the present time, such organizations have been too weak to be effective in this role. "The democratic potential is not likely to be realized if one significant pressure interest is organized and the other is not."² Nor can a third party be effective as a democratizing influence without organization.

This problem of devising new institutional patterns that will decentralize power without disrupting our economic structure is highly important. Most of us would probably agree, if pressed, that avoiding excessive power concentration is more important than automobile or refrigerator production. And it seems likely that, if effort and ingenuity are applied to the task, solutions can be devised that will distribute power without loss of production. Indeed, the evidence from the Scanlon-plan contracts suggests that diffusion of power can actually increase productivity by releasing individual energies formerly held back from production.

SOCIAL THERAPY

Implicit in the foregoing is the notion that the social scientist has a responsibility to society, to the "public interest" in some form, by

¹ An institutional reform which would put the force of government behind such a balance of power is the proposal for *codetermination* which has been incorporated in labor legislation in West Germany and is being discussed in the United States. Codetermination obviously offers opportunities for the development of group affiliations and group norms, but it is subject to the power criticism noted above—i.e., that it may lead to collaboration against the consumer.

² Edelman (1950), p. 59.

helping in the resolution of industrial conflicts. Just as international warfare destroys values that social scientists hold dear, so on a smaller scale does industrial warfare. And if psychologists can help in resolving individual conflicts through therapy, to achieve happier, more productive lives, might not social therapy similarly operate to improve the condition of our society?

The question, of course, supplies its own answer. The social scientist does have an obligation to devise programs of social therapy. But two cautions are in order. The first is that society is not an organism, and techniques developed for individual therapy cannot automatically be applied to the solution of group conflicts. The second is that social therapy should not be confused with a program by which people are manipulated by experts on behalf of groups to which they do not belong, for the achievement of goals which are not their own. In other words, as Jaques (1947) pointed out, the social scientist should not attempt to *do things to people*, but rather should *do things with people*. The shift in emphasis connotes a shift from technocracy to democracy, from manipulation to cooperation.

The task of the therapist in an individual relationship is to help his client to develop awareness of unconscious factors determining his behavior, and achieve a realistic perception of his situation. Reason cannot operate to solve problems when certain facts are buried by repression, or blocked from awareness by an emotional attitude that prevents them from being learned. New and constructive solutions to problems become possible when all the relevant facts can be consciously considered.

The role of the social therapist is somewhat analogous to the following. He needs to break down barriers to communication between groups, so that information needed for problem solving is readily available. He must help people to "see" certain facts that are not readily observable, such as the motives and frustrations that provide the dynamics for other people's behavior. He may encourage release of emotional tension under conditions where it is safe to do so, and help individuals to achieve feelings of security so that they are no longer threatened to an excessive extent by the existence of rival power groups. To some extent, as Carl Rogers (1948) has noted, the concepts and techniques of individual therapy can be translated to serve these functions. But a brief glance backward through the earlier portions of this chapter indicates that many of the steps that seem to be essential if we are to move toward industrial peace cannot be fostered by such methods. The therapist can work with an individual client because the client comes to him for help. The client knows he

has a problem, and he recognizes in some degree the fact that he himself must change. In so far as his own emotions and perceptions are involved, he can change as therapy proceeds. (He is, of course, hampered in greater or less degree by environmental frustrations.)

The group conflict situation has some major differences. In the first place, although both executives and union leaders agree that "strikes are bad," each tends to blame the other rather than accepting any responsibility or need to change himself. Secondly, both the manager and the unionist are to some extent prisoners of the institutional framework within which they operate. Certain policies are imposed upon them by their social roles. And in the background are punishments for deviation; the union officer, for example, who becomes "too cooperative" with the company may cease to be a union leader very suddenly.

To the extent that the social scientist comes into an industrial conflict situation rather than participating in it, he is an outsider. Specifically, he is sharply limited in the extent to which he can initiate change in the variables that are most significant, such as channels of communication, structures of interaction between union and management, the formulation and execution of policy. The social therapist, therefore, may be able to render valuable assistance, but the major role in any movement toward industrial peace must be played by individuals within the establishment.

NEEDED: LEADERSHIP

So we conclude on a point which has long been recognized, but one which is true though trite. The real chance of industrial peace depends on the kind of leadership that we get within management and within unions. The leader can structure a situation for his followers. He can make information available to them and help them achieve their goals. He can provide outlets for emotional tension and direct their behavior into constructive or into destructive channels, within rather broad limits.

There are good reasons for believing that the chief need here is for mature, constructive leaders on the management side. Institutionally, managers have power and freedom of action to a degree not possible to the union leader. A top executive who decides to adopt a cooperative policy runs no risk of losing his job, whereas a top union official who deviates too far from the policy of his members will be thrown out of office. As we noted in Chapter 12, the attitudes of top execu-

tives have a profound influence on the course of the accommodation process.

In terms of social expectancies, the company official should take the lead, and, in terms of managerial ideology, he should show initiative in developing constructive solutions to problems. Many company spokesmen hold that industrial peace is up to management. Mr. A. A. Low, retiring from his post as Vice-President of Consolidated Edison Company in New York, where he had handled industrial relations, stated: "As a rule, I believe that companies can get along with labor if they want to get along. Of course, this is not always true. Sometimes, especially when it is young, a union is likely to be belligerent, but usually *the choice is up to management on whether there will be war or peace.*"¹

Industrial peace is not a Utopian dream. But it cannot be achieved by sticking blindly to traditional rules of conduct, nor can it be attained by glossing over and denying the facts of conflict. Indeed, the refusal to face facts usually increase conflict. Failure of communication and lack of perception result in an inaccurate view of the situation. This sets off behavior that is inappropriate, and friction and aggression follow.

The successful leader must have intelligence and information. He must be able to perceive all the relevant facts in the situation, including the attitudes and motives that are effective within his own group, and within the opposition. He must be able to assess the possibility that a strike will occur if a given course is followed, and whether the risk is rational, rather than an acting of irrational hostility. Thus, not all strikes are irrational. Sometimes a strike may be the only way of finding out how intense certain needs are, or how strong the resistance is.

Above all, the successful leader needs emotional maturity. If he feels a need to punish disobedient subordinates simply because they challenge his authority, or clings to traditional procedures because he feels insecure when he tries any new operation, he cannot fulfill this assignment. Understanding and insight with respect to himself, and with respect to others, are essential. Perhaps this is a large order, but there must be many men in leadership positions in American industry who can take constructive roles in planning for industrial peace.

¹ *New York Times*, August 1, 1954, p. 72. Italics are ours.

IN CONCLUSION

We have tried to develop a picture of man adapting to an economic institution. He seeks to establish a favorable equilibrium, and to protect it against disturbance. He acts in terms of the facts as he sees them, in pursuit of values as he sees them. In terms of this analysis, industrial conflict is not at all an abnormal manifestation; the man is behaving normally in relation to the situation as it looks to him.

Adaptive behavior calls for control over the physical environment, by learning the properties of objects and setting up procedures for living with them. Man cannot change natural laws; he can only learn to get along with them.

Adaptation in society calls for control over social conflicts by learning the characteristics of human beings and human groups. We must think as realistically about people as we do about electrons. We cannot change psychological laws, but we can learn to live with them. The emergence of a new and more favorable social equilibrium, a state of accommodation in which group conflicts are resolved with a minimum of waste and aggression, will be the reward. From industrial conflict to industrial cooperation is the step now before us.

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¹ All these references have been considered in preparing this volume, but some of them are not mentioned in the text. They are included here for the convenience of those who may wish to make a more detailed study of the literature on some specific problem.

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
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